Killing of Arouri Sends Menacing Message to Hamas Chiefs, May Hamper Truce Effort

Hezbollah affiliated civil defense member sprays water at a damaged site in the aftermath of what security sources said was an Israeli drone strike in Beirut's southern suburbs of Dahiyeh, Lebanon January 3, 2024. (Reuters)
Hezbollah affiliated civil defense member sprays water at a damaged site in the aftermath of what security sources said was an Israeli drone strike in Beirut's southern suburbs of Dahiyeh, Lebanon January 3, 2024. (Reuters)
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Killing of Arouri Sends Menacing Message to Hamas Chiefs, May Hamper Truce Effort

Hezbollah affiliated civil defense member sprays water at a damaged site in the aftermath of what security sources said was an Israeli drone strike in Beirut's southern suburbs of Dahiyeh, Lebanon January 3, 2024. (Reuters)
Hezbollah affiliated civil defense member sprays water at a damaged site in the aftermath of what security sources said was an Israeli drone strike in Beirut's southern suburbs of Dahiyeh, Lebanon January 3, 2024. (Reuters)

The killing of a Hamas chief in Lebanon removes a big name from Israel’s most-wanted list but could drive the Palestinian group's exiled leaders deeper into hiding, hampering efforts to negotiate further Gaza ceasefires and hostage releases.

Hamas deputy leader Saleh al-Arouri was struck down by a drone in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the stronghold of Hamas' Iranian-backed Lebanese ally Hezbollah, in an attack widely attributed to Hamas' sworn foe Israel.

Israel has not confirmed or denied a role, but the attack came a month after Israeli broadcaster Kan aired a recording of the head of Israel's domestic security agency Shin Bet vowing to hunt down Hamas in Lebanon, Türkiye and Qatar even if it took years.

On Wednesday, Israel's Mossad spy chief David Barnea said he was committed to "settling the score" with Hamas.

Arouri's killing, said Ashraf Abouelhoul, managing editor of Egypt's Al-Ahram daily and an expert in Palestinian affairs, "may push Hamas to harden its stance so it doesn’t look as if it is bowing under pressures or threats of more assassination."

The stakes are high both for the two million Palestinians trying to survive Israeli bombardment in Gaza and for Israeli hostages held there by Hamas, ruler of the coastal territory and like Hezbollah.

Hamas negotiators including Arouri had been in Qatar-mediated talks with Israel over a possible further ceasefire in the war and prospects for further releases of Israeli hostages.

As recently as the past week the two sides were having discussions with Qatari mediators on a truce and hostages, a source familiar with the talks said, indicating a period when the Arouri strike may have been in final stages of preparation.

Security concerns may now complicate matters, analysts said.

Mohanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, said that in recent years Palestinian groups operating in Lebanon, where Hezbollah is a powerful player, had become used to a measure of security. Hamas needed to be far more cautious now, he added.

'Open battle’

Such groups, he said, had been "happy with the arrangements in place – some quiet and stability and some sort of deterrence by Hezbollah. This has flown out of the window, given Oct. 7 and the conflict in south Lebanon and how things are going forward."

Arouri, 57, was the first senior Hamas political leader to be assassinated outside the Palestinian territories since Israel vowed to eliminate the group following its Oct.7 rampage, when it killed 1,200 people and took 240 hostages back to Gaza.

The loss of a top figure could now prompt Hamas to take a tougher line against Israel, currently waging a shattering air and ground offensive against the group, analysts told Reuters.

The extent of any change in Hamas' stance remains unclear.

Hussam Badran, a Hamas political leader in exile, reacted defiantly to Arouri's death by saying: "We tell the criminal occupation (Israel) that the battle between us and them is open.”

However, Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri said that while Arouri's death "will have its consequences", Hamas' position remained that provided Israel fully stopped its attacks then the group would be open to talks "on all other issues".

Arouri's assassination may also widen the Gaza war to new territory in Lebanon, marking the first strike on Beirut after nearly three months of cross-border shelling between Hezbollah and Israel that had been limited to southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah will come under pressure to exact revenge for its ally, especially since he was killed in the group's Beirut stronghold Dahiyeh, the analysts said.

Three Iranian insiders closely connected to Tehran's hardline clerical establishment said the killing had raised concerns among Iranian leaders that Israel could be trying to widen the conflict by dragging in Iran.

"His assassination shocked everyone in Tehran. However, it does not mean that Tehran will get involved in the conflict directly, though apparently this is the main goal of the Zionist regime's leaders," said one of the insiders.

Within hours of the killing, however, an Israeli official signaled Israel wanted to avoid escalation, even as he insisted Israel had not taken responsibility for the attack.

Caution in Lebanon

Speaking to MSNBC, the official, Mark Regev, an adviser to Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, described the attack as a "surgical strike against the Hamas leadership" and not an attack on the Lebanese state or Hezbollah.

Whatever its eventual impact on regional stability, Arouri's death is highly likely to make other Hamas leaders more cautious about their whereabouts. In Gaza, no Hamas leader has been seen since the Oct. 7 killing spree. Many are believed to be hiding in deep underground tunnels.

For decades, the long arm of Israel's Mossad intelligence service has encouraged Palestinian opponents to live in the shadows to avoid assassination.

Israel's responded to the 1972 killing of 11 Israeli Olympic team members at the Munich games with an assassination campaign against operatives and organizers of the Black September Palestinian group over several years and in several countries.

Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal survived a 1997 assassination attempt by Israeli Mossad agents in Jordan.

In Lebanon, some Hamas officials have appeared regularly in recent months to deliver press statements. But Arouri and others more involved in strategic affairs have avoided the limelight.

Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Khaled Meshaal are expected to stay in Türkiye, a heavyweight regional power, and Qatar, an active diplomatic player, two countries Israel will not want to antagonize.

Türkiye has repeatedly warned Israel to stay away from Hamas members on Turkish soil. On Tuesday, before Arouri's killing, Turkish authorities detained 34 people suspected of links to Mossad and of planning to attack Palestinians living in Türkiye.



Why and How Did al-Kadhimi Return to Baghdad?

Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)
Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)
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Why and How Did al-Kadhimi Return to Baghdad?

Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)
Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)

Mustafa al-Kadhimi, the former Prime Minister of Iraq, arrived in Baghdad last Tuesday aboard a private jet. He was greeted by a security detail typically assigned by the government to former heads of state, a scene that would have been unimaginable for an Iraqi politician who faced widespread persecution for two years.

A political faction had wanted al-Kadhimi to leave Baghdad after a drone strike targeted his home in November 2021. He formally left the capital in late 2022 after a broad alliance, including political parties, judicial and governmental institutions, and activists, united to force him out of the public arena and effectively push him into exile.

The first image of al-Kadhimi, shaking hands with a security officer near his home in the Green Zone, offers a powerful snapshot of the changes unfolding in Iraq today. It also hints at the future of the country amidst a Middle East in the midst of unprecedented turmoil.

There are growing speculations surrounding the circumstances of al-Kadhimi’s return, with close associates suggesting it followed a “special invitation” to assist the Coordination Framework alliance in tackling an emerging crisis ahead of a potential second term for Donald Trump.

Critics of both the Framework and al-Kadhimi view this as further evidence of his knack for “saving the deep state.”

Did al-Kadhimi return to aid those who stripped him of the opportunity to remain secure in the public sphere, or is he seeking to help himself and his political agenda at a “golden moment”?

A newly appointed advisor to al-Kadhimi said: “The region is undergoing dangerous transformations that will affect Iraq, and all politicians must contribute to mitigating these risks.”

Meanwhile, politicians within the Coordination Framework commented: “Something will happen within the next two months... something for which the current Framework structure has no antidote.”

This answer offers little clarity about what transpired since the fall of 2022 and how the Coordination Framework and its media apparatus relentlessly targeted al-Kadhimi’s government. Now, he returns, with the political system pinning its hopes on him at a critical juncture.

“Recharging Phones”

Before al-Kadhimi’s return, signs emerged suggesting Baghdad had lost its ability to connect with key US decision-making circles, and to some extent, with its immediate regional surroundings.

Since the Democrats left their posts at the US State Department, the government of Prime Minister Mohamed Shia al-Sudani has struggled to find a single Republican willing to answer the phone.

Reports indicate that a team assigned to revive communications with the Trump administration failed to establish a reliable channel, aside from ceremonial meetings with individuals uninterested in Iraq’s concerns.

The “loss of connection,” a term used by three senior figures in the government and one of the ruling parties, was underscored on November 13, when Sudani attended the Munich Security Conference without securing any meeting with an American official present at the event.

This communication breakdown coincided with a series of “unfriendly” US messages, frequently relayed by Republican Congressman Joe Wilson and US Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs Adam Boehler.

Iraqi politicians suggest that the “deep state” sees al-Kadhimi as “the man capable of recharging the dead phones,” and potentially rescuing both al-Sudani and the Coordination Framework.

“No one knows if he’s willing to provide this service for free, or if he’ll offer it at any cost,” said a politician who opposed al-Kadhimi during his tenure as prime minister.

The Nightmare of Sanctions

The prospect of a second term for Trump brings a team that holds little affection for leaders in the Coordination Framework, ministers in the government, and officials in the judiciary.

Among them is the new National Security Advisor, Michael Waltz, who has consistently seized opportunities to attack Baghdad, accusing it of “surrendering itself to Tehran.”

In Baghdad, there is a strong belief that the Republican team will not hesitate to act on Iraq once it finishes with Gaza and the war in Ukraine. The least that comes to the minds of Iraqi politicians, many of whom are disliked by Waltz, is that they will one day find their names on a sanctions list.

“Why not try al-Kadhimi’s formula, which gave Washington the confidence of a balance between it and the Iranians?” say many in Shiite parties, anxious about what lies ahead. Their list of speculations starts with sanctions on influential Shiites and ends with the potential for Trump to block the dollar.

Does al-Kadhimi possess these exceptional abilities that would make him a "steel dome," as some politicians in Baghdad envision him, now dreaming of discovering a way to protect them from a possible American storm?

“A Known Figure”

How did the Iraqi government end up in a political deadlock? Prominent politicians in the Coordination Framework offer explanations, often converging on the Syrian file. Iraq struggled to understand the new regional political philosophy and faced difficulties in shifting away from the rules of “Al-Aqsa Flood” to the post-Assad era.

“Since Trump doesn't think much about Iraq,” says David Schenker, the former US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Washington will not engage in healthy relations with Iraq unless it aligns sufficiently with the changes in its surrounding environment.

Even among circles close to the religious establishment in Najaf, views are emerging that reflect an understanding of Iraq’s lost political position—one that sees the regime as a vital part of the Arab movement on regional issues.

Interestingly, this is all happening without any response from Tehran.

“Not because it has abandoned the Iraqi file, or is unable to influence it,” says a source familiar with the discussions surrounding al-Kadhimi’s return.

The source adds that “Tehran needs to revive Baghdad, which is reaching a dead end in foreign policy and losing vitality in its dealings with the region and the West,” though it remains unclear whether al-Kadhimi’s return is linked to this climate.

Despite a generally positive view of al-Kadhimi's tenure, many criticize al-Sudani for his delayed efforts to adapt to the region’s tumultuous changes. It was difficult to remain in the same place while a seismic shift occurred in Syria and a storm raged in Lebanon.

What role does al-Kadhimi play? Most likely, he seized the “golden opportunity.”

He sees himself as the person capable of quickly adapting to a changing Middle East, with a solid communication channel to the Arab world and experience in balancing regional dynamics.

Iraqi politicians argue that Trump’s era and the new Middle East will impose a new political equation in Baghdad, one that demands a person who can be a “reliable partner” in Arab decision-making circles to be recognized by the Americans.

For this reason, al-Kadhimi has secured his return ticket to the competitive arena—this time, not with slogans of “resistance,” but with a focus on integration into the new order.

Liberal Shiites

Al-Kadhimi’s return was preceded by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s announcement of a new alliance, and by the activities of Adnan al-Zurfi, a former candidate for the premiership whose nomination was opposed by armed factions.

Together, these elements form a growing context for the search for liberal Shiites offering a fresh alternative.

Those who favor this scenario and promote it as “the only solution” argue that Syria, under Ahmed al-Sharaa, Lebanon under Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam, are missing Iraq—a country led by liberal Shiites who know how to balance relations between Washington and Tehran without tipping the scale.

Al-Kadhimi found his way back to Baghdad after the alliance that had relentlessly targeted him crumbled.

The Coordination Framework is no longer the same as it was in 2022. Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law coalition, is searching for ways to rein in al-Sudani, while the armed factions are working hard to carve out new positions that free them from the burden of “uniting the arenas.”

Meanwhile, Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, is experimenting with silence—a stance he typically avoids, especially in an election year.

Al-Kadhimi senses that all of these figures now welcome his presence in Baghdad.

They seek from him a “good reputation” for Iraq—one that does not require drastic changes to align with the new dynamics in Syria and Lebanon. The question remains: will he offer this service for free?