Biden Avoids a Further Mideast Spiral as Israel and Iran Show Restraint. But for How Long?

US President Joe Biden boards Air Force One at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland, US, April 19, 2024. (Reuters)
US President Joe Biden boards Air Force One at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland, US, April 19, 2024. (Reuters)
TT
20

Biden Avoids a Further Mideast Spiral as Israel and Iran Show Restraint. But for How Long?

US President Joe Biden boards Air Force One at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland, US, April 19, 2024. (Reuters)
US President Joe Biden boards Air Force One at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland, US, April 19, 2024. (Reuters)

President Joe Biden can breathe a bit easier, at least for the moment, now that Israel and Iran appear to have stepped back from the brink of tipping the Middle East into all-out war.

Israel's retaliatory strikes on Iran and Syria caused limited damage. The restrained action came after Biden urged Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to temper its response to Iran's unprecedented direct attack on Israel last week and avoid an escalation of violence in the region. Iran's barrage of drones and missiles inflicted little damage and followed a suspected Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus this month that killed two generals.

Iran's public response to the Israeli strikes Friday also was muted, raising hopes that Israel-Iran tensions — long carried out in the shadows with cyberattacks, assassinations and sabotage — will stay at a simmer.

The situation remains a delicate one for Biden as he gears up his reelection effort in the face of headwinds in the Middle East, Russia and the Indo-Pacific. All are testing the proposition he made to voters during his 2020 campaign that a Biden White House would bring a measure of calm and renewed respect for the United States on the world stage.

Foreign policy matters are not typically the top issue for American voters. This November is expected to be no different, with the economy and border security carrying greater resonance.

But public polling suggests that overseas concerns could have more relevance with voters than in any US election since 2006, when voter dissatisfaction over the Iraq War was a major factor in the Republican Party losing 30 House and six Senate seats.

“We see this issue rising in saliency, and at the same time we're seeing voter appraisals of President Biden's handling of foreign affairs being quite negative,” said Christopher Borick, director of the Muhlenberg College Institute of Public Opinion. “That combination is not a great one for Biden.”

Biden has staked enormous political capital on his response to the Israel-Hamas war as well as his administration's backing of Ukraine as it fends off a Russian invasion.

The apparent de-escalation of tensions between Israel and Iran also comes as Congress moves closer to approving $95 billion in wartime aid for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, a measure that Biden has pushed for as Ukrainian forces run desperately short on arms.

After months of delay in the face of the threat of ouster by his party’s right flank, House Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., pushed the package forward and final House passage was expected this weekend. That prospect — and a surge of weaponry to the front lines — is giving the White House renewed hope that Ukraine can right the ship after months of setbacks in the war.

Biden also has made bolstering relations in the Indo-Pacific a central focus of his foreign policy agenda, looking to win allies and build ties as China becomes a more formidable economic and military competitor.

But Republicans, including former President Donald Trump, have an argument to make that Biden’s policies have contributed to US dealing with myriad global quandaries, said Richard Goldberg, a senior adviser at the Washington think tank Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

Republicans have criticized Biden's unsuccessful efforts earlier in his term to revive a nuclear deal with Iran brokered by the Obama administration and abandoned by Trump, saying that would embolden Tehran. The agreement had provided Iran with billions in sanctions relief in exchange for the country agreeing to roll back its nuclear program.

GOP critics have sought to connect Russia's invasion of Ukraine to Biden's decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and they blame the Obama administration for not offering a strong enough response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2014 seizure of Crimea.

“You can make an intellectual case, a policy case of how we got from Point A to B to C to D and ended up in a world on fire,” said Goldberg, a national security official in the Trump administration. “People may not care about how we got here, but they do care that we are here.”

Polling suggests Americans' concerns about foreign policy issues are growing, and there are mixed signs of whether Biden's pitch as a steady foreign policy hand is resonating with voters.

About 4 in 10 US adults named foreign policy topics in an open-ended question that asked people to share up to five issues for the government to work on in 2024, according to The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research poll published in January. That’s about twice as many as mentioned the topic in an AP- NORC poll conducted in the previous year.

Further, about 47% of Americans said they believe Biden has hurt relations with other countries, according to an AP-NORC poll published this month. Similarly, 47% said the same about Trump.

Biden was flying high in the first six months of his presidency, with the American electorate largely approving of his performance and giving him high marks for his handling of the economy and the coronavirus pandemic. But the president saw his approval ratings tank in the aftermath of the chaotic withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 and they never fully recovered.

Now, Biden finds himself dealing with uncertainty of two wars. Both could shadow him right up to Election Day.

With the Israel-Hamas war, Republicans pillory him as being not being adequately supportive of Israel, and the left wing of his party harshly criticize the president, who has shown displeasure with Netanyahu's prosecution of the war, for not doing more to force the Israelis to safeguard Palestinian lives.

After Israel's carefully calibrated strikes on Iran, Middle East tensions have entered a “gray area” that all parties must navigate carefully, said Aaron David Miller, an adviser on Middle East issues in Republican and Democratic administrations.

“Does what has occurred over the last 10 days strengthen each sides' risk-readiness or has it made them drop back from the brink and revert into risk aversion?” Miller said. “Israel and Iran got away with striking each other's territory without a major escalation. What conclusions do they draw from that? Is the conclusion that we might be able to do this again? Or is it we really dodged a bullet here and we have to be exceedingly careful.”

Israel and Hamas appear far away from an agreement on a temporary ceasefire that would facilitate the release of remaining hostages in Hamas-controlled Gaza and help get aid into the territory. It's an agreement that Biden sees as essential to finding an endgame to the war.

CIA Director William Burns expressed disappointment this past week that Hamas has not yet accepted a proposal that Egyptian and Qatari negotiators had presented this month. He blamed the group for "standing in the way of innocent civilians in Gaza getting humanitarian relief that they so desperately need.”

At the same time, the Biden administration has tried to demonstrate it is holding Israel accountable, imposing new penalties Friday on two entities accused of fundraising for extremist Israel settlers that were already under sanctions, as well as the founder of an organization whose members regularly assault Palestinians.

National security adviser Jake Sullivan and other administration officials met on Thursday with Israel's minister for strategic affairs, Ron Dermer, and national security adviser Tzachi Hanegbi. US officials, according to the White House, reiterated Biden's concerns about Israel's plans to carry out an operation in the southern Gaza city of Rafah, where some 1.5 million Palestinians have taken shelter.

Ross Baker, professor emeritus of political science at Rutgers University, said Biden may have temporarily benefited from Israeli-Iranian tensions driving attention away from the deprivation in Gaza.

“Sometimes salvation can come in unexpected ways,” Baker said. “But the way ahead has no shortage of complications.”



Why and How Did al-Kadhimi Return to Baghdad?

Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)
Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)
TT
20

Why and How Did al-Kadhimi Return to Baghdad?

Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)
Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)

Mustafa al-Kadhimi, the former Prime Minister of Iraq, arrived in Baghdad last Tuesday aboard a private jet. He was greeted by a security detail typically assigned by the government to former heads of state, a scene that would have been unimaginable for an Iraqi politician who faced widespread persecution for two years.

A political faction had wanted al-Kadhimi to leave Baghdad after a drone strike targeted his home in November 2021. He formally left the capital in late 2022 after a broad alliance, including political parties, judicial and governmental institutions, and activists, united to force him out of the public arena and effectively push him into exile.

The first image of al-Kadhimi, shaking hands with a security officer near his home in the Green Zone, offers a powerful snapshot of the changes unfolding in Iraq today. It also hints at the future of the country amidst a Middle East in the midst of unprecedented turmoil.

There are growing speculations surrounding the circumstances of al-Kadhimi’s return, with close associates suggesting it followed a “special invitation” to assist the Coordination Framework alliance in tackling an emerging crisis ahead of a potential second term for Donald Trump.

Critics of both the Framework and al-Kadhimi view this as further evidence of his knack for “saving the deep state.”

Did al-Kadhimi return to aid those who stripped him of the opportunity to remain secure in the public sphere, or is he seeking to help himself and his political agenda at a “golden moment”?

A newly appointed advisor to al-Kadhimi said: “The region is undergoing dangerous transformations that will affect Iraq, and all politicians must contribute to mitigating these risks.”

Meanwhile, politicians within the Coordination Framework commented: “Something will happen within the next two months... something for which the current Framework structure has no antidote.”

This answer offers little clarity about what transpired since the fall of 2022 and how the Coordination Framework and its media apparatus relentlessly targeted al-Kadhimi’s government. Now, he returns, with the political system pinning its hopes on him at a critical juncture.

“Recharging Phones”

Before al-Kadhimi’s return, signs emerged suggesting Baghdad had lost its ability to connect with key US decision-making circles, and to some extent, with its immediate regional surroundings.

Since the Democrats left their posts at the US State Department, the government of Prime Minister Mohamed Shia al-Sudani has struggled to find a single Republican willing to answer the phone.

Reports indicate that a team assigned to revive communications with the Trump administration failed to establish a reliable channel, aside from ceremonial meetings with individuals uninterested in Iraq’s concerns.

The “loss of connection,” a term used by three senior figures in the government and one of the ruling parties, was underscored on November 13, when Sudani attended the Munich Security Conference without securing any meeting with an American official present at the event.

This communication breakdown coincided with a series of “unfriendly” US messages, frequently relayed by Republican Congressman Joe Wilson and US Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs Adam Boehler.

Iraqi politicians suggest that the “deep state” sees al-Kadhimi as “the man capable of recharging the dead phones,” and potentially rescuing both al-Sudani and the Coordination Framework.

“No one knows if he’s willing to provide this service for free, or if he’ll offer it at any cost,” said a politician who opposed al-Kadhimi during his tenure as prime minister.

The Nightmare of Sanctions

The prospect of a second term for Trump brings a team that holds little affection for leaders in the Coordination Framework, ministers in the government, and officials in the judiciary.

Among them is the new National Security Advisor, Michael Waltz, who has consistently seized opportunities to attack Baghdad, accusing it of “surrendering itself to Tehran.”

In Baghdad, there is a strong belief that the Republican team will not hesitate to act on Iraq once it finishes with Gaza and the war in Ukraine. The least that comes to the minds of Iraqi politicians, many of whom are disliked by Waltz, is that they will one day find their names on a sanctions list.

“Why not try al-Kadhimi’s formula, which gave Washington the confidence of a balance between it and the Iranians?” say many in Shiite parties, anxious about what lies ahead. Their list of speculations starts with sanctions on influential Shiites and ends with the potential for Trump to block the dollar.

Does al-Kadhimi possess these exceptional abilities that would make him a "steel dome," as some politicians in Baghdad envision him, now dreaming of discovering a way to protect them from a possible American storm?

“A Known Figure”

How did the Iraqi government end up in a political deadlock? Prominent politicians in the Coordination Framework offer explanations, often converging on the Syrian file. Iraq struggled to understand the new regional political philosophy and faced difficulties in shifting away from the rules of “Al-Aqsa Flood” to the post-Assad era.

“Since Trump doesn't think much about Iraq,” says David Schenker, the former US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Washington will not engage in healthy relations with Iraq unless it aligns sufficiently with the changes in its surrounding environment.

Even among circles close to the religious establishment in Najaf, views are emerging that reflect an understanding of Iraq’s lost political position—one that sees the regime as a vital part of the Arab movement on regional issues.

Interestingly, this is all happening without any response from Tehran.

“Not because it has abandoned the Iraqi file, or is unable to influence it,” says a source familiar with the discussions surrounding al-Kadhimi’s return.

The source adds that “Tehran needs to revive Baghdad, which is reaching a dead end in foreign policy and losing vitality in its dealings with the region and the West,” though it remains unclear whether al-Kadhimi’s return is linked to this climate.

Despite a generally positive view of al-Kadhimi's tenure, many criticize al-Sudani for his delayed efforts to adapt to the region’s tumultuous changes. It was difficult to remain in the same place while a seismic shift occurred in Syria and a storm raged in Lebanon.

What role does al-Kadhimi play? Most likely, he seized the “golden opportunity.”

He sees himself as the person capable of quickly adapting to a changing Middle East, with a solid communication channel to the Arab world and experience in balancing regional dynamics.

Iraqi politicians argue that Trump’s era and the new Middle East will impose a new political equation in Baghdad, one that demands a person who can be a “reliable partner” in Arab decision-making circles to be recognized by the Americans.

For this reason, al-Kadhimi has secured his return ticket to the competitive arena—this time, not with slogans of “resistance,” but with a focus on integration into the new order.

Liberal Shiites

Al-Kadhimi’s return was preceded by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s announcement of a new alliance, and by the activities of Adnan al-Zurfi, a former candidate for the premiership whose nomination was opposed by armed factions.

Together, these elements form a growing context for the search for liberal Shiites offering a fresh alternative.

Those who favor this scenario and promote it as “the only solution” argue that Syria, under Ahmed al-Sharaa, Lebanon under Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam, are missing Iraq—a country led by liberal Shiites who know how to balance relations between Washington and Tehran without tipping the scale.

Al-Kadhimi found his way back to Baghdad after the alliance that had relentlessly targeted him crumbled.

The Coordination Framework is no longer the same as it was in 2022. Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law coalition, is searching for ways to rein in al-Sudani, while the armed factions are working hard to carve out new positions that free them from the burden of “uniting the arenas.”

Meanwhile, Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, is experimenting with silence—a stance he typically avoids, especially in an election year.

Al-Kadhimi senses that all of these figures now welcome his presence in Baghdad.

They seek from him a “good reputation” for Iraq—one that does not require drastic changes to align with the new dynamics in Syria and Lebanon. The question remains: will he offer this service for free?