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Al-Burhan, Hemedti: From Friends to Foes, the Rift That Ignited Sudan

The leaders of the army, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left), and the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), in 2019. (AFP)
The leaders of the army, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left), and the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), in 2019. (AFP)
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Al-Burhan, Hemedti: From Friends to Foes, the Rift That Ignited Sudan

The leaders of the army, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left), and the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), in 2019. (AFP)
The leaders of the army, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left), and the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), in 2019. (AFP)

A saying among Sudanese military circles warns that camaraderie can swiftly turn to conflict when interests clash. This rings true for Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti.”
Since mid-April, the once-close allies have been locked in a bitter feud, hurling insults and threats at each other.
How did their friendship sour, and why did it degenerate into hostility?
From Brothers-in-Arms to Enemies: The Rift That Shattered Friendship
After two decades of military camaraderie, the friendship between al-Burhan and Hemedti crumbled as they competed for power. What was once a strong bond deteriorated, leading to gunfire and warfare, destroying everything in its wake.
Today, the two men continue to clash, leaving Sudan and its people in turmoil.
Hemedti, in an earlier interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, recounted his journey from a “merchant” to joining the Border Guard Forces during the war in Darfur. It was during this time, under the command of al-Burhan, that they first met.
Retired Col. Tayeb al-Malikabi confirmed that the relationship between the two men began in Darfur.
At the time, al-Burhan served as a local commissioner in Nierteti, while Hemedti was in the Border Guard Forces, which later became the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), al-Malikabi told Asharq Al-Awsat.
According to al-Malikabi, Hemedti played a significant role in the war against armed movements in Darfur.
In 2007, former President Omar al-Bashir appointed him as a colonel and placed him under the General Intelligence Service.
In 2013, al-Bashir restructured these forces, naming them the RSF under Hemedti’s command, granting him extensive powers and privileges. Al-Bashir suspected the former head of the General Intelligence Service, Salah Abdullah “Gosh,” of involvement in a coup attempt.
The former president then capitalized on the moment, placing the freshly formed RSF directly under his authority as President and Army Commander. This gave them more independence in their operations.
Their leader, Hemedti, earned the nickname “protector” for his suggested role as a safeguard against coups.
Yemen War
Al-Burhan and Hemedti’s alliance grew stronger in 2015 when they backed Yemen’s government. They teamed up to train fighters from the RSF and the army for “Operation Decisive Storm” mounted by the Saudi-led Arab coalition against insurgents in Yemen.
In 2017, Sudan’s Parliament passed a law recognizing the RSF as an independent military force. Despite being officially under army command, they effectively answered directly to the President and Army Commander-in-Chief, operating as his personal forces.
Ousting Ibn Auf, Installing al-Burhan
When the people’s revolt against the Islamist regime erupted in December 2018, the RSF were deployed to quell the uprising. However, according to earlier statements to the Asharq Al-Awsat, Hemedti asserted that he summoned his forces to support the revolution, not to attack the rebels.
He took a different stance from his boss, protecting the protesters, amidst speculation that al-Bashir had ordered him to crush the rebels, even if it resulted in the deaths of many.
Hemedti, whose forces almost took control of Khartoum, played a key role in ousting al-Bashir’s government, along with junior army officers. This led to the resignation of Lt. Gen. Awad Ibn Auf after one day in power due to public pressure.
Afterward, al-Burhan was chosen to lead the transitional military council, with Hemedti as his deputy.
This reunited the two men, as described by retired Brigadier Kamal Ismail, who said they formed a strong bond through joint military operations in Darfur.
"Hemedti and al-Burhan met in Darfur, where they formed a very strong relationship through joint military operations,” Ismail told Asharq Al-Awsat.
“Having two commanders requires tight military coordination, mutual trust, and a strong bond. When Hemedti became the leader of the RSF, their relationship grew even stronger,” he added.
According to Ismail, Hemedti cleared the path for al-Burhan, who was the army’s Inspector General, to become its leader.
This strengthened their relationship further. Al-Burhan then appointed Hemedti as his deputy in the transitional military council. Together, they worked to remove opponents from the security committee, including Gosh.
Breaking up the General Command Sit-In
Ismail reveals that the bond between the two men hit a snag during the dispersal of the General Command Sit-In. While both parties agreed on the move, Hemedti felt he was unfairly linked to it due to involvement of soldiers wearing RSF uniforms. This led to some tension.
Hemedti had previously mentioned feeling implicated in the dispersal and blamed elements of the Muslim Brotherhood within the army and security forces.
However, tensions eased after Hemedti was tasked with leading negotiations between the military and civilians. He also played a significant role in signing the Constitutional Document and handling peace negotiations with armed groups.
Despite this, disputes resurfaced within the Transitional Sovereignty Council, causing strain in the relationship between the two men.
Ismail believes the root of the tension lies in the competition for power between the two leaders.
Eyewitness reports suggest that the relationship between al-Burhan and Hemedti depended on their interactions with civilians in the transitional government.
When tensions rose between the military and civilians, the two men grew closer, culminating in the October 2021 coup that removed the civilian government.
“Al-Burhan and Hemedti were completely aligned in supporting the coup due to their deteriorating relationship with civilians,” emphasized Ismail.
Coup’s Pitfall
Shortly after the coup, Hemedti felt he was being lured into a new trap, as revealed by his brother, Abdul Rahim Dagalo, the second-in-command of the RSF.
Dagalo mentioned that they realized the coup’s failure early on, which allowed Islamists to regain power.
“Hemedti told al-Burhan about receiving wrong reports from security agencies and asked him to dismiss the intelligence chief, Jamal Abdel Majid, the police chief, and the army chief of staff,” revealed Ismail.
Ismail also explained that while al-Burhan removed the police chief and intelligence director, he avoided ousting the army chief of staff to prevent internal military issues.
Hemedti distanced himself from the coup early on. His deputy attempted to reinstate Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok in November 2021, but al-Burhan remained committed to the coup despite failing to form a government as promised.
Hamdok’s attempted return was rejected by political circles and the “Forces of Freedom and Change” (FFC) alliance, leading to his resignation.
As per Ismail, clashes between the two leaders were inevitable, given their political ambitions.
Political thinker Haji Warraq foresaw conflicts between them, highlighting the military institution’s internal disputes as a major concern.
On December 5, 2022, the two leaders admitted their failed coup attempt and signed an agreement with the civilian FFC alliance to bring back civilian rule, unify the army, and keep the military out of politics.
However, they later clashed over how long it would take to merge the RSF into the army and who would lead the unified forces during the transition.
“Their disagreement escalated, turning them from allies to enemies. It was expected because their relationship was based on interests, not principles. Having two armies in a country always threatens stability,” explained Ismail.
Supporters of the former president saw an opportunity in the growing discord between the leaders and worked to widen the gap between them.
“Some saw the disagreement between the leaders as a chance to spark conflict,” said Ismail.

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Jamal Mustafa: Saddam and Other Iraqi Officials Headed to the Gallows with Heads Held High

Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Jamal Mustafa: Saddam and Other Iraqi Officials Headed to the Gallows with Heads Held High

Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Saddam Hussein’s entourage never expected that they would one day find themselves in jail. It never occurred to them that the American military machine would use all of its might to oust Saddam’s regime and overthrow the ruling party and army. They never believed that forces allied to Iran would assume positions of power in the new regime.

Times changed and Saddam, who controlled the fate of the nation and its people, found himself in prison where he counted the days until his execution. The man was unyielding until his last breath and his will remained unbroken.

The men who made up the Revolutionary Command Council or government soon found themselves in prison. They were interrogated by the Americans and Iraqis and a death sentence was always going to be their fate.

In the second installment of his interview to Asharq Al-Awsat, Dr. Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan, late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law and second secretary, recalled the execution of his colleagues and relatives. He also recalled how he married Hala, the youngest of Saddam’s daughters, and how the late president acted around his family, away from state affairs.

Other officials who were held along with Saddam included “Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan, my uncle and member of the Revolutionary Command Council Ali Hussein al-Majid, my other uncle Abed Hassan al-Majid, head of the Revolutionary Command Council Awad al-Bandar, Saddam’s half-brother Barzan Ibrahim al-Hassan, Secretary Abed Hammoud and aide to the intelligence chief Farouk Hijazi,” said Mustafa.

He showed Asharq Al-Awsat a video that recently came to light of Khodair al-Khozaei, the former vice president during the American occupation. “In it, he said that he saw no justification for the death sentence against Abed Hammoud. Most dangerous of all, he confessed that he visited Iran and consulted with a judicial official, who encouraged him to sign the death sentence, which he did,” added Mustafa.

“The truth is that we sensed from the beginning that our trial was a means of revenge acting at Iran’s orders. One day, Abed Hammoud was informed that he was going to be moved to hospital and later that day the guards informed us that he was executed,” he continued.

“Mr. President (Saddam) expected to be executed. The truth is that his very existence, whether in jail or otherwise, was a source of concern for them. I can firmly attest that the members of the leadership bravely faced their death sentence. None of them showed any weakness or faltered,” he revealed.

He recalled the day they informed Barzan and Awad that they were going to be executed. “I was working out with al-Bandar when we received the news. I am not exaggerating when I say that he maintained his optimism even in that moment. They were executed the next day. Days later, I learned that Abed Hassan al-Majid, Farouk Hijazi and Hadi Hassan, an intelligence officer, were executed,” Mustafa said.

“Let me tell you what used to happen. One day, they came up with false charges that before the US occupation, I gave Mr. Khamis al-Khanjar (a Sunni politician) a sum of 250,000 dollars. Of course, the charge is baseless. They told me that I would remain in jail for life if I did not confess to the charge. I refused and told them that I enjoyed normal relations with Khanjar,” he went on to say.

“They later came up with a different scenario. They told me that they would take me to the Iraqi embassy in Jordan if I confessed to the charge and that I would late be released in Amman with a hefty sum of money. I told them that I would reject whatever they have to offer because I would not abandon my values to betray Khanjar, who was a friend,” he stated.

“They later accused me of complicity in the draining of the Mesopotamian Marshes, which I had nothing to do with,” he added.

Saddam Hussein with his daughter Hala in this undated photo. (Getty Images)

First call after Saddam’s execution

Mustafa recalled the first telephone call he had with his wife Hala and her mother, Sajida Khairallah Talfah, right after Saddam’s execution. “Five days after Mr. President’s martyrdom, I contacted my family. I spoke with my wife, and she was in very good spirits. She had very high faith and patience. I asked her about her mother, and she reassured me that she was also doing very well despite the pain,” he said.

“I pray that Gold Almighty will give her health and a long life. We have always derived our strength from her. My mother-in-law lost her two sons, Uday and Qusay, and then her husband. She had played a major role in supporting her husband from the beginning of his struggle. She always used to support him and stood by him throughout his career,” he remarked.

First meetings with Saddam

Mustafa recalled the early days of his meeting with Saddam. “They started when I began working for his special guard. That was when I first met him. Like most Iraqis and Arabs, I believed that he would be a difficult person, but the truth is that I saw him as a paternal figure,” he added. “When you work with him, you begin to develop a different opinion than the public impression. He was a very paternal figure.”

During their first meeting, they learned that they came from the same tribe and were distant cousins.

“I stayed by Mr. President’s side for around 20 years. I started off as part of his personal guard and he then tasked me with people’s affairs, meaning seeing to their needs and addressing their problems. He was very concerned with the people’s affairs and refused any one of them to be wronged. The truth is that many laws were amended or changed at the time following complaints from the people,” he revealed.

“There were two telephones at Mr. President’s office, and both were connected to my office. Whoever had a problem could call the president through the citizens’ line. I used to answer their calls and listen to their problems and set an appointment with the president. Sometimes I used to ask the caller to come in person with their request so that their problem could be tackled. Sometimes Mr. President would interject on the call to ask about the issue and would request to talk to the citizen on the line,” Mustafa said.

“He would listen to the person’s grievance and tell him to head to the dedicated office to tackle the issue. (...) So we used to receive hundreds of citizens every week to solve their problems. Mr. President was very concerned about these issues,” he stressed. “I have never met another person like him. He would listen, care and then come up with a solution.”

President’s son-in-law

Asharq Al-Awsat asked Mustafa about when he asked Hala to marry him. “It was in 1994. As is the tradition in Iraq, I headed with my uncles to Saddam’s family to ask her hand in marriage,” he said. “One of my uncles made the request to Mr. President on my behalf and he agreed and welcomed it.”

“A judge was summoned immediately for the ceremony, and we were married. We had lunch at the president’s house that same day. I first met Hala on September 12, and we were married on September 26. It was a short engagement in line with tradition.”

“Mr. President used to separate state affairs from his relationship with his family. His work was completely separate from family, which had nothing to do with political or state affairs. It never intervened in those issues. Mr. President was a man of state when he was doing his job, and a father when he came home. He treated his family as if he were its father – the perfect father. Every family wishes to have a father that can measure up to him because he looked after all of his children and all of his relatives,” Mustafa said.

“When he sat down to the dinner table, he himself used to serve his own food and ask his children about their day. He would serve them food and generally cared very much for them. The state is one thing and family is another. At the same time, he acted as a father to all Iraqis. He treated them fairly. This is Saddam Hussein,” stressed Mustafa. “He was always keen that Iraqis be treated justly and that none of them be wronged. He was also very firm with his children if they made any mistake.”

Saddam’s hobbies

Saddam was a “very traditional Arab man. He loved traditional Arab and Iraqi dishes. He himself used to cook his own version of the traditional Iraqi dish al-Habeet. (...) He also loved seafood and would cook the Masgouf fish dish himself,” Mustafa told Asharq Al-Awsat.

His hobbies included horseback riding, hunting, swimming and sharpshooting. “Occasionally, before heading to the front to fight against Iran, he would visit the al-Amarah region, where gazelle and geese are abundant, to hunt. As circumstances became more challenging, he limited himself to fishing, which he did regularly,” he added.

He was a skilled shooter from his youth. “Generally, growing up in a tribe, children are taught at a young age how to become a good shooter. This is part of our upbringing. He was also an avid reader. He was always reading something,” Mustafa said of Saddam.