War on Gaza Strains Relations between Iran, Syria

Rubble is removed from the site of the Iranian consulate in Damascus after it was destroyed by an Israeli strike in April. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Rubble is removed from the site of the Iranian consulate in Damascus after it was destroyed by an Israeli strike in April. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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War on Gaza Strains Relations between Iran, Syria

Rubble is removed from the site of the Iranian consulate in Damascus after it was destroyed by an Israeli strike in April. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Rubble is removed from the site of the Iranian consulate in Damascus after it was destroyed by an Israeli strike in April. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

It appears that the war on Gaza has impacted Iran’s military deployment in Syria. Local sources said Tehran has started to put in place plans for the relocation of Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) headquarters from the Damascus countryside to regions close to the border with Lebanon after the killing of several of its prominent members in Israeli strikes in recent months.

Syria has notably taken “neutral” and even “cold” stances towards Iran in wake of these developments, amid Iranian suspicions that Syrian security agencies could have leaked information about its officers who were later targeted by Israel.

Iran also appears to be alarmed by Damascus’ openness to overtures to return to the Arab fold, which could be interpreted as distancing itself from Tehran.

Asharq Al-Awsat was in Syria where it witnessed how the deployment of gunmen at the Sayyeda Zainab region has become limited to Lebanese Hezbollah members when Iran’s presence used to be felt in the past. The area is a destination for Shiite visitors from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Local sources in the town of Hujeirah north of Sayyeda Zainab told Asharq Al-Awsat: “This is the headquarters of Iranian religious and military leaders. Ever since Israel intensified its strikes on the region, we have started to see very little of them. We have hardly seen them as of late. They have disappeared.”

Israel struck in April the Iranian consulate in Damascus, leaving seven people dead, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon. The development was a blow to Iran who after a decade of conflict in Syria, had sent tens of thousands of Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani militia members to back the Damascus regime.

Fears and evacuation plans

A source close to a high-ranking Iranian “adviser” in Syria spoke of the deep fear over his life the latter is experiencing in wake of the repeated Israeli strikes. He quoted the adviser as saying that he was being forced to “sleep in the open over fears for his life”.

Sources from pro-Iran militias in the Damascus countryside said Tehran has come up with plans to evacuate IRGC members from Syria given “the mounting Israeli pressure.” They are expected to leave through Damascus International Airport and across the border with Iraq.

The IRGC had already evacuated its known headquarters in the Damascus countryside and relocated to areas to close to the Lebanese border, said local sources that observed their movement.

Israel had intensified its strikes against Iranian targets in Syria since the eruption of the war on Gaza on October 7.

Sayyeda Zainab

Sayyed Zainab is viewed as the main headquarters of the Iranian forces in Syria. Now, it has become devoid of Iranians or militias loyal to them. The forces quit the area in wake of an Israeli strike that killed Reza Mousavi, a top commander, in December.

Asharq Al-Awsat toured the area and noted that gunmen deployed in the area are limited to Hezbollah members.

In spite of the situation on the ground, Iranian Ambassador to Syria Hossein Akbari stressed that his country will not withdraw militarily from the country.

Commenting to Syria’s Al-Watan newspaper on reports that the Iranian advisers were leaving, he said: “We are present in Syria, and we will never withdraw from it.”

Iran was Syria’s top backer from the early days of the Syrian conflict that broke out in 2011. It has supported it on the political, military and economic levels. Around 3,000 IRGC members are deployed in the country, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Influence

Hezbollah is the most powerful Shiite militia in Syria and it comes only second to the IRGC in terms of influence, a source close to the party told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The party is focusing on managing communication with regular Syrians, it added. The party leaders are “very keen on avoiding provoking Syria’s Sunni majority.” They have forged good relations with society figures in areas where they are deployed, such as al-Qusayr in Homs and al-Qalamoun in the western Damascus countryside.

In many instances, they have protected locals against the practices of the Syrian security forces, said the source.

For the Syrian authorities, the discipline of Hezbollah members and leaderships is seen in a positive light, contrasted with the Iraqi militias that are undisciplined, said another source.

On relations between Damascus and Hezbollah, a source close to the Syrian authorities told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah leaderships “always intervene to ease tensions that may arise with Iranian or Iraqi militias.”

“We enjoy a long history of cooperation with them. They understand our way of thinking,” he added.

Moreover, he said Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has long used his personal influence with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to “resolve several disputes”. He recently played a role in easing tensions between Syria and Iran, leading him to defend during a recent televised address Syria’s decision to not become involved in the war on Gaza.

Syria distances itself

Contrary to Iran’s allies in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, the authorities in Syria chose to remain on the sidelines in the war. For example, the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights has seen little unrest.

Sources in Damascus said: “The Iranians fail to understand Syria’s neutral position on Gaza and its refusal to open the Golan front.”

The Iranians believe their country “has paid dearly in defending the Syrian regime, which in turn, is luring dialogue offers from the West that are seen as a reward for its decision to distance itself” from the war. “This is something the Iranians will not accept,” they added.

They explained: “Some Syrian officials believe that any Iranian regional gain will inevitably come at Damascus’ expense as evidenced by how terrified the regime was at the beginning of the war on Gaza of Iran and the United States possibly striking a deal.”

As tensions between Damascus and Tehran continue, Iranian advisers in Syria have said they no longer hold the same respect among the people.

“We have no value here in Syria. No one cares about us. Back home, I was in charge of an entire province and the people were grateful to me. Here, no one even respects us,” a source quoted an Iranian general in Syria as saying.

Jaramana: The Iraqi ‘capital’

The situation is viewed differently by the leaders of various Iraqi militias. They believe they know the Syrians better than the Iranians and Lebanese militants.

“Hezbollah officials believe we must cater to the Syrian officials. The Iranians share the same view, but our experience has shown that the Syrians may openly adopt a hard line, while in fact they are actually much weaker than they appear,” a source quoted a medium-ranked Iraqi militia member as saying.

Damascus officials have criticized Iraqis for their excessive involvement with the Syrians, most notably in Jaramana city in the eastern Damascus countryside. The city has become known as the Iraqi “capital” given the heavy presence of the militias there.

The source said the fighters spend their time at the nightclubs in the city, “which poses high security risks.” He also spoke of doubts harbored by the Iranians that the militias may have leaked information about the Iranians and Hezbollah in Syria.

Hezbollah has been informed of several leaks that can be traced back to its own members.

Relations turn cold

Syrian security agencies have also been suspected of leaking sensitive information about the Iranians to Israel that led to the killings of Iranian officials, “who died in defense of the Syrian regime.”

President Assad has also referred to retirement several security and military officials who were in charge when Iran was deepening its influence during the war and so understand all it has offered the country, further straining relations between Tehran and Damascus.

Sources following the course of Syrian-Iranian relations told Asharq Al-Awsat that the developments took place as Iran is secretly alarmed by the Arab openness towards Damascus and the regime turning towards the Arab fold.

The shift is seen as a response by Damascus to agreements reached between Iran and the US that did not sit well with the regime. One such deal was the 2022 agreement reached between Lebanon and Israel over their joint maritime border, said the sources.

The tensions continue. Iran has been exerting more pressure on the Damascus government to pay debts owed to it, in a bid by Tehran to impose more restrictions and extract more commitments from it so as to limit is ability to maneuver in the region.

In August 2023, a classified Iranian government document was leaked to the media. It spoke of how Tehran spent 50 billion dollars on the war in Syria in ten years. The sum is viewed as a debt it wants Damascus to pay in the form of Iranian investments in phosphates, oil and other resources in Syria.

The Syrians at the time approached the Iranians for a denial of the document, but they refused, saying they do not comment on media claims. This was interpreted as an Iranian move to lead Syria and Arab countries to believe that Damascus was shackled by Iranian debts, informed sourced told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The sources following the Syrian-Iranian ties quoted a Syrian official as saying: “We went along with the Iranians, but we realized that they have not fulfilled several of their commitments. We are now trying to get out of this situation. This is our chance and we must explore it for the sake of the future of our country.”

Gaza rift

The war on Gaza has revealed a rift between Tehran and Damascus. The informed sources said Damascus sensed there was a possibility to normalize relations with the West because it refused to become involved in the war.

Signs have emerged that Syrian-Iranian relations have grown cold. No Iranian officials were invited to the Quds Day commemoration that was held south of Damascus in April. Posters of the Iranian president, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Hezbollah’s Nasrallah were noticeably absent at the event in contrast to previous years.

Meanwhile, a fuel shortage in Syria appears to have deepened, another sign of strains with Iran, which is the country’s main supplier.

And on the advent of the holy fasting month of Ramadan earlier this year, Assad exchanged cables of congratulations with several Arab leaders. His exchange with Iranian officials was notably not covered by the media. Congratulations on the Eid al-Fitr holiday with Iran were also left out of the coverage.



US Sanctions on Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to al-Sharaa 

A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
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US Sanctions on Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to al-Sharaa 

A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)

Syrians have lived under the shadow of US sanctions for 46 years, spanning generations who know no other reality. These sanctions have become woven into every aspect of daily life, from banking and international aviation to construction and food supplies. Their burden has fallen hardest on ordinary people, rather than on the symbols of the ousted Assad regime.

While lifting sanctions now would undoubtedly unlock planning and reconstruction efforts, political and security concerns persist, and Syria’s dilapidated infrastructure may impede private-sector investment.

Most importantly, we must ask whether US President Donald Trump’s move to begin lifting sanctions was as improvised as his 2018 announcement to withdraw militarily from Syria, or whether it marks a pivotal shift in US foreign policy toward Syria.

On May 13, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump announced the lifting of US sanctions on Syria. This triggered a period of confusion and internal reviews before his administration outlined an initial mechanism that balanced implementing his announcement with addressing his advisors’ worries over unfettered engagement with the new Syrian leadership.

Before assessing this current phase of easing sanctions, we need a historical overview of them, their context, underlying rationale, implementation methods, and what their potential impact might be for Syria and its people. Sanctions on Syria can be divided into three eras: under Hafez al-Assad, under his son Bashar, and now under interim President Ahmed al‑Sharaa.

Shift toward Iran (1979–2000)

US sanctions on Syria began in 1979, following the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel and the rise of Iran’s revolution. With the end of the strategic alliance between Cairo and Damascus, Hafez al-Assad viewed Iran’s emerging regime as a counterweight to Iraq and Israel.

Washington designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979 due to its role in Lebanon and its support for fighters opposed to Israel. Consequently, the US imposed restrictions on foreign aid, defense exports, and the transfer of dual‑use goods. In November 1986, President Ronald Reagan barred Syrian planes from landing in the US.

The Iraq War (2001–2010)

Sanctions entered a new phase as US policy shifted after the September 11, 2001 attacks and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, coinciding with Bashar al‑Assad’s arrival to power in July 2000. In his 2002 State of the Union, President George W. Bush labeled Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and North Korea the “Axis of Evil”, prompting Iran to form a “Resistance Axis” that included Syria and Hezbollah.

With these strains came stricter measures: the Syria Accountability and Lebanon Sovereignty Act of 2003, enforced by OFAC at the US Treasury in 2004 under Executive Order 13338, targeted Syria’s role in Lebanon and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, as well as its opposition to the US-led occupation of Iraq.

On May 7, 2025, the Trump administration signed a notice extending the national emergency concerning Syria until May 7, 2026, encompassing executive orders from 2003 to 2012.

The Syrian uprising and Caesar Act

Following Syria’s uprising in March 2011, the US imposed a wave of sanctions targeting violence and human rights abuses. President Barack Obama’s April 29, 2011 executive order froze Assad regime assets, followed by an August 2011 ban on oil, asset freezes, and broad trade prohibitions, excluding food and medicine.

However, the defining moment came with the Caesar Civilian Protection Act of 2019, signed by Trump in December 2019 and implemented in June 2020. Targeting infrastructure, military maintenance, energy, and those funding the Assad regime, it also banned foreign investment in Syria’s reconstruction. This legislation aimed to check both Russian and Iranian influence and serve as leverage for negotiations with Moscow, permitting temporary waivers if productive talks occurred.

Though enacted long after the internal conflict began, the Act functioned less as a response to internal dynamics and more as an economic restraint on reconstruction efforts.

Al‑Sharaa after Assad

By late 2024, with Bashar al-Assad’s regime fallen and Trump back in power, Syria had not been a US priority, with internal debate over how to engage the new al‑Sharaa administration. That shifted after Trump spoke with Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on March 16, signaling alignment with Turkish‑Saudi policy against the hardline Israeli stance.

In Saudi Arabia, Trump began rolling back sanctions on Syria, but the fate of the Caesar Act remains uncertain, currently suspended in 180‑day increments, extendable. Although it was briefly lifted for humanitarian relief during the Feb 2023 Türkiye-Syria earthquakes and in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), its full repeal remains on hold.

Mechanisms and challenges

Trump’s administration has implemented three key executive measures: Treasury’s “GL‑25” on May 23, enabling sweeping economic coverage; a 180‑day suspension of Caesar sanctions; and a specific waiver for the Commercial Bank of Syria via the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, allowing re‑establishment of correspondent banking relationships.

GL‑25 has no set expiry and can be revoked anytime, while Caesar waivers renew every six months. An earlier GL‑24 waiver, issued in January, allowed limited official and energy sector transactions and personal transfers, but US banks have remained cautious.

The permit covers four sectors: finance, oil‑gas, maritime shipping, and aviation. US persons remain barred from transactions that may benefit Russia, Iran, or North Korea, meaning rigorous due diligence is necessary. The original executive orders remain in force, although press reports suggest possible cancellations.

Procedurally, Syria remains on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, as removal would require Congress to be notified by the US State Department. The Department of Commerce and State’s defense trade regulators have yet to remove export controls, which means that Syria still falls under International Traffic in Arms Regulations, necessitating export licenses for most goods, excluding basic food and medicine.

Furthermore, Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham is still designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Even after al‑Sharaa met Trump, the Treasury’s waiver excludes HTS leader Abu Mohammed al‑Golani, al-Sharaa's former nom de guerre, who remains sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1267, supported by a likely Russian veto of any attempt to remove HTS from global blacklists. Arms embargoes and surveillance‑tech restrictions will also persist.

The Caesar Act itself was renewed by Congress in January 2025 for five years, lasting until January 2030 unless overturned legislatively and its suspension may be extended in November 2025. But these continue as temporary waivers, not full repeals.

US politics and Congressional dynamics

Legislative repeal would require Act passage in Congress. Ironically, Trump’s allies in this are Democrats, as many Republicans, especially senators, remain wary.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jim Risch remarked that Trump lifted sanctions a bit more than what was expected, but cautioned that the sanctions could come back. US energy firms, together with Syrian‑American groups, have lobbied Trump to ease sanctions, while pro‑Israel lobby AIPAC insists any relief must hinge on demonstrable positive behavior from the new Syrian government.

Impact on economy and society

In 2018, the UN estimated at least $250 billion would be required to rebuild Syria fully, far beyond what domestic resources can furnish.

Serious barriers remain: destroyed roads, hospitals, and power networks hinder basic services. Reviving industry needs massive investment; millions displaced internally or abroad need rehousing; food, fuel, medical gear, and decent jobs are in short supply.

Even a partial lifting marks a seismic shift: essential imports like food, medicine, and technology could flow more freely; reconstruction of schools, hospitals, and roads becomes feasible; frozen international assets might be unfrozen, inviting foreign companies back to construction, energy, and trade.

The most immediate relief will come from reconnecting Syrian banks to global payment systems, especially SWIFT, dismantling the economic collapse born of widespread distrust. Yet Syria remains on the FATF grey list, deterring banks and obstructing liquidity, so regulatory frameworks must be built.

Future prospects

Ambitious domestic and regional projects have surfaced under al‑Sharaa, with some contracts bypassing competitive bids. The UAE has been granted an $800 million concession at the Port of Tartus, via a Dubai Ports World MoU, to develop multi-purpose terminals, industrial zones, dry ports, and logistics hubs.

Meanwhile, a 30‑year deal with French CMA CGM was signed to develop Latakia Port. China’s VDL company secured rights to 300,000 m² in the Adra Free Zone outside Damascus for 20 years to build industrial and commercial facilities with tax breaks, labor flexibility, and repatriable profits.

A Qatari-US-Turkish energy consortium plans a $7 billion, 5,000 MW power project.

All are seen as steps to lure foreign capital and reshape Syria’s foreign policy by leveraging international corporate interests.

Uncertain transition

The sanctions regime hinges on three pillars: Syria’s State Sponsor designation (since 1979), the Syria Accountability Act (2003), and the Caesar Act (2019). Only the first may soon shift, pending a State Department and Congressional review; the others remain entrenched.

While Syria will not likely see a flood of US investment tomorrow, the first visible presence would probably involve Turkish and Gulf investors, as the US must first verify the stability and reliability of the new Syrian leadership before enabling wider investors to return.

Damascus does not fully control its territory or armed factions, and fresh sanctions may target entities linked to coastal violence in recent months.

Thus, Caesar’s intent has transitioned from coercing the Assad regime to ensuring al‑Sharaa’s good behavior. But its six‑month renewals offer limited investor certainty, making regional neighbors the marginal beneficiaries.

Al‑Sharaa’s teams may aim to woo Trump with bold reconstruction plans akin to a Marshall Plan. But Trump isn’t easily swayed. He has yet to appoint an ambassador to Damascus; instead, US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack was named envoy to Syria, indicating Syria remains an extension of Turkish policy.

Trump is unpredictable and could reverse course swiftly, but current signs still point to provisional waivers rather than a full repeal of sanctions.