Destruction, Lawlessness and Red Tape Hobble Gaza Aid

FILE PHOTO: Trucks are parked at the Nitzana Crossing, in Nitzana, Israel, January 30, 2024. REUTERS/Alexandre Meneghini/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Trucks are parked at the Nitzana Crossing, in Nitzana, Israel, January 30, 2024. REUTERS/Alexandre Meneghini/File Photo
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Destruction, Lawlessness and Red Tape Hobble Gaza Aid

FILE PHOTO: Trucks are parked at the Nitzana Crossing, in Nitzana, Israel, January 30, 2024. REUTERS/Alexandre Meneghini/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Trucks are parked at the Nitzana Crossing, in Nitzana, Israel, January 30, 2024. REUTERS/Alexandre Meneghini/File Photo

In mid-March, a line of trucks stretched for 3 kilometers along a desert road near a crossing point from Israel into the Gaza Strip. On the same day, another line of trucks, some 1.5 kilometers long, sometimes two or three across, was backed up near a crossing from Egypt into Gaza.

The trucks were filled with aid, much of it food, for the more than 2 million Palestinians in the war-ravaged enclave. About 50 kilometers from Gaza, more aid trucks – some 2,400 in total – were sitting idle this month in the Egyptian city of Al Arish, according to an Egyptian Red Crescent official.

These motionless food-filled trucks, the main lifeline for Gazans, are at the heart of the escalating humanitarian crisis gripping the enclave. More than five months into Israel’s war with Hamas, a report by a global authority on food security has warned that famine is imminent in parts of Gaza, as more than three-quarters of the population have been forced from their homes and swathes of the territory are in ruins.

Galvanized by reports and images of starving children, the international community, led by the United States, has been pressuring Israel to facilitate the transfer of more aid into Gaza. Washington has airdropped food into the Mediterranean enclave and recently announced it would build a pier off the Gaza coast to help ferry in more aid.

UN officials have accused Israel of blocking humanitarian supplies to Gaza. The European Union’s foreign policy chief alleged Israel was using starvation as a “weapon of war.” And aid agency officials say Israeli red tape is slowing the flow of trucks carrying food supplies.

Israeli officials reject these accusations and say they have increased aid access to Gaza. Israel isn’t responsible for delays in aid getting into Gaza, they say, and the delivery of aid once inside the territory is the responsibility of the UN and humanitarian agencies. Israel has also accused Hamas of stealing aid.

Reuters interviewed more than two dozen people, including humanitarian workers, Israeli military officials and truck drivers, in tracing the tortuous route that aid takes into Gaza in an effort to identify the chokepoints and reasons for delays of supplies. Reuters also reviewed UN and Israeli military statistics on aid shipments, as well as satellite images of the border crossing areas, which revealed the long lines of trucks.

Before the aid shipments enter Gaza, they undergo a series of Israeli checks, and a shipment approved at one stage of the process can later be rejected, according to 18 aid workers and UN officials involved in the aid effort. At one crossing from Israel into Gaza, goods are twice loaded off trucks and then reloaded onto other trucks that then carry the aid to warehouses in Gaza. The aid delivery process can also be complicated by competing international demands, with some countries wanting their contributions to be prioritized.
Aid that does make it into Gaza can be ransacked by desperate civilians, sometimes fall prey to armed gangs, or get held up by Israeli army checkpoints. Half the warehouses storing aid in Gaza are no longer operational after having been hit in the fighting.

“It’s upsetting watching these aid trucks go nowhere and vast humanitarian supplies sit in warehouses when you think about what’s happening, right now, to the people who need them,” said Paolo Pezzati, an Oxfam worker who recently visited the queue of aid trucks near the Egypt-Gaza border.

Before the war began, an average of 200 trucks carrying aid entered Gaza each day, according to UN figures. A further 300 trucks laden with commercial imports, including food, agricultural supplies and industrial materials, also entered each day via Israel. Since the start of the war, an average of around 100 trucks have entered Gaza daily, according to a review of UN and Israeli military statistics on aid shipments.

While the trucks struggle to get into Gaza, the need for aid has risen dramatically, both because of the vast number of displaced people and the devastation of key infrastructure in Israel’s assault. This includes the destruction of bakeries, markets, and farmland whose crops met some of Gaza’s food needs.

“Previous wars weren’t like this,” said Alaa al-Atar, a municipal official, referring to conflicts in Gaza. “There wasn’t the destruction of all sources of subsistence – homes, farmland, infrastructure. There’s nothing left to survive on, just aid,” said Atar, who was displaced from the north to the south of Gaza early in the war.

To meet its minimum needs, aid agencies and UN officials say Gaza currently requires 500 to 600 trucks a day, including humanitarian aid and the commercial supplies that were coming in before the war. That’s about four times the number of trucks getting in now.

In March there has been an uptick, with an average of 150 trucks entering Gaza each day.

Some deliveries are being made by international air drops and via sea, but they aren't making up for shortfalls on the land routes. In the first three weeks of March, the equivalent of some 50 truckloads of aid was airdropped and brought in by sea, a Reuters tally based on Israeli military statistics showed.

The recent food security report, known as the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), found that a lack of aid means almost all households in Gaza are skipping meals every day and adults are cutting back on meals so their children can eat. The situation is particularly dire in northern Gaza, it said, where in nearly two-thirds of households, “people went entire days and nights without eating at least 10 times in the last 30 days.”

A senior Hamas official said Israel is responsible for the inadequate aid flows. The “biggest threat” to the distribution of aid is Israel’s ongoing attacks in Gaza, Hamas official Bassem Naim told Reuters. “The biggest obstacle to getting the aid to the people who need it is the continued gunfire and the continued targeting of aid and those who are handling it,” he said.

WAITING IN THE DESERT

Before some of the aid begins its journey to Gaza, it is flown to Cairo or shipped by sea to Port Said, which borders Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, about 150 kms to the west of Al Arish. From there, it is trucked to the city of Al Arish, on the Mediterranean coast. Some aid is also flown directly to the Egyptian city.

Once in Cairo or Al Arish, the aid undergoes its first check. International agencies submit a detailed inventory of each shipment to the Israeli military via the UN for clearance. Israel has long banned “dual use” items that it says could be used by Hamas to make weapons.

Of 153 requests made to the Israeli authorities for goods to enter Gaza between Jan. 11 and March 15, 100 were cleared, 15 were rejected outright and another 38 were pending, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs told Reuters. UN officials didn’t specify whether a request referred to a specific number of trucks or volume of aid. It takes almost a month on average to get a response, according to minutes of a meeting of aid agencies seen by Reuters.

The Israeli military says it approves almost 99% of the Gaza-bound trucks it inspects and that once the goods are inside the enclave, it is the responsibility of the international aid organizations to distribute it. The inspection process “isn’t the impediment” to aid “getting into the Gaza Strip,” said Shimon Freedman, a spokesman for COGAT, the Israeli military branch that handles aid transfers.

Diplomatic wrangling by countries donating aid can also create snarls in the delivery process. UN officials told Reuters that because aid comes not only from international agencies but also directly from individual donor countries, the process of deciding which trucks go to the front of the queue can be thorny even before they depart Al Arish.

The Egyptian Red Crescent official said donor countries “drop off aid in Al Arish or at Al Arish airport and walk away and say, ‘We gave out aid to Gaza.’” It is the Red Crescent and Egyptian authorities who then bear the responsibility of getting the aid to Gaza, he said.

From Al Arish, the trucks make the 50-kilometer journey to the Rafah crossing point on the Egypt-Gaza border.

Next stop: Israel’s truck-scanning centers.

Once they reach the Rafah crossing, some trucks are then required to drive along the Egypt-Israel border for 40 kilometers to an inspection facility on the Israeli side called Nitzana. Here the goods are physically checked by Israeli soldiers who use scanning machines and sniffer dogs, according to UN and other aid agency staff.

Some items get rejected during the physical inspection, in particular ones Israel believes could be used by Hamas and other armed groups for military purposes. Some shipments carrying dual-use items are sent back to Al Arish. The same item that is let through one day, can be rejected on another day, UN officials and aid workers said.

UN agencies say solar panels, metal tent poles, oxygen tanks, generators and water purification equipment are among the items the military has rejected.

COGAT’S Freedman said there is a publicized list of what constitutes dual-use items, but there isn’t a “blanket ban” on these goods. If Israeli authorities “understand what exactly it is necessary for, we can coordinate it,” he said. But Israel wants to be sure that goods aren’t going to be “used by Hamas for terrorist activities,” he said.

The Israeli military says it can scan a total of 44 trucks an hour at Nitzana and at a crossing from Israel into Gaza where aid trucks are inspected, at Kerem Shalom. But aid agency officials say the actual number scanned is fewer. The military declined to say how many hours Nitzana and Kerem Shalom are open each day.

Once the trucks pass inspection at Nitzana, they make the 40-kilometer journey back to Rafah, where they wait to cross into Gaza.

In late January, groups of Israelis, including friends and relatives of the more than 130 people still being held hostage by Hamas, began protesting against the delivery of aid to Gaza. Between late January and early March, the protests effectively shut down either Nitzana or Kerem Shalom for a total of 16 days, according to aid agencies.

At the Kerem Shalom crossing, goods are unloaded from the scanned trucks and reloaded onto trucks that have been vetted by the Israeli army, according to UN and aid agency workers. These “sanitized” trucks then make a 1 kilometer journey to a warehouse inside Gaza where the aid is again offloaded. The goods are then placed on trucks driven by Palestinians and taken to mostly UN-run warehouses in Rafah.

Under growing international pressure, Israel earlier this month initiated a new route for the delivery of aid directly to northern Gaza, known as the 96th gate. By March 20, COGAT said at least 86 international aid trucks had entered via the new crossing.

“There is a sufficient amount of food entering Gaza every day,” said Col. Moshe Tetro, a COGAT official overseeing Gaza.

The new route was initiated “as part of a pilot in order to prevent Hamas from taking over the aid,” COGAT said in a post on social media site X. Freedman, though, said he didn’t have “specific evidence” he could share about Hamas pilfering aid.

Hamas official Naim rejected the accusation that the group was stealing aid. “We have been cooperating and are cooperating with every single state and humanitarian organization so that the aid reaches people in dire need,” he said.

AN ARDUOUS JOURNEY

Once inside Gaza, the aid shipments face more challenges.
Several convoys have been attacked on the stretch of road from Kerem Shalom to Gaza warehouses by people carrying crude weapons such as axes and box-cutters, according to UN officials and truck drivers. Deeper inside Gaza, others have been swarmed by crowds of people desperate for food.

In an incident that galvanized aid efforts, more than 100 people were killed in late February when a crowd descended on an aid convoy organized by Israel.
Security for food convoys traveling the short distance from the crossing points to warehouses in Rafah also deteriorated after several strikes by the Israeli military killed at least eight policemen in Gaza, according to UN officials. Israel says all police are members of Hamas.

“Whether they’re Hamas or not I don’t know, but they were doing a job for us in terms of crowd control,” said Jamie McGoldrick, a senior UN official. “The police are less willing to do that now.”

Aid agencies mostly now negotiate their own security with local communities, McGoldrick said.

Reuters reported recently that armed and masked men from an array of clans and factions in Gaza had begun providing security to aid convoys.

Police officers in Gaza “are Hamas, they are part of the Hamas terrorist organization,” COGAT’s Freedman said. Israel doesn’t target humanitarian convoys, “we try to assist them, but Hamas is our enemy.”

Storing aid in Gaza has also become a problem. Warehouses have been damaged by the fighting and occasionally looted. Of the 43 warehouses in Gaza that were operational before the war, only 22 are now working, according to the Logistics Cluster, a UN-run logistics facilitator for aid agencies.

In mid-March, an Israeli airstrike hit a UN food distribution center in southern Gaza, killing several people. Israel said it killed a Hamas commander in the attack. Hamas said the man targeted by Israel was a member of its police force.

From the warehouses, aid is delivered to southern Gaza, where the majority of the population is now located.

Making deliveries to northern Gaza is more fraught.

Roads to the north have been bombed by Israel and there are delays as trucks are held up or denied access at Israeli army checkpoints, say UN and other aid agency officials. Aid convoys are also often looted before reaching their destination by crowds of people desperate for food, UN officials said.

UN officials told Reuters that humanitarian agencies had made 158 requests to the Israeli military to deliver aid to northern Gaza from the beginning of the war to March 14. Of those, the military denied 57, they said.

COGAT’s Freedman said some requests to move aid inside Gaza have been rejected because aid agencies didn’t coordinate sufficiently with Israel.
“They weren't able to tell us exactly where that aid was going,” he said. “And if we don't know where it's going to, we don't know it's not going to end up in the hands of Hamas.”
In southern Gaza, residents are desperately waiting for aid.
“People have nothing to eat at all, nor do they have a place to stay, or a refuge,” said Suleiman al-Jaal, a local truck driver who said he has been attacked transporting aid in Gaza. “This is not a life. No matter how much aid they bring in, it’s not enough.”



Floods, Drought Raise Questions over Türkiye’s Tigris, Euphrates Leverage

The Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River sparked a Türkiye -Syria crisis in the 1990s. (Turkish State Hydraulic Works website)
The Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River sparked a Türkiye -Syria crisis in the 1990s. (Turkish State Hydraulic Works website)
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Floods, Drought Raise Questions over Türkiye’s Tigris, Euphrates Leverage

The Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River sparked a Türkiye -Syria crisis in the 1990s. (Turkish State Hydraulic Works website)
The Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River sparked a Türkiye -Syria crisis in the 1990s. (Turkish State Hydraulic Works website)

Floods that swept northern and eastern Syria in early June, along with a rise in the Euphrates River after heavy rain and increased flows from Türkiye, have revived questions about the water crisis in Syria and Iraq, and whether Türkiye is using the Tigris and Euphrates as a political and security pressure card.

The crisis between Türkiye, Iraq and Syria centers on how to share the waters of the two rivers. Türkiye, the upstream state, controls the main tributaries. Its water policies and expanding dam network have sharply reduced flows, worsened drought and pushed water levels to near-catastrophic lows, especially in Iraq, which has faced its worst drought in more than 80 years.

Türkiye says the Tigris and Euphrates are transboundary rivers and that it has the right to manage them under its territorial sovereignty. Iraq and Syria want them classified as international rivers, with fair-sharing rules and international law applied under historic agreements, including the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and joint cooperation protocols.

Mismanagement or resource depletion?

Türkiye has been accused of using water as leverage against Iraq and Syria for security reasons, mainly linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, and its extensions inside both countries. Those tensions later widened into Turkish air and ground operations in the two neighboring states, leaving a Turkish military presence that has long caused friction, especially between Ankara and Baghdad.

Several issues drive the crisis. The most important is Türkiye’s Southeastern Anatolia Project, designed to develop eastern and southeastern Türkiye. Under the project, Türkiye built major dams and reservoirs, including the Ataturk, Keban and Ilisu dams, to regulate irrigation and generate power. That sharply reduced the water reaching Syria and Iraq, the transit and downstream states.

The impact has been especially severe in Iraq. Water scarcity has battered agriculture, shrunk farmland, damaged the southern marshes listed as a World Heritage site and triggered repeated social and environmental crises.

Lower flows have also hit hydroelectric power generation and drinking water supplies for millions of people. In Syria, drought periods have raised the risks of pollution and disease.

Diplomatic efforts have surfaced from time to time. The countries have reached understandings, joint agreements and bilateral, and sometimes trilateral, memorandums of understanding to secure the minimum vital needs of each state. During severe droughts, Iraq and Syria have also tried to persuade Türkiye to increase flows. Türkiye insists it is a water-poor country and says Iraq’s crisis stems from local mismanagement and poor resource use, not from Turkish dams.

In Mesopotamia, water has rarely been just a natural resource. It has been a foundation of civilization, a source of conflict and, at times, a key to reconstruction and joint development. That was reflected in the Iraq-Türkiye framework agreement on water and development signed in November 2025.

What the Tigris brings together, the Euphrates drives apart

Turkish writer and water affairs researcher Bilgay Duman said the agreement, whose full terms have not been disclosed, marked an important development not only in Ankara-Baghdad relations, but also in redefining how shared resources are managed in the Middle East.

Duman said that after Türkiye, Iraq and Syria emerged as states, regulating the use of resources became a political and legal necessity. It also became a permanent source of dispute. The Euphrates turned into a three-way issue, while the Tigris became central to Turkish-Iraqi relations.

Early attempts were made to agree on water shares. The 1921 Ankara Agreement and the 1946 agreement between Türkiye and Iraq laid technical foundations for cooperation, including data sharing and flood control.

Later came the 1987 Syrian-Turkish agreement, a temporary deal to share Euphrates waters during the five-year filling of the Ataturk Dam reservoir.

Signed on July 17, 1987, the agreement committed Türkiye to provide an annual average of more than 500 cubic meters per second at the Turkish-Syrian border until a final arrangement was reached among the three Euphrates states.

On April 17, 1989, Syria and Iraq signed an agreement setting Iraq’s share at 9.106 billion cubic meters a year through the Syrian border, Syria’s share at 6.627 billion cubic meters and Türkiye’s at 15.700 billion cubic meters.

Syria registered its agreement with Türkiye at the United Nations in 1994 to secure its minimum share, and Iraq’s, of Euphrates waters. But that did not solve the problem.

Water for the PKK

As accusations grew that Türkiye was using water to pressure its neighbors, squeeze Kurds in Syria and push Iraq to act against the PKK and classify it as a terrorist organization, the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses set out the principles of no harm and equitable distribution.

It also required states to consider the water, economic and social needs of all riparian countries, as well as the needs of populations dependent on the watercourse and its direct and possible effects.

The convention strengthened Iraq and Syria’s legal position against Türkiye because both countries have large areas along the Tigris and Euphrates. Syria was among the first states to ratify it. Türkiye did not join, saying it harmed its interests and water rights, and voted against its adoption.

Syria, where the Euphrates irrigates more than 640,000 hectares, did not turn to international arbitration to secure its water rights from Türkiye. International law remains inconclusive in such cases, and arbitration requires both sides to agree.

Syrian support for the PKK, and its decision to allow the group’s fighters to use northern Syria as a rear base, pushed Türkiye into a harder position and led Ankara to link that support to the water dispute.

In 1993, Turkish-Syrian talks were held in Ankara to reach a final agreement on water shares. They produced nothing beyond the temporary 1987 arrangement, which was tied only to the filling of Lake Ataturk.

The same period saw Syria and Türkiye sign a joint development agreement on the Orontes River, which rises in Lebanon’s upper Bekaa Valley. Türkiye had been excluded from sharing the river with Syria and Lebanon in 1994. Giving up its share was a small price for greater benefit from the Euphrates.

Only 10% of the Orontes reached Türkiye’s Hatay province, and by then it was polluted and unusable. For decades, residents of the province bordering Syria, historically known as the Sanjak of Alexandretta, saw central government policies as unfair and blamed them for marginalizing the area and depriving it of a natural resource for political, ethnic and religious reasons.

Syrian revolution, Turkish opportunity

After the Syrian uprising against Bashar al-Assad began, Türkiye moved quickly to complete the Sanliurfa water canals project in 2012. The canals allowed water held at the Ataturk Dam to irrigate the border plains with Syria in Harran, Mardin and Ceylanpinar. The Silvan Dam was also filled in 2011. Syria took no countermeasure because Assad’s authorities were busy suppressing the uprising.

Syria’s approach to the water file showed that its main strategy against Türkiye had been to exploit internal security and the PKK threat, a strategy that ended with the Adana Agreement. Other options seemed impossible because of Türkiye’s military strength, external alliances and control of the Euphrates source.

Iraq: Drought and unrest

Iraq, which gets 60% of its water needs from Türkiye, has been the hardest hit by shortages. It faced successive severe crises across its territory, especially after the Ilisu Dam, built on the upper Tigris in Türkiye, began operating in 2020. Other dams on smaller tributaries added to the pressure. Tensions with Türkiye over water reached their peak.

Other environmental issues, including tree-cutting in northern Iraq during a Turkish military campaign against PKK militants, deepened tensions with Ankara. Pressure on the Turkish government produced little beyond a slight delay in filling Ilisu, postponing the problem rather than solving it.

In the summer of 2018, dwindling water resources and pollution caused fish to die in the Euphrates. Water shortages then became a major cause of social unrest across Iraq in the following years, culminating in the worst drought in 80 years in 2025.

The Ilisu Dam reduced Iraq’s share of Tigris waters to nearly 60% because of power generation.

In June 2025, Iraq called for water not to be used as a political pressure card and urged a joint regional vision based on fair distribution of transboundary waters. At the same time, it noted progress in negotiations and in the work of joint committees with Türkiye and Iran.

Despite this, Iraq and Türkiye kept positive relations, which expanded under Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. The two sides reached understandings on security, the economy, trade, water and energy, while focusing on cooperation over the Development Road project.

Water disputes, also tied to security as in the Syrian case, became a route to cooperation after Iraq’s National Security Council declared the PKK a banned group in 2024.

Development Road runs through politics

On Nov. 2, 2025, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein signed a document establishing a mechanism to finance projects under a framework agreement for water cooperation. The mechanism implements the water cooperation framework agreement signed in 2024 during Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Iraq.

The agreement set a framework for water projects worth billions of dollars. Turkish companies will build new infrastructure to improve water-use efficiency and storage in Iraq. The projects will be financed from Iraqi oil revenues, in an attempt to turn crude exports into water security.

According to details that have emerged but have not been formally announced by either side, the first projects include water-collection dams and land-reclamation initiatives.

Ankara described the initiative as mutually beneficial for regional stability and economic cooperation.

“We in Türkiye are keen to support Iraq’s security, development and safety, and our support in this regard is absolute,” Fidan said at the signing ceremony.

Hussein said the agreement was needed to protect water security, food production and economic stability. He said Baghdad had long suffered from a weak position because of the absence of formal treaties regulating the use of Tigris and Euphrates waters.

Securing Erdogan’s presidency in 2028?

The agreement stirred doubts and fears among some Iraqi politicians and water experts. Some said it serves Türkiye more than Iraq and supports Erdogan’s effort to remain president after 2028.

Some Iraqi political forces reject the agreements with Türkiye, including those linked to the Development Road project and water cooperation. They say the deals could make Iraq dependent on Türkiye.

Allocating oil revenues to contracts with Turkish companies also raises legal and constitutional questions, along with concerns about corruption, weak transparency and possible obstacles caused by relying on one funding source, oil, which is exposed to global price swings.

Some opponents point to the absence of a final, binding legal framework agreed by both sides that defines the water share Türkiye must release to Iraq from the Tigris and Euphrates.

Although Türkiye and the PKK have begun a process to end the group’s activity, the PKK file and the presence of its members in northern Iraq, in areas beyond Baghdad’s control, could still obstruct implementation of the agreement.

The issue is not limited to Iraq’s domestic situation. It also touches the regional balance, with some parties seeing stronger Iraq-Türkiye ties as a source of pressure. That could turn Iraq into an arena for regional competition and influence struggles.

The Ottoman legacy

Duman said the agreement serves the interests of both Türkiye and Iraq. He said the water problem between the two countries did not emerge in recent decades, but dates back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, when the Tigris and Euphrates changed from internal rivers inside one political entity into transboundary rivers between independent states.

What marks the current phase in Turkish-Iraqi relations, he said, is the gradual shift from conflict over water shares to managing mutual benefit, and a broader rethinking of transboundary resources as a driver of integration, not a permanent source of tension.

He said the agreement’s most important new feature is the direct link between water and energy. Revenues from oil Türkiye imports from Iraq will finance water projects inside Iraq.

Turkish companies specializing in dams, modern irrigation networks, water treatment and waste reduction will carry them out. That bypasses one of Iraq’s biggest development obstacles, lack of funding, without turning to foreign loans or the conditions of international financial institutions.

In an article on the Turkish platform Fikir Turu, Duman said the model gives Türkiye a new role, not just as a state that controls water sources but as a partner in rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure. That strengthens Türkiye’s regional influence through economic and development tools rather than hard-power tools.

The model could also expand regionally and become a practical reference for future cooperation with Syria, especially on Euphrates water management, if the right political conditions emerge.

Water diplomacy in the Levant could then shift from a source of fragility and chronic conflict into a platform for trust-building and regional integration, by linking natural resources to economic development rather than reducing them to sovereignty and conflict.

Prominent Turkish transboundary water researcher Dr. Tugba Evrim Maden told Asharq Al-Awsat that shared water resources need joint management based on technological solutions, not conflict or legal disputes.

She said the problems of downstream countries mostly stem from political instability, destroyed infrastructure, poor resource use and waste.

Türkiye is not rich in water

Contrary to common belief, Türkiye is not rich in water resources. It is not water-abundant compared with its region. It lies in a semi-arid climate zone and has less annual water per person than its neighbors, North America and water-rich northern Europe.

In water-rich countries, the annual per capita share of usable water exceeds 10,000 cubic meters. In Türkiye, it is about 1,350 cubic meters, according to Turkish Foreign Ministry data.

If the population reaches 100 million in 2030, Türkiye’s per capita water share is expected to fall to about 1,000 cubic meters. Because Türkiye’s water resources vary by region and season, they cannot meet current and expected needs everywhere. Some areas have abundant water that is not suitable for use, while densely populated industrial areas lack enough water.

Türkiye’s arid and semi-arid regions receive rain for only four or five months a year. That makes water development projects, including dams and reservoirs that store rainwater for year-round use, vital to sustainable social and economic development.

At the same time, Türkiye’s energy consumption is rising because of rapid urbanization and industrialization. Its per capita energy use is only one-sixth of the European Union average. Türkiye has no major oil or natural gas resources, so it is pursuing domestic resources to meet rising energy needs, including renewable, cheap and environmentally friendly hydropower.

The UN Convention to Combat Desertification’s report, “Global Drought Hotspots 2023-2025,” placed Türkiye among critical areas in the drought belt stretching from southern Europe to the Middle East.

The report warned that current trends could push Türkiye into severe water scarcity by 2030, with nearly 80% of its farmland potentially exposed to repeated and severe drought waves over the next decade.

As climate change intensifies, Türkiye is nearing a crisis that threatens its water security. Turkish and international experts say it is approaching the critical threshold of water poverty and could be officially classified as water-poor by 2030 if current conditions continue.

Türkiye’s per capita share of renewable water has fallen from about 1,650 cubic meters at the start of the millennium to below 1,300 cubic meters now, nearing the UN red line of 1,000 cubic meters a year.

The 19% decline in two decades reflects not only a resource crisis, but also an unsustainable consumption pattern and a water management system facing a serious structural challenge, water experts say.

Türkiye suffered severe drought in 2025, marked by scarce rain, record temperatures and dried-up lakes and water bodies. It recorded its hottest December in more than half a century, with rainfall more than 50% below seasonal averages, according to the Turkish State Meteorological Service.

Lack of response

Experts say that despite growing warnings about water poverty, the authorities’ response remains below the scale of the challenge.

Mustafa Chashmaz, a climate professor at Karadeniz Technical University, warned that evaporation caused by rising temperatures has become one of the main drivers of water loss. He said that storing water in broad-surface dams without accounting for climate conditions makes reservoirs more vulnerable to evaporation as heat waves intensify.

He called for urgent technical solutions, including deeper reservoirs less exposed to sunlight, covered basins in sensitive areas, and a ban on the use of freshwater in private swimming pools at coastal resorts, replacing it with treated saltwater.

He also said state institutions are part of the problem because public facilities consume large amounts of water without effective conservation systems or modern saving technologies.

Türkiye faces one of the most complex environmental challenges in its modern history: widening desertification, worsening drought and rising environmental stress. Recent years have brought repeated severe heat waves and forest fires, including about 3,000 fires in the summer of 2025.

Türkiye’s water crisis extends beyond its borders and affects regional water security, especially in Syria and Iraq. Türkiye controls about 90% of Euphrates waters and a large share of Tigris waters.

At the opening of water projects in October 2025, Erdogan said Türkiye was not water-rich, as some believe. Annual average rainfall does not exceed 574 millimeters, he said, far below the global average.

Experts say agriculture consumes 70% to 75% of total water withdrawals, while cities lose 20% to 35% through leaking networks. Dam efficiency is also weakened by evaporation and sediment buildup.

The Turkish government recently announced a program to restore shrinking or dried-up lakes, including Lake Marmara in western Türkiye. It also plans to invest in wastewater recycling plants for irrigation, agriculture and industry, and to build new desalination plants in areas with chronic freshwater shortages, especially western Anatolia and the Mediterranean coast.

Urgent priorities include cutting urban water losses to below 15%, expanding high-efficiency irrigation systems to save up to 30% of agricultural consumption, reducing evaporation by improving reservoir design and expanding underground storage, raising treated-water reuse to 20% of urban demand, adjusting water tariffs, shifting to less water-intensive crops and adopting mandatory drought management plans.


Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
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Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)

Sudan is passing through an exceptionally complex phase as the war enters its fourth year and military and political alliances continue to shift at a rapid pace. With factions that have defected from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) joining the Sudanese Armed Forces, alongside the Joint Forces of Darfur’s armed movements, the Sudan Shield Forces, and formations linked to the Islamist movement, a new balance of power is gradually emerging within the anti-RSF camp.

This evolving landscape reflects a temporary convergence of interests among actors that differ sharply in their backgrounds, objectives, and visions for Sudan’s future. While confronting the RSF remains the primary factor uniting these forces, underlying political and military differences raise serious questions about the durability of their alliance.

Sudan’s history suggests that wartime coalitions do not necessarily evolve into stable partnerships in peacetime. Instead, they often become arenas for new struggles over influence, power, and postwar arrangements. Understanding the emerging balance of forces is therefore crucial to assessing whether cooperation or confrontation will define the next phase.

In recent months, the Sudanese army has become the principal military umbrella under which a range of disparate groups operate.

The Joint Forces drawn from Darfur’s armed movements bring battlefield experience and significant combat capability. The Sudan Shield Forces have emerged as a growing tribal and military force, while former RSF members are seeking to secure a place within the new order.

Necessary alliance

This configuration has created what amounts to an “alliance of necessity.” Its members are united by a common objective — defeating the RSF — but not by a shared political project. Each faction has its own calculations regarding future power-sharing arrangements and influence.

Within this context, a central question concerns the place of Sudan’s Islamist movement in the postwar landscape.

For decades, Islamists constituted one of the most influential forces within the Sudanese state through their political, organizational, and security networks. Today, however, they no longer monopolize the instruments of power.

Many of the groups that have risen during the conflict do not subscribe to the Islamist project. Some also carry a long history of political rivalry with Islamists dating back to the era of the National Salvation regime led by ousted former President Omar al-Bashir.

This has produced a striking paradox: the broader the coalition supporting the army becomes, the smaller the Islamists’ relative weight within it. They are no longer the sole source of political backing, military support, or social mobilization. Instead, they have become one actor among several competing centers of influence, each pursuing its own interests.

Sudanese army soldiers parade in the streets of eastern Sudan's city of Gedaref on August 14, 2025 to mark the 71st anniversary of the formation of the Sudanese army. (AFP)

Mounting pressure

Signs are growing that the Islamist movement is facing increasing political pressure, both domestically and internationally.

Retired Maj. Gen. Abdel-Hadi Abdel-Basit, a strategic analyst close to Islamist circles, said the movement is confronting unprecedented challenges.

Calls have intensified for Islamists to be excluded from post-war arrangements and even held accountable for their role during decades of rule and the allegations associated with that period.

In recent months, several prominent Islamist figures were detained and later released, while National Congress Party leader Al-Numan Abdel Halim remains in custody.

These developments coincided with what many Islamists believe were externally driven pressures, including the US State Department’s designation of Sudan’s Islamist movement, the National Congress Party, and the Al-Baraa ibn Malik Battalion as terrorist organizations.

Regional and international actors have likewise called for Islamists to be excluded from any future political process.

Such positions have surfaced in consultations involving both the Quad mechanism — comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and United States — and the Quintet mechanism, which includes the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Civilian political forces, however, view the decline of Islamist influence primarily as a consequence of Sudan’s democratic transition rather than the war itself.

Bakri Eljack, spokesman for the democratic civilian coalition Somoud (Resilience), argued that army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan may be able to distance himself from the Islamists, but their influence within state institutions remains significant.

Any effort to remove them would require a broad political alliance capable of managing the next phase, he explained.

Sharif Mohamed Osman, of the Sudanese Congress Party, said the Islamist project and National Congress Party rule were rejected by the people will during the December 2018 revolution.

He noted that efforts associated with prolonging the conflict have further weakened the movement, while international pressure and sanctions have deepened its political isolation.

Yet, predictions of the Islamists’ complete demise may be premature. The movement still possesses extensive organizational networks, decades of political experience, and influence within parts of the state and society.

Even so, current trends suggest that regaining the dominant position it enjoyed during the Bashir era may be more difficult than ever before.


Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
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Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)

Iraqi politicians are closely watching what they describe as the potential “side effects” of any future US-Iran agreement and how it could reshape the balance of power inside Iraq.

Some observers argue that a deal would likely strengthen Washington’s influence while diminishing Tehran’s leverage. Others contend that Iran could emerge from the process with a renewed and possibly more durable form of dominance in Iraq over the coming months and years.

With significant ambiguity still surrounding the US-Iran memorandum of understanding - particularly regarding Tehran’s regional proxies and allied armed groups - signals from both capitals have done little to clarify Iraq’s future position within the competing spheres of influence of the two longtime adversaries.

The US Position

Despite repeated American warnings to Baghdad against bringing factions designated on the US terrorism list into government, Washington’s broader position remains unclear.

Asked by Alhurra, the US-funded Arabic-language broadcaster, whether a US-Iran agreement would affect Iraq and whether it might weaken or strengthen armed factions, Joshua Harris, the chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Baghdad, declined to speculate on the outcome.
Instead, he said the priority should be an Iraqi government that places the interests of its citizens first, noting that the United States approaches foreign policy by prioritizing its own national interests.

Harris added that the foundation of a mutually beneficial partnership between Washington and Baghdad depends on the Iraqi state confronting the challenge posed by militias and ensuring that weapons remain exclusively under state control. He described this as the essential benchmark that Iraq must meet in order to deepen its partnership with the United States.

A handout photo made available by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office on 17 June 2026 shows Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi (L) meeting with US Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack (R) in Baghdad, Iraq, 15 June 2026. EPA/IRAQI PRIME MINISTER'S MEDIA OFFICE

Iran Regains Momentum

At the same time, the Iranian role appears to be returning to the level seen before the war that erupted at the end of February.

Media outlets close to Tehran report that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi plans to visit Baghdad soon to discuss the talks held in Switzerland and preparations for the funeral procession of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Earlier, Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani announced that Khamenei’s body would be transferred in early July as part of the funeral arrangements preceding burial ceremonies.

Even amid uncertainty surrounding those plans, some observers argue that the announcement itself underscores the extent of Iran’s influence in Iraq.

The Militias Question

Although Iran-aligned factions created security challenges through their involvement in the war on Tehran’s side, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq, recently insisted that Iran “has not asked any party to intervene because it did not need such intervention.”

The remark suggested that Iraqi armed factions volunteered to support Iran rather than acting at Tehran’s request.

On the issue of restricting weapons to state control - a matter on which Washington has adopted a notably firm position - the Iranian ambassador said it was an internal Iraqi matter and that Tehran would respect any decision taken by the Iraqi government.

At the same time, he stressed the need to understand why armed factions wish to retain their weapons and to address what he described as their concerns and fears.

The source argued that Iran has demonstrated over the past two decades that it knows precisely what it wants from Iraq, unlike what he characterized as inconsistent American policy. He predicted that this situation would continue even after any US-Iran agreement is signed.

According to the source, who requested anonymity, Iran is likely to adopt a less visible approach after an agreement, one that avoids provoking Washington while preserving its traditional influence through allied political parties and figures.

Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters near the western al‑Qaim district on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda

The Oil Card

Opponents of Iranian influence take a different view. They believe the administration of President Donald Trump is both willing and able to curb Tehran’s reach through mounting pressure on Iran and sustained influence over decision-making in Baghdad.

These groups argue that the threat of economic sanctions alone could prompt Iraqi leaders - particularly Shiite political parties - to reconsider the risks associated with continued Iranian influence.

A key factor is Iraq’s dependence on the US-controlled financial system. Revenues from Iraqi oil sales are deposited with the US Federal Reserve before being transferred back to Iraqi banks, giving Washington a powerful source of leverage over Baghdad.