Sinwar, Israel’s Problem After 8 Months of War

Yehya Al-Sinwar...Israel has failed to find him during the Gaza War (AP)
Yehya Al-Sinwar...Israel has failed to find him during the Gaza War (AP)
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Sinwar, Israel’s Problem After 8 Months of War

Yehya Al-Sinwar...Israel has failed to find him during the Gaza War (AP)
Yehya Al-Sinwar...Israel has failed to find him during the Gaza War (AP)

Since the beginning of the war on the Gaza Strip in October, Israel has placed, among its top goals, the elimination of the Hamas movement’s leaders, including Yehya Sinwar.

Political and military officials in Tel Aviv accuse the man of planning the October 7 attack, which led to the killing of hundreds of Israelis and the captivity of nearly 240 others.

But after 8 months of continuous war and Israel excavating every house, tunnel and place in search of Sinwar, from the north of the Gaza Strip to its center, then to Khan Yunis and Rafah in its south, the occupation army has found no trace of the man except a short video showing him with his family in a tunnel, apparently at the beginning of the war in Khan Yunis, his hometown.

Israel’s pursuit of Sinwar, along with many of the political and military leaders of the Hamas movement, highlights a blatant intelligence failure. Sources in the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip and outside it told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Israeli occupation’s inability to find him does not mean that he has cut communication with the movement’s officials.

The sources confirmed that Sinwar was constantly informed of all developments, especially with regard to the ongoing negotiations, and communicated several times with the movement’s leaders abroad, in particular during the recent negotiations on the release of hostages and on reaching a ceasefire. He also contacted the head of the movement’s political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, to convey his condolences after Israel killed members of his family in an airstrike.

The sources added that only two or three people knew his whereabouts and provided for his various needs, as well as ensured his contact with the movement’s leaders inside Gaza and abroad.

“The occupation failed to reach many of the leaders of the first and second ranks at the political and military levels, but it tried to assassinate some of them, while others were injured...but Sinwar is not among them,” according to the sources.

Meanwhile, reports in Jewish media said that Sinwar was moving inside the remaining tunnels of the Hamas movement, without providing evidence of these claims. The Israeli army has constantly announced its success in destroying Hamas’ capabilities, including tunnels, in addition to the dismantling of the movement’s brigades in Khan Yunis and other areas in the Strip.

Asharq Al-Awsat tried to contact people close to Sinwar, including some of his relatives, to draw a better picture of the man’s personality and how he might make his decisions.

“Sinwar is thinking of two options... Either fulfilling the conditions of the resistance in stopping the war, withdrawing the occupation forces, and completing an honorable exchange deal, or obtaining the honor of martyrdom,” they said.

Regarding his character, and in response to Israeli claims that he is violent and stubborn, those close to Sinwar explain that he has a sociable personality, and often visits legal and local figures and even his neighbors, despite his preoccupations since his election as leader of the movement in the Gaza Strip.

“Contrary to what is seen by many as a very sharp personality, he often possesses a sense of humor, even during the meetings and interviews that he ran at the level of the movement’s leaders,” a person close to Sinwar told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He added: “But this does not negate that he is a leader... and was able to resolve any discussion.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu constantly affirms his refusal to end the Gaza war in a way that gives Sinwar and Hamas the image of victory, as part of his response to criticism by political and military officials in Tel Aviv regarding the lack of a strategic plan for the day after the war, as well as the failure to reach a deal with Hamas that guarantees the release of Israeli prisoners.

Analysts believe that Israel’s failure to catch Sinwar represents a military and political problem. Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sinwar is aware of this fact and understands that Israel wants to kill or capture him to claim that it has won the war.

“As he has spent many years in Israeli prisons, [Sinwar] understands well how Israeli leaders think, and therefore manages many aspects of the battle politically... He is described as a stubborn negotiator, who wants to impose the Palestinian conditions, especially with regard to a full cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the occupation forces from the entire Gaza Strip,” the sources said.



Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
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Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he would meet former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime fell in Damascus. But what will Putin say to his former ally? And how might their first exchange unfold, given Russia’s role in helping Assad escape on a chaotic night?

The Kremlin, known for staging Putin’s meetings with precision, might opt to limit media coverage this time. Putin could be seen sitting at a small table with Assad, now on asylum

in Moscow, in a soundless scene—one that leaves little room for formal pleasantries.

Why has Putin announced plans to meet Assad? Is it to reprimand him? Many in Russia believe Assad’s stubbornness has hurt Moscow’s efforts, threatened its gains in Syria, and could eventually risk its key military presence there.

As details remain unclear, Russian experts are racing to analyze developments in Syria and outline scenarios for the next phase.

Some Russian experts have painted grim scenarios. A member of the prestigious Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy warned of potential risks, including a prolonged conflict with civil war elements, a humanitarian catastrophe with millions of refugees, escalating migration in Europe, and rising tensions among nations like Israel, the US, and Iran.

He also predicted a new wave of international terrorism that could reach far beyond the region.

Other experts echoed this pessimism. One posted an image of a Syrian dissident stepping on a statue of Assad’s father, warning that “this is just the beginning.” Another blamed the crisis on the “Obama curse,” citing the West’s interference, while a third shared a bleak analysis titled, “We Must Pray for Syria.”

So far, Russian media and think tanks have avoided any optimistic outlooks for Syria’s future.

Experts, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, believe Moscow may be preparing to handle one of three possible scenarios in Syria.

The first, most favorable for Russia’s interests, involves Moscow reaching an agreement with the new Syrian authorities to maintain its military presence for a limited period.

This could mean replacing the current 49-year agreements with a five-year deal to facilitate a gradual Russian withdrawal. Such an arrangement could help the new leadership in Syria manage Western pressure to cut ties with Moscow.

The second scenario envisions Russia giving up its airbase in Hmeimim while retaining a significant presence in Tartus. This would mirror agreements from 1972, which allowed Russian naval vessels to use the Tartus logistics center in the Mediterranean. This compromise would preserve Russia’s interests while reducing Western pressure on Damascus.

The third scenario involves a full Russian withdrawal from both bases, with Moscow later seeking agreements for shared use of air and sea ports. Such agreements, similar to those Russia has signed with other countries, are less likely to provoke Western opposition.

Regardless of the outcome, the Kremlin has yet to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the emerging situation in Syria.

Key questions remain, including how to curb Iran’s regional influence, manage Türkiye and Israel’s growing roles in Syria, and establish a new regional balance that secures Moscow’s minimum interests.