Sudan on April 11: Bashir Falls, Legacy Endures

Sudanese from other provinces arrive in Khartoum by train to join the popular celebrations following the fall of the Bashir regime (EPA)
Sudanese from other provinces arrive in Khartoum by train to join the popular celebrations following the fall of the Bashir regime (EPA)
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Sudan on April 11: Bashir Falls, Legacy Endures

Sudanese from other provinces arrive in Khartoum by train to join the popular celebrations following the fall of the Bashir regime (EPA)
Sudanese from other provinces arrive in Khartoum by train to join the popular celebrations following the fall of the Bashir regime (EPA)

In the early hours of April 11, 2019, Sudanese woke up to rumors that the army was siding with protesters demanding the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir.

This led to Bashir’s removal, ending his Islamist-backed regime, which had ruled for three decades. Soon, millions gathered at protest sites across the country, hoping for real change.

Behind the scenes, reports suggested that Bashir was deceived by his own security chief, who warned him about crushing the protests but then turned against him.

When Bashir woke up, he found his guards replaced and was told by a senior officer that his own security committee had decided to remove him, as he had lost control of the country.

A high-ranking military leader, second-in-command of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), told Asharq Al-Awsat in an interview on March 4, 2021, that due to the escalating revolution, military leaders decided to oust Bashir.

They tasked the then head of intelligence, Salah Abdallah (Gosh), to deliver the message. Initially reluctant, Gosh eventually complied, fearing imprisonment.

Around noon, jubilant protesters realized that Bashir’s regime had collapsed. Tears of joy flowed as they celebrated what they saw as a triumph.

However, their joy was short-lived as Bashir’s deputy, Awad Ibn Auf, appeared on state TV announcing the regime’s removal and the suspension of the constitution.

In a brief address, Ibn Auf declared a two-year transitional period under military control, imposed a three-month state of emergency, enforced a curfew, shut down airspace and borders, and formed a Transitional Military Council dominated by Islamist officers.

Rebel leaders outside the army headquarters immediately rejected Ibn Auf’s moves, seeing them as an attempt to stifle their revolution and revive the Islamist regime.

They chanted “fall again,” seeing Bashir's ousting as the first blow and Ibn Auf’s removal as the second.

Despite being appointed head of the Transitional Military Council, Ibn Auf resigned the next day due to lack of support from the rebels and the revolution’s leaders. His rule became one of Sudan’s shortest, second only to Hashim al-Atta, who ruled for just three days.

Media reports say Ibn Auf called RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and told him he was stepping down as president, as long as he wasn’t replaced by the well-known Islamist officer Kamal Abdel Maarouf.

Instead, he suggested General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who was serving as the army’s Inspector General. So, Burhan, relatively unknown, became the head of the Transitional Military Council and the state.

He chose Hemedti as his deputy. Burhan said he convinced Hemedti to join him despite Hemedti’s earlier refusal to take on a leadership role.

Bashir’s removal came as a surprise, but reports circulating two months earlier suggested that leaders within the ruling party and the political arm had secret plans to oust him.

These plans were said to be carried out by the “Security Committee,” which included Islamist officers in the army and intelligence, along with the leader of the RSF.

At the time, Reuters reported that Gosh, the head of the intelligence agency, visited political prisoners, including party leaders, asking for their support in a plan for a new political system and finding a graceful exit for Bashir, with the help of a regional state.

Gosh then announced that Bashir would step down from the presidency of the National Congress Party and would not seek re-election in 2020. However, Bashir later downplayed Gosh’s statements in a televised speech.

The National Congress Party and the Islamic Movement planned to remove Bashir while still holding power through the Security Committee. Gosh was quoted as saying that “Bashir is finished.” However, the protesters’ demands for civilian rule disrupted the Islamists’ plans.

This led to the gradual removal of some top figures from the Security Committee. The military had to negotiate with civilian protest leaders to share power, resulting in a power-sharing agreement (5+5).

Relations between civilian and military factions became strained after an attempted coup by Islamist officers on September 21, 2021. Civilians accused the military of involvement, but military leaders denied it, dismissing the accusation as hypocritical.

Abdalla Hamdok, then Deputy Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, refused to negotiate with civilians, worsening the divide between the two groups.

Amid mounting tensions, Islamist groups saw an opportunity to regain influence after lying low for months. They organized protests, initially ignored by the military but possibly supported by security forces.

These protests brought the Islamists back into the spotlight. However, divisions emerged within the alliance supporting civilian rule after the Juba Peace Agreement, leading to a split between those backing the government and those siding with the military.

The latter staged a protest demanding the removal of the civilian government.

On October 25, 2021, military leaders led a coup, seizing power and arresting Prime Minister Hamdok and others. They declared a state of emergency, dissolved the government, and faced resistance met with force, resulting in civilian deaths.

Despite the ousting of Bashir’s regime five years ago, its influence persists, with Islamists still holding sway and suspected of instigating the coup and fueling the war that erupted in April 2023. While Bashir may have fallen, his legacy remains.



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.