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The Stuxnet Mystery... Dutch Engineer Disrupted Iranian Uranium Enrichment

Natanz nuclear facility, 322 kilometers south of Tehran (AP)
Natanz nuclear facility, 322 kilometers south of Tehran (AP)
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The Stuxnet Mystery... Dutch Engineer Disrupted Iranian Uranium Enrichment

Natanz nuclear facility, 322 kilometers south of Tehran (AP)
Natanz nuclear facility, 322 kilometers south of Tehran (AP)

Sixteen years after the largest operation targeting the Iranian nuclear program, a new investigative report by a Dutch newspaper revealed the identity of the agent who introduced the “Stuxnet” computer worm to the main uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, central Iran, in a process that took years of cooperation between the United States and Israel.
Washington and Tel Aviv developed the Stuxnet virus, which was discovered in 2010, after it was used to strike the Natanz facility, in the first attack of its kind on industrial equipment. Iranian officials said at the time that the virus had infected the Bushehr nuclear station, which overlooks the Arabian Gulf.
The virus is a malicious computer program that attacks widely used industrial control systems produced by the German company Siemens AG, and exploits security vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Windows operating system. Experts say that the virus could be used for espionage or sabotage.
Years after the attack that disrupted the Iranian nuclear program and caused tension between Tehran and the West, De Volkskrant revealed the details of the access of American and Israeli intelligence to the heavily fortified facility, after a Dutch engineer succeeded in introducing equipment contaminated with the virus into the lifeline of Natanz, and installing it on water pumps.
According to the investigation published by De Volkskrant, Dutch Engineer Erik van Sabben, an agent of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), succeeded in reaching the Natanz facility, to carry out the secret operation that was preceded by years of preparation and cooperation between the CIA, the Israeli Mossad, at a cost of one billion dollars.
The investigation stated that the engineer carried out an extremely risky mission in Iran, by infiltrating the Natanz facility in 2007, where he installed contaminated devices and equipment. The results of the largest major blow to the Iranian nuclear weapons program emerged eight months after the equipment was fixed, causing the disruption of a thousand central devices within the facility.
Van Sabben, a civil engineer by profession, died in a motorbike crash near his home in Dubai two years after the operation.
According to the newspaper, the Dutch engineer, who is married to an Iranian woman, worked for a transport company in Dubai, and traveled several times to Iran. The company said it had previously sent spare parts to Iran’s oil and gas industry, but was not aware of the secret activities of its employee.
His death raised questions among the Dutch intelligence service, and fears that it was linked to his secret activities in Iran.
The two-year investigation was based on the testimonies of 43 people, 19 of whom were from the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), and former employees of the Mossad, the Israeli Military Intelligence Service (Aman), and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The investigation raises questions about why the Dutch government, the two main Dutch intelligence services, and the parliamentary committee on public security and intelligence were not informed of the details of the Stuxnet operation. The newspaper noted that international experts view the sabotage of the Iranian nuclear program as “an act of war while the Netherlands was not at war with Iran,” and warned of “geo-political consequences” if the involvement of the country’s intelligence services is proven.
Electronic warfare constitutes an essential aspect of the shadow war taking place between Israel and Iran, especially against the backdrop of the nuclear file, the focus of the main conflict between Tehran and the Western powers.
At the end of August, Iran announced that it had thwarted an “Israeli plot” to damage its program to develop ballistic missiles and drones through defective spare parts imported from abroad.
According to the Iranian account, the Ministry of Defense obtained spare parts and electronic chips, which are used in the production of advanced missiles and drones.

Mahdi Farahi, Deputy Minister of Defense, told state television: “Had it not been for thwarting the interference, and if spare parts had been used, all the missiles would have been ineffective.”
State television accused a “professional and specialized network with the help of some infiltrated elements” of being behind the “conspiracy.”

 

 

 

 

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Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed

Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
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Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed

Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)

In the third installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and ex-Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa discusses various experiences with Arab leaders, emphasizing the nuances of diplomacy in a turbulent region.

Moussa recalled that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak “was neither bloodthirsty nor a pharaoh, nor did he try to be one.” He points to a famous remark by President Anwar Sadat, who once said: “Gamal (Abdel Nasser) and I are the last of the pharaohs.”

The Gaddafi encounter

Reflecting on his complex interactions with Libyan leader Moammar al-Gaddafi, Moussa admitted that the beginning was anything but smooth. “When I first met Gaddafi, he treated me as if I were an American spy. He wouldn’t look at me directly, only speaking while facing another direction. It was very theatrical,” Moussa said. He recalled this behavior with a certain amusement, treating it almost like a game: “I would wager with myself before our meetings—will he speak to me directly this time, or not?”

Initially, rumors had reached Gaddafi that Moussa had been sent with a US agenda, though he had actually been Egypt’s ambassador to the UN in New York, not Washington. “But once he observed how I performed in my role, he began to change his mind. Eventually, he would ask President Mubarak if I could join their private discussions.”

Moussa recalled a specific instance in Tobruk, where he was invited by Gaddafi to sit at a table with him and Mubarak to discuss a matter of importance. He knew this would stir unease among others present, but the conversation went ahead regardless. This type of scene, he noted, happened several times.

Hosni Mubarak, Moammar al-Gaddafi and Amr Moussa at the Arab summit in Sirte in 2010. (AFP)

Diplomatic drama in a tent

When Gaddafi visited Cairo during Moussa’s tenure as foreign minister, the Libyan leader insisted on setting up his trademark tent in the gardens of the Qubba Palace. Though the palace was fully equipped, Gaddafi would receive guests only in the tent. “At that time, he still saw me as a US spy,” Moussa said, “so he avoided looking at me during our meeting. He inspected every corner of the tent—except the one where I was sitting.”

Despite Gaddafi’s sometimes abrasive behavior, Moussa conceded that the Libyan leader was intelligent and unique. “He was eccentric, yes, but he had a cleverness about him. His actions often carried a deeper rationale, even if misguided.”

Gaddafi’s erratic rule extended to his own ministers. Moussa noted how even highly regarded officials like Abdul Rahman Shalgham and Ali Treki were subject to his whims. “If Gaddafi was displeased with something, he might simply tell you to stay home—and that could mean house arrest for years. Yet, your salary would still arrive at your door.”

A moment of humor

One incident stood out. Libya was scheduled to host the Arab summit and had failed to pay its dues to the Arab League, and as Secretary-General, Moussa received an envoy from Gaddafi carrying a list of demands. Moussa didn’t even read the letter; he simply locked it in a drawer. “When the envoy asked what to report back, I told him exactly that,” Moussa laughed.

Soon after, Gaddafi summoned him to Sirte. As Moussa waited in the tent, Gaddafi’s secretary, Bashir Saleh, walked by singing an old Arabic poem: “You seem tearless, and patience is your nature.” Moussa quipped: “Tell the leader he’s not tearless—he’s payment-less!” Saleh shared the joke with Gaddafi, who burst into laughter and finally paid Libya’s dues.

Later, during an Arab summit in Libya, Gaddafi displayed a surprising sense of responsibility. Moussa recalled a heated moment when Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh demanded immediate action on forming a pan-Arab army. Gaddafi gently interrupted: “Take it easy, Ali.” That phrase—“Take it easy, Ali”—spoke volumes, according to Moussa. “It revealed Gaddafi’s desire to manage tension even among volatile leaders.”

On Hosni Mubarak and the ‘pharaoh’ myth

Asked if Mubarak ever resembled the authoritarian archetype of a “pharaoh” as Russians view their “czars,” Moussa was firm: “No, not Mubarak. Maybe Sadat had some traits—he liked symbolism. But Mubarak? He wasn’t violent, nor bloodthirsty. Yes, he could be firm, but he didn’t revel in bloodshed.”

Moussa clarified that while Mubarak might have approved harsh punishments as president, it never escalated to a murderous level. “Perhaps there were isolated incidents, especially within the prison system, but it wasn’t part of Mubarak’s character to govern through violence. He wasn’t built that way.”

Saddam Hussein meets with Amr Moussa in Iraq in January 2002. (AFP)

The song that stirred controversy

When the Egyptian folk singer Shaaban Abdel Rahim sang “I hate Israel, and I love Amr Moussa,” it caused a stir. Moussa downplayed the drama. “I don’t think Mubarak himself was offended. He was the president; no foreign minister would rival him in popularity. But some people in the surrounding circles—not necessarily his inner circle—were irked.”

Eventually, another version of the song emerged, replacing Moussa’s name with Mubarak’s. “But it was the original that made waves. Even a diplomat from Latin America once told me, ‘We’re dancing to this song here!’”

A difficult meeting with Saddam Hussein

One of the most tense encounters Moussa ever had was with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. After being elected Secretary-General of the Arab League in 2001, Moussa set out to visit all Arab leaders. He deliberately left Saddam until the end, knowing the sensitivities involved.

In January 2002, Moussa visited Saddam at a small palace. He carried a message from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding weapons inspections. “I told Saddam that Annan was open to negotiations, and that continued confrontation with the US would lead nowhere. At some point, no one would stand by him.”

Moussa asked Saddam directly: “Do you possess nuclear weapons?” Saddam answered, “No.” Moussa pressed him again: “Are you absolutely sure?” Saddam repeated, “No.” This made Moussa’s deputy, Ahmed Ben Helli, visibly nervous. “He probably thought we weren’t going to walk out of there.”

Moussa then asked why Iraq objected to the UN inspectors. Saddam responded: “These people don’t just inspect nuclear sites. They ask civilians about food supplies, their opinions on the government. What business is that of theirs?”

Moussa promised to report this to Annan, which he did. Negotiations resumed between Iraq and the UN, but history took its course and the US-led invasion followed.

Asked if he felt fortunate never to have served directly under a figure like Gaddafi, Moussa answered without hesitation: “Absolutely. I saw how respected men like Shalgham and Treki were sidelined. You could be a top official one day and under house arrest the next.”