War on Gaza Strains Relations between Iran, Syria

Rubble is removed from the site of the Iranian consulate in Damascus after it was destroyed by an Israeli strike in April. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Rubble is removed from the site of the Iranian consulate in Damascus after it was destroyed by an Israeli strike in April. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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War on Gaza Strains Relations between Iran, Syria

Rubble is removed from the site of the Iranian consulate in Damascus after it was destroyed by an Israeli strike in April. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Rubble is removed from the site of the Iranian consulate in Damascus after it was destroyed by an Israeli strike in April. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

It appears that the war on Gaza has impacted Iran’s military deployment in Syria. Local sources said Tehran has started to put in place plans for the relocation of Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) headquarters from the Damascus countryside to regions close to the border with Lebanon after the killing of several of its prominent members in Israeli strikes in recent months.

Syria has notably taken “neutral” and even “cold” stances towards Iran in wake of these developments, amid Iranian suspicions that Syrian security agencies could have leaked information about its officers who were later targeted by Israel.

Iran also appears to be alarmed by Damascus’ openness to overtures to return to the Arab fold, which could be interpreted as distancing itself from Tehran.

Asharq Al-Awsat was in Syria where it witnessed how the deployment of gunmen at the Sayyeda Zainab region has become limited to Lebanese Hezbollah members when Iran’s presence used to be felt in the past. The area is a destination for Shiite visitors from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Local sources in the town of Hujeirah north of Sayyeda Zainab told Asharq Al-Awsat: “This is the headquarters of Iranian religious and military leaders. Ever since Israel intensified its strikes on the region, we have started to see very little of them. We have hardly seen them as of late. They have disappeared.”

Israel struck in April the Iranian consulate in Damascus, leaving seven people dead, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon. The development was a blow to Iran who after a decade of conflict in Syria, had sent tens of thousands of Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani militia members to back the Damascus regime.

Fears and evacuation plans

A source close to a high-ranking Iranian “adviser” in Syria spoke of the deep fear over his life the latter is experiencing in wake of the repeated Israeli strikes. He quoted the adviser as saying that he was being forced to “sleep in the open over fears for his life”.

Sources from pro-Iran militias in the Damascus countryside said Tehran has come up with plans to evacuate IRGC members from Syria given “the mounting Israeli pressure.” They are expected to leave through Damascus International Airport and across the border with Iraq.

The IRGC had already evacuated its known headquarters in the Damascus countryside and relocated to areas to close to the Lebanese border, said local sources that observed their movement.

Israel had intensified its strikes against Iranian targets in Syria since the eruption of the war on Gaza on October 7.

Sayyeda Zainab

Sayyed Zainab is viewed as the main headquarters of the Iranian forces in Syria. Now, it has become devoid of Iranians or militias loyal to them. The forces quit the area in wake of an Israeli strike that killed Reza Mousavi, a top commander, in December.

Asharq Al-Awsat toured the area and noted that gunmen deployed in the area are limited to Hezbollah members.

In spite of the situation on the ground, Iranian Ambassador to Syria Hossein Akbari stressed that his country will not withdraw militarily from the country.

Commenting to Syria’s Al-Watan newspaper on reports that the Iranian advisers were leaving, he said: “We are present in Syria, and we will never withdraw from it.”

Iran was Syria’s top backer from the early days of the Syrian conflict that broke out in 2011. It has supported it on the political, military and economic levels. Around 3,000 IRGC members are deployed in the country, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Influence

Hezbollah is the most powerful Shiite militia in Syria and it comes only second to the IRGC in terms of influence, a source close to the party told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The party is focusing on managing communication with regular Syrians, it added. The party leaders are “very keen on avoiding provoking Syria’s Sunni majority.” They have forged good relations with society figures in areas where they are deployed, such as al-Qusayr in Homs and al-Qalamoun in the western Damascus countryside.

In many instances, they have protected locals against the practices of the Syrian security forces, said the source.

For the Syrian authorities, the discipline of Hezbollah members and leaderships is seen in a positive light, contrasted with the Iraqi militias that are undisciplined, said another source.

On relations between Damascus and Hezbollah, a source close to the Syrian authorities told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah leaderships “always intervene to ease tensions that may arise with Iranian or Iraqi militias.”

“We enjoy a long history of cooperation with them. They understand our way of thinking,” he added.

Moreover, he said Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has long used his personal influence with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to “resolve several disputes”. He recently played a role in easing tensions between Syria and Iran, leading him to defend during a recent televised address Syria’s decision to not become involved in the war on Gaza.

Syria distances itself

Contrary to Iran’s allies in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, the authorities in Syria chose to remain on the sidelines in the war. For example, the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights has seen little unrest.

Sources in Damascus said: “The Iranians fail to understand Syria’s neutral position on Gaza and its refusal to open the Golan front.”

The Iranians believe their country “has paid dearly in defending the Syrian regime, which in turn, is luring dialogue offers from the West that are seen as a reward for its decision to distance itself” from the war. “This is something the Iranians will not accept,” they added.

They explained: “Some Syrian officials believe that any Iranian regional gain will inevitably come at Damascus’ expense as evidenced by how terrified the regime was at the beginning of the war on Gaza of Iran and the United States possibly striking a deal.”

As tensions between Damascus and Tehran continue, Iranian advisers in Syria have said they no longer hold the same respect among the people.

“We have no value here in Syria. No one cares about us. Back home, I was in charge of an entire province and the people were grateful to me. Here, no one even respects us,” a source quoted an Iranian general in Syria as saying.

Jaramana: The Iraqi ‘capital’

The situation is viewed differently by the leaders of various Iraqi militias. They believe they know the Syrians better than the Iranians and Lebanese militants.

“Hezbollah officials believe we must cater to the Syrian officials. The Iranians share the same view, but our experience has shown that the Syrians may openly adopt a hard line, while in fact they are actually much weaker than they appear,” a source quoted a medium-ranked Iraqi militia member as saying.

Damascus officials have criticized Iraqis for their excessive involvement with the Syrians, most notably in Jaramana city in the eastern Damascus countryside. The city has become known as the Iraqi “capital” given the heavy presence of the militias there.

The source said the fighters spend their time at the nightclubs in the city, “which poses high security risks.” He also spoke of doubts harbored by the Iranians that the militias may have leaked information about the Iranians and Hezbollah in Syria.

Hezbollah has been informed of several leaks that can be traced back to its own members.

Relations turn cold

Syrian security agencies have also been suspected of leaking sensitive information about the Iranians to Israel that led to the killings of Iranian officials, “who died in defense of the Syrian regime.”

President Assad has also referred to retirement several security and military officials who were in charge when Iran was deepening its influence during the war and so understand all it has offered the country, further straining relations between Tehran and Damascus.

Sources following the course of Syrian-Iranian relations told Asharq Al-Awsat that the developments took place as Iran is secretly alarmed by the Arab openness towards Damascus and the regime turning towards the Arab fold.

The shift is seen as a response by Damascus to agreements reached between Iran and the US that did not sit well with the regime. One such deal was the 2022 agreement reached between Lebanon and Israel over their joint maritime border, said the sources.

The tensions continue. Iran has been exerting more pressure on the Damascus government to pay debts owed to it, in a bid by Tehran to impose more restrictions and extract more commitments from it so as to limit is ability to maneuver in the region.

In August 2023, a classified Iranian government document was leaked to the media. It spoke of how Tehran spent 50 billion dollars on the war in Syria in ten years. The sum is viewed as a debt it wants Damascus to pay in the form of Iranian investments in phosphates, oil and other resources in Syria.

The Syrians at the time approached the Iranians for a denial of the document, but they refused, saying they do not comment on media claims. This was interpreted as an Iranian move to lead Syria and Arab countries to believe that Damascus was shackled by Iranian debts, informed sourced told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The sources following the Syrian-Iranian ties quoted a Syrian official as saying: “We went along with the Iranians, but we realized that they have not fulfilled several of their commitments. We are now trying to get out of this situation. This is our chance and we must explore it for the sake of the future of our country.”

Gaza rift

The war on Gaza has revealed a rift between Tehran and Damascus. The informed sources said Damascus sensed there was a possibility to normalize relations with the West because it refused to become involved in the war.

Signs have emerged that Syrian-Iranian relations have grown cold. No Iranian officials were invited to the Quds Day commemoration that was held south of Damascus in April. Posters of the Iranian president, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Hezbollah’s Nasrallah were noticeably absent at the event in contrast to previous years.

Meanwhile, a fuel shortage in Syria appears to have deepened, another sign of strains with Iran, which is the country’s main supplier.

And on the advent of the holy fasting month of Ramadan earlier this year, Assad exchanged cables of congratulations with several Arab leaders. His exchange with Iranian officials was notably not covered by the media. Congratulations on the Eid al-Fitr holiday with Iran were also left out of the coverage.



Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed

Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
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Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed

Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)

In the third installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and ex-Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa discusses various experiences with Arab leaders, emphasizing the nuances of diplomacy in a turbulent region.

Moussa recalled that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak “was neither bloodthirsty nor a pharaoh, nor did he try to be one.” He points to a famous remark by President Anwar Sadat, who once said: “Gamal (Abdel Nasser) and I are the last of the pharaohs.”

The Gaddafi encounter

Reflecting on his complex interactions with Libyan leader Moammar al-Gaddafi, Moussa admitted that the beginning was anything but smooth. “When I first met Gaddafi, he treated me as if I were an American spy. He wouldn’t look at me directly, only speaking while facing another direction. It was very theatrical,” Moussa said. He recalled this behavior with a certain amusement, treating it almost like a game: “I would wager with myself before our meetings—will he speak to me directly this time, or not?”

Initially, rumors had reached Gaddafi that Moussa had been sent with a US agenda, though he had actually been Egypt’s ambassador to the UN in New York, not Washington. “But once he observed how I performed in my role, he began to change his mind. Eventually, he would ask President Mubarak if I could join their private discussions.”

Moussa recalled a specific instance in Tobruk, where he was invited by Gaddafi to sit at a table with him and Mubarak to discuss a matter of importance. He knew this would stir unease among others present, but the conversation went ahead regardless. This type of scene, he noted, happened several times.

Hosni Mubarak, Moammar al-Gaddafi and Amr Moussa at the Arab summit in Sirte in 2010. (AFP)

Diplomatic drama in a tent

When Gaddafi visited Cairo during Moussa’s tenure as foreign minister, the Libyan leader insisted on setting up his trademark tent in the gardens of the Qubba Palace. Though the palace was fully equipped, Gaddafi would receive guests only in the tent. “At that time, he still saw me as a US spy,” Moussa said, “so he avoided looking at me during our meeting. He inspected every corner of the tent—except the one where I was sitting.”

Despite Gaddafi’s sometimes abrasive behavior, Moussa conceded that the Libyan leader was intelligent and unique. “He was eccentric, yes, but he had a cleverness about him. His actions often carried a deeper rationale, even if misguided.”

Gaddafi’s erratic rule extended to his own ministers. Moussa noted how even highly regarded officials like Abdul Rahman Shalgham and Ali Treki were subject to his whims. “If Gaddafi was displeased with something, he might simply tell you to stay home—and that could mean house arrest for years. Yet, your salary would still arrive at your door.”

A moment of humor

One incident stood out. Libya was scheduled to host the Arab summit and had failed to pay its dues to the Arab League, and as Secretary-General, Moussa received an envoy from Gaddafi carrying a list of demands. Moussa didn’t even read the letter; he simply locked it in a drawer. “When the envoy asked what to report back, I told him exactly that,” Moussa laughed.

Soon after, Gaddafi summoned him to Sirte. As Moussa waited in the tent, Gaddafi’s secretary, Bashir Saleh, walked by singing an old Arabic poem: “You seem tearless, and patience is your nature.” Moussa quipped: “Tell the leader he’s not tearless—he’s payment-less!” Saleh shared the joke with Gaddafi, who burst into laughter and finally paid Libya’s dues.

Later, during an Arab summit in Libya, Gaddafi displayed a surprising sense of responsibility. Moussa recalled a heated moment when Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh demanded immediate action on forming a pan-Arab army. Gaddafi gently interrupted: “Take it easy, Ali.” That phrase—“Take it easy, Ali”—spoke volumes, according to Moussa. “It revealed Gaddafi’s desire to manage tension even among volatile leaders.”

On Hosni Mubarak and the ‘pharaoh’ myth

Asked if Mubarak ever resembled the authoritarian archetype of a “pharaoh” as Russians view their “czars,” Moussa was firm: “No, not Mubarak. Maybe Sadat had some traits—he liked symbolism. But Mubarak? He wasn’t violent, nor bloodthirsty. Yes, he could be firm, but he didn’t revel in bloodshed.”

Moussa clarified that while Mubarak might have approved harsh punishments as president, it never escalated to a murderous level. “Perhaps there were isolated incidents, especially within the prison system, but it wasn’t part of Mubarak’s character to govern through violence. He wasn’t built that way.”

Saddam Hussein meets with Amr Moussa in Iraq in January 2002. (AFP)

The song that stirred controversy

When the Egyptian folk singer Shaaban Abdel Rahim sang “I hate Israel, and I love Amr Moussa,” it caused a stir. Moussa downplayed the drama. “I don’t think Mubarak himself was offended. He was the president; no foreign minister would rival him in popularity. But some people in the surrounding circles—not necessarily his inner circle—were irked.”

Eventually, another version of the song emerged, replacing Moussa’s name with Mubarak’s. “But it was the original that made waves. Even a diplomat from Latin America once told me, ‘We’re dancing to this song here!’”

A difficult meeting with Saddam Hussein

One of the most tense encounters Moussa ever had was with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. After being elected Secretary-General of the Arab League in 2001, Moussa set out to visit all Arab leaders. He deliberately left Saddam until the end, knowing the sensitivities involved.

In January 2002, Moussa visited Saddam at a small palace. He carried a message from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding weapons inspections. “I told Saddam that Annan was open to negotiations, and that continued confrontation with the US would lead nowhere. At some point, no one would stand by him.”

Moussa asked Saddam directly: “Do you possess nuclear weapons?” Saddam answered, “No.” Moussa pressed him again: “Are you absolutely sure?” Saddam repeated, “No.” This made Moussa’s deputy, Ahmed Ben Helli, visibly nervous. “He probably thought we weren’t going to walk out of there.”

Moussa then asked why Iraq objected to the UN inspectors. Saddam responded: “These people don’t just inspect nuclear sites. They ask civilians about food supplies, their opinions on the government. What business is that of theirs?”

Moussa promised to report this to Annan, which he did. Negotiations resumed between Iraq and the UN, but history took its course and the US-led invasion followed.

Asked if he felt fortunate never to have served directly under a figure like Gaddafi, Moussa answered without hesitation: “Absolutely. I saw how respected men like Shalgham and Treki were sidelined. You could be a top official one day and under house arrest the next.”