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Saudi Arabia’s Shura Council: A Century of Historic Governance

The view of Saudi Shura Council in session.
The view of Saudi Shura Council in session.
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Saudi Arabia’s Shura Council: A Century of Historic Governance

The view of Saudi Shura Council in session.
The view of Saudi Shura Council in session.

Since the early days of modern Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz established key principles, including the use of Shura (consultative) councils as a crucial aspect of his wise governance.

Under his rule, the Shura Council was formed, representing a significant move towards institutionalizing governance practices.

This marked the beginning of a constitutional framework for the developing state.

The constitutional movement began in February 1925 with the first National Council being founded under the speakership of Sheikh Abdul Gadir Al-Shebi.

That council continued for six months until a reshuffle that saw Sheikh Mohammed Al-Marzouki Abou Hussein act as speaker and Shebi as his deputy. The council boasted 15 members and Mohammed Suroor Al-Sabban acted as its secretary.

On August 5, 1925, King Abdulaziz inaugurated the council’s session at its Makkah headquarters.

He delivered the first royal address in two parts: a brief impromptu speech with his directives, and an extended official statement presented by Counselor Hafez Wahba.

This tradition continues to this day, with members considering the royal address as the council’s “work program.”

They formed committees to review and discuss the addressed topics, presenting the results to the king after council approval.

First step

On May 13, 1926, an official announcement was made for the election of consultative councils, including the Shura Council.

A royal decree was issued on May 23, 1926, appointing Sharif Mohammed Sharaf Basha bin Adnan Al-Ghalib as speaker.

The first constitutional document, published later, outlined the creation of the Council.

Formed under the deputyship of the King in the Hijaz in September 1926, with Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Mohammed Al-Otaiqi as the deputy, three councils represented the starting point for Shura development.

They marked an experimental phase for the model upon which the Saudi institutional state is built, including the systems and formation methods of these councils.

On July 8, 1927, in response to recommendations from the Inspection and Reform Committee, the King agreed to a new system for the council.

He replaced its members and reorganized it with his advisor Sharif Mohammed Sharaf Adnan leading the sessions.

Evolution of the Council

This marked the beginning of the Shura Council in its long-standing form.

In the second session, King Abdulaziz saw the need to improve its system. The initial system had 14 articles.

The Council’s new internal rules were issued, consisting of 24 articles. This system remained in place for almost 65 years, during which the council carried out its functions.

After the creation of the Council of Ministers in 1952, which limited the Shura Council's powers, there was a need to update its system to match the changes in various state authorities.

The Council made its first attempt in 1953, preparing a proposal for the development of its system and internal rules, which was submitted for review.

Committees were formed, and in 1962, a committee led by Prince Mishaal bin Abdul Rahman worked on drafting the basic governance system.

In 1980, another committee led by Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz resulted in the creation of the “Shura Council System.”

5,963 meetings in 54 years

Despite a delay in updating the system for about 40 years, the Council’s experience during that period is still remembered in political and administrative circles, with its impact documented in government archives.

According to Saudi Shura historian Dr. Abdulrahman bin Ali Al-Zahrani, the Council held 51 sessions, between 1927 and 1980, conducting a total of 5,963 meetings and issuing 8,583 decisions, including various regulations and instructions.

During this time, the Council boasted 85 members, with each session attended between six and 25 members.

Sheikh Ahmed bin Ibrahim Al-Ghazawi held the longest tenure at 51 years, starting as a secretary and eventually becoming the permanent deputy speaker. Sheikh Mohammed Al-Tayyib Al-Hazazi had the shortest membership, lasting only one month.

Membership extensions were common at the time, with an average tenure of 10-and-a-half years per member.

King Faisal at the helm

King Faisal served as the president of the Council from 1927 until his passing in 1975.

Afterward, the Council remained linked to the monarchy, with the vice president managing its affairs.

It wasn't until 1992, with the royal decree appointing Sheikh Mohammed bin Ibrahim bin Jubair as speaker, that new leadership emerged.

Jubair had been a member of committees studying the Council’s system development since 1962.

The role of vice president was held by individuals like Sheikh Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Fadl, Saleh Shata, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Shebi, Sharif Mohammed Sharaf Rida, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Ghazawi, and Saadik Dahlan.

The role of Secretary-General saw seven individuals taking charge, including Sheikh Ahmed Al-Ghazawi, Hamza Al-Marzouki Abu Hussein, Fuad Ali Rida, Saadik Dahlan, Alawi Al-Idroos, Mohammed Saeed Jawharji, and Abdel Razak Al-Tayeb.

The last session of the Council during its 51st term took place on September 27, 1980.

From Makkah to Riyadh

But interestingly, after that point, the council didn't stop its work. It continued to function as an entity with its own budget, staff, and headquarters in Makkah’s Shisha neighborhood.

The General Secretariat and administrative operations were based there, and extensions were given to remaining members.

After the death of the Council’s deputy speaker, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Ghazawi, a Royal Decree (No. 2931) was issued on July 14, 1981, appointing Dahlan to replace him.

Dahlan continued in this role until 1992 when the Council’s offices moved to Riyadh.

The Council even had a summer headquarters in Taif.

King Abdulaziz inaugurated the third session and delivered the royal address in Taif on July 27, 1930.

Other key figures also delivered royal addresses in the absence of the King.

These foundations set by King Abdulaziz during a crucial period in the Kingdom’s early years illustrate his dedication to establishing the state’s structure.

Despite focusing on unification wars and ensuring security, he prioritized stabilizing the state's foundations. His successors continued and refined these practices.

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Questions Over Israel’s Interceptor Stockpiles as Middle East War Drags on

Streaks of light illuminate the sky during an interception attempt, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, as seen from Ashkelon, Israel, March 28, 2026. (Reuters)
Streaks of light illuminate the sky during an interception attempt, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, as seen from Ashkelon, Israel, March 28, 2026. (Reuters)
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Questions Over Israel’s Interceptor Stockpiles as Middle East War Drags on

Streaks of light illuminate the sky during an interception attempt, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, as seen from Ashkelon, Israel, March 28, 2026. (Reuters)
Streaks of light illuminate the sky during an interception attempt, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, as seen from Ashkelon, Israel, March 28, 2026. (Reuters)

The ability of Israel's highly sophisticated air defenses to keep intercepting Iranian attacks is coming under scrutiny as the Middle East war drags on into a second month.

The military has dismissed reports that it is running low on the interceptors used to shoot down the steady stream of Iranian missiles and Hezbollah rockets fired at Israel.

However, some analysts suggest that the war against Iran has significantly drained allied resources, with long-range interceptors among the most severely depleted, reported AFP.

Israel has a multi-layered air defense array, with a variety of systems intercepting threats at different altitudes.

The top tier consists of the anti-ballistic missile Arrow systems, with Arrow 2 operating both within the Earth's atmosphere and in space and Arrow 3 intercepting above the Earth's atmosphere.

Below that sits David's Sling, which was created to target medium-range threats including drones, shorter-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Israel's famed Iron Dome system is the third tier and was originally designed to intercept short-range rockets and artillery shells.

US systems also complement Israel's air defenses with some THAAD anti-missile batteries reportedly in Israel.

"There is no area in Israel that is not under multi-layer defense," said reservist Brigadier General Pini Yungman, who played a key role in developing the country's air defenses and is now president of defense company TSG.

But "there is no 100 percent in defense," he told AFP.

"To get the 92 percent that we are getting all together with all the systems, it's outstanding".

The Israeli military, which reveals few details about its air defenses, says Iran has launched more than 400 ballistic missiles since the start of the war on February 28 -- sparked by US and Israeli strikes on Iran.

Spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Nadav Shoshani recently lauded the interception rate as "exceeding expectations".

Most damage in Israel has been caused by falling debris, but among the 19 civilians killed in the country since the start of the war, more than half died when Iranian missiles broke through.

- 'Nearing exhaustion' -

Around two weeks after the war began, news outlet Semafor first reported that Israel was "running critically low on ballistic missile interceptors", citing unnamed US officials.

An Israeli military source at the time denied the reports, saying there was no shortage "as of now" and that the military was "prepared for prolonged combat".

But analysis published by the London-based RUSI defense think tank on Tuesday indicates that the US, Israel and regional allies have burned through vast quantities of missiles and interceptors since the end of February.

Researchers estimated that in the first 16 days of conflict, allied forces expended 11,294 munitions costing roughly $26 billion.

Stockpiles of long-range interceptors and precision munition in particular, it said, were "nearing exhaustion".

"This basically means that if the war continues, coalition aircraft have to fly deeper into Iranian airspace -- and on the defensive side it means absorbing more Iranian missiles and drones," one of the co-authors, US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Jahara Matisek, told AFP.

Long and costly production timelines make the depletion of high-end interceptors, like Israel's Arrows, particularly critical.

Each Arrow 2 interceptor costs an estimated $1.5 million, with Arrow 3s around $2 million.

"The bottleneck isn't just money. It's industrial physics," Matisek said, pointing to issues including capacity constraints at the supplier level.

These are "production lines that don't scale like an iPhone factory," he said.

These are munitions "you save for the worst threats" he said, and the supply "is never going to be huge".

The RUSI analysis estimated that 81.33 percent of Israel's pre-war Arrow interceptor stocks had already been depleted, and that they would likely "be completely expended by the end of March".

- Accelerated production -

Yungman insisted that, taking into account all its air defense systems, Israel could produce interceptors faster than Iran could produce ballistic missiles.

He added that Israel accelerated its interceptor production after Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack and upgraded its systems to deal with ballistic missiles.

The military confirmed on Monday that it was a malfunction in David's Sling that had allowed Iranian ballistic missiles to strike the southern towns of Dimona and Arad last week.

Dimona is widely believed to hold Israel's undeclared nuclear arsenal.

Israeli financial newspaper Calcalist reported that the military had chosen to use David's Sling in a bid to preserve Arrow interceptor stocks.

Faced with the challenges posed by Iranian missiles, Israel has three options to conserve interceptor stocks, Jean-Loup Samaan, a senior researcher at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore, told AFP.

"Mixing the different missile systems in order to avoid massive shortages; not intercepting missiles or drones if they land in unpopulated areas; and increasing the pressure on the offensive campaign, hoping that they are able to degrade Iran's capabilities before the Israeli amilitary’s air defense resources run out".

Features

Middle East Power Struggle Faces Defining Moment

Map showing the Strait of Hormuz, alongside a 3D-printed model of US President Donald Trump (Reuters)
Map showing the Strait of Hormuz, alongside a 3D-printed model of US President Donald Trump (Reuters)
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Middle East Power Struggle Faces Defining Moment

Map showing the Strait of Hormuz, alongside a 3D-printed model of US President Donald Trump (Reuters)
Map showing the Strait of Hormuz, alongside a 3D-printed model of US President Donald Trump (Reuters)

Perhaps the worst-case scenario long feared in decision-making circles has come true. With the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Washington and Tel Aviv used the same “shock and awe” approach Israel has relied on in recent years, one that delivers rapid gains before losing momentum by the end of a campaign.

This time, however, US President Donald Trump broke a taboo and opened a Pandora’s box, pushing the region into war on shaky grounds and with no clear end. He forced a confrontation of mutual deterrence with an Iranian system that has lost its regional deterrent image.

The expansion of these rival projects in the Middle East, shifting between confrontation and coexistence, has reached a breaking point.

The Khamenei project, which dominated four Arab capitals for decades, has suffered repeated setbacks over the past ten years after peaking in the wake of the Arab Spring. It drained its limited resources and drew the attention of Washington, and Israel’s determination to confront it.

The failure of coexistence made a clash inevitable, one the current US administration has not handled with the patience of a major power.

In the first US military intervention of its kind since 2003, Trump’s war on Iran has lacked a clear endgame. His rhetoric mixed shifting goals with flexible timelines to pressure Tehran. Over time, his administration lost control of the war’s narrative and psychological edge, while hesitating to escalate militarily. The failure to quickly weaken Iran led Washington to conclude that following Israel’s pace would deepen US involvement.

Who decides in Tehran?

Uncertainty also surrounds decision-making in Tehran. The system appears to be paying the price of successive assassinations, from Qassem Soleimani to Ismail Haniyeh and Hassan Nasrallah.

Now it faces a new deterrence phase after Khamenei’s killing, a leader who balanced conservatives and reformists, and the Revolutionary Guard with negotiators.

The new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, deepens concerns over hereditary rule and strengthens the security establishment over the religious one. The transition remains unclear, including loyalties and decision-making centers.

Will power be collective and contested, or will Mojtaba consolidate control, if he is not targeted? His legitimacy depends on the continuation of the war in the near term. Ending it would raise questions about his authority and force decisions on dealing with Washington, including easing the air blockade and rebuilding after war and sanctions.

A fragile deterrence balance

Washington believed the cost of confronting Iran was low, concluding with Israel that military action offered better results than diplomacy. That calculation proved wrong.

The United States destroyed much of Iran’s conventional capabilities but has not stopped its ballistic missile launches or its ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has used the strait as economic leverage, linking pressure on the regime to damage to the global economy.

The result has been the biggest supply disruption since the 1970s energy crisis, forcing the Trump administration to temporarily ease sanctions on Iranian oil.

Iran’s strategy unfolded in three phases. First, survival, preventing collapse and internal unrest. In a leadership vacuum, Tehran’s security system escalated deterrence sharply. As US rhetoric hinted at regime change, Iran treated the war as existential, despite knowing it could not win a conventional fight.

Second, raising the cost of war for Washington and the global economy. Credibility of deterrence became central. Without a response to a strike as major as Khamenei’s assassination, Iran risks appearing defeated, weakening its regional deterrence and internal stability.

Both sides turned to what Thomas Schelling called the “diplomacy of violence,” using constant military threats as pressure.

Another goal for Tehran has been internal cohesion, using external war to limit divisions and strengthen hardliners.

The past week marked a peak in tensions over Hormuz and energy infrastructure. Both sides stepped back from full escalation after recognizing the cost of retaliation would be too high. Signals of restraint emerged, along with a need for communication and clear red lines.

Trump moved first by announcing negotiations, surprising both Iran and Israel. The fight shifted from the battlefield to diplomacy, where the side that moves first shapes the outcome.

Mediation on three tracks

Arab diplomatic sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that mediation is underway, led by Pakistan, Egypt and Türkiye through three channels in Iran: the Revolutionary Guard, the foreign ministry and parliament speaker Mohammad Qalibaf.

Each country is using its own channels. No other states are currently positioned to mediate, especially as these three have not been targeted by Iranian missiles. The sources also point to advanced US proposals seeking a middle ground.

The challenge is timing. Washington wants a quick deal, while Tehran says time is tight, especially with communication risks under Israeli surveillance.

Iran’s proxies under strain

Iran’s regional proxies form the second pillar of deterrence. The idea of unified, simultaneous fronts proved largely unrealistic. It materialized only once after the 2023 “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation before the axis suffered repeated blows.

In the 2025 Iran-Israel war, these groups stayed neutral. Now, after Khamenei’s assassination, they have entered the conflict.

Assassinations by Israel and the United States weakened the network, while sanctions since 2019 cut resources. Supply routes through Iraq and Syria have also been strained.

Iran now leads from the front as its proxy network narrows. Its strategy focuses on expanding battlefields, not unifying them, with centralized control in Tehran. The Revolutionary Guard is now coordinating directly with Hezbollah and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces.

Hezbollah is fighting with depleted resources and a strained base. The Popular Mobilization Forces, long avoiding direct confrontation with US troops, have now targeted American forces and interests in Iraq and beyond, potentially reshaping deterrence and boosting Iran’s influence.

But the group is divided. Some factions continue attacks, others prioritize political interests. The result is fragmented deterrence and weaker credibility.

What comes next?

The key question is whether Tehran will insist on including Hezbollah in any deal, or whether Israel will impose a new reality south of the Litani River.

Even if Washington ends the war, Israel may keep pressure on Iran. Tehran’s proxies remain under pressure but not defeated. This ambiguity may weaken them over time without leading to full settlements.

Neither war nor truce will resolve local crises across these arenas.

As Carl von Clausewitz said, war continues politics by other means. Tehran is now shifting from deterrence to negotiation as part of its survival strategy. Signals point to pragmatic figures within hardline structures who can engage across factions.

Washington is trying to reach them, while Israel has targeted some, including Ali Larijani.

The key shift is now between Washington and Israel. Trump surprised Israel by considering de-escalation and sending Vice President JD Vance to deliver that message to Benjamin Netanyahu.

Both sides have moved to negotiating under fire, raising stakes while testing intentions. Washington favors Qalibaf, Tehran prefers Vance.

Gains and losses

Victory is relative. For Iran, staying at the table is a win despite heavy losses. Early talk of regime change has faded, even in Israel, under US pressure.

The narrative has shifted from regime change to control of Hormuz. Trump negotiates through pressure, Iran deters through endurance. Nuclear deadlock is now mirrored on the battlefield.

Both sides want to end the war, but on terms they can sell at home.

Russia and China prefer that Trump does not dominate global energy routes. Iran is part of a wider struggle over influence. If Trump falls short, Washington risks its image as a guarantor of global navigation.

Trump has hinted at joint management of Hormuz with Iran’s new leader, echoing US-China competition in the South China Sea.

A limited US intervention, combined with hesitation and economic risks, may give Iran an edge in the near term, strengthening its internal control, though long-term recovery depends on a clear deal with the West.

Features

Why Pakistan Has Emerged as a Mediator between US and Iran

FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump looks at Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif speaking following the official signing of the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, during a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump looks at Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif speaking following the official signing of the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, during a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein/File Photo
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Why Pakistan Has Emerged as a Mediator between US and Iran

FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump looks at Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif speaking following the official signing of the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, during a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump looks at Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif speaking following the official signing of the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, during a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein/File Photo

As fears of a wider regional conflict escalate following US and Israeli strikes on Iran that began in late February, Pakistan has emerged as an unexpected mediator, offering to help bring Washington and Tehran to the negotiating table.

Islamabad isn't often called on to act as an intermediary in high-stakes diplomacy, but it's stepped into the role this time for a number of reasons, both because it has relatively good ties with both Washington and Tehran and because it has a lot at stake in seeing the war resolved.

Pakistani government officials have said that their public peace effort follows weeks of quiet diplomacy, though they have provided few details. They have also said that Islamabad stands ready to host talks between representatives from the US and Iran.

Here's what to know about Pakistan's mediation effort:

Pakistan helped US deliver 15-point plan to Iran

Pakistan’s role in Iran-US negotiations surfaced only days ago following media reports. Officials in Islamabad later acknowledged that a US proposal had been conveyed to Iran.

It remains unclear who has served as Iran’s point of contact in the indirect talks. Iran has maintained it has not held such talks and dismissed the US proposal, but Tehran has acknowledged responding with its own proposals.

According to Pakistani officials, US messages are being passed to Iran and Iranian responses relayed to Washington, though they did not specify how the process is being handled or who is directly communicating with whom. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said this week that Türkiye and Egypt are also working behind the scenes to bring the sides to the negotiating table.

Abdullah Khan, managing director of the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, said that Pakistani’s mediation efforts may be contributing to relative restraint in the conflict. He noted that US President Donald Trump has delayed his threats of large-scale attacks on Iran’s energy infrastructure citing diplomatic progress, and Iranian responses toward US interests in the Gulf have been measured in what may be an effort to preserve space for diplomacy.

Ties with both US and Iran set Pakistan up for new role

Previous US-Iran negotiations have been facilitated mainly by countries in the Middle East, including Oman and Qatar, but as they come under Iranian fire during the war Pakistan has stepped into the role.

Analysts say Pakistan’s geographic proximity to Iran — it’s one of its neighbors — coupled with its longstanding ties with the US, gives it a unique position at a time when direct communication between the two sides remains constrained.

Islamabad has good working relations with most of the key parties in the war, including both the US and Iran. It has close strategic ties with Gulf states including Saudi Arabia, with which it signed a defense cooperation agreement last year. However, Pakistan has no diplomatic relations with Israel because of the lingering issue of Palestinian statehood.

Relations between the United States and Pakistan have improved since last year, with increased diplomatic engagement and expanding economic ties. Pakistan also joined Trump's Board of Peace, which aims to ensure peace in Gaza.

Pakistan has a lot at stake in ceasefire talks

The conflict poses some of “the biggest economic and energy security challenges” in Pakistan’s history, said Islamabad-based security analyst Syed Mohammad Ali.

The country gets most of its oil and gas from the Middle East — and, he said, the five million Pakistanis working in the Arab world send home remittances each year roughly equal to the country’s total export earnings.

Rising tensions have already contributed to higher global oil prices, forcing Pakistan to increase fuel prices by about 20% and putting pressure on the government of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government.

The war is also adding to domestic turmoil, even as Pakistan has been grappling for months with its own conflict with neighboring Afghanistan. Islamabad has accused the country's Taliban government of tolerating militant groups that are behind attacks in Pakistan.

Earlier this month, protests erupted across the country following US strikes on Iran, with demonstrators clashing with security forces in several cities.

A day after the United States and Israel attacked Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, clashes erupted in Pakistan’s southern port city of Karachi and in parts of the north, leaving at least 22 people dead and more than 120 injured nationwide.

At least 12 people were killed in and around the US Consulate in Karachi after a mob breached the compound and attempted to set it on fire.

Khamenei was a central religious and political figure for Shiites worldwide, including in Pakistan.

Pakistan has a record as a mediator

While Pakistan rarely serves as a mediator, its record does include playing a role in some very high-profile talks.

Pakistan’s then-President Gen. Yahya Khan facilitated backchannel contacts that led to US President Richard Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to China. That paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic ties between Washington and Beijing in 1979.