'Long Arms'…Cross-border Cyber Blackmail Crimes without Effective Deterrence

Asharq Al-Awsat Investigated Cases Related to 5 Countries

'Long Arms'…Cross-border Cyber Blackmail Crimes without Effective Deterrence
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'Long Arms'…Cross-border Cyber Blackmail Crimes without Effective Deterrence

'Long Arms'…Cross-border Cyber Blackmail Crimes without Effective Deterrence

Egyptian Engineer Mohamed Ahmed, 40, was on annual leave abroad with his family in July 2021 when he received an email from an official in the administration of his 7-year-old son's school, informing him of the need to "communicate immediately for an urgent and important matter."

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, the man said he was surprised by the urgency of the message, especially as his son was with him on his vacation. When he contacted the school administration, the official told him that they had received warning letters accompanied by a picture of his son that included “accusations and abuse against the family and the child, as well as extremely serious health allegations against them,” which usually cause stigma in Arab societies.

Between the Arab country, where engineer Mohamed Ahmed works (and still does), and his birthplace in Egypt (from where it was later proven that those messages were issued, and the judicial authorities accused a woman of being behind them), the man lived through episodes of cross-border crimes, including “death threats, financial blackmail, defamation, insults and slander”, which took him nearly 10 years to prove.

But the man is not a single case. Asharq Al-Awsat investigated similar crimes and documented them by interviewing the victims, reviewing official investigations, attending trials, hearing the testimonies of activists and verifying incidents that took place in more than 5 countries, most of them in the Arab region, as well as victims from other Arab countries who later declined to participate in the investigation, for fear of stigma, despite their initial approval.

The investigation reveals that the perpetrators relied on “being outside the borders of the country” where the crime took place, using “long electronic arms,” and taking advantage of “the difficulty of prosecution.”

"The investigation reveals that the perpetrators relied on being outside the borders of the country where the crime took place, using long electronic arms, and taking advantage of the difficulty of prosecution."

The investigation also shows exploitation of a loophole represented by “the absence of a specialized regional executive entity (Arab at least), for the effective deterrence, prosecution, and exchange of information in transnational cyber-extortion crimes,” according to activists and officials in several countries, despite the presence of an “Arab Convention to Combat Information Technology Crimes” dating back to 2010, ratified by 11 countries.

Eng. Ahmed was “shocked” that the blackmail he was subjected to since 2013 extended to his son. His problem began about a decade ago when he received extensive calls from relatives and friends stating that they had received messages (via Facebook) containing “insults, slander, and defamation” related to his person. He recalls: “My acquaintances were embarrassed to inform me of the messages because of the low quality and ugly language.”

The man was an “ideal victim,” as he put it, and says that the perpetrator “took advantage on my residence outside the country, as well as my inability to easily prove that a crime had been committed against me, and that at a time (late 2013) the issue of prosecuting information technology crimes was not common.” He adds sadly: “I remember that I used to receive 50 to 60 calls or messages daily informing me that my acquaintances had received these heinous abuses.”

In 2002, Egypt established a department affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior to “combat computer crimes,” but it continued to operate in a semi-centralized manner in the capital. Then, it expanded over time through regional offices that serve geographical areas covering more than one governorate. In April 2021, the Interior Ministry announced that citizens were now able to submit reports regarding cybercrimes to all security directorates in any Egyptian governorate.

For nearly 7 years, and during most of his annual vacations in Egypt, Eng. Ahmed was trying to write a report against the account that was accusing him of insults, but did not succeed “because of his presence outside the country,” as he put it, and his inability for years to quickly and urgently prove the crime had occurred. (Asharq Al-Awsat refrains from explaining the technical details used to prove the crime that the writer of the investigation reviewed in detail, in order to avoid illegal re-exploitation.)

The accused is outside our borders!

The issue of threatening the engineer’s son was central to his move in pursuing the woman accused of blackmailing him. Especially after the school administration informed him that it had notified the police of the Arab country in which it is located of the letters it had received. The officials informed the father (after his return from his vacation) that they had verified that the letters received by the school were from “outside their borders,” and therefore “they would not be able to take additional steps,” as he said.

Later, the “blackmailer” escalated her attack, “asking for money”, according to the official indictment against her, and broadcast the offensive content to the parents of the son’s classmates at school, further exacerbating his “harsh” experience, as he describes it.

As the pressures grew, the man was forced, as he told Asharq Al-Awsat, to take emergency leave from work for days and incur “large financial costs” to come to Egypt more than once to fulfill “a number of technical and legal requirements necessary to prove the crime” and file a lawsuit against the perpetrator.

Before the court

Inside the Mansoura Criminal Court in Dakahlia Governorate (135 kilometers north of Cairo), Asharq Al-Awsat attended the trial session of the accused in the case of engineer Mohamed Ahmed, where investigations indicated that the woman “used defamation and blackmail with more than 10 other victims inside and outside Egypt,” in addition to Engineer Ahmed.

At the end of one of the sessions that the accused attended after her arrest, Lawyer Ahmed Al-Bakri, who is the legal attorney of engineer Ahmed, spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, saying that the “pattern of that crime was innovative, because the perpetrator did not have special images or shameful facts, but only relied on information provided by social media sites, tracked the victim’s accounts and acquaintances, and focused on expanding the scope of defamation by messaging them.”

Based on this blackmailing case, which took place between two countries, Al-Bakri believes that there is a practical need to task the embassies with submitting complaints and reports related to electronic crimes, if the perpetrator had the same nationality of the victim, even if the latter resided in a different country.

If this proposal has merit...what about the cases in which the victim holds the nationality of one country and resides in it, while the perpetrator has a different nationality and residence?

Baghdad and Damascus... and between them, Berlin

Between three elements was the case of the Iraqi woman Shams (her nickname). Her blackmailer holds “Syrian nationality” and resides in “Germany,” according to what he told her, while she lives in one of the governorates of Iraq.

Mrs. Shams (32), a divorced mother of five children, spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity for fear that she would be exposed to danger.

She said: “Like everyone, I have accounts on social media, and through them, in early 2021, I met a person who told me that he was a Syrian refugee residing in Germany. Over time, the conversation between us developed and he proposed to marry and come to Iraq to get engaged and take responsibility for my children.”

She added: “I decided to talk to him and we got to know each other.” In a very low voice, which forced her to record her message twice, Mrs. Shams spoke, justifying the matter by saying that she feared being heard by a member of her family, whom she described as “extremist” and who resides with her due to her separation from her husband.

Over time, “his (the blackmailer’s) intentions began to appear, but he did not blackmail me financially, but rather with my private photos to force me to do what he wanted, otherwise he threatened to publish these photos,” the woman recounted.

With pain that resounded in her stuttering words, Shams narrates that, under the weight of fear, she tried to calm the blackmailer, “but to no avail... He started asking me for ‘some nice things’, and unfortunately I started doing everything he wanted, for a period of 6 months.”

However, things developed, and the woman was surprised that her blackmailer, according to her words, “began asking me to perform satisfactory sexual acts related to my five-year-old daughter... Then I fought with him and blocked him.”

Despite the risk of defying tribal norms and the fear of stigma if her problem was exposed, Shams tried to carefully follow the legal path to stop the threat. She says: “I called the (community police) in the governorate in which I live, and they could not help me because he (i.e. the blackmailer) was outside Iraq, and also communicated with National Security, and reached the same obstacle.”

Iraq has not yet been able to pass a law to combat cybercrimes, although a draft law was already submitted to Parliament 12 years ago and was subject to amendments. However, Iraqi executive authorities are tasked with confronting some cybercrimes and the blackmail associated with them, including the “Iraqi Community Police.”

According to an official statement, an annual increase in electronic blackmail crimes is observed in Iraq, amounting in 2021 to about 1,950 cases handled by the community police, said Brigadier General Ghaleb Al-Attiyah, the former commander of the Iraqi community police, in remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (He left his position in October).

The particularity of Iraqi society leaves its mark on the way extortion crimes are treated, since “most of the victims are women, especially children,” according to Al-Attiyah, who explained that the “seriousness of the matter is that these incidents in Iraqi society develop into what is known as crimes of honor killing, or killing to wash away shame, or suicide, not to mention girls running away from their families for fear of their lives.”

Al-Attiyah attributed the increase in electronic blackmail crimes to several reasons, including “the absence of a law on cybercrime, and reliance on the existing penal code dating back to the 1960s.”

When asked by Asharq Al-Awsat about the mechanism followed if the perpetrator was outside the borders of Iraq, he answered: “Certainly, in our work, we face many (transnational) cases... but frankly, we were able to address some of the incidents through (personal relationships) with officers in Arab countries... but this issue is difficult (...) and some routine procedures for tracking and prosecuting allow criminals to get away.”

A new obstacle hindered the attempts of Iraqi Shams to break free from the shackles of blackmail. If there is no developed local deterrent law that protects her if the perpetrator is residing in her country... then what if she faces a blackmailer from outside the borders?... And what did she proceed?

“Resist”

Luck was on Mrs. Shams’ side, as when she told a friend about her problem, he advised her to resort to the “Resist Initiative to Combat Electronic Blackmail.” The “Resist” volunteer initiative operates through electronic platforms on social media, and aims to “provide support” to victims.

“Resist” volunteers obtained enough information about the blackmailer’s identity. When they informed him that they would contact the German authorities if he did not stop the blackmailing immediately, he complied and ended his threats.

Despite its success in supporting the Iraqi woman, the founder of “Resist,” human rights activist Mohammad Al-Yamani, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We realize that it is not possible to fully rely on the efforts of activists in transnational blackmail cases, as the movement and coordination of the official police and judicial authorities has more impact and is more legal.”

“Resist” receives many complaints related to blackmail crimes and undertakes “directing victims to available legal paths, and completing the collection of required incriminating evidence through a legal support team,” according to its founder, who admits that “transnational electronic crimes are very difficult due to the technical and legal obstacles resulting from the absence of regional and international coordination in this field, compared, for example, to exchanging information between countries quickly and intensively in the case of money crimes or terrorism.

Al-Yamani calls for implementing agreements pertaining to electronic crimes between Arab countries as a “first stage,” and says: “An executive body must be established (similar to Interpol) to exchange information and prosecute criminals in electronic blackmail cases to protect victims.”

An Arab diplomat and a third party

Through the door of taking pride in the word, paying attention to the gesture, and staying away from what could stain the diplomatic suit, blackmailers of a unique type exploited a weak point in the life of an Arab diplomat, and through arenas and communications that took place in more than one country, including (his workplace), they turned their past electronic weapons on the man, in an incident that was documented and whose details were shared with by activist Mohammad Al-Yamani, without revealing names or identities.

Things appeared to be almost normal. The Arab diplomat worked in one of the countries, and in one way or another, “he became involved with his female citizen, who was residing in the same country where he worked. After a while, that woman threatened him with publishing the conversations and pictures she obtained in the context of their relationship, and asked him for financial compensation.”

The Arab diplomat responded “twice” to the blackmail. In the third time, he thought about resorting to the judiciary but later backed down after he learned that because of his situation, he must notify his country’s foreign ministry and embassy, which consequently means the case will be exposed and his professional future may be at risk.

But the surprise was that the two parties to the blackmail crime were not just two residents of the same country, as the Arab diplomat believed, and the victim discovered that “the perpetrator, who had left the crime scene for her home country to escape a potential prosecution, had carried out the operation on behalf of (a third party).”

This third party was none other than “the diplomat’s wife, who had a dispute with him and resided in their hometown. She (i.e. his wife) instigated the blackmailer from afar, taking advantage of her distance from the crime scene and the difficulty of prosecuting her internationally, to tighten the screws on the man with the aim to obtain divorce and financial gains, Al-Yamani recounted.

Fraud and impersonation

In late December 2021, Egyptian student at Ain Shams University, Shorouk Fouad (27), received a message via the Messenger application showing a photo of a person wearing clothes similar to the Egyptian police uniform.

The message included a claim from the sender that he “works as an officer,” and that he had received a report against her, accompanied by some pictures of her, according to what Shorouk told Asharq Al-Awsat.

In a stressful and confusing manner, the blackmailer pressured the Egyptian girl, who recounted: “He asked me to quickly send my data and pictures so that he would start moving to resolve the issue of the report in an amicable manner, and so that it would not reach my family. Under the pressure of fear and tension, I sent him my data, my location, and my photos.”

The relationship took immediately a different turn as soon as the sender obtained the girl’s data and photos. He began to blackmail her for the purpose of “establishing a relationship,” according to what she says, otherwise he would expose her in front of her family. Shorouk confirms that her blackmailer, in further threatening her, “actually created pages on social media” using her photos.

Shorouk, and her family, who supported her after learning of what had happened, thought that filing a police report would prosecute the accused and end a nightmare that had long exhausted them, but instead received a shocking news.

The first thing that awaited the girl was that “officials from the Qalyubia Security Directorate and officers from the Internet Investigations” told her, according to her account, that he (i.e. the blackmailer) “is impersonating an officer, and that officers are prohibited from posting pictures in uniform on any social networking site.” The second surprise was that the blackmailer who spoke to her in an “Egyptian dialect” was communicating with her “via a phone number belonging to a Libyan telecommunications company.”

In addition to the psychological pressure, the girl suffered the loss of her engagement after problems arose with the young man she was in a relationship with. Regarding the pursuit of her blackmailer, “the only report she was able to file was dated January 4, 2022, at the Qalyubia Security Directorate,” which serves its place of residence. It included her accusation of the blackmailer of impersonating her on Facebook, while saying that she “was informed that no action could be taken against other crimes, because the phone number is not Egyptian.”

...But can anyone obtain a Libyan phone number without his data being available to service providers?

In an effort to investigate Shorouk’s case, Asharq Al-Awsat obtained the phone number through which the Egyptian girl said she received blackmail messages. Based on its key number, the author of this investigation could prove that it belonged to a specific company that provides mobile phone services in Libya. He sent an inquiry to the company, asking whether it was possible for a person to buy a line belonging to the company without proof of his identity... An official in charge of the company’s accounts on social media stated that the rules for purchasing its lines include “providing the national number and proof of identity.” (ID card or passport).

When we asked the company official about the possibility of a non-Libyan citizen purchasing a line, he said that in that case it was necessary to “present a valid passport and a valid residence certificate.”

Determining the identity of the owner of the line, or at least the person who sold it to its current user, then seems possible, as Egypt and Libya signed, along with other countries, in 2010 the “Arab Agreement to Combat Information Technology Crimes.”

The agreement stipulates the provision of technical and legal assistance and the extradition of criminals in a number of criminal cases, including “sexual exploitation.” While Egypt ratified the convention in 2014, Libya, which is rife with political conflicts, is yet to endorse it.

Libyan women under threat

Does the situation seem different from the case of the Egyptian Shorouk in Libya, for example? Libyan human rights activist Khadija Al-Bouaishi tells us that she was “a witness and a supporting party for a number of Libyan women who fell victim to blackmail by a perpetrator in another Arab country. They were asked to send sums of money, otherwise... he (the blackmailer) threatened to publish their pictures and information and say that they practice witchcraft.”

Once again, due to the failure to activate international prosecutions, the attempts of these Libyan women to take the legal course against their blackmailer, who resides in another country, were shattered. Al-Bouaishi attributes the matter to “weak legislation, the absence of technical qualifications, and the lack of a local security apparatus specialized in combating cybercrimes.”

“Thus, many obstacles hinder the prosecution of blackmailers inside the country, and the cases are also more complex and almost impossible if the perpetrator is outside Libya,” she remarked.

Crimes without confrontation... and a rare experience for the Interpol

As technological crimes rely on unconventional means, they do not require a confrontation between the perpetrator and the victim, which guarantees relative safety for the perpetrators, and enable them to some degree to hide and evade prosecution, especially when their activities occur across borders,” Former Assistant Minister of the Interior for Information Technology and Internet Crimes, Major General Mahmoud Al-Rashidi, told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The main feature in cases of electronic blackmail, according to Al-Rashidi, is that some “perpetrators rely on exhausting the victims by directing intense abuse based on artificial information with the aim of subjecting the targets to blackmail.”

The Interpol places cybercrime among its areas of competence, noting that criminals adopt new techniques to commit attacks against governments, companies and individuals, and that crimes do not stop at borders, whether they were physical or virtual and cause damage and pose threats to victims around the world.

The Interpol press office did not respond to questions sent by Asharq Al-Awsat to find out the extent of its participation in operations to pursue, seize, or exchange information in transnational electronic blackmail crimes, especially in Arab countries.

However, a rare experiment carried out by the organization in 2014 resulted in the arrest of 58 people within organized crime networks operating from the Philippines, and which was behind “sexual blackmail” cases, including the case of Scottish teenager Daniel Perry (17), who committed suicide in 2013 after falling victim to an extortion attempt on the Internet.

According to Interpol, this operation was the first of its kind, and witnessed the participation of police agencies in Scotland, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines, as well as the US National Security Investigations Division, in a process funded by the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Despite the Arab precedence in establishing a convention to combat transnational information crimes, these crimes are happening and will continue to occur, until the right mechanisms are put into effect and executive entities are formed to overcome obstacles that hinder its implementation. Only then may hundreds and perhaps thousands of victims be saved from extremely bad fates that begin with defamation and stigma and sometimes end with murder.



Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
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Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)

A US defense agreement with Ethiopia was announced days before an important visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Cairo that saw agreements and memorandums of understanding signed in several fields and coincided with joint Egyptian-Chinese air exercises.

The timing raised questions over whether Washington’s military cooperation with Addis Ababa was driven by “US anger at Cairo” and what objectives it serves amid tensions in the Horn of Africa.

The United States and Ethiopia signed a defense agreement on Aug. 21 during an official visit by an Ethiopian military delegation to Washington. Both sides described it as a strategic framework aimed at strengthening military and security cooperation, protecting national interests and securing mutual benefits.

Raafat Mahmoud, head of the African Affairs Research Unit at the Egyptian Cabinet's Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC), told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington was seeking to rebuild ties with Addis Ababa after years of tension, particularly over the Tigray war and US criticism of Ethiopia’s human rights record.

He argued that the agreement showed Ethiopia had become part of broader US calculations involving Red Sea security, countering Chinese and Russian influence and combating armed groups in the Horn.

Ethiopian lawmaker Mohammed Al-Arusi noted that Washington views the Horn as directly linked to Red Sea security, international trade and maritime routes, while also facing terrorist threats.

“Ethiopia lies at the heart of this geography, with its demographic, political and military weight across a broad region, and it hosts the permanent headquarters of the African Union,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. Washington, he added, was not seeking a temporary stance but it is “rebuilding its position in a region where the balance of power is changing.”

US Republican and strategic affairs expert Adolfo Franco cautioned that the agreement lacks formally binding treaties and direct financial funding, adding that future defense exports remain subject to strict restrictions and case-by-case assessments, including human rights considerations.

Al-Arusi pointed to a US-Ethiopian dialogue launched in May covering economics, trade, investment, defense and security. The defense track advanced just three months later, a sequence he said showed Washington was approaching Ethiopia with long-term considerations.

Mahmoud said growing US support could strengthen Ethiopia’s negotiating position not only on water but also in its efforts to secure maritime access and expand its presence in the Red Sea region.

Recent media reports have portrayed the US-Ethiopian rapprochement as Washington’s response to Egypt’s growing ties with China, highlighted by Xi’s visit to Cairo this week.

Mahmoud countered that Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement was not new, although recent developments naturally raised sensitivities in Washington, particularly amid expanding economic and security cooperation.

In January 2026, Ethiopia and China elevated their relations to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” nearly two years after Egypt and China upgraded their ties to a “strategic partnership” in 2024.

Al-Arusi argued that Washington’s expanding partnership with Addis Ababa should not be viewed as replacing one partner with another, but rather as evidence of Ethiopia’s growing strategic value.

Former US diplomat Henry Ensher told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington wants a security partner in the Horn and that Ethiopia is the best option given its capabilities.

While China and the United States compete in Africa, Egypt is the more important partner, he said, making it unlikely that Washington would use this approach to confront or punish Cairo.


Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
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Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)

Ahmad al-Hilali, deputy governor of Hasakah, told Asharq Al-Awsat on Friday that the integration process stipulated in the “January 29, 2026 Agreement” has moved, following the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the former Kurdish Autonomous Administration, from “the stage of understandings and negotiations to actual implementation, whether in civilian institutions or in the security and military sectors.”

He described the security situation as “much better” and said “stability is gradually strengthening,” stressing that the process “is moving toward completion, and what we want is for it to take place calmly.”

Since SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced from the presidential palace in Damascus on August 25 the dissolution of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration, Hasakah has witnessed a series of developments and changes signaling the emergence of a new phase in the governorate. Its defining features are the restoration of state authority across all sectors, stronger security and stability, the unification of institutions, and the end of administrative duplication, in accordance with the January 29 Agreement.

In his remarks, al-Hilali said that “the integration process is not simply a matter of transferring buildings or changing names. It is about reunifying institutional authority, administrative decision-making, and security and military command under the umbrella of the Syrian state.”

He said significant steps had already been completed in this direction, while work was underway to address the remaining files in an orderly manner that would prevent any institutional or security vacuum and preserve stability in the governorate.

Before the announcement of the SDF's dissolution, most cities and areas in Hasakah had experienced security disorder involving the Revolutionary Youth. Such incidents increased after the signing of the January 29 Agreement, when members of the group prevented the handover of institutions to the government. That situation, however, has now disappeared.

Al-Hilali attributed the disappearance of the previous unrest primarily to the fact that “the phase has changed.”

“Previously, there were attempts to obstruct the process of transferring state institutions, and some activities emerged aimed at disrupting this course. But as implementation of the agreement progressed and the direction toward ending institutional and security duplication became clear, these manifestations declined significantly,” he said.

According to al-Hilali, “There is now a growing conviction among everyone that state institutions should not be a subject of conflict or confrontation, and that the integration process is moving toward completion.”

“What we want is for this process to take place calmly, away from provocation and tension, and for all residents of the governorate to feel that the return of state institutions means the return of services, the rule of law and stability, and is not directed against any component of society,” he said.

Asked when the integration of military, security and civilian institutions would be fully completed, the deputy governor said: “I do not want to set an artificial date for a process of this scale and complexity, because some files require technical, administrative and security procedures before they can be formally closed.”

He added: “But I can say that we are at a very advanced stage and that the overall direction is clearly toward completing the integration as soon as possible.”

He noted that “the bulk of the work is now in the implementation phase, while what remains consists of detailed files requiring the completion of arrangements, verification and coordination among the ministries and relevant authorities.”

Women fighters from the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) take part in military traning in Hasakah, Syria, August 22, 2026. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman

Pending Files

Al-Hilali said: “What matters most to us is that the integration be complete, genuine and sustainable, rather than merely a political announcement whose impact fades after a short period.”

Asked about the main outstanding issues preventing the completion of the integration process, al-Hilali said the remaining files could be divided into three main tracks.

“First is the military and security file, involving the completion of the restructuring of personnel and cadres and the integration of those who meet the requirements into the Ministries of Defense and Interior in accordance with the established procedures,” he said.

“The second is the administrative and civilian file, particularly the status of employees and staff, the mechanisms for confirming their positions and paying their entitlements, and the integration of institutions and departments whose transfer to the state has not yet been completed.”

“The third involves a number of service-related, technical and administrative files linked to the transfer of powers and the reunification of operating systems, databases and resources.”

Al-Hilali said these issues “do not represent an obstacle to the integration process so much as they are implementation files that need to be completed.”

“The political decision is clear and the overall direction has been settled: state institutions will be unified, authority will rest with the Syrian state, and the rights of all citizens and components of the governorate will be preserved,” he said.

The rise of the Autonomous Administration

The first foundations of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, which sought to establish a “Kurdish project in Syria,” emerged through the formation of the Kurdish Supreme Committee. It was established by Syria's Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council following the signing of the Erbil Agreement on July 12, 2012.

A military wing was subsequently established for the committee, comprising the People's Protection Units (YPG), the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) and the Asayish security forces. The SDF was later formed in 2015, under predominantly Kurdish leadership.

The geographic footprint of the Autonomous Administration expanded from three cantons in 2014 to six in 2016 and seven by 2023. This territorial expansion was accompanied by the growth of its military and security apparatus and civilian institutions, which collectively included tens of thousands of personnel.

The SDF subsequently lost a significant portion of its territory during armed clashes that erupted between its fighters and the Syrian army in late 2025 and early 2026. The fighting lasted about two weeks and was followed by the signing of the January 29, 2026 Agreement.

The agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF called for a ceasefire and the gradual integration into Syrian state institutions of the military and civilian institutions established by the Kurds during the years of conflict. It also called for the handover of border crossings and oil and gas fields, as well as the withdrawal of foreign fighters from the region.


Lebanon's Ali Al-Taher Ridge, Strategic Hezbollah Position Israel Says It Seized

31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
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Lebanon's Ali Al-Taher Ridge, Strategic Hezbollah Position Israel Says It Seized

31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)

Southern Lebanon's Ali al-Taher ridge, which the Israeli army on Thursday said it captured, was a strategic position for Iran-backed Hezbollah, where it was believed to have established a command center.

Hezbollah did not confirm losing the highland, which is around 10 kilometers (six miles) from the border with Israel and was targeted by several Israeli strikes in recent weeks despite a ceasefire.

The ridge, a flashpoint since Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war in March, lies close to the major city of Nabatieh and the Litani River.

It is just a few kilometers from UNESCO-listed Beaufort castle, another strategic site that Israel captured in recent months and continues to occupy.

Ali al-Taher ridge, on the edge of the Israeli-proclaimed occupied "security zone", overlooks surrounding areas and key districts further north, and sits atop a network of tunnels.

During US-mediated negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, Washington proposed the Lebanese military take over the ridge, but Hezbollah refused, according to a source close to the talks.

Military expert Riad Kahwaji told AFP that the ridge is "in between several villages and adjacent to the city of Nabatieh" with a "web of tunnels (that) connects these villages around it".

On Friday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the capture "marks the completion of the phase of securing control in the security zone in southern Lebanon", meaning the Lebanese territory Israel occupied during the war.

- 'Command centers' -

The Israeli military on Thursday said that the tunnel network included "command centers (and) weapons storage rooms".

"The infrastructure is a strategic underground network that was built over two decades and funded and planned by the Iranian terror regime," it added.

Kahwaji, who heads the INEGMA military analysis institute, said the hilltops overlook Iqlim al-Tuffah, an area further from the border where Hezbollah holds sway, as well as part of the country's east.

Control of the area would therefore "give the Israelis an easy passage to move on both sides".

Speaking to journalists including AFP last month, Hezbollah spokesman Youssef al-Zein refused to say how many of the group's fighters were at the Ali al-Taher position. He denied any Iranian personnel were there, as had been reported in some media outlets.

He claimed that Israel had "exaggerated the importance of Ali al-Taher" as a military objective but also vowed that Hezbollah would "defend this position as much as it can".

The ridge is located right above the Litani. Hezbollah agreed to disarm in areas south of the river under a 2024 ceasefire that sought to end its previous war with Israel.

Two years later, Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into the broader Middle East war by attacking Israel in support of Iran.

Israel responded with airstrikes and a ground invasion that Lebanon says have killed more than 4,300 people.

The conflict has calmed since a US-Iran memorandum of understanding and a framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel agreed in June. But Israeli strikes continue and violence persisted around Ali al-Taher.

On August 15, Israel's army launched its deadliest strikes in weeks in response to what it said was a Hezbollah attack against its soldiers in the area.

In June, Israel's army published an updated map showing the parts of south Lebanon it considers within its "security zone" where its troops are operating, expanding the area to include the Ali al-Taher ridge.