‘Iraqi Resistance’ Ready for ‘Wider War’ in Lebanon

Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein arrive for a joint news conference in Baghdad, Iraq June 13, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein arrive for a joint news conference in Baghdad, Iraq June 13, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
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‘Iraqi Resistance’ Ready for ‘Wider War’ in Lebanon

Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein arrive for a joint news conference in Baghdad, Iraq June 13, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein arrive for a joint news conference in Baghdad, Iraq June 13, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

When Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein warned of the outbreak of war in Lebanon, his disturbing words were expected to receive a stormy response from Iraqi factions loyal to Iran about preparations to support Lebanon’s Hezbollah. But this did not happen.

On June 13, Hussein was speaking in a joint press conference with his acting Iranian counterpart, Ali Bagheri Kani, and without prior context, he fired a “warning shot” about South Lebanon, while Baghdad is committed to the truce under a government that is increasingly admired by the Americans.

“If a war breaks out there, the entire region will be affected, not just Lebanon,” Hussein said.

For many, the words of the Iraqi chief diplomat were a “message” based on information provided by the Iranian visitor, Bagheri Kani, who, two weeks before his arrival in Baghdad, was holding “normal” meetings in Beirut and Damascus about the “close and lasting partnership.”

Two figures in the Coordination Framework told Asharq Al-Awsat that when Kani arrived in Baghdad, he spoke with Iraqi officials about “a possible war that Israel is planning in South Lebanon.”

In an attempt to understand the position of the military factions, Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to an Iraqi faction leader, who said: “We were asked about our position if the Lebanon front were to witness further escalation. We replied: We are ready, (...) we will go there.”

A diplomat confirmed that Bagheri had not made the request “in this manner,” while an Iraqi expert interpreted Hussein’s words as an attempt to achieve “political balance between the government and the resistance,” ruling out the chances of a “wider war”.

Who is seeking to expand the war, Iran or Israel?

For months, the regions of South Lebanon and northern Israel have been witnessing the most violent exchange of attacks since the 2006 war, within the framework of unconventional rules of engagement that make it a war in doses, with high costs, especially on the side of Hezbollah in the South.

Lebanese sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the toll of the past months is equivalent to the damage of a comprehensive war.

Amos Hochstein, advisor to US President Joe Biden, who arrived in Israel on Monday, and from there to Beirut, conveyed a message to dissuade Netanyahu from any possible escalation that might push Iran to intervene directly in Lebanon, through its arms in Iraq.

Aqeel Abbas, a political science professor in Washington, believes that Netanyahu “wants this war more than Hezbollah and Iran,” because the latter wants to maintain the pattern of frequent strikes from South Lebanon to ease pressure on Hamas in Gaza.

Hezbollah itself also wants to maintain the “dynamic of deterrence” at its current level, as any open military operation by the Israelis will annihilate the Lebanese infrastructure, according to Abbas.

Iran waves the Hezbollah card

Before Bagheri Kani’s visit to Baghdad, Iran was transmitting messages to the Iraqis suggesting that it was facing three intractable problems: The vacuum left by the death of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdullahian, the enormous pressure from the Americans and the West regarding the nuclear program, and Tehran’s position in the Gaza ceasefire deal, which will ultimately force it to abandon one of its axes in the region.

In this context, Iran is seeking to put the South Lebanon card on the table to improve its conditions in the negotiations. It is not clear how this hypothesis fits with the case of Hezbollah, as many observers say that the group is exhausted and limited in its movement. However, the Iraqi politician responded by saying: “No one has yet confirmed the fact that Hezbollah is exhausted, while it can at any time cause a harmful blow to the Israelis.”

To a large extent, Aqeel Abbas agrees with this suggestion, pointing to an Israeli and American concern over “Hezbollah’s military and technological capabilities,” even after months of attrition.

“Hands on the trigger, Lebanon”

When the Iraqi minister issued his warning on Lebanon, Baghdad was at a safe distance from the flames of the Gaza war in the region. The government was able to maintain the truce with the US forces for months, while Prime Minister Mohammad Shiaa al-Sudani tried to balance between Iran’s requirements and the ambitions of the factions.

Since the death of Raisi, the leaders of the Shiite parties and factions have not heard many important messages from the Iranians.

A Shiite faction leader in Baghdad, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, said that unannounced visits by Iranian military figures to Iraq have decreased since Raisi’s death.

He noted that before Bagheri Kani’s visits to Baghdad and Erbil, the Iranians addressed direct questions to the Hezbollah Brigades and the Nujaba Movement about their willingness to participate in the South Lebanon confrontations with Israel.

The faction leader told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We told them, yes, of course. Hands on the trigger...”

Hezbollah does not want the Iraqis’ involvement

“Indeed, we are preparing for any emergency in Lebanon (...) we know what the crown jewel of the resistance in the region (Hezbollah) is facing,” said a field commander of an influential Shiite faction, which is active in Nineveh Governorate (northern Iraq). He also claimed that he informed the IRGC about his readiness to fight alongside the resistance in Lebanon.

It seems that Tehran wants the “concerned parties” to express this position publicly, while Hezbollah is under enormous pressure by the Israelis who are planning for a wider war with the aim of disintegrating the “resistance in South Lebanon.”

However, the participation of the Iraqi factions in a war alongside Hezbollah is not guaranteed. Even though the Iraqis are offering “human equipment,” the Lebanese faction has not informed any of the “resistance comrades” that they would be allowed to deploy in the field, on Lebanese territory.

The leaders of the two Shiite factions in Baghdad and Nineveh agree that “(Hezbollah) will not welcome the Iraqis, because it views them as unqualified, lack a cohesive entity, and are at best bad allies, with countless problems in decision-making.”

What increases the conviction that the Iraqi factions will not engage in the South Lebanon War is the rare understanding between the Iranians and the government in Baghdad to protect the existing formula of stability.

A senior official in the government of Adel Abdul Mahdi said: “Iraq is the crown jewel of the Iranians, more than Hezbollah, and they will not risk it in the South Lebanon war.” He added that Hussein’s words were a form of “pressure to prevent war, not the contrary.”

Abbas believes that Tehran does not want to facilitate [Donald] Trump’s victory by striking the Americans under the mandate of his rival, Biden.

In the context, the former Iraqi official stated that Iran wants to keep the war away from Iraq’s borders, because “they are now keener on calm in Iraq.”

The Syrian model in Lebanon

The former Iraqi official said “a comprehensive war is only present in the imagination of the Lebanese.”

However, if such a war erupted, “Hezbollah would not likely need the Iraqi brigades.”

But if war breaks out, “Iran will not leave Hezbollah alone. This will not happen (...). It will definitely do something,” said the official.

A pessimistic scenario indicates that the “broader” war will break out in South Lebanon, pushing Iran to resort to the Syrian model.

The Iraqi official said: “This would mean dividing the map of Lebanon according to certain calculations, between factions from Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan...”

However, there is no decisive information regarding a broader war in the South and the engagement of pro-Iranian Iraqi factions. Iran is trying to use all the cards with caution to make amendments in its favor in the “day after” the Gaza deal, and fears that the “arenas” it manages will spiral into a war in which it will lose the ability to maneuver.



Jamal Mustafa to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Couldn’t Provide Bribe Demanded by Judge, So I Was Jailed for Another 10 Years

Saddam Hussein and Jamal Mustafa Sultan.
Saddam Hussein and Jamal Mustafa Sultan.
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Jamal Mustafa to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Couldn’t Provide Bribe Demanded by Judge, So I Was Jailed for Another 10 Years

Saddam Hussein and Jamal Mustafa Sultan.
Saddam Hussein and Jamal Mustafa Sultan.

In the final installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Jamal Mustafa Sultan, a former Iraqi official and Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, delves into his arrest, the collapse of hopes for resistance against US forces, and the turmoil that followed the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Mustafa faced a harsh journey during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. He traveled to rally tribal leaders to defend Baghdad, only to return and find the city occupied. Declared a fugitive, his face appeared on the US “most-wanted” playing cards.

Mustafa fled to Syria but was denied asylum and sent back to Iraq, where he was arrested. Accused of leading resistance and car bombings, the court found no evidence to convict him.

In 2011, a judge offered him release in exchange for a bribe, which Mustafa could not afford. His proposal to sell family land to pay was rejected, leaving him imprisoned for another decade. He was eventually freed over lack of evidence.

A US soldier watches the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad on April 7, 2003. (Reuters)

After his release, Mustafa went to Erbil, where Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani invited him for a meeting. Barzani welcomed him warmly and asked how he could help. Mustafa requested assistance in obtaining a passport, praising Barzani’s generosity.

Mustafa shared that Saddam respected Barzani, once calling him a “tough but honorable opponent.” He also revealed that, before the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Barzani had assured Saddam that Kurdish forces would not fight the Iraqi army.

Recalling the lead-up to the war, Mustafa said Saddam tasked him with reconnecting with tribal leaders to encourage them to resist the invasion.

He delivered personal messages from Saddam, along with financial support, to help tribes host Iraqi soldiers stationed nearby. Mustafa later traveled to the Anbar province to rally tribes and bring them to defend Baghdad.

This account offers a rare glimpse into the behind-the-scenes efforts to resist the US invasion and the complex relationships that shaped Iraq’s history.

As the US invasion loomed, Mustafa met with thousands of tribal leaders to rally support for Baghdad’s defense.

“During the war, I met with over 4,500 tribal sheikhs from across Iraq,” he said. But when he returned to Baghdad after a trip to Anbar, everything had changed. “The city had fallen, and everything was in chaos.”

Mustafa tried to locate his associates but found no one. On April 11, 2003, he sent his driver to search for allies.

By chance, his brother, Lt. Gen. Kamal Mustafa, located him. “He told me we needed to leave Baghdad. I hadn’t planned to leave, but he convinced me it was the logical choice—we had no weapons, no men, and no resources. Staying would only mean capture.”

The brothers fled to Ramadi, where tribal leaders offered them refuge, and from there, they attempted to seek asylum in Syria. After just two days, Syrian authorities sent them back to Iraq.

Back in Baghdad, Mustafa and Khalid Najm, Iraq’s last intelligence chief, stayed with a university friend, Dr. Hafidh Al-Dulaimi. While there, Al-Dulaimi’s nephew suggested surrendering to Ahmed Chalabi’s forces, but Mustafa refused.

Saddam Hussein meets with top members of his regime. (Getty Images)

Shortly after, armed men stormed the house. “They came with tanks and masks,” Mustafa recalled. He and Najm were arrested on April 21, 2003—a day he will never forget.

Mustafa shared his experiences in US detention after his capture. “The interrogations were relentless, often involving psychological and physical pressure,” he added.

“They focused on weapons of mass destruction—’did Iraq have them, and where were they?’ Everyone faced the same questions. They also asked about US pilot Michael Scott Speicher, whose plane was shot down during the Gulf War. Though his remains were later found, the Americans kept questioning us, believing more was being hidden.”

Life in the detention center was highly controlled. Detainees were grouped in blocks of seven and given 30 minutes of outdoor time. Sultan recalled a chilling moment when Ahmed Hussein, Saddam’s office chief, told him during exercise: “The president has been captured.”

“We had clung to hope that Saddam’s freedom could lead to Iraq’s liberation,” Mustafa said. “His arrest shattered that hope and signaled the occupation’s permanence.”

He also described mysterious construction in the prison. “We saw carpenters working constantly. Eventually, they built a wooden barrier, blocking the corridor from view. We could only guess what it was for.”

When asked if Saddam had led the resistance before his capture, Mustafa confirmed: “Yes, the resistance began after the war. It wasn’t planned in advance because, at that time, the focus was purely military—army against army.”

“After the occupation, a new phase started. Battles unfolded in stages, and Saddam was leading the resistance during this one. He was the hope of the resistance, of the Iraqi people, and of Arabs and Muslims,” Mustafa revealed.

His remarks offer a glimpse into the post-invasion dynamics and the symbolic role Saddam played during Iraq’s turbulent transition.

Mustafa also recounted the difficulty of reaching his family after his arrest.

“After my capture, I lost all contact with my family. I didn’t have any phone numbers for my brothers, friends, or colleagues. Even if I had, phone lines had been disrupted—many exchanges had been bombed, and communication in Iraq was severely impacted,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Mustafa recalled an encounter with the International Red Cross during his detention.

Saddam Hussein and his daughter Hala. (Courtesy of the family)

“The Red Cross offered me the chance to write a message to my family, as is their usual practice. But I was at a loss—who could I write to? I had no idea where my brothers or family were. I didn’t know anything about their whereabouts.”

Then, Mustafa had an idea. “I thought of Ammo Baba, a well-known football coach in Iraq. I didn’t know his address, but I remembered the address of the Police Club, where I had been president. I decided to write the letter there, addressed to Ammo Baba, asking him to pass it on to my family.”

Mustafa’s story highlights the communication challenges and isolation faced by detainees during the Iraq War.

He then described the prolonged separation from his family following his arrest. “I had no hopes of hearing from my family when I sent my letter through Ammo Baba,” Mustafa said.

“The situation was too difficult. After two and a half to three months, I received a response from Ammo Baba. He sent his regards, inquired about my health, and included a message from Yassin, a coach who worked with me. Along with the letter, they sent me sportswear—a shirt and shorts.”

Mustafa’s communication with his family may have been limited, but the letter served as a lifeline.

“A couple of years later, I received the first message from my wife, Hala, after two years in detention.”

Jamal Mustafa Sultan with his children.

When asked if he had been separated from his family for 18 years, Mustafa confirmed: “Yes, I hadn’t seen them or my children for 18 and a half years.”

“There were no visits or conversations, except for a brief period when we were held by the Americans. During that time, they allowed us five minutes a week to speak with our families. I would split the time—two and a half minutes with my mother and siblings, and the rest with my wife and daughters,” he said.

However, he revealed that after 2010, communication was cut off entirely.

“When we were transferred to Iraqi custody, they stopped allowing any contact. I was careful not to make calls with the Iraqis, as I feared enemies or foreign agents could record them,” explained Mustafa.

Mustafa’s story underscores the isolation he endured and the limited means of contact with his loved ones during years of detention.