West Bank Palestinians Rely on Israel for Essentials, Fear Collective Punishment

The body of 13-year-old Ghassan Gharib is carried on shoulders after he was shot dead by Israeli forces near Ramallah this July (AFP)
The body of 13-year-old Ghassan Gharib is carried on shoulders after he was shot dead by Israeli forces near Ramallah this July (AFP)
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West Bank Palestinians Rely on Israel for Essentials, Fear Collective Punishment

The body of 13-year-old Ghassan Gharib is carried on shoulders after he was shot dead by Israeli forces near Ramallah this July (AFP)
The body of 13-year-old Ghassan Gharib is carried on shoulders after he was shot dead by Israeli forces near Ramallah this July (AFP)

Palestinians in the West Bank, unlike those in Gaza, do not want an open war between Israel and Hezbollah. They know from past experiences that such a conflict would bring significant political and economic costs, impacting their daily lives and essential needs.

If they become prisoners in their own land, Israel would have no hesitation in harming or detaining them.

In a possible war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel would likely isolate itself and close its borders, cutting off the Palestinians in the West Bank to prevent another front. This would mean restricted movement, halted travel, and a stop to the flow of goods to the West Bank.

Israel would also cut off electricity, water, and fuel to Palestinians, reserving these resources for itself during the crisis.

While Israel might manage such a situation, the Palestinian Authority, already in financial and security turmoil, would struggle severely. Israel is preparing for extreme scenarios, including prolonged blackouts, infrastructure damage, and shortages of basic supplies, which would also affect the Palestinians.

Life Support Cut

Recent remarks by Shaul Goldstein, head of Israel’s state-owned electricity company, about a potential power grid collapse if war breaks out with Hezbollah, have alarmed not only Israelis but also Palestinians in the West Bank who buy electricity from Israel.

“We are not in a good situation, and we are not prepared for a real war. We are living in a fantasy,” said Goldstein.

“We cannot promise electricity if there is a war in the north. After 72 hours without electricity, it will be impossible to live here. We are not prepared for a real war,” he added.

This issue extends to water and fuel as well.

Even before any potential conflict this summer, Palestinians are already experiencing water shortages. The Israeli national water company “Mekorot” has reduced water supplies to the West Bank, a punitive measure Palestinians have grown accustomed to.

Official figures show that the average daily water consumption per person in Israel, including the settlements, is 247 liters. This is nearly three times the average for a Palestinian in the West Bank, which is 82.4 liters. In Palestinian communities without a water network, it falls to just 26 liters.

Stockpiling Essentials

Many Palestinians in the West Bank already face severe water shortages, receiving running water for less than 10 days a month, while the rest goes to Israelis.

Statistics show that Israelis consume ten times more water than Palestinians in the West Bank. This disparity is expected to grow even further this year.

With the threat of a potential war, Palestinians understand they could be left without water, electricity, medicine, or fuel. This fear has led many to start stockpiling essentials like flour, canned goods, and bottled water.

“I didn’t want to wait any longer. I bought some flour, canned goods, and water,” said Saeed Abu Sherkh.

“Once war starts, panic will set in. Prices will skyrocket, and supplies will disappear. We might face the same harsh conditions Gazans experienced,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Gaza has suffered severe shortages of electricity, water, medicine, and basic supplies, reaching a point of famine.

Abu Sherkh, like many of his friends, prefers to be prepared. He has stocked up on flour, canned goods, bottled water, and even gasoline or diesel.

A recent test occurred when Iranian drones and rockets targeted Israel, making it difficult to access grocery stores. People rushed to buy essential food, while fuel stations ran out for several days, serving as a “simulation” for a real war.

Abdul Azim Awad does not want to face another such test.

“One hour after the Iranian drones hit, I couldn’t find many food items. I couldn't get fuel for days. I feared the war had actually started. I wasn’t prepared,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Despite this, Awad hopes not to endure another, more severe experience and does not want to see another war.

“We’re tired of war. The situation is tough. Businesses are suffering, the economy is collapsing. There are no salaries, and workers can’t go to Israel. Traders are complaining. Another long war with Lebanon would mean real devastation here. I think it would be catastrophic,” he added.



Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
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Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he would meet former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime fell in Damascus. But what will Putin say to his former ally? And how might their first exchange unfold, given Russia’s role in helping Assad escape on a chaotic night?

The Kremlin, known for staging Putin’s meetings with precision, might opt to limit media coverage this time. Putin could be seen sitting at a small table with Assad, now on asylum

in Moscow, in a soundless scene—one that leaves little room for formal pleasantries.

Why has Putin announced plans to meet Assad? Is it to reprimand him? Many in Russia believe Assad’s stubbornness has hurt Moscow’s efforts, threatened its gains in Syria, and could eventually risk its key military presence there.

As details remain unclear, Russian experts are racing to analyze developments in Syria and outline scenarios for the next phase.

Some Russian experts have painted grim scenarios. A member of the prestigious Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy warned of potential risks, including a prolonged conflict with civil war elements, a humanitarian catastrophe with millions of refugees, escalating migration in Europe, and rising tensions among nations like Israel, the US, and Iran.

He also predicted a new wave of international terrorism that could reach far beyond the region.

Other experts echoed this pessimism. One posted an image of a Syrian dissident stepping on a statue of Assad’s father, warning that “this is just the beginning.” Another blamed the crisis on the “Obama curse,” citing the West’s interference, while a third shared a bleak analysis titled, “We Must Pray for Syria.”

So far, Russian media and think tanks have avoided any optimistic outlooks for Syria’s future.

Experts, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, believe Moscow may be preparing to handle one of three possible scenarios in Syria.

The first, most favorable for Russia’s interests, involves Moscow reaching an agreement with the new Syrian authorities to maintain its military presence for a limited period.

This could mean replacing the current 49-year agreements with a five-year deal to facilitate a gradual Russian withdrawal. Such an arrangement could help the new leadership in Syria manage Western pressure to cut ties with Moscow.

The second scenario envisions Russia giving up its airbase in Hmeimim while retaining a significant presence in Tartus. This would mirror agreements from 1972, which allowed Russian naval vessels to use the Tartus logistics center in the Mediterranean. This compromise would preserve Russia’s interests while reducing Western pressure on Damascus.

The third scenario involves a full Russian withdrawal from both bases, with Moscow later seeking agreements for shared use of air and sea ports. Such agreements, similar to those Russia has signed with other countries, are less likely to provoke Western opposition.

Regardless of the outcome, the Kremlin has yet to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the emerging situation in Syria.

Key questions remain, including how to curb Iran’s regional influence, manage Türkiye and Israel’s growing roles in Syria, and establish a new regional balance that secures Moscow’s minimum interests.