'Long Arms'…Cross-border Cyber Blackmail Crimes without Effective Deterrence

Asharq Al-Awsat Investigated Cases Related to 5 Countries

'Long Arms'…Cross-border Cyber Blackmail Crimes without Effective Deterrence
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'Long Arms'…Cross-border Cyber Blackmail Crimes without Effective Deterrence

'Long Arms'…Cross-border Cyber Blackmail Crimes without Effective Deterrence

Egyptian Engineer Mohamed Ahmed, 40, was on annual leave abroad with his family in July 2021 when he received an email from an official in the administration of his 7-year-old son's school, informing him of the need to "communicate immediately for an urgent and important matter."

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, the man said he was surprised by the urgency of the message, especially as his son was with him on his vacation. When he contacted the school administration, the official told him that they had received warning letters accompanied by a picture of his son that included “accusations and abuse against the family and the child, as well as extremely serious health allegations against them,” which usually cause stigma in Arab societies.

Between the Arab country, where engineer Mohamed Ahmed works (and still does), and his birthplace in Egypt (from where it was later proven that those messages were issued, and the judicial authorities accused a woman of being behind them), the man lived through episodes of cross-border crimes, including “death threats, financial blackmail, defamation, insults and slander”, which took him nearly 10 years to prove.

But the man is not a single case. Asharq Al-Awsat investigated similar crimes and documented them by interviewing the victims, reviewing official investigations, attending trials, hearing the testimonies of activists and verifying incidents that took place in more than 5 countries, most of them in the Arab region, as well as victims from other Arab countries who later declined to participate in the investigation, for fear of stigma, despite their initial approval.

The investigation reveals that the perpetrators relied on “being outside the borders of the country” where the crime took place, using “long electronic arms,” and taking advantage of “the difficulty of prosecution.”

"The investigation reveals that the perpetrators relied on being outside the borders of the country where the crime took place, using long electronic arms, and taking advantage of the difficulty of prosecution."

The investigation also shows exploitation of a loophole represented by “the absence of a specialized regional executive entity (Arab at least), for the effective deterrence, prosecution, and exchange of information in transnational cyber-extortion crimes,” according to activists and officials in several countries, despite the presence of an “Arab Convention to Combat Information Technology Crimes” dating back to 2010, ratified by 11 countries.

Eng. Ahmed was “shocked” that the blackmail he was subjected to since 2013 extended to his son. His problem began about a decade ago when he received extensive calls from relatives and friends stating that they had received messages (via Facebook) containing “insults, slander, and defamation” related to his person. He recalls: “My acquaintances were embarrassed to inform me of the messages because of the low quality and ugly language.”

The man was an “ideal victim,” as he put it, and says that the perpetrator “took advantage on my residence outside the country, as well as my inability to easily prove that a crime had been committed against me, and that at a time (late 2013) the issue of prosecuting information technology crimes was not common.” He adds sadly: “I remember that I used to receive 50 to 60 calls or messages daily informing me that my acquaintances had received these heinous abuses.”

In 2002, Egypt established a department affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior to “combat computer crimes,” but it continued to operate in a semi-centralized manner in the capital. Then, it expanded over time through regional offices that serve geographical areas covering more than one governorate. In April 2021, the Interior Ministry announced that citizens were now able to submit reports regarding cybercrimes to all security directorates in any Egyptian governorate.

For nearly 7 years, and during most of his annual vacations in Egypt, Eng. Ahmed was trying to write a report against the account that was accusing him of insults, but did not succeed “because of his presence outside the country,” as he put it, and his inability for years to quickly and urgently prove the crime had occurred. (Asharq Al-Awsat refrains from explaining the technical details used to prove the crime that the writer of the investigation reviewed in detail, in order to avoid illegal re-exploitation.)

The accused is outside our borders!

The issue of threatening the engineer’s son was central to his move in pursuing the woman accused of blackmailing him. Especially after the school administration informed him that it had notified the police of the Arab country in which it is located of the letters it had received. The officials informed the father (after his return from his vacation) that they had verified that the letters received by the school were from “outside their borders,” and therefore “they would not be able to take additional steps,” as he said.

Later, the “blackmailer” escalated her attack, “asking for money”, according to the official indictment against her, and broadcast the offensive content to the parents of the son’s classmates at school, further exacerbating his “harsh” experience, as he describes it.

As the pressures grew, the man was forced, as he told Asharq Al-Awsat, to take emergency leave from work for days and incur “large financial costs” to come to Egypt more than once to fulfill “a number of technical and legal requirements necessary to prove the crime” and file a lawsuit against the perpetrator.

Before the court

Inside the Mansoura Criminal Court in Dakahlia Governorate (135 kilometers north of Cairo), Asharq Al-Awsat attended the trial session of the accused in the case of engineer Mohamed Ahmed, where investigations indicated that the woman “used defamation and blackmail with more than 10 other victims inside and outside Egypt,” in addition to Engineer Ahmed.

At the end of one of the sessions that the accused attended after her arrest, Lawyer Ahmed Al-Bakri, who is the legal attorney of engineer Ahmed, spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, saying that the “pattern of that crime was innovative, because the perpetrator did not have special images or shameful facts, but only relied on information provided by social media sites, tracked the victim’s accounts and acquaintances, and focused on expanding the scope of defamation by messaging them.”

Based on this blackmailing case, which took place between two countries, Al-Bakri believes that there is a practical need to task the embassies with submitting complaints and reports related to electronic crimes, if the perpetrator had the same nationality of the victim, even if the latter resided in a different country.

If this proposal has merit...what about the cases in which the victim holds the nationality of one country and resides in it, while the perpetrator has a different nationality and residence?

Baghdad and Damascus... and between them, Berlin

Between three elements was the case of the Iraqi woman Shams (her nickname). Her blackmailer holds “Syrian nationality” and resides in “Germany,” according to what he told her, while she lives in one of the governorates of Iraq.

Mrs. Shams (32), a divorced mother of five children, spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity for fear that she would be exposed to danger.

She said: “Like everyone, I have accounts on social media, and through them, in early 2021, I met a person who told me that he was a Syrian refugee residing in Germany. Over time, the conversation between us developed and he proposed to marry and come to Iraq to get engaged and take responsibility for my children.”

She added: “I decided to talk to him and we got to know each other.” In a very low voice, which forced her to record her message twice, Mrs. Shams spoke, justifying the matter by saying that she feared being heard by a member of her family, whom she described as “extremist” and who resides with her due to her separation from her husband.

Over time, “his (the blackmailer’s) intentions began to appear, but he did not blackmail me financially, but rather with my private photos to force me to do what he wanted, otherwise he threatened to publish these photos,” the woman recounted.

With pain that resounded in her stuttering words, Shams narrates that, under the weight of fear, she tried to calm the blackmailer, “but to no avail... He started asking me for ‘some nice things’, and unfortunately I started doing everything he wanted, for a period of 6 months.”

However, things developed, and the woman was surprised that her blackmailer, according to her words, “began asking me to perform satisfactory sexual acts related to my five-year-old daughter... Then I fought with him and blocked him.”

Despite the risk of defying tribal norms and the fear of stigma if her problem was exposed, Shams tried to carefully follow the legal path to stop the threat. She says: “I called the (community police) in the governorate in which I live, and they could not help me because he (i.e. the blackmailer) was outside Iraq, and also communicated with National Security, and reached the same obstacle.”

Iraq has not yet been able to pass a law to combat cybercrimes, although a draft law was already submitted to Parliament 12 years ago and was subject to amendments. However, Iraqi executive authorities are tasked with confronting some cybercrimes and the blackmail associated with them, including the “Iraqi Community Police.”

According to an official statement, an annual increase in electronic blackmail crimes is observed in Iraq, amounting in 2021 to about 1,950 cases handled by the community police, said Brigadier General Ghaleb Al-Attiyah, the former commander of the Iraqi community police, in remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (He left his position in October).

The particularity of Iraqi society leaves its mark on the way extortion crimes are treated, since “most of the victims are women, especially children,” according to Al-Attiyah, who explained that the “seriousness of the matter is that these incidents in Iraqi society develop into what is known as crimes of honor killing, or killing to wash away shame, or suicide, not to mention girls running away from their families for fear of their lives.”

Al-Attiyah attributed the increase in electronic blackmail crimes to several reasons, including “the absence of a law on cybercrime, and reliance on the existing penal code dating back to the 1960s.”

When asked by Asharq Al-Awsat about the mechanism followed if the perpetrator was outside the borders of Iraq, he answered: “Certainly, in our work, we face many (transnational) cases... but frankly, we were able to address some of the incidents through (personal relationships) with officers in Arab countries... but this issue is difficult (...) and some routine procedures for tracking and prosecuting allow criminals to get away.”

A new obstacle hindered the attempts of Iraqi Shams to break free from the shackles of blackmail. If there is no developed local deterrent law that protects her if the perpetrator is residing in her country... then what if she faces a blackmailer from outside the borders?... And what did she proceed?

“Resist”

Luck was on Mrs. Shams’ side, as when she told a friend about her problem, he advised her to resort to the “Resist Initiative to Combat Electronic Blackmail.” The “Resist” volunteer initiative operates through electronic platforms on social media, and aims to “provide support” to victims.

“Resist” volunteers obtained enough information about the blackmailer’s identity. When they informed him that they would contact the German authorities if he did not stop the blackmailing immediately, he complied and ended his threats.

Despite its success in supporting the Iraqi woman, the founder of “Resist,” human rights activist Mohammad Al-Yamani, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We realize that it is not possible to fully rely on the efforts of activists in transnational blackmail cases, as the movement and coordination of the official police and judicial authorities has more impact and is more legal.”

“Resist” receives many complaints related to blackmail crimes and undertakes “directing victims to available legal paths, and completing the collection of required incriminating evidence through a legal support team,” according to its founder, who admits that “transnational electronic crimes are very difficult due to the technical and legal obstacles resulting from the absence of regional and international coordination in this field, compared, for example, to exchanging information between countries quickly and intensively in the case of money crimes or terrorism.

Al-Yamani calls for implementing agreements pertaining to electronic crimes between Arab countries as a “first stage,” and says: “An executive body must be established (similar to Interpol) to exchange information and prosecute criminals in electronic blackmail cases to protect victims.”

An Arab diplomat and a third party

Through the door of taking pride in the word, paying attention to the gesture, and staying away from what could stain the diplomatic suit, blackmailers of a unique type exploited a weak point in the life of an Arab diplomat, and through arenas and communications that took place in more than one country, including (his workplace), they turned their past electronic weapons on the man, in an incident that was documented and whose details were shared with by activist Mohammad Al-Yamani, without revealing names or identities.

Things appeared to be almost normal. The Arab diplomat worked in one of the countries, and in one way or another, “he became involved with his female citizen, who was residing in the same country where he worked. After a while, that woman threatened him with publishing the conversations and pictures she obtained in the context of their relationship, and asked him for financial compensation.”

The Arab diplomat responded “twice” to the blackmail. In the third time, he thought about resorting to the judiciary but later backed down after he learned that because of his situation, he must notify his country’s foreign ministry and embassy, which consequently means the case will be exposed and his professional future may be at risk.

But the surprise was that the two parties to the blackmail crime were not just two residents of the same country, as the Arab diplomat believed, and the victim discovered that “the perpetrator, who had left the crime scene for her home country to escape a potential prosecution, had carried out the operation on behalf of (a third party).”

This third party was none other than “the diplomat’s wife, who had a dispute with him and resided in their hometown. She (i.e. his wife) instigated the blackmailer from afar, taking advantage of her distance from the crime scene and the difficulty of prosecuting her internationally, to tighten the screws on the man with the aim to obtain divorce and financial gains, Al-Yamani recounted.

Fraud and impersonation

In late December 2021, Egyptian student at Ain Shams University, Shorouk Fouad (27), received a message via the Messenger application showing a photo of a person wearing clothes similar to the Egyptian police uniform.

The message included a claim from the sender that he “works as an officer,” and that he had received a report against her, accompanied by some pictures of her, according to what Shorouk told Asharq Al-Awsat.

In a stressful and confusing manner, the blackmailer pressured the Egyptian girl, who recounted: “He asked me to quickly send my data and pictures so that he would start moving to resolve the issue of the report in an amicable manner, and so that it would not reach my family. Under the pressure of fear and tension, I sent him my data, my location, and my photos.”

The relationship took immediately a different turn as soon as the sender obtained the girl’s data and photos. He began to blackmail her for the purpose of “establishing a relationship,” according to what she says, otherwise he would expose her in front of her family. Shorouk confirms that her blackmailer, in further threatening her, “actually created pages on social media” using her photos.

Shorouk, and her family, who supported her after learning of what had happened, thought that filing a police report would prosecute the accused and end a nightmare that had long exhausted them, but instead received a shocking news.

The first thing that awaited the girl was that “officials from the Qalyubia Security Directorate and officers from the Internet Investigations” told her, according to her account, that he (i.e. the blackmailer) “is impersonating an officer, and that officers are prohibited from posting pictures in uniform on any social networking site.” The second surprise was that the blackmailer who spoke to her in an “Egyptian dialect” was communicating with her “via a phone number belonging to a Libyan telecommunications company.”

In addition to the psychological pressure, the girl suffered the loss of her engagement after problems arose with the young man she was in a relationship with. Regarding the pursuit of her blackmailer, “the only report she was able to file was dated January 4, 2022, at the Qalyubia Security Directorate,” which serves its place of residence. It included her accusation of the blackmailer of impersonating her on Facebook, while saying that she “was informed that no action could be taken against other crimes, because the phone number is not Egyptian.”

...But can anyone obtain a Libyan phone number without his data being available to service providers?

In an effort to investigate Shorouk’s case, Asharq Al-Awsat obtained the phone number through which the Egyptian girl said she received blackmail messages. Based on its key number, the author of this investigation could prove that it belonged to a specific company that provides mobile phone services in Libya. He sent an inquiry to the company, asking whether it was possible for a person to buy a line belonging to the company without proof of his identity... An official in charge of the company’s accounts on social media stated that the rules for purchasing its lines include “providing the national number and proof of identity.” (ID card or passport).

When we asked the company official about the possibility of a non-Libyan citizen purchasing a line, he said that in that case it was necessary to “present a valid passport and a valid residence certificate.”

Determining the identity of the owner of the line, or at least the person who sold it to its current user, then seems possible, as Egypt and Libya signed, along with other countries, in 2010 the “Arab Agreement to Combat Information Technology Crimes.”

The agreement stipulates the provision of technical and legal assistance and the extradition of criminals in a number of criminal cases, including “sexual exploitation.” While Egypt ratified the convention in 2014, Libya, which is rife with political conflicts, is yet to endorse it.

Libyan women under threat

Does the situation seem different from the case of the Egyptian Shorouk in Libya, for example? Libyan human rights activist Khadija Al-Bouaishi tells us that she was “a witness and a supporting party for a number of Libyan women who fell victim to blackmail by a perpetrator in another Arab country. They were asked to send sums of money, otherwise... he (the blackmailer) threatened to publish their pictures and information and say that they practice witchcraft.”

Once again, due to the failure to activate international prosecutions, the attempts of these Libyan women to take the legal course against their blackmailer, who resides in another country, were shattered. Al-Bouaishi attributes the matter to “weak legislation, the absence of technical qualifications, and the lack of a local security apparatus specialized in combating cybercrimes.”

“Thus, many obstacles hinder the prosecution of blackmailers inside the country, and the cases are also more complex and almost impossible if the perpetrator is outside Libya,” she remarked.

Crimes without confrontation... and a rare experience for the Interpol

As technological crimes rely on unconventional means, they do not require a confrontation between the perpetrator and the victim, which guarantees relative safety for the perpetrators, and enable them to some degree to hide and evade prosecution, especially when their activities occur across borders,” Former Assistant Minister of the Interior for Information Technology and Internet Crimes, Major General Mahmoud Al-Rashidi, told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The main feature in cases of electronic blackmail, according to Al-Rashidi, is that some “perpetrators rely on exhausting the victims by directing intense abuse based on artificial information with the aim of subjecting the targets to blackmail.”

The Interpol places cybercrime among its areas of competence, noting that criminals adopt new techniques to commit attacks against governments, companies and individuals, and that crimes do not stop at borders, whether they were physical or virtual and cause damage and pose threats to victims around the world.

The Interpol press office did not respond to questions sent by Asharq Al-Awsat to find out the extent of its participation in operations to pursue, seize, or exchange information in transnational electronic blackmail crimes, especially in Arab countries.

However, a rare experiment carried out by the organization in 2014 resulted in the arrest of 58 people within organized crime networks operating from the Philippines, and which was behind “sexual blackmail” cases, including the case of Scottish teenager Daniel Perry (17), who committed suicide in 2013 after falling victim to an extortion attempt on the Internet.

According to Interpol, this operation was the first of its kind, and witnessed the participation of police agencies in Scotland, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines, as well as the US National Security Investigations Division, in a process funded by the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Despite the Arab precedence in establishing a convention to combat transnational information crimes, these crimes are happening and will continue to occur, until the right mechanisms are put into effect and executive entities are formed to overcome obstacles that hinder its implementation. Only then may hundreds and perhaps thousands of victims be saved from extremely bad fates that begin with defamation and stigma and sometimes end with murder.



Worn Banknotes, Tobacco Taxes: How Hamas Pays Its Members

Palestinians shop amid the rubble in Khan Younis in southern Gaza, February last year (DPA)
Palestinians shop amid the rubble in Khan Younis in southern Gaza, February last year (DPA)
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Worn Banknotes, Tobacco Taxes: How Hamas Pays Its Members

Palestinians shop amid the rubble in Khan Younis in southern Gaza, February last year (DPA)
Palestinians shop amid the rubble in Khan Younis in southern Gaza, February last year (DPA)

More than two months after a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas took effect in Gaza, the group has steadily reasserted some security control in areas under its authority. Yet for Gaza’s residents, daily economic hardship and deteriorating living conditions show little sign of easing.

Hamas’s popular base, made up of its members, their families, and supporters, remains a key pillar of its strength. Nearly two years of war with Israel have partially disrupted the group’s ability to consistently pay salaries.

During the war, Israel sought to dry up Hamas’s financial network by killing figures responsible for transferring money inside Gaza, as well as raiding currency exchange companies in the occupied West Bank that Israeli authorities said were linked to Palestinian factions.

According to field sources and Hamas officials who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, the group faced difficulties and delays in paying salaries regularly at leadership, field and other levels due to security conditions.

It has since resumed partial payments to all its members, including leaders and fighters from the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s armed wing, while paying lower rates to its preaching and social apparatus, described as civilian elements.

Where does Hamas get its money?

Sources agree that Hamas has managed to preserve some of its financial resources, including commercial activities inside and outside Gaza. One Hamas source said these business revenues generate income for the group alongside funds received from supporting parties such as Iran and others.

They added that such external support fluctuates, sometimes declining, increasing or arriving with delays for reasons related to the donors.

The source said Hamas faces growing difficulties in transferring funds into Gaza, forcing those overseeing salary payments to rely on whatever cash remains accessible in their reserves or to collect revenues from their own commercial sources.

How are salaries paid?

Sources who receive some of these payments told Asharq Al-Awsat, on condition of anonymity, that salaries and stipends were sometimes paid regularly each month but were also delayed by periods ranging from six weeks to two months.

A Hamas source said salary rates varied and did not exceed 80 percent at best, particularly for leaders and operatives in the Qassam Brigades and at the political level.

Lower percentages were paid to the preaching and social apparatus and other bodies, alongside allocations for activities aimed at supporting the population and what the group calls its popular base.

The source said the lowest rates were paid to government employees at both civilian and military levels, reaching 60 percent at most before declining in recent months to around 35 percent.

Several sources said Hamas continues to pay stipends to the families of its members and leaders killed over decades of its activities, as well as to prisoners and wounded fighters.

They added that the group also supports families whose salaries were cut by the Palestinian Authority, continues to provide social assistance and allocates funds to projects aimed at supporting its popular base, including food aid, water provision and communal kitchens, in coordination with foreign institutions.

Asked how salaries are delivered, Hamas sources said payments are made through tight networks and by hand to avoid Israeli monitoring of electronic wallets and banks.

Worn banknotes and tobacco taxes

As Hamas relies on manual delivery, questions remain over how it secures cash under Israel’s blockade. A Hamas source said the process was complex and could not be disclosed for security reasons.

Local sources outside Hamas said the group depends heavily on traders to obtain cash, alongside its existing cash reserves and revenues from businesses it operates.

One source said Hamas often pays worn banknotes to government employees in particular, and to a lesser extent to Qassam fighters and political figures. This forces recipients to manage on their own as most traders refuse to accept damaged or worn currency.

Hamas has encouraged some small traders, especially fruit and vegetable sellers, to accept such notes in exchange for continued support and access to goods at lower prices.

Another source said Hamas has imposed taxes on certain goods, such as tobacco products, to raise funds, noting that most cigarette traders deal in cash rather than electronic wallets, which many Gaza residents now rely on.

Israeli accusations against Iran

On Dec. 7, Israel accused Iran of supporting what it described as a banking network transferring hundreds of thousands of dollars to Hamas. Israel said the network consisted of Gaza-based money changers residing in Türkiye who exploit the country’s financial infrastructure for what it called terrorist purposes.

According to Israel, the network operated in full cooperation with the Iranian regime, transferring funds to Hamas and its leaders and managing wide ranging economic activity involving receiving money from Iran, storing it and transferring it to Hamas via Türkiye.

Israel published the identities of three individuals, including an official in Hamas’s financial apparatus and two money changers from Gaza, claiming they worked under the direction of Khalil al-Hayya.

Sources familiar with the two men told Asharq Al-Awsat they have lived outside Gaza for many years.

One was known to work with various Palestinian factions and had previously smuggled funds for them, including through tunnels along the Egyptian border, while also operating as a businessman in multiple fields beyond currency exchange.

Hamas sources dismissed the accusations as baseless, saying the group has its own methods for transferring funds.

They said Hamas often faces difficulties moving money from abroad into Gaza, a problem that also affects the West Bank due to Israeli pursuit and Palestinian Authority security pressure, though conditions there are better than in Gaza for transferring funds.

Sources from other Palestinian factions said they are also suffering financial crises and difficulties paying salaries and stipends to their members and leaders.

They said they sometimes distribute food aid and other assistance to help their members and families cope with harsh economic conditions, with most of the support coming through institutions backed by Iran or other parties.


Shadow Battles in Syria: Fighting ISIS, Rebuilding the State 

An aerial photograph shows thousands of people celebrating the first anniversary since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad near The Damascus Sword monument in Umayyad Square, in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025. (AFP)
An aerial photograph shows thousands of people celebrating the first anniversary since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad near The Damascus Sword monument in Umayyad Square, in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025. (AFP)
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Shadow Battles in Syria: Fighting ISIS, Rebuilding the State 

An aerial photograph shows thousands of people celebrating the first anniversary since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad near The Damascus Sword monument in Umayyad Square, in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025. (AFP)
An aerial photograph shows thousands of people celebrating the first anniversary since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad near The Damascus Sword monument in Umayyad Square, in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025. (AFP)

At the entrances to Damascus branching off the Mezzeh highway, just before Umayyad Square, young men with a quasi-military appearance line both sides of the road, selling flags and banners for “Liberation Day.”

In narrower streets and at intersections leading deeper into the city, they are met by women in long dresses, some with headscarves pulled halfway across their faces. The women drag one or two children behind them and carry loaves of bread for sale, stacking them openly and thrusting them toward passersby and car windows — unwrapped, exposed to diesel fumes and the dust rising from the rubble encircling the capital.

Selling bread in this manner has gradually become a “profession,” largely female, expanding as poverty deepens. Women queue at bakeries to purchase their ration, resell it for a small margin, then return to the lines, repeating the cycle late into the night.

This scene is not confined to Damascus; it recurs across Syrian cities and regions I visited, from Homs and Idlib to Aleppo. Over time, this female presence has become woven into the landscape of a prolonged crisis, a quiet pillar of daily survival.

Widespread destruction

If women’s exhausted faces and roughened hands are the clearest witnesses to a catastrophe now nearing its fifteenth year, the unrelenting destruction bears equally stark testimony. Entire neighborhoods and suburbs, flattened to the ground, ring Damascus, choking it in dust and debris.

The same gray desolation dominates major cities and their surrounding countryside, stretching across vast expanses of the country. Driving more than 350 kilometers without encountering a single intact tree, neighborhood, or home offers a visceral sense of what over a decade of killing, destruction, and vengeance has left behind.

The scale of devastation reflects not only military confrontations or the superiority of one side, but a deliberate effort to annihilate people and livelihoods, to extinguish even the faintest hope of return. What bombs spared was often burned, looted, or rendered uninhabitable. And yet, returns are taking place slowly, haltingly, through sheer individual persistence.

Only a few enclaves have endured in Damascus and its markets, or beyond in certain towns and districts, some even prospering, driven by sectarian calculations or political and commercial interests, most notably those tied to the production and trafficking of captagon.

A view of Damascus, Syria. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Damascus: The polished façade

Damascus was preparing for exceptional celebrations marking the first anniversary of Bashar al-Assad’s ouster. Preparations were extensive: stages erected, loudspeakers installed, traffic rerouted, and banners raised proclaiming national unity, “One people... one nation”, and announcing that “the dark era has ended.”

Programs circulated via text messages urging citizens to participate and “celebrate freedom and hope... and complete the story.” But which story? The question reverberates through streets where bread is sold on bare asphalt while victory celebrations unfold.

Here, narratives multiply and diverge, sometimes to the point of contradiction, like neighboring bubbles that coexist without touching. A sharp vertical divide in perspectives remains, recalling 2011, when Syrians split to the brink between supporters and opponents, even as official discourse insists on projecting a seamless image of a new phase.

Silent security battle

Behind the celebratory façade, another battle is underway, which is quieter and more complex. “ISIS, especially the muhajireen [foreign fighters], poses our most serious challenge,” a senior Syrian security source who requested anonymity told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that arrests and “neutralizations” are carried out regularly.

Another source explained that “security operations are conducted with precision and professionalism. Lists of those affiliated with extremist organizations under the broad ISIS umbrella are already in the hands of the security services.”

He added: “We know them individually. We monitor them closely. The former regime left behind an extremely detailed surveillance system that we continue to rely on.”

I met both sources days before the recent Palmyra incident. When it occurred, it appeared unsurprising; officials and those in sensitive positions had anticipated such scenarios as among several looming security risks, especially after Syria formally joined the counterterrorism coalition.

One source summarized these risks as three simultaneous confrontations: “First, the fight against ISIS and its offshoots, handled with extreme caution because it poses a personal threat to President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Second, the confrontation with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which threatens the emerging state and its identity over the long term. Third, a colder, less intense standoff with Israel linked to developments in Sweida.”

In a semi-official assessment, the security source did not rule out that those released from al-Hol camp could become “time bombs,” exploited to destabilize internal security and serve the agendas of extremists rejecting the current transition of power.

Such incidents could also signal abroad that stripping the SDF of its “counterterrorism” duties would be futile, potentially “opening the door to packs of lone wolves.”

Destruction from fighting between the regime forces and opposition is seen in the Yarmuk camp on the outskirts of Damascus. (EPA)

Is a security approach enough?

The challenge confronting the state is not purely a security one, and a strictly securitized approach lacks consensus even within governing circles.

Contrary to those who view ISIS and extremism as a “technical problem” solvable through force alone, a figure close to the political leadership argues that “the core issue lies in absorbing a massive human bloc that spent years outside any normal social framework, without education, stable families, or organized structures of life.”

“The real challenge,” he added, “is integrating them into the idea of the state and rehabilitating them accordingly. Just as these adolescents were once pulled toward a specific form of extremism, today we must work to move them toward a middle ground.”

“If the president says we are leaving a factional phase and entering a state-based one, how does that happen at the grassroots level? Is it merely individual and security-driven, or is it societal as well?” he wondered.

In this light, one observer interpreted al-Sharaa’s statement — “Obey me so long as I obey God among you” — delivered from the Umayyad Mosque on the night of the grand celebration and widely criticized by civil and secular circles, as a message aimed at a different audience: a segment the state seeks to reassure through a religious call to obedience and rejection of rebellion.

If words come easily, lived reality does not.

Security is tightly enforced in major cities, such as Damascus and Aleppo, through heavy deployments and modern technologies, including drones, especially during sensitive periods like mass anniversary celebrations.

Beyond the cities, however, vast rural areas remain largely neglected, marked by immense destruction, extreme poverty, and rampant unemployment. Checkpoints line major inter-provincial roads, but side towns and village alleys are often left to fend for themselves.

Idlib, once cited as an exception for its services and administrative capacity, has lost much of that distinction since liberation. Opening to the rest of Syria exposed the city and its devastated countryside to the demands of ordinary life, revealing governance that had amounted largely to crisis management. That legacy persists even in everyday language: soldiers addressing civilians as “sheikh,” or telling them to “seek God’s help” as shorthand for “move along.”

Between Idlib’s countryside and Aleppo, villages and small towns are known for particular loyalties and affiliations — some far removed from the moderation celebrated on Damascus stages. Their reputations lead drivers to take longer routes considered “safer.”

In this belt, young men, especially the youngest, have long served as fuel for armed factions. In recent years, only Hayat Tahrir al-Sham maintained dominance on the ground.

After the fall of the regime, thousands joined the general security forces or the army, often for lack of alternatives. Many cannot afford to rebuild destroyed homes or recover looted livelihoods; barracks, offering food and shelter, remain preferable to civilian life.

A fabric of clashing identities

These identities crystallized during years of militarization, particularly after 2013, though their social roots run deeper. Today, anyone associated with the new authority is often labeled “Idlibi,” after Idlib — the stronghold of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham for nine years — a term frequently tinged with condescension in Damascus and Aleppo. Understanding the social and economic distinctions among these rural communities helps explain their divergent political and military choices.

Some towns, organized around extended families, land ownership, and later labor migration beginning in the mid-1980s, invested in education and professional paths while maintaining a socially rooted religiosity. These communities had previously experienced nationalist and Arabist currents before Baathist authoritarianism took hold.

Others, smaller towns built around sub-clans, relied on seasonal agriculture and service in the police and security apparatus of the former regime. They welcomed their sons’ joining the Nusra Front when it began recruiting, seeing in it both as an organized military path against Assad and a religious identity long suppressed.

Added to this are vast desert regions governed by tribal structures and shifting systems of mutual aid.

Though all are Arab Sunnis, their behaviors, loyalties, and alignments differed, shaping how radical factions penetrated some communities while failing in others, often setting one group against another.

Syrian security forces detain a suspect during an anti-ISIS operation in the Idlib countryside on December 1. (Syrian Interior Ministry)

Idlib and the keys to Damascus

When security officials say today they know extremists “one by one,” they rely partly on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s security apparatus and its accumulated knowledge of radical factions it fought in recent years, such as Jund al-Aqsa and the al-Qaeda-aligned Hurras al-Din, along with informant networks.

Idlib remains, to a significant extent, a secure stronghold holding key levers of power. Courts, administrative bodies, and civil registries still operate under the “Sharia courts” established in mid-2013, unlike other regions, especially Damascus, where transactions are centralized.

Sources identify three main recruitment pathways used by ISIS and its offshoots: ideological recruitment, the fastest and most effective, especially among youth who embraced extremism and have yet to absorb Syria’s rapid changes; recruitment driven by money and revenge amid pervasive poverty and lost status; and recruitment among foreign fighters, embittered by abandonment and with little left to lose.

The emerging state and the ‘Sahwa’ model

When President al-Sharaa returned from Washington, he carried a daunting mandate: to “confront and dismantle terrorist networks” linked to remnants of ISIS, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah, and Hamas, according to US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack.

While Israel has targeted Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, Syria must contend with their residual networks. Yet the greater challenge remains ISIS and its offshoots, fighters who, until recently, were close “brothers in arms” to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

As observers await the form this confrontation will take, particularly in the absence of a unified army with a clear doctrine, Washington’s earlier experiment in post-Saddam Iraq looms large: the Sunni-on-Sunni “Awakening” (Sahwa).

The Sahwa rested on what an informed Iraqi source described as a “coalition of the harmed” from al-Qaeda, centered in Anbar province with its Sunni Arab identity and traditional religiosity. A similar model could emerge in Syria through an alliance of communities damaged by ISIS in the north and northeast, led by the emerging state that wants to fight extremism.

The Iraqi source, who closely followed the Sahwa’s rise and subsequent decline under then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, noted that tribes around Ramadi, especially al-Bourisha, al-Buallwan, al-Bou Fahd, and to a lesser extent al-Dulaim, formed the backbone of the fight after al-Qaeda devastated their trade and social fabric.

Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, greets people as he attends celebrations marking the first anniversary of the ousting of former President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, Syria, Monday, Dec. 8, 2025. (AP)

Though some were coerced into allegiance, clashes never fully ceased, culminating in atrocities such as the massacre of the al-Bu Nimr tribe, where nearly 2,000 men were executed. A Syrian parallel is the al-Shaitat tribe, which resisted ISIS and suffered one of the largest massacres, with around 1,800 young men killed.

Those who joined the Sahwa were required to publicly renounce al-Qaeda and integrate into security forces coordinated with US troops, in hopes of transforming that tribal bloc into a political actor.

From arms to politics

The Iraqi source highlighted a central lesson: despite the Sahwa’s security successes, it failed to transition into meaningful political participation. When its leaders entered elections, they achieved little representation and failed to build durable popular support.

That failure mirrors Syria’s core dilemma today: the collective transition from a factional, militarized reality confined to limited geography toward a state defined by broader political and administrative principles — and, militarily, by the monopoly of force within a single national army.

Between a woman selling bread on a street corner, a young man dancing in a public square, and institutions struggling to impose order and define the state, Syria appears as a country of overlapping bubbles: a glossy façade prepared for celebration, like a carefully designed postcard, and beneath it a fragile social and security depth whose battles remain unresolved.


Iraq’s Dreams of Wheat Independence Dashed by Water Crisis 

A drone view shows a circular wheat field in the desert of Basra, Iraq, November 27, 2025. (Reuters)
A drone view shows a circular wheat field in the desert of Basra, Iraq, November 27, 2025. (Reuters)
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Iraq’s Dreams of Wheat Independence Dashed by Water Crisis 

A drone view shows a circular wheat field in the desert of Basra, Iraq, November 27, 2025. (Reuters)
A drone view shows a circular wheat field in the desert of Basra, Iraq, November 27, 2025. (Reuters)

Iraqi wheat farmer Ma'an al-Fatlawi has long depended on the nearby Euphrates River to feed his fields near the city of Najaf. But this year, those waters, which made the Fertile Crescent a cradle of ancient civilization 10,000 years ago, are drying up, and he sees few options.

"Drilling wells is not successful in our land, because the water is saline," al-Fatlawi said, as he stood by an irrigation canal near his parched fields awaiting the release of his allotted water supply.

A push by Iraq - historically among the Middle East's biggest wheat importers - to guarantee food security by ensuring wheat production covers the country's needs has led to three successive annual surpluses of the staple grain.

But those hard-won advances are now under threat as the driest year in modern history and record-low water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers have reduced planting and could slash the harvest by up to 50% this season.

"Iraq is facing one of the most severe droughts that has been observed in decades," the UN Food and Agriculture Organization's Iraq representative Salah El Hajj Hassan told Reuters.

VULNERABLE TO NATURE AND NEIGHBORS

The crisis is laying bare Iraq's vulnerability.

A largely desert nation, Iraq ranks fifth globally for climate risk, according to the UN's Global Environment Outlook. Average temperatures in Iraq have risen nearly half a degree Celsius per decade since 2000 and could climb by up to 5.6 C by the end of the century compared to the period before industrialization, according to the International Energy Agency. Rainfall is projected to decline.

But Iraq is also at the mercy of its neighbors for 70% of its water supply. And Türkiye and Iran have been using upstream dams to take a greater share of the region's shared resource.

The FAO says the diminishing amount of water that has trickled down to Iraq is the biggest factor behind the current crisis, which has forced Baghdad to introduce rationing.

Iraq's water reserves have plunged from 60 billion cubic meters in 2020 to less than 4 billion today, said El Hajj Hassan, who expects wheat production this season to drop by 30% to 50%.

"Rain-fed and irrigated agriculture are directly affected nationwide," he said.

EFFORTS TO END IMPORT DEPENDENCE UNDER THREAT

To wean the country off its dependence on imports, Iraq's government has in recent years paid for high-yield seeds and inputs, promoted modern irrigation and desert farming to expand cultivation, and subsidized grain purchases to offer farmers more than double global wheat prices.

It is a plan that, though expensive, has boosted strategic wheat reserves to over 6 million metric tons in some seasons, overwhelming Iraq's silo capacity. The government, which purchased around 5.1 million tons of the 2025 harvest, said in September that those reserves could meet up to a year of demand.

Others, however, including Harry Istepanian - a water expert and founder of Iraq Climate Change Center - now expect imports to rise again, putting the country at greater risk of higher food prices with knock-on effects for trade and government budgets.

"Iraq's water and food security crisis is no longer just an environmental problem; it has immediate economic and security spillovers," Istepanian told Reuters.

A preliminary FAO forecast anticipates wheat import needs for the 2025/26 marketing year to increase to about 2.4 million tons.

Global wheat markets are currently oversupplied, offering cheaper options, but Iraq could once again face price volatility.

A person walks along the edge of uncultivated farmland on the outskirts of Najaf, where dry soil stretches across fields left unplanted due to water shortages, in Najaf, Iraq, November 29, 2025. (Reuters)

Iraq's trade ministry did not respond to a request for comment on the likelihood of increased imports.

In response to the crisis, the ministry of agriculture capped river-irrigated wheat at 1 million dunams in the 2025/26 season - half last season's level - and mandated modern irrigation techniques including drip and sprinkler systems to replace flood irrigation through open canals, which loses water through evaporation and seepage.

A dunam is a measurement of area roughly equivalent to a quarter acre.

The ministry is allocating 3.5 million dunams in desert areas using groundwater. That too is contingent on the use of modern irrigation.

"The plan was implemented in two phases," said Mahdi Dhamad al-Qaisi, an advisor to the agriculture minister. "Both require modern irrigation."

Rice cultivation, meanwhile, which is far more water-intensive than wheat, was banned nationwide.

RURAL LIVELIHOODS AT RISK

One ton of wheat production in Iraq requires about 1,100 cubic meters of water, said Ammar Abdul-Khaliq, head of the Wells and Groundwater Authority in southern Iraq. Pivoting to more dependence on wells to replace river water is risky.

"If water extraction continues without scientific study, groundwater reserves will decline," he said.

Basra aquifers, he said, have already fallen by three to five meters.

Groundwater irrigation systems are also expensive due to the required infrastructure like sprinklers and concrete basins. That presents a further economic challenge to rural Iraqis, who make up around 30% of the population.

Some 170,000 people have already been displaced in rural areas due to water scarcity, the FAO's El Hajj Hassan said.

"This is not a matter of only food security," he said. "It's worse when we look at it from the perspective of livelihoods."

At his farm in Najaf, al-Fatlawi is now experiencing that first-hand, having cut his wheat acreage to a fifth of its normal level this season and laid off all but two of his 10 workers.

"We rely on river water," he said.