Türkiye's Local Vote a Test for Erdogan and Rival Imamoglu

Official ballots are displayed on a table during the Turkish municipal elections, in Istanbul on March 31, 2024. (AFP)
Official ballots are displayed on a table during the Turkish municipal elections, in Istanbul on March 31, 2024. (AFP)
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Türkiye's Local Vote a Test for Erdogan and Rival Imamoglu

Official ballots are displayed on a table during the Turkish municipal elections, in Istanbul on March 31, 2024. (AFP)
Official ballots are displayed on a table during the Turkish municipal elections, in Istanbul on March 31, 2024. (AFP)

Türkiye holds municipal elections across 81 provinces on Sunday March 31, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AK Party (AKP) aiming to reclaim cities it lost in 2019, including the country's largest city of Istanbul and the capital Ankara.

On Sunday, polling stations opened at 7 a.m. and will close at 4 p.m. in eastern provinces and from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. in the rest of the country. Initial results are expected by 10 p.m. (1900 GMT) on Sunday.

Analysts see the vote as a nationwide gauge of Erdogan's support and the opposition's durability, especially that of Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu of Istanbul. A tight race is expected in the city that is home to more than 16 million people and drives more than a quarter of the nation's GDP.

WHAT'S AT STAKE?

In the last local vote in 2019, the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) shocked Erdogan when it prevailed in Istanbul and Ankara and ended more than two decades of rule by the AKP and its Islamist predecessors.

Erdogan, who has ruled Türkiye for more than two decades and campaigned hard for the AKP in recent weeks, launched his political career as mayor of Istanbul in 1994.

Almost 11 million people are eligible to vote in the city, the Supreme Election Council says. Turnout in both general and local elections is very high in Türkiye at close to 90%.

Incumbent CHP Mayor Imamoglu's main challenger is the AKP's Murat Kurum, a former government minister. Polls give Imamoglu a slight edge.

Last May, Erdogan was re-elected president and his alliance won a majority in parliament in tight general elections - a result that splintered and disheartened an alliance of the CHP and other opposition parties.

WHY DOES IT MATTER?

The budget of Istanbul metropolitan municipality dwarfs all other 80 cities in the country at 516 billion lira ($16.05 billion) in 2024, including its subsidiaries. The budget of the second city, Ankara, is 92 billion.

Controlling big cities and their budgets can give parties say over financing, contracts and job creation, boosting their popularity on the national stage.

Istanbul holds special importance for Erdogan as he rose to the national political stage during his time as mayor between 1994 and 1998.

Imamoglu has emerged as the opposition's main alternative to Erdogan. If he wins a second mayoral term, he would very likely run in the next presidential vote, analysts say, while a loss could stunt his career and leave the opposition in further disarray.

For Erdogan, regaining Istanbul and Ankara would bolster his pursuit of a new constitution that could potentially extend his rule beyond 2028, which marks the end of his current term, analysts say.

Under the existing constitution, the presidency is limited to two terms. Erdogan secured a third term last year thanks to a legal loophole resulting from the transition to a presidential system in 2018, as his initial term was served under the previous system.

"The electoral test is also significant for Erdogan's pursuit of a new constitution (or constitutional amendments) to side-step presidential term limits and remove the remaining elements of judicial independence," said Wolfango Piccoli, co-President of Teneo.

Who are the candidates?

MURAT KURUM, AKP, ISTANBUL:

Kurum, 47, was environment and urbanization minister from July 2018 until last June, leaving the post after the general elections in 2023. He was then elected as a member of parliament for Istanbul.

Born in Ankara, Kurum served at the state mass housing agency TOKI from 2005 to 2009 and later as the general manager of Emlak Konut, a government-run real estate investment trust.

EKREM IMAMOGLU, CHP, ISTANBUL:

Imamoglu, 52, originally from the Black Sea city of Trabzon, was a district mayor in the city before becoming Istanbul mayor.

He won the 2019 election in Istanbul with the backing of an alliance of the CHP, the nationalist IYI Party, and the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (DEM), which is now called DEM. This year IYI and DEM are running their own candidates. Many of Türkiye's Kurds are set to put aside party loyalty and back Imamoglu on Sunday, according to pollsters.

CHP'S MANSUR YAVAS, AKP'S TURGUT ALTINOK:

Pollsters say Ankara's incumbent Mayor Mansur Yavas, a former district mayor in Ankara, is comfortably ahead of AKP challenger Turgut Altinok, another former district mayor.

OTHER PROVINCES:

Turks will also vote in the other 79 provinces of the country, casting four votes in total: one for the mayor of their province, one for their district mayor, one for the district council and another for the local administrator of their neighborhood.

Other competitive cities include CHP-run Antalya, Bursa, and Adana.



Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH

Iran's Revolutionary Guards have tightened their grip on the country's oil industry and control up to half the exports that generate most of Tehran's revenue and fund its proxies across the Middle East, according to Western officials, security sources and Iranian insiders.

All aspects of the oil business have come under the growing influence of the Guards, from the shadow fleet of tankers that secretively ship sanctioned crude, to logistics and the front companies selling the oil, mostly to China, according to more than a dozen people interviewed by Reuters.
The extent of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) control over oil exports has not previously been reported.

Despite tough Western sanctions designed to choke Iran's energy industry, reimposed by former US President Donald Trump in 2018, Iran generates more than $50 billion a year in oil revenue, by far its largest source of foreign currency and its principal connection to the global economy.

Six specialists - Western officials and security experts as well as Iranian and trading sources - said the Guards control up to 50% of Iran's oil exports, a sharp increase from about 20% three years ago. The sources declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Three of the estimates were based on intelligence documents about Iranian shipping while others derived their figures from monitoring shipping activity by tankers and companies linked to the IRGC. Reuters was unable to determine the exact extent of the IRGC's control.

The IRGC's growing domination of the oil industry adds to its influence in all areas of Iran's economy and also makes it harder for Western sanctions to hit home - given the Guards are already designated as a terrorist organization by Washington.

Trump's return to the White House in January, however, could mean tougher enforcement of sanctions on Iran's oil industry. The country's oil minister said Tehran is putting measures in place to deal with any restrictions, without giving details.

As part of their expansion in the industry, the Guards have muscled in on the territory of state institutions such as the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its NICO oil trading subsidiary, according to four of the sources.

When sanctions hit Iran's oil exports years ago, the people running NIOC and the wider industry were specialized in oil rather than how to evade sanctions, added Richard Nephew, a former deputy special envoy for Iran at the US State Department.

"The IRGC guys were much, much better at smuggling, just terrible at oil field management, so they began to get a larger control of oil exports," said Nephew, who is now a researcher at Columbia University.
The IRGC, NIOC, NICO and Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
RISK APPETITE
The IRGC is a powerful political, military and economic force with close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The Guards exert influence in the Middle East through their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, by providing money, weapons, technology and training to allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Yemen's Houthis and militias in Iraq.
While Israel has killed a number of senior IRGC commanders over the past year, the oil specialists in its ranks have been able to continue their operations, two Western and two Iranian sources said.
The Iranian government began allotting oil, instead of cash, to the IRGC and Quds Force around 2013, according to Nephew.
The government was under budgetary pressure then because it was struggling to export oil due to Western sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program.
The IRGC proved adept at finding ways to sell oil even under sanctions pressure, said Nephew, who was actively involved in tracking Iranian oil activities then.
Iranian oil revenues hit $53 billion in 2023 compared with $54 billion in 2022, $37 billion in 2021 and $16 billion in 2020, according to estimates from the US government's Energy Information Administration.
This year, Tehran's oil output has topped 3.3 million barrels per day, the highest since 2018, according to OPEC figures, despite the Western sanctions.
China is Iran's biggest buyer of oil, with most going to independent refineries, and the IRGC has created front companies to facilitate trade with buyers there, all the sources said.
Oil export revenues are split roughly evenly between the IRGC and NICO, said one source involved in Iranian oil sales to China. The IRGC sells oil at a $1-$2 barrel discount to prices offered by NICO because buyers take a bigger risk buying from the Guards, the person said.
"It depends on a buyer's risk appetite, the higher ones will go for the IRGC, which the US designates as a terrorist group."
Two Western sources estimated that the IRGC offered an even bigger discount, saying it was $5 per barrel on average but could be as much as $8.
The oil is allocated directly by the government to the IRGC and Quds Force. It's then up to them to market and ship the oil - and work out a mechanism for disbursing the revenue, according to the sources and intelligence documents seen by Reuters.
NIOC gets a separate allocation.
CHINESE FRONT
One of the front companies used is China-based Haokun. Operated by former Chinese military officials, it remains an active conduit for IRGC oil sales into China, despite Washington hitting it with sanctions in 2022, two of the sources said.
The US Treasury said China Haokun Energy had bought millions of barrels of oil from the IRGC-Quds Force and was sanctioned for having "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF".
In one oil transaction dated March 16, 2021 involving Haokun and parties including Turkish company Baslam Nakliyat - which is under US sanctions for its trading links to the IRGC - a payment was processed via US bank JP Morgan and Turkish lender Vakif Katilim, according to the intelligence documents.
The transaction took place before the companies were sanctioned. Reuters has no indication JP Morgan or Vakif Katilim were aware of the Iranian connection - highlighting the risks of companies getting inadvertently caught up in the shadow trade.
JP Morgan declined to comment. Vakif Katilim said in a statement: "Our bank performs its activities within the framework of national and international banking rules."
Haokun declined to comment. Baslam did not respond to a request for comment.
'GHOST FLEET'
Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, had set up a clandestine headquarters and inaugurated that year for the unit's oil smuggling activities, initially staffed by former oil minister Rostam Ghasemi, according to the intelligence documents.
Reuters could not determine where all the oil money funneled through the IRGC goes. The IRGC headquarters and day-to-day operations has an annual budget of around $1 billion, according to assessments from two security sources tracking IRGC activities.
They estimated that the IRGC budget for Hezbollah was another $700 million a year.
"Exact figures remain undisclosed, as Hezbollah conceals the funds it receives. However, estimates are that its annual budget is approximately $700 million to $1 billion. Around 70%-80% of this funding comes directly from Iran," Shlomit Wagman, former director general of Israel’s Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prohibition Authority, said separately.
Hezbollah did not respond to a request for comment.
The former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike, said Iran provided the group's budget, including for salaries and weapons.
Iran's main tanker operator NITC, which previously played a key role in exports, also now provides services to the IRGC.
It executes ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian oil onto vessels operated by the IRGC to ship crude into China, according to sources and ship-tracking data. Such transfers are common practice to help disguise the origin of the oil tankers carry.
NITC did not respond to a request for comment.
In August, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, part of the country's defense ministry, imposed sanctions on 18 tankers it said were involved in transporting oil belonging to the Quds Force.
In October, the US Treasury slapped sanctions on 17 separate tankers it said formed part of Iran's "ghost fleet", outside of NITC vessels. It followed up with sanctions on a further 18 tankers on Dec. 3.