'Long Arms'…Cross-border Cyber Blackmail Crimes without Effective Deterrence

Asharq Al-Awsat Investigated Cases Related to 5 Countries

'Long Arms'…Cross-border Cyber Blackmail Crimes without Effective Deterrence
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'Long Arms'…Cross-border Cyber Blackmail Crimes without Effective Deterrence

'Long Arms'…Cross-border Cyber Blackmail Crimes without Effective Deterrence

Egyptian Engineer Mohamed Ahmed, 40, was on annual leave abroad with his family in July 2021 when he received an email from an official in the administration of his 7-year-old son's school, informing him of the need to "communicate immediately for an urgent and important matter."

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, the man said he was surprised by the urgency of the message, especially as his son was with him on his vacation. When he contacted the school administration, the official told him that they had received warning letters accompanied by a picture of his son that included “accusations and abuse against the family and the child, as well as extremely serious health allegations against them,” which usually cause stigma in Arab societies.

Between the Arab country, where engineer Mohamed Ahmed works (and still does), and his birthplace in Egypt (from where it was later proven that those messages were issued, and the judicial authorities accused a woman of being behind them), the man lived through episodes of cross-border crimes, including “death threats, financial blackmail, defamation, insults and slander”, which took him nearly 10 years to prove.

But the man is not a single case. Asharq Al-Awsat investigated similar crimes and documented them by interviewing the victims, reviewing official investigations, attending trials, hearing the testimonies of activists and verifying incidents that took place in more than 5 countries, most of them in the Arab region, as well as victims from other Arab countries who later declined to participate in the investigation, for fear of stigma, despite their initial approval.

The investigation reveals that the perpetrators relied on “being outside the borders of the country” where the crime took place, using “long electronic arms,” and taking advantage of “the difficulty of prosecution.”

"The investigation reveals that the perpetrators relied on being outside the borders of the country where the crime took place, using long electronic arms, and taking advantage of the difficulty of prosecution."

The investigation also shows exploitation of a loophole represented by “the absence of a specialized regional executive entity (Arab at least), for the effective deterrence, prosecution, and exchange of information in transnational cyber-extortion crimes,” according to activists and officials in several countries, despite the presence of an “Arab Convention to Combat Information Technology Crimes” dating back to 2010, ratified by 11 countries.

Eng. Ahmed was “shocked” that the blackmail he was subjected to since 2013 extended to his son. His problem began about a decade ago when he received extensive calls from relatives and friends stating that they had received messages (via Facebook) containing “insults, slander, and defamation” related to his person. He recalls: “My acquaintances were embarrassed to inform me of the messages because of the low quality and ugly language.”

The man was an “ideal victim,” as he put it, and says that the perpetrator “took advantage on my residence outside the country, as well as my inability to easily prove that a crime had been committed against me, and that at a time (late 2013) the issue of prosecuting information technology crimes was not common.” He adds sadly: “I remember that I used to receive 50 to 60 calls or messages daily informing me that my acquaintances had received these heinous abuses.”

In 2002, Egypt established a department affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior to “combat computer crimes,” but it continued to operate in a semi-centralized manner in the capital. Then, it expanded over time through regional offices that serve geographical areas covering more than one governorate. In April 2021, the Interior Ministry announced that citizens were now able to submit reports regarding cybercrimes to all security directorates in any Egyptian governorate.

For nearly 7 years, and during most of his annual vacations in Egypt, Eng. Ahmed was trying to write a report against the account that was accusing him of insults, but did not succeed “because of his presence outside the country,” as he put it, and his inability for years to quickly and urgently prove the crime had occurred. (Asharq Al-Awsat refrains from explaining the technical details used to prove the crime that the writer of the investigation reviewed in detail, in order to avoid illegal re-exploitation.)

The accused is outside our borders!

The issue of threatening the engineer’s son was central to his move in pursuing the woman accused of blackmailing him. Especially after the school administration informed him that it had notified the police of the Arab country in which it is located of the letters it had received. The officials informed the father (after his return from his vacation) that they had verified that the letters received by the school were from “outside their borders,” and therefore “they would not be able to take additional steps,” as he said.

Later, the “blackmailer” escalated her attack, “asking for money”, according to the official indictment against her, and broadcast the offensive content to the parents of the son’s classmates at school, further exacerbating his “harsh” experience, as he describes it.

As the pressures grew, the man was forced, as he told Asharq Al-Awsat, to take emergency leave from work for days and incur “large financial costs” to come to Egypt more than once to fulfill “a number of technical and legal requirements necessary to prove the crime” and file a lawsuit against the perpetrator.

Before the court

Inside the Mansoura Criminal Court in Dakahlia Governorate (135 kilometers north of Cairo), Asharq Al-Awsat attended the trial session of the accused in the case of engineer Mohamed Ahmed, where investigations indicated that the woman “used defamation and blackmail with more than 10 other victims inside and outside Egypt,” in addition to Engineer Ahmed.

At the end of one of the sessions that the accused attended after her arrest, Lawyer Ahmed Al-Bakri, who is the legal attorney of engineer Ahmed, spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, saying that the “pattern of that crime was innovative, because the perpetrator did not have special images or shameful facts, but only relied on information provided by social media sites, tracked the victim’s accounts and acquaintances, and focused on expanding the scope of defamation by messaging them.”

Based on this blackmailing case, which took place between two countries, Al-Bakri believes that there is a practical need to task the embassies with submitting complaints and reports related to electronic crimes, if the perpetrator had the same nationality of the victim, even if the latter resided in a different country.

If this proposal has merit...what about the cases in which the victim holds the nationality of one country and resides in it, while the perpetrator has a different nationality and residence?

Baghdad and Damascus... and between them, Berlin

Between three elements was the case of the Iraqi woman Shams (her nickname). Her blackmailer holds “Syrian nationality” and resides in “Germany,” according to what he told her, while she lives in one of the governorates of Iraq.

Mrs. Shams (32), a divorced mother of five children, spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity for fear that she would be exposed to danger.

She said: “Like everyone, I have accounts on social media, and through them, in early 2021, I met a person who told me that he was a Syrian refugee residing in Germany. Over time, the conversation between us developed and he proposed to marry and come to Iraq to get engaged and take responsibility for my children.”

She added: “I decided to talk to him and we got to know each other.” In a very low voice, which forced her to record her message twice, Mrs. Shams spoke, justifying the matter by saying that she feared being heard by a member of her family, whom she described as “extremist” and who resides with her due to her separation from her husband.

Over time, “his (the blackmailer’s) intentions began to appear, but he did not blackmail me financially, but rather with my private photos to force me to do what he wanted, otherwise he threatened to publish these photos,” the woman recounted.

With pain that resounded in her stuttering words, Shams narrates that, under the weight of fear, she tried to calm the blackmailer, “but to no avail... He started asking me for ‘some nice things’, and unfortunately I started doing everything he wanted, for a period of 6 months.”

However, things developed, and the woman was surprised that her blackmailer, according to her words, “began asking me to perform satisfactory sexual acts related to my five-year-old daughter... Then I fought with him and blocked him.”

Despite the risk of defying tribal norms and the fear of stigma if her problem was exposed, Shams tried to carefully follow the legal path to stop the threat. She says: “I called the (community police) in the governorate in which I live, and they could not help me because he (i.e. the blackmailer) was outside Iraq, and also communicated with National Security, and reached the same obstacle.”

Iraq has not yet been able to pass a law to combat cybercrimes, although a draft law was already submitted to Parliament 12 years ago and was subject to amendments. However, Iraqi executive authorities are tasked with confronting some cybercrimes and the blackmail associated with them, including the “Iraqi Community Police.”

According to an official statement, an annual increase in electronic blackmail crimes is observed in Iraq, amounting in 2021 to about 1,950 cases handled by the community police, said Brigadier General Ghaleb Al-Attiyah, the former commander of the Iraqi community police, in remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (He left his position in October).

The particularity of Iraqi society leaves its mark on the way extortion crimes are treated, since “most of the victims are women, especially children,” according to Al-Attiyah, who explained that the “seriousness of the matter is that these incidents in Iraqi society develop into what is known as crimes of honor killing, or killing to wash away shame, or suicide, not to mention girls running away from their families for fear of their lives.”

Al-Attiyah attributed the increase in electronic blackmail crimes to several reasons, including “the absence of a law on cybercrime, and reliance on the existing penal code dating back to the 1960s.”

When asked by Asharq Al-Awsat about the mechanism followed if the perpetrator was outside the borders of Iraq, he answered: “Certainly, in our work, we face many (transnational) cases... but frankly, we were able to address some of the incidents through (personal relationships) with officers in Arab countries... but this issue is difficult (...) and some routine procedures for tracking and prosecuting allow criminals to get away.”

A new obstacle hindered the attempts of Iraqi Shams to break free from the shackles of blackmail. If there is no developed local deterrent law that protects her if the perpetrator is residing in her country... then what if she faces a blackmailer from outside the borders?... And what did she proceed?

“Resist”

Luck was on Mrs. Shams’ side, as when she told a friend about her problem, he advised her to resort to the “Resist Initiative to Combat Electronic Blackmail.” The “Resist” volunteer initiative operates through electronic platforms on social media, and aims to “provide support” to victims.

“Resist” volunteers obtained enough information about the blackmailer’s identity. When they informed him that they would contact the German authorities if he did not stop the blackmailing immediately, he complied and ended his threats.

Despite its success in supporting the Iraqi woman, the founder of “Resist,” human rights activist Mohammad Al-Yamani, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We realize that it is not possible to fully rely on the efforts of activists in transnational blackmail cases, as the movement and coordination of the official police and judicial authorities has more impact and is more legal.”

“Resist” receives many complaints related to blackmail crimes and undertakes “directing victims to available legal paths, and completing the collection of required incriminating evidence through a legal support team,” according to its founder, who admits that “transnational electronic crimes are very difficult due to the technical and legal obstacles resulting from the absence of regional and international coordination in this field, compared, for example, to exchanging information between countries quickly and intensively in the case of money crimes or terrorism.

Al-Yamani calls for implementing agreements pertaining to electronic crimes between Arab countries as a “first stage,” and says: “An executive body must be established (similar to Interpol) to exchange information and prosecute criminals in electronic blackmail cases to protect victims.”

An Arab diplomat and a third party

Through the door of taking pride in the word, paying attention to the gesture, and staying away from what could stain the diplomatic suit, blackmailers of a unique type exploited a weak point in the life of an Arab diplomat, and through arenas and communications that took place in more than one country, including (his workplace), they turned their past electronic weapons on the man, in an incident that was documented and whose details were shared with by activist Mohammad Al-Yamani, without revealing names or identities.

Things appeared to be almost normal. The Arab diplomat worked in one of the countries, and in one way or another, “he became involved with his female citizen, who was residing in the same country where he worked. After a while, that woman threatened him with publishing the conversations and pictures she obtained in the context of their relationship, and asked him for financial compensation.”

The Arab diplomat responded “twice” to the blackmail. In the third time, he thought about resorting to the judiciary but later backed down after he learned that because of his situation, he must notify his country’s foreign ministry and embassy, which consequently means the case will be exposed and his professional future may be at risk.

But the surprise was that the two parties to the blackmail crime were not just two residents of the same country, as the Arab diplomat believed, and the victim discovered that “the perpetrator, who had left the crime scene for her home country to escape a potential prosecution, had carried out the operation on behalf of (a third party).”

This third party was none other than “the diplomat’s wife, who had a dispute with him and resided in their hometown. She (i.e. his wife) instigated the blackmailer from afar, taking advantage of her distance from the crime scene and the difficulty of prosecuting her internationally, to tighten the screws on the man with the aim to obtain divorce and financial gains, Al-Yamani recounted.

Fraud and impersonation

In late December 2021, Egyptian student at Ain Shams University, Shorouk Fouad (27), received a message via the Messenger application showing a photo of a person wearing clothes similar to the Egyptian police uniform.

The message included a claim from the sender that he “works as an officer,” and that he had received a report against her, accompanied by some pictures of her, according to what Shorouk told Asharq Al-Awsat.

In a stressful and confusing manner, the blackmailer pressured the Egyptian girl, who recounted: “He asked me to quickly send my data and pictures so that he would start moving to resolve the issue of the report in an amicable manner, and so that it would not reach my family. Under the pressure of fear and tension, I sent him my data, my location, and my photos.”

The relationship took immediately a different turn as soon as the sender obtained the girl’s data and photos. He began to blackmail her for the purpose of “establishing a relationship,” according to what she says, otherwise he would expose her in front of her family. Shorouk confirms that her blackmailer, in further threatening her, “actually created pages on social media” using her photos.

Shorouk, and her family, who supported her after learning of what had happened, thought that filing a police report would prosecute the accused and end a nightmare that had long exhausted them, but instead received a shocking news.

The first thing that awaited the girl was that “officials from the Qalyubia Security Directorate and officers from the Internet Investigations” told her, according to her account, that he (i.e. the blackmailer) “is impersonating an officer, and that officers are prohibited from posting pictures in uniform on any social networking site.” The second surprise was that the blackmailer who spoke to her in an “Egyptian dialect” was communicating with her “via a phone number belonging to a Libyan telecommunications company.”

In addition to the psychological pressure, the girl suffered the loss of her engagement after problems arose with the young man she was in a relationship with. Regarding the pursuit of her blackmailer, “the only report she was able to file was dated January 4, 2022, at the Qalyubia Security Directorate,” which serves its place of residence. It included her accusation of the blackmailer of impersonating her on Facebook, while saying that she “was informed that no action could be taken against other crimes, because the phone number is not Egyptian.”

...But can anyone obtain a Libyan phone number without his data being available to service providers?

In an effort to investigate Shorouk’s case, Asharq Al-Awsat obtained the phone number through which the Egyptian girl said she received blackmail messages. Based on its key number, the author of this investigation could prove that it belonged to a specific company that provides mobile phone services in Libya. He sent an inquiry to the company, asking whether it was possible for a person to buy a line belonging to the company without proof of his identity... An official in charge of the company’s accounts on social media stated that the rules for purchasing its lines include “providing the national number and proof of identity.” (ID card or passport).

When we asked the company official about the possibility of a non-Libyan citizen purchasing a line, he said that in that case it was necessary to “present a valid passport and a valid residence certificate.”

Determining the identity of the owner of the line, or at least the person who sold it to its current user, then seems possible, as Egypt and Libya signed, along with other countries, in 2010 the “Arab Agreement to Combat Information Technology Crimes.”

The agreement stipulates the provision of technical and legal assistance and the extradition of criminals in a number of criminal cases, including “sexual exploitation.” While Egypt ratified the convention in 2014, Libya, which is rife with political conflicts, is yet to endorse it.

Libyan women under threat

Does the situation seem different from the case of the Egyptian Shorouk in Libya, for example? Libyan human rights activist Khadija Al-Bouaishi tells us that she was “a witness and a supporting party for a number of Libyan women who fell victim to blackmail by a perpetrator in another Arab country. They were asked to send sums of money, otherwise... he (the blackmailer) threatened to publish their pictures and information and say that they practice witchcraft.”

Once again, due to the failure to activate international prosecutions, the attempts of these Libyan women to take the legal course against their blackmailer, who resides in another country, were shattered. Al-Bouaishi attributes the matter to “weak legislation, the absence of technical qualifications, and the lack of a local security apparatus specialized in combating cybercrimes.”

“Thus, many obstacles hinder the prosecution of blackmailers inside the country, and the cases are also more complex and almost impossible if the perpetrator is outside Libya,” she remarked.

Crimes without confrontation... and a rare experience for the Interpol

As technological crimes rely on unconventional means, they do not require a confrontation between the perpetrator and the victim, which guarantees relative safety for the perpetrators, and enable them to some degree to hide and evade prosecution, especially when their activities occur across borders,” Former Assistant Minister of the Interior for Information Technology and Internet Crimes, Major General Mahmoud Al-Rashidi, told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The main feature in cases of electronic blackmail, according to Al-Rashidi, is that some “perpetrators rely on exhausting the victims by directing intense abuse based on artificial information with the aim of subjecting the targets to blackmail.”

The Interpol places cybercrime among its areas of competence, noting that criminals adopt new techniques to commit attacks against governments, companies and individuals, and that crimes do not stop at borders, whether they were physical or virtual and cause damage and pose threats to victims around the world.

The Interpol press office did not respond to questions sent by Asharq Al-Awsat to find out the extent of its participation in operations to pursue, seize, or exchange information in transnational electronic blackmail crimes, especially in Arab countries.

However, a rare experiment carried out by the organization in 2014 resulted in the arrest of 58 people within organized crime networks operating from the Philippines, and which was behind “sexual blackmail” cases, including the case of Scottish teenager Daniel Perry (17), who committed suicide in 2013 after falling victim to an extortion attempt on the Internet.

According to Interpol, this operation was the first of its kind, and witnessed the participation of police agencies in Scotland, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines, as well as the US National Security Investigations Division, in a process funded by the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Despite the Arab precedence in establishing a convention to combat transnational information crimes, these crimes are happening and will continue to occur, until the right mechanisms are put into effect and executive entities are formed to overcome obstacles that hinder its implementation. Only then may hundreds and perhaps thousands of victims be saved from extremely bad fates that begin with defamation and stigma and sometimes end with murder.



Four Iranian Narratives on the Collapse of the ‘Resistance’ in Syria  

Iran's General Qassem Soleimani makes a phone call near the historic Citadel of Aleppo, winter 2016. (Fars)
Iran's General Qassem Soleimani makes a phone call near the historic Citadel of Aleppo, winter 2016. (Fars)
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Four Iranian Narratives on the Collapse of the ‘Resistance’ in Syria  

Iran's General Qassem Soleimani makes a phone call near the historic Citadel of Aleppo, winter 2016. (Fars)
Iran's General Qassem Soleimani makes a phone call near the historic Citadel of Aleppo, winter 2016. (Fars)

One hundred and ninety-two days separated the last meeting between Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Syria’s ousted President Bashar al-Assad in Tehran from the moment the Syrian regime fell to the opposition in December 2024.

That interval was no footnote in the Syrian war. It became a sharp mirror inside Tehran, reflecting the magnitude of the wager Iran’s leadership had placed on Assad, and the limits of its ability to anticipate the trajectory of the conflict and shifts in the regional balance of power.

At that meeting, Khamenei laid out the essence of his “Syrian doctrine” amid changing realities across the “Axis of Resistance.” Syria, he argued, was no ordinary state but one with a “special place” because its identity, in his view, stemmed from its role in this axis.

Since “resistance is Syria’s defining identity and must be preserved,” he addressed Assad not as a political ally but as a partner in that identity. He praised Assad for once saying that “the cost of resistance is lower than the cost of compromise” and that “whenever we retreat, the other side advances.” Thus, Khamenei reaffirmed his full - if belated – gamble on the regime’s survival, even as signs of collapse were unmistakable on the ground.

Less than seven months later, the regime would fall. Assad’s collapse would yield several Iranian narratives: the Supreme Leader’s, the Revolutionary Guard’s, the diplomatic narrative, and a fourth voiced from within the system itself, one that raised blunt questions about the price of Iran’s Syrian gamble.

Khamenei’s narrative

In his first speech after Assad’s fall, Khamenei offered a hard-edged explanation: the event, he said, was the product of a “joint American-Zionist plot,” aided by neighboring states. He spoke of factors that he claimed prevented Iran from providing the necessary support, including Israeli and US strikes inside Syria and the closure of air and land corridors to Iranian supplies.

He concluded that the decisive flaw lay within Syria itself, where the “spirit of resistance” had eroded in state institutions.

He stressed that the regime’s fall did not mean the fall of the idea of “resistance,” predicting that “patriotic Syrian youth” would one day revive it in a new form.

This narrative rejects the notion of strategic defeat: for Khamenei, what happened is not the end of the struggle, but a harsh phase in a longer one.

Revolutionary Guard’s narrative

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) adopted a language closer to national security logic than pure ideology, though it drew from the same lexicon. In 2013, cleric Mehdi Taeb, head of the IRGC’s Ammar Headquarters think tank, framed the equation starkly: “Syria is our 35th province... If the enemy attacks Syria or Khuzestan, our priority is to keep Syria.”

With that shocking sentence, Syria was elevated to the level of Iranian strategic geography, sometimes above parts of Iran itself.

Late General Qassem Soleimani, then commander of the Quds Force, became the chief architect of this approach: confronting threats abroad by building multinational militia networks and using the “protection of shrines” as a mobilizing slogan that fused ideology with national security calculations.

A month after Assad’s fall, at a memorial for Soleimani, Khamenei reaffirmed this school of thought, linking the defense of shrines in Damascus and Iraq to the defense of “Iran as a sanctuary,” aiming to bind various fronts into a single cross-border security-sectarian struggle.

After the Syrian regime’s collapse, this narrative preserved its core: success or failure is not defined by who sits in Damascus, but by whether the IRGC’s influence networks remain intact and whether Iran still has access to Syrian depth.

Full withdrawal would amount, in this logic, to admitting that the “35th province” had slipped from the map, so the IRGC will continue to search for any possible foothold.

Diplomatic narrative

Iran’s diplomatic apparatus sought to tell a softer story. Weeks before the fall, Khamenei dispatched his adviser Ali Larijani to Damascus and Beirut with reassuring messages for Assad and other allies, publicly asserting that events in Syria and Lebanon “directly concern Iran’s national security.”

Days later, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Damascus just six days before the collapse, even posing with shawarma in a downtown restaurant to signal “normalcy” and dismiss talk of impending downfall as “psychological warfare.”

It was the peak of the gap between diplomatic messaging and a disintegrating reality.

Afterward, the Foreign Ministry adopted a defensive formula: Iran had “responded to the request of an allied government”, but “cannot decide on behalf of peoples.” Thus, responsibility was shifted toward Syrian internal failures and the external “conspiracy” often invoked by Khamenei.

This narrative treats Syria as one file among many, not an existential arena as seen by the IRGC and the Leader.

‘Open account’ narrative

The fourth narrative emerged, unexpectedly, from within the establishment itself. For the first time, semi-public acknowledgments surfaced that the economic return on Iran’s Syrian adventure was nearly nil and that the political-security “investment” had resulted in something resembling a net loss.

In 2020, former member of the Iranian parliamentary national security and foreign policy committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh revealed that Tehran had spent “$20-30 billion” in Syria, insisting: “This is the people’s money and must be recovered.”

Five years later, he returned with a more bitter charge: Syria’s debts to Iran were effectively settled through “land without oil, cow farms without cows, and empty promises.”

This view is no outlier. Over a decade, Iranian protest slogans increasingly linked “Gaza, Lebanon, Syria” with bread, fuel, and economic hardship at home.

With Assad gone, critics more easily argue that Iran spent tens of billions and paid a human cost among its fighters and proxies, only to end up with almost no influence in Damascus.

For decision-makers, this narrative becomes domestic pressure against any large-scale return to Syria.

Four scenarios for Tehran

Taken together, these narratives reveal a deep contradiction: the IRGC and Khamenei refuse to concede that Iran “lost Syria,” treating the episode as one phase in a longer struggle. Meanwhile, the diplomatic and economic narratives acknowledge, implicitly, that the previous intervention model is no longer sustainable.

Four broad scenarios emerge. The first is a return through proxies, closest to the IRGC’s logic: Iran would rebuild influence from the ground up through militias - old or newly recruited - to pressure any future authority in Damascus.

The second is regional repositioning without Syria, in which Iran shifts resources to arenas where it still holds leverage, including Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Gaza, while limiting its role in Syria to preventing hostile entrenchment.

The third is a “gray” re-entry: a gradual, negotiated, non-confrontational return through localized deals or modest economic and security projects, allowing Tehran to claim continued presence without the cost of backing a single ruler.

The fourth is institutionalizing the loss: Iran accepts Syria’s departure from its strategic depth, but repackages the outcome within a narrative of “conspiracy and steadfastness,” using it to tighten internal control while maintaining symbolic presence through shrine rhetoric and minimal diplomacy.

Across all scenarios, one fact remains. Syria, which was once described as more vital than Khuzestan and the “distinct identity of resistance”, is no longer what it was before December 8, 2024 when the regime collapsed.

Tehran can invoke time, the IRGC can search for openings, diplomats can polish their statements, and critics can lament “land without oil.” But one question looms over every debate in Iran: Can Tehran afford a second Syrian-sized gamble after emerging from the first still trying to convince itself that the “resistance factor” remains standing, even as its Syrian pillar has broken?


A Year After Assad’s Fall, Families of Missing Detainees Languish without Answers 

Amina Beqai holds a photo of her husband, who went missing after he was arrested by security forces under the rule of ousted President Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, November 23, 2025. (Reuters)
Amina Beqai holds a photo of her husband, who went missing after he was arrested by security forces under the rule of ousted President Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, November 23, 2025. (Reuters)
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A Year After Assad’s Fall, Families of Missing Detainees Languish without Answers 

Amina Beqai holds a photo of her husband, who went missing after he was arrested by security forces under the rule of ousted President Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, November 23, 2025. (Reuters)
Amina Beqai holds a photo of her husband, who went missing after he was arrested by security forces under the rule of ousted President Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, November 23, 2025. (Reuters)

A year after dictator Bashar al-Assad's ouster in Syria, little has changed in Amina Beqai's desperate quest. She types her missing husband's name yet again into an internet search box, hoping for answers to a 13-year-old question. In vain.

Beqai has nowhere else to turn.

A National Commission for Missing Persons established in May has been gathering evidence of enforced disappearances under Assad, but has yet to offer families any clues on the estimated 150,000 people who vanished in his notorious prisons.

They include Beqai's husband Mahmoud, arrested by Syria's security forces at their home near Damascus on April 17, 2012, and her brother Ahmed, detained in August that year.

Assad's overthrow initially stirred hope that prison records could tell families if, when and how their loved ones died. Mass graves dug by Assad's forces across Syria could be exhumed. Victims could be properly buried.

None of that has transpired.

"It's been a year. They didn't do anything ... Is it thinkable that they didn't even get the documents for these men? Showing us the truth is what we want," Beqai told Reuters.

FADING HOPES

As opposition fighters swept through Syrian towns last year on the way to capturing Damascus, they rushed first to the jails, flinging doors open to free thousands of bewildered prisoners.

On December 8, 2024, hours after Assad fled to Russia, the fighters freed dozens of prisoners from Sednaya, dubbed "the human slaughterhouse" by Amnesty International for the industrial-scale torture and executions undertaken there.

The emerging detainees did not include Beqai's loved ones.

"When the prisons were open, and they didn't come back – that was the shock. That was when the hope ended, it really died," Beqai said. But she demands to know how, when and where her husband and brother may have died.

With no updates from the national commission, Beqai said she had become "obsessed" with her online hunt, scouring pictures of dead detainees and scans of prison documents published by Syrian news outlets who entered jails and security branches after Assad's fall.

"All there is left to do is sit and search," she said.

Such documents have revealed crucial information.

Sarah al-Khattab last saw her husband heading into a police station in Syria's south on February 9, 2019 to reconcile with Assad's government after years holed up with insurgents.

She has had no news of him since.

A spreadsheet of dead Sednaya prisoners seen by Reuters after Assad's fall included his name, Ali Mohsen al-Baridi, dating his death as October 22, 2019 from "stopped pulse and breathing" with orders that the body not be given to his family.

Reuters passed its finding to the Syrian Justice and Accountability Center, an advocacy group working with families of the missing, who informed Khattab.

COMMISSION SEEKS HELP, OVERSIGHT

The national commission was established by new President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The commission's media adviser, Zeina Shahla, told Reuters its mandate includes any missing Syrian, no matter the circumstances.

"When it comes to the pain of the families, maybe we really are being slow. But this file needs progress to come carefully, in a way that is scientific and systemic and not rushed," she said.

Next year, the commission hopes to launch a database of all the missing using documents from prisons and other locations. Exhuming mass graves requires more technical expertise and probably won't happen until 2027, Shahla said.

The commission has met with Syrian advocacy groups and some families. In November, it signed a cooperation agreement with the Geneva-based International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Commission on Missing Persons, which have global expertise on the issue.

Syria's commission hopes that will lead to more training for its personnel and access to equipment in short supply in Syria, including DNA testing labs for exhumed remains.

"We welcome any kind of cooperation and support we can receive, as long as the issue remains under (our commission's) authority,” Shahla said.

RELATIVES, ACTIVISTS DEMAND BETTER

The government's approach has upset organizations who developed expertise on enforced disappearances while in exile during the Assad era, six rights groups told Reuters.

Many were excited to apply that knowledge on the ground with Assad gone, but say the government's centralized approach has excluded them, slowed progress and left families in limbo.

"When you have as many as a quarter of a million people missing, you can't do that. You break up the work," said Ahmad Helmi, a Syrian activist who leads Ta'afi, an initiative focused on missing detainees and prison survivors.

Activists also accuse the commission of "monopolizing" detention-related documents.

In September, Syrian authorities briefly detained Amer Matar, an activist who founded a virtual museum to preserve detainees' experiences, accusing him of illegally accessing official documents for personal purposes.

In November, the commission urged families not to believe any detention-related documents shared on unofficial online platforms, like the ones Beqai has been searching, and threatened legal action against those outlets.

"The commission wants to monopolize the file, but it lacks the tools, the competence and the transparency. It demands the trust of families but delivers no results," Matar said.

Shahla said the commission is "the central, official body authorized to reveal the fate" of missing people and that families needed one place to go to for accurate answers.

Agnes Callamard, head of Amnesty International, said the commission should issue regular updates about its progress and consider granting financial aid to relatives of missing people.

"The most important thing ... the national commission can do at the moment is ensuring that families feel they are being heard and being supported," she told Reuters.

As Syria marks a year since Assad's downfall, many people remain exhausted by the same burden that plagued them under his rule: the lack of closure.

Alia Darraji last saw her son Yazan on November 1, 2014, as he left home to meet friends near Damascus. He never returned.

In the last year, the elderly woman has spent time in "truth tents" - sit-ins demanding information on disappeared Syrians that were unthinkable under Assad. While solidarity has helped, it hasn't given her what her heart aches for.

"We were hoping to find their bodies, to bury them, or to find out where they are," Darraji said.


‘It’s All Over’: How Iran Abandoned Assad to His Fate Days Before Fall

 Iran was a staunch backer of Bashar al-Assad but quickly withdrew its forces once as opposition forces took over Syria. (AFP)
Iran was a staunch backer of Bashar al-Assad but quickly withdrew its forces once as opposition forces took over Syria. (AFP)
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‘It’s All Over’: How Iran Abandoned Assad to His Fate Days Before Fall

 Iran was a staunch backer of Bashar al-Assad but quickly withdrew its forces once as opposition forces took over Syria. (AFP)
Iran was a staunch backer of Bashar al-Assad but quickly withdrew its forces once as opposition forces took over Syria. (AFP)

As city after city fell to a lightning opposition offensive in Syria last December, Iranian forces and diplomats supporting Bashar al-Assad saw the writing on the wall, abandoning the longtime ruler days before his ousting, sources told AFP.

During Syria's civil war, which erupted in 2011 following the government's brutal repression of pro-democracy protests, Iran was one of Damascus's biggest backers, sending Assad military advisers and forces from its Revolutionary Guards.

Iranian and allied regional fighters -- mainly from Lebanon's Hezbollah, but also from Iraq and Afghanistan -- had held key locations and helped prop up Assad, only to melt away in the face of opposition forces' headlong rush towards the capital.

Syrian officers and soldiers served under the Iranian Guards, whose influence grew during the conflict as Assad's power waned.

A former Syrian officer assigned to one of the Guards' security headquarters in Damascus said that on December 5 last year, his Iranian superior summoned him to an operations center in the Mazzeh district the following day to discuss an "important matter".

The former officer, requesting anonymity due to fears for his safety, said his superior, known as Hajj Abu Ibrahim, made a bombshell announcement to around 20 Syrian officers and soldiers gathered for the meeting.

"From today, there will be no more Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syria. We're leaving," they were told.

"It's all over. From today, we are no longer responsible for you."

He said they were ordered to burn or otherwise destroy sensitive documents and remove hard drives from computers.

- Border bottleneck -

The announcement came as the opposition forces were making huge gains, but it still took the Syrian soldiers by surprise, he said.

"We knew things hadn't been going well, but not to that extent."

They received one month's salary in advance and went home.

Two days later the opposition forces captured Damascus without a fight after Assad fled to Russia.

Two Syrian employees of Iran's consulate in Damascus, requesting anonymity for security reasons, also described a hasty Iranian exit.

The consulate was empty by the evening of December 5 as Iranian diplomats scarpered across the border to Beirut, they told AFP.

Several Syrian employees "who held Iranian nationality left with them, accompanied by senior Revolutionary Guards officers", according to one of the former employees.

At Jdeidet Yabus, Syria's main border crossing with Lebanon, taxi drivers and former staff reported a massive bottleneck on December 5 and 6, with an eight-hour wait to clear the frontier.

Both of the former consulate employees said the Iranians told their Syrian personnel to stay home and paid them three months' salary.

The embassy, consulate and all Iranian security positions were deserted by the morning of December 6, they said.

- Russian base -

During the war, forces under Iranian command were concentrated in sensitive areas inside Damascus and its suburbs, particularly the Sayyida Zeinab area, home to an important Shiite shrine, and around Damascus airport, as well as near the Lebanese and Iraqi borders.

Parts of the northern city of Aleppo and locations elsewhere in the province were also major staging areas for personnel and fighters.

At a site that used to be a key military base for Iranian forces south of Aleppo, Colonel Mohammad Dibo said that when the city fell early in the opposition campaign, "Iran stopped fighting".

Iranian forces "had to withdraw suddenly after the quick collapse" of Assad's military, said Dibo, who took part in the opposition offensive and now serves in Syria's new army.

On the heavily damaged walls of the abandoned base, an AFP journalist saw Iranian and Hezbollah slogans, and a painting of a sword tearing through an Israeli flag.

Tehran's foe Israel had launched hundreds of strikes on Syria over the course of the war, mainly saying it was targeting Assad's army and Iran-backed groups.

The former Syrian army officer who requested anonymity said that on December 5, a senior Iranian military official known as Hajj Jawad and several Iranian soldiers and officers were evacuated to Russia's Hmeimim base on the Mediterranean coast, then flown back to Tehran.

At the abandoned site near Aleppo, Dibo said that after the city's fall, "some 4,000 Iranian military personnel were evacuated via Russia's Hmeimim base" where they had taken refuge.

Others fled overland through Iraq or Lebanon, he said.

Their exit was so rushed that "when we entered their bases" in Aleppo province, "we found passports and identity documents belonging to Iranian officers who didn't even have time to retrieve them."