عربي English Türkçe اردو فارسى
Logo
Latest News
Features

The Final Voyage of the Infamous ‘Salt’ Ship

The RAPTOR as it sails to Istanbul. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
The RAPTOR as it sails to Istanbul. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT
20
TT

The Final Voyage of the Infamous ‘Salt’ Ship

The RAPTOR as it sails to Istanbul. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
The RAPTOR as it sails to Istanbul. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

On October 15, 2023, a rundown ship docked at Abu Qir Port in Alexandria, Egypt. The ship had sailed in from Romania and sent for repairs. At that moment also, Ahmed Issam Barakat, 27, Mohammed Daadour, 33, and eight others arrived from Ezbat Al Borg city in northern Egypt to work on the ship.

Barakat had worked as an oiler in Ezbat Al Borg where the majority of the population works in fishing and aboard ships. He chose to work at sea, obtained a seafarer passport in August and took up a job as an assistant mechanic on the newly docked ship. That was his first job at sea.

Daadour was not enticed by the sea like Barakat. He had graduated with a degree in media from Mansoura University. After becoming a father and the head of a family, he decided to turn to work at sea to earn a better living.

In the summer of 2023, Barakat and Daadour applied for work at a marine shipping company in Damietta city and they were hired to work for the RAPTOR in October. The men didn’t know at the time that the ship had just returned from a suspicious voyage in the Black Sea. It never occurred to them that they would become new victims of rundown ships that operate the black market.

At the repair yard, the crew worked day and night for 35 days to cover and paint over the flaws of the ship, such as holes and rust. Photos sent to relatives of the crew showed just how rundown the ship was.

Daadour telephoned his wife, telling her about the “big holes” in the ship, she told Asharq Al-Awsat. One crew member even tried to quit because he was afraid that the ship would sink once it sails.

On the day the ship was to be loaded with its cargo and salt, Daadour and his colleagues were surprised to learn that they were getting the day off and that new workers were being brought in to do this specific job.

At 1 am on November 22, the ship set sail from Alexandria to Istanbul, but under a new name: ROVANA.

Egyptian maritime lawyer Ahmed Kamel suspected that the name change was because the owners were aware that the RAPTOR had a poor reputation, had previously been blacklisted and subject to inspections dozens of times at various ports. The owners believed that the name change would make international sailing easy and “legal”.

Conflicting information has emerged over the weight of the cargo. Official declared figures showed it was carrying around 4,000 tons of cargo and 294 tons of salt. Other documents showed that it was in fact carrying 6,400 tons with the additional 2,000 never having been declared. It was also carrying liquid salt that was improperly stored.

Moreover, the crew was told that the ROVANA was headed to Istanbul, when in fact, it was sailing to Ukraine via Libya.

Daarour, Barakat and seven others, who made up the 14-member crew, had never worked on a shipping vessel before. The captain was Egyptian Rashad Hafez, who had over 20 years of experience working on shipping vessels. The rest of the crew consisted of a marine engineer from India and two sailors from Syria.

Captain Waled Jomaa, a friend of Hafez, said hiring nine crew members with no sea experience was a bad omen that the already rundown ship was going to be in trouble if it encountered any problems at sea.

Barakat said the flaws in the ship became more apparent after the salt was loaded onto it. Water started to seep in from the right side and it began to slant in that direction. He revealed that the crew had to dump the water out of the ship throughout the journey. That was only the beginning of their troubles.

The business of rundown ships

The 39-year-old RAPTOR sailed under the Comoros flag. Responsibility for a ship lies on the country whose flag it is flying, not the port from which it sailed. So, some rundown ships suffering from technical problems or embarking on a suspicious journey often resort to raising the Comoros flag because the country is lax in applying marine safety regulations.

Ownership of the RAPTOR was transferred from a Turkish to a Lebanese shipping company in 2019.

The continuous synopsis record (CSR) showed that the Lebanese company became the commercial manager of the ship. Ownership was transferred to an Egyptian company Equasis. The Lebanese company told Asharq Al-Awsat that it was in no way tied to the ownership of the RAPTOR.

From 2018 and until its final voyage in 2023, the RAPTOR racked up 205 grave violations at several ports and was blacklisted by international marine authorities since 2022. It was held for 279 days at Bulgaria’s Burgas port in 2018 over 29 grave violations.

How could such a ship continue to be allowed to sail? Just two months before its final journey, it added 65 violations to its record in Romania.

The key here lies in the change of ownership. During the time it was held in Burgas, the ownership was changed from the Turkish to the Lebanese company in May 2019.

The market of rundown ships is very active in Türkiye and Syria. Owners of these ships get rid of them on the black market and sell them at very low prices. They are then bought by shipping companies that make light repairs and maintenance as the cost of full repairs would start at at least 100,000 dollars.

Daadour, Barakat and the other rookie seafarers were unaware of these details, all they wanted was to earn a living and improve the lives of their families. The owner company even refused to disclose the ownership details of the ship. Daadour managed to secretly photograph them and send the documents to his wife. They confirm that the RAPTOR was owned by the Egyptian company.

Inquiries by Asharq Al-Awsat to the company were unanswered. A captain who has very close ties to the company revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat documents that prove that it owned the RAPTOR. But the ship was named the ROVANA, meaning the operating contracts were tied to a ship that no longer exists.

When the then-RAPTOR was still in Romania, its Egyptian captain at the time was Ahmed al-Dally. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that he discovered major flaws in the vessel.

“I exerted major efforts for the ship to be released from Romania to Egypt. I quit my job as soon as I arrived. The ship that had just docked in Alexandria was rundown and had three big holes. It should have never sailed again,” he said. “The inspection in Romania revealed catastrophic flaws.”

The RAPTOR was guilty of another grave violation: manipulating fuel records. It is repeat offender, with such offenses going back to 2018. The discovery forced the International Association of Classification Societies to impound the ship because it was not seaworthy.

The manipulation of fuel records is a red flag in any shipping vessel, because it means the ship is consuming more fuel than the number of miles it is declaring, meaning it is making undeclared journeys with this extra fuel.

Veson Nautica, which works on developing, implementing, and supporting maritime commerce solutions, revealed that since the eruption of the conflict in Ukraine in 2022, the RAPTOR had made repeated voyages from Libya to Ukraine. Between 2022 and November 2023, the ship didn’t make a single journey outside the Mediterranean, except to head to Ukraine.

During these journeys, the RAPTOR would turn off its radar as it entered a specific zone between Lebanon and Cyprus. It would turn it back on again after exiting that zone. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a short-range coastal tracking system used on ships. Ships are prohibited from ever turning it off while at sea.

Captain Jomaa said shutting off the AIS allows coastguards in any country the right to follow the ship and search it. These ships are often accused of smuggling.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, a former officer in the Greek coastguard said regular shipping journeys are carried out between Libya and Ukraine, raising questions that they may be smuggling weapons and fuel.

Final journey

Back on the RAPTOR, the journey was going well for Daarour. He would update his wife about the trip whenever he had an internet connection.

The journey took a turn for the worse when the ship entered Greek waters on November 24, 2023. A storm was forecast for the next day and until the 26th. Despite the warning, the captain sailed on, and the ship started to take on more water.

Daarour said the ship lacked any equipment that would help the crew in case it sank. There even weren’t enough lifejackets. The crew worked on dumping the water out, but sinking was inevitable.

Daarour sent a message to his wife that the ship was flooding. The captain issued a distress call to the Greek coastguard and was awaiting a response. On deck, Barakat was working tirelessly to dump water off the ship to the extent that he became nauseous.

Daarour sent his wife a photo of a Greek island just off the ship. He reassured her that the crew would swim towards it.

Daarour’s messages to his wife revealed that the owner of the ship had contacted the captain that night to angrily rebuke him for contacting the coastguard. The owner said the ship mustn't reply to the coastguard, that it must turn off its radar and change course immediately towards Turkish waters.

The captain complied and started sailing away from Greek shores until the ship reached four nautical miles off Greece’s Lesbos island that is located near the border with Türkiye. The ship then turned off its radar as the crew continued its fight to survive.

Barakat recalled that by that point the ship was tilting sharply to the right. Greece that night announced that the area was witnessing strong winds and waves as high as five meters.

Aya, Daarour’s wife, said her husband was the only person on board who had a Greek phone number and internet. He concealed this information from the captain and ship owner who had strict instructions that there could be no contact with anyone outside the ship. This was obviously an attempt to conceal the ship’s course.

Aya said her husband revealed his phone when the ship started to sink that night. He gave it to the crew so that they could bid farewell to their families.

At 6:15 in the morning of November 26, the RAPTOR appeared on radar some 4.5 miles off Lesbos. Having lost hope, the captain reopened communications lines and sent a distress call to the Greek coastguard at 7:20 am.

Daadour was making his final calls on the phone before the sinking. He called his mother to tell her “I am drowning with everyone on board this ship.”

On the other side of the ship, Barakat was the only member of the crew left without a lifejacket as there weren’t enough. He flung himself in the sea and clung onto a wooden barrel.

Despite the short distance to shore, the coastguard wouldn’t locate them until around two hours after the distress call. A helicopter arrived to take Barakat to Mitilini Hospital in Greece. When he regained consciousness, he thought he was the last of the crew to arrive, believing that the lifejackets would have saved them.

Turns out he was the sole survivor.

The entire crew perished and the ship with its cargo was lost in the Aegean. Forty-eight hours after the sinking, Greece announced that there were no survivors except Barakat. The search was officially called off after three days.

Most Viewed

 
Features

Iran Keeps Low Profile in Iraq's Vote, Still Pulls Strings

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani (X)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani (X)
TT
20
TT

Iran Keeps Low Profile in Iraq's Vote, Still Pulls Strings

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani (X)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani (X)

Iran is allowing rival Shi’ite factions in Iraq to battle it out in a wide-open political arena ahead of the country’s November 2025 elections, adopting a hands-off approach as its regional influence wanes.

But officials and analysts say Tehran is quietly preparing a “Plan B” from a distance, wary of internal Shi’ite conflict and the potential return of populist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

While Iran remains largely absent from the backrooms where election alliances are typically shaped, insiders say it is still keeping close watch — ready to step in to prevent infighting among its allies, particularly as it seeks to stay out of the spotlight of US President Donald Trump’s administration in Baghdad.

Since Iraq’s Coordination Framework – a coalition of Iran-aligned Shi’ite parties – announced plans to run on separate lists, the race for Shi’ite votes has narrowed to two main figures: incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and former premier Nouri al-Maliki.

A senior leader in al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party warned the contest could spiral beyond control.

Strategists working in the campaign teams of major Shi’ite factions say Tehran’s influence has notably waned.

“For the first time, we don’t feel Iran’s pressure in forming alliances,” said one operative. “But they’re still there, in case a political storm threatens to uproot the whole process.”

This marks a turning point in Iran’s role in Iraq. Rumors circulating in Baghdad suggest Tehran is willing to make sacrifices — potentially even among its Iraqi proxies — to safeguard the broader regional order, especially as its Houthi allies in Yemen face setbacks.

At the same time, Iranian-linked groups in Iraq have conveyed to Tehran a desire to integrate further into state institutions — even if that means laying down their arms temporarily.

Tensions between Baghdad and Tehran remain muted but persistent, particularly over how Iraq’s election dynamics might impact Iran’s stalled nuclear negotiations. Yet both sides appear to agree that the current political turbulence is temporary and necessary.

On April 25, 2025, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the talks with the United States as “a temporary situation,” telling mourners at a ceremony in Tehran that “the dominance of hypocrisy is not eternal, but a temporary divine test.”

Earlier, Iraqi sources told Asharq al-Awsat that Iranian-backed factions in Iraq had received religious authorization from Khamenei to engage in tactical maneuvers in response to pressure from Trump’s administration.

Recent interviews conducted by Asharq al-Awsat with Iraqi politicians paint a picture of near-chaotic freedom in the political arena — likened to “freestyle wrestling” — that could again spiral into street violence.

Some fear a repeat of the September 2022 clashes, when Sadr’s supporters stormed Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone to protest their exclusion from forming a majority government.

“Iran may have stepped out of the election kitchen,” said one political figure. “But it’s still very much inside the house.”

Fluid alliances

A fluid and shifting map of alliances is taking shape in Iraq’s Shi’ite political landscape ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections, as Iran adopts an unusually low profile, leaving its allies to grapple with strategy and rivalry on their own.

On April 10, 2025, Asharq al-Awsat revealed that Esmail Qaani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, had quietly left behind a small team in Baghdad to oversee political files, including preparations by Shi’ite factions for the elections.

But within two weeks, Iraq’s Iran-aligned Coordination Framework announced it would run as separate lists – a familiar tactic under Iraq’s electoral law, which divides the country into multiple constituencies and often amplifies internal rivalries.

Despite the presence of Qaani’s operatives, Iranian influence appears largely absent from the coordination rooms of the Shi’ite bloc.

“Tehran is going through a delicate moment,” said a senior leader in the Islamic Dawa Party. “It’s focused on defending its own political system and legacy, which explains why its presence in Baghdad is barely visible.”

That vacuum, according to the official, has allowed greater freedom among Shi’ite parties to explore alliances independently — though not without risk. “Operating without supervision has its dangers,” they added.

Over the past two weeks, a flurry of negotiations among Shi’ite parties has yielded little consensus, with many attempts to build joint electoral lists stalling amid shifting loyalties and strategic feints.

The result is what observers describe as a “liquid map” — alliances that form and dissolve without resolution.

Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohsen al-Mandalawi drifted toward former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition before backing away. Likewise, Hadi al-Amiri, head of the Badr Organization, drew close to Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, only for the two to part ways after a brief convergence — a pattern that could easily repeat.

Hisham Dawood, a researcher at the French National Center for Scientific Research, says Iraq’s Shi’ite political community has been fracturing since 2009, when al-Maliki chose to run independently to assert his leadership, triggering tensions that were only later resolved under Iranian pressure amid the rising challenge from the secular Iraqiya bloc led by Ayad Allawi.

Today’s fragmentation of the Coordination Framework, Dawood argues, is part of a broader regional unraveling.

“The Gaza war, Hezbollah’s setbacks in Lebanon, the collapse of Assad’s regime in Syria, and the intensified strikes on the Houthis in Yemen — all point to a shifting Middle East,” he said.

These changes are forcing Iran to re-evaluate its strategy in Iraq. “How does it preserve its strategic gains?” Dawood asked. A senior Dawa figure close to al-Maliki suggested Iran may be deliberately signaling non-interference, focusing instead on internal stability and recalibrating its foreign policy.

“Iran might be letting its allies clash now, confident they will come back to it in the end,” said another senior Shi’ite leader. “Only Iran knows how to tie the final knots.”

Iraq seen as Iran’s potential ‘Sacrifice’ amid regional retreat

A senior figure in Iraq’s Dawa Party believes Iran may be prepared to let Iraq become the next “sacrifice” in a string of strategic retreats, following Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen — all in a bid to protect Tehran’s political system from collapse.

“To avert a major threat, Tehran could even offer up Iraq,” the politician told Asharq al-Awsat. “But the Iranians never truly change. They will never accept pulling back from the region. They will return — it’s only a matter of time.”

Despite Iran’s subdued profile in Iraq’s pre-election landscape, many within the Shi’ite-dominated Coordination Framework remain unconvinced that Tehran has really stepped away.

“There are key interests here that require a watchful eye,” one member of the alliance said, speaking on condition of anonymity. “And Iran’s network is far from absent,” they added.

According to insiders, multiple power centers within Iran are involved in the Iraq file — including the Quds Force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iranian intelligence, the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and even individuals within his family.

“Each has its own preferences and interests when it comes to Iraq’s elections,” one official said.

Dawood underscored Iraq’s strategic weight for Tehran: “Iraq is not Syria, and not even Lebanon. It is Iran’s largest commercial market and a vital land bridge to the Mediterranean.”

Indeed, while Iran’s presence may no longer dominate Baghdad’s political scene, Qaani’s team has held discreet meetings with key Shi’ite figures to ensure “everything remains under control.”

Negotiators working on election alliances say Tehran is still involved — but from a distance.

“They have two clear priorities,” one strategist said. “Reducing the number of competing lists to avoid fragmentation, and ensuring that major armed factions are integrated into broad alliances.”

When Asharq al-Awsat asked leaders of armed groups whether they planned to participate in the elections, most said they had not yet decided — or that the vote was not their concern.

Kazem al-Fartousi, a leader in the Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades, acknowledged the tension: “We don’t readily accept participating in the elections, even if we’re convinced that they are the foundation of Iraq’s political system.”

‘The kids have grown’

Iran’s waning influence in Iraq is not only the result of a weakening “Axis of Resistance” across the region — it’s also because “the kids have grown up,” says Dawood, referring to Iraq’s powerful Iran-backed militias and factions.

“These groups now have their own patronage networks and strong local interests inside Iraq,” Dawood told Asharq al-Awsat. “They can no longer be controlled through blind loyalty to Tehran.”

Until recently, Iran-aligned factions were more responsive to pressure from Tehran, Dawood explained. “At the time, their interests aligned closely with Iran’s. These factions lacked a social base, funding, and military experience — they were reliant on Iranian backing.”

Today, many of those same groups form the core of al-Sudani’s government — “no longer operating on the sidelines, but from within,” Dawood said. The evolution presents what he calls a “structural crossroads” for Iraq’s armed groups.

“They now face a stark choice,” he said. “Either preserve their strategic gains by dismantling their armed wings and integrating their fighters into state institutions, or risk mounting regional and international threats — particularly after the political earthquakes in Syria.”

This growing assertiveness is already visible within the Coordination Framework, where Shi’ite parties are increasingly engaging in open political competition with fewer restraints. According to senior Shi’ite officials, these intra-Shi’ite rivalries continue to play out under “remote Iranian monitoring,” but with far less direct interference than in the past.

Power struggle between Maliki and Sudani

A simmering rift within Iraq’s ruling Shi’ite coalition has spilled into public view, as al-Sudani and al-Maliki clash over control of the government and the future of the Coordination Framework ahead of the 2025 elections.

In early January, Ammar al-Hakim, leader of the Shi’ite “National Wisdom Movement,” broke the silence over tensions brewing inside the coalition. He pointedly reminded allies that al-Sudani, who once held a lone parliamentary seat, owes his rise to the premiership to the Coordination Framework — and should not attempt to chart his own course.

“Some coalition leaders are asking: why empower someone who now seeks to outgrow us?” Hakim said, framing al-Sudani’s independence as a betrayal.

According to a political advisor who served in previous Iraqi cabinets, the coalition is grappling with what he calls “the Prime Minister complex” — the tendency among Shi’ite leaders to resist any premier who gains too much personal influence. al-Maliki, who held office from 2006 to 2014, is among those alarmed by al-Sudani’s growing stature and regional outreach.

“Al-Sudani is replicating al-Maliki’s first term,” the advisor told Asharq al-Awsat, “leveraging a strong central state and public sector to cultivate loyalty.”

 

That strategy, however, has triggered anxiety inside the Framework. A senior figure in al-Maliki’s Dawa Party said al-Maliki is uneasy with how al-Sudani manages the cabinet and bypasses consensus mechanisms. “We are now dealing with a prime minister with unchecked authority,” he said.

The tensions reached new heights when al-Sudani traveled to Qatar and met Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa without coordinating with his political allies — moves seen by some as an attempt to position himself as a regional powerbroker.

The Dawa official warned that “landmines are planted in al-Sudani’s path,” and he will need “considerable strength” to navigate them ahead of the vote.

Iraq’s political arena is no stranger to explosive conflicts, but al-Sudani is testing these waters for the first time — and with competing agendas in his head, according to a veteran political figure. “He’s trying to manage opposing plans simultaneously,” the source said.

Despite Tehran’s reduced visibility, Iranian actors continue to wield influence, often behind the scenes. One source said Iran has pressured al-Sudani to include certain armed factions in his circle as a means of securing his position and protecting Tehran’s interests. “Iran sees al-Sudani as a difficult but valuable figure — not someone to discard easily.”

Members of al-Sudani’s Furatain Bloc declined to comment on his election strategy. However, sources close to coalition talks confirmed that al-Sudani has clashed with Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri over the leadership of a joint electoral list.

According to these sources, al-Sudani demanded to head the alliance and called for a pledge supporting his bid for a second term — conditions viewed as excessive by Amiri’s camp.

Political analysts say al-Sudani is seeking to break free from the shadow of the Coordination Framework’s first-generation leadership, especially those associated with hardline regional agendas such as the “Al-Aqsa Flood” rhetoric. Yet, aware of the political landmines ahead, he is carefully courting allies who can shield him from the fallout.

“Color of the cat doesn’t matter”: Iran adapts its Iraq strategy amid shifting regional dynamics

Iran appears to have recalibrated its approach to Iraq, learning from past overreach and embracing a more pragmatic stance that reflects regional shifts and American influence, analysts and political insiders say.

Tehran’s introspection dates back to the tenure of former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi (2018–2019), a period viewed by Iraqi protesters and civil movements as “tragic.”

At the time, Iran was emboldened by what it saw as the decline of US influence in West Asia and pushed to consolidate its hold over Iraq, according to a former Iraqi government advisor.

Abdul Mahdi, a seasoned figure with roots in the Tehran-founded Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, oversaw a period during which pro-Iran factions expanded their parallel state structures. But the October 2019 protest movement disrupted that momentum, triggering a political realignment — despite the deaths of over 600 demonstrators.

“Tehran realized it had overplayed its hand,” the former advisor told Asharq al-Awsat. “Since then, it’s returned to a more measured formula.”

Dawood said Iran has spent the past two decades convincing — or compelling — Washington to share responsibility for Iraq’s political management. “This dual oversight between the US and Iran often drives the reconfigurations we see in Iraqi politics,” he said.

The former advisor likened Iran’s flexibility to Deng Xiaoping’s famous adage: “It doesn’t matter what color the cat is, as long as it catches mice.” Iran, he said, demonstrated this mindset during the war against ISIS, and even earlier.

He recalled how, before the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, Iran issued religious rulings allowing Shi’ite factions to cooperate with the United States — despite Tehran’s official position branding it the “Great Satan.” That green light cleared the way for opposition figures to travel to Washington in preparation for the Gulf War.

On the other side of Iraq’s fractured Shi’ite landscape, secular-leaning politicians see an opportunity. One such figure, who spoke to Asharq al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, said he had visited Washington twice — before and after Trump’s inauguration in January 2025.

“The next elections must reflect the transformations sweeping the region,” he said. “If they don’t, Iraq risks being left behind in the emerging Middle East order.”

Iran’s ‘plan B’: quiet calculations in Iraq ahead of 2025 elections

Iran is recalibrating its presence in Iraq, balancing public restraint with behind-the-scenes maneuvering as it braces for a pivotal election season. While Tehran’s footprint appears subdued, political sources say its operatives are quietly managing a fallback strategy — “Plan B” — from the shadows.

Two competing narratives dominate assessments of Iran’s current posture. One holds that Tehran is intentionally keeping a low profile in Baghdad to avoid provoking Washington and to demonstrate its commitment to ongoing negotiations. The other suggests Iran is overstretched at home but will inevitably return to assert itself more forcefully.

But behind the scenes, commanders aligned with Esmail Qaani, head of Iran’s Quds Force, are actively adjusting political calculations in Baghdad, according to Shi’ite political insiders.

Leaked details from high-level meetings in the Iraqi capital indicate that Tehran is seeking to secure three key objectives before the November 2025 elections: prevent the emergence of a Shi’ite faction that could challenge its influence in the future, preserve a carefully curated balance of electoral competition among Iraq’s Shi’ite parties, and keep both al-Sudani and al-Maliki politically viable — even if they remain rivals.

"Al-Sudani could be Tehran’s strategic bet if talks with Washington succeed, while al-Maliki may prove crucial if they fail," a senior figure in Iraq’s Dawa Party told Asharq al-Awsat.

Iran is currently working to keep Shi’ite political rivalries from escalating into violence, but the same Dawa official warned that “Plan B” would see Tehran decisively back one faction — particularly if the powerful Sadrist movement reenters the political fray.

Sources familiar with the thinking inside the Sadrist camp said the bloc is deliberately delaying any announcement on whether it will contest the elections, hoping to catch its rivals off-guard and reduce their ability to mobilize against it.

A business of politics

Iraqi elections increasingly resemble a high-stakes entrepreneurial summit, where political newcomers and veterans alike jockey to raise their stakes in power.

“Everyone is in it to boost their influence,” said a former Shi’ite candidate who ran in Iraq’s first two post-2003 elections. “For many newcomers, this is their shot at entering the club of political elites.”

The retired candidate, now observing from the sidelines, said Tehran is grappling with a generation of loyalists who have matured into power brokers.

“Some of them now have access to state contracts and resources. They’re strong enough to donate to the Revolutionary Guard — not the other way around.”

This complex and shifting power dynamic alarms researchers like Dawood, who warned that two decades of Shi’ite rule have delivered disappointing outcomes.

“What we’ve seen is a rentier economy entirely dependent on oil, a complete absence of economic vision, and little understanding of how to govern a complex society,” Dawood said. “Add to that a lack of market knowledge, limited regional or global connectivity, and a systemic fusion of diplomacy with ideology — plus entrenched corruption.”

As Iraq approaches its next election, Dawood sees two parallel tracks hurtling toward November 2025: the failure to build a rational state model, and intensifying regional and international pressure.