Targeting of Deif: Symbolic Blow to Al-Qassam Brigades Deepens Leadership Crisis

Palestinians stand near covered bodies after an Israeli air strike in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, 13 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
Palestinians stand near covered bodies after an Israeli air strike in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, 13 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
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Targeting of Deif: Symbolic Blow to Al-Qassam Brigades Deepens Leadership Crisis

Palestinians stand near covered bodies after an Israeli air strike in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, 13 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
Palestinians stand near covered bodies after an Israeli air strike in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, 13 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER

Israel killed dozens of Palestinians on Saturday in an attempt to assassinate Mohammed Deif, leader of Hamas’ military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, alongside his deputy, the head of the Khan Younis brigade, Rafa Salama.

This is at least the seventh attempt in 30 years to eliminate Deif.

Israel awaits confirmation of Deif’s death, which, if confirmed, would be a significant propaganda victory during the current Gaza conflict. Hamas denies Israel’s claims, calling the incident another civilian massacre.

The potential success of this operation raises questions about its impact on the Al-Qassam Brigades, whose leaders have been targeted since Israel’s recent conflict escalation following the Oct.7 attacks.

Understanding Deif’s role is crucial—he is the second leader of the Al-Qassam Brigades, assuming his position after the assassination by the Israeli army of its former commander, Salah Shahada, on July 23, 2002.

However, he is widely regarded as the architect of the group’s significant military strength.

Sources informed Asharq Al-Awsat that shortly after assuming leadership of Al-Qassam Brigades, specifically in 2003, Deif swiftly obtained authorization from Hamas’ political leadership to establish a large military force, effectively an army, and immediately began implementation.

Despite numerous assassination attempts and the loss of many of his aides and family members, Deif has never ceased in his efforts, persisting in building this “large army” which has over the years become the foremost Palestinian force and to some extent, a deterrent against Israel.

Since the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel’s repeated attempts to assassinate Deif have intensified, following six previous failed efforts.

Deif’s ability to evade capture elevated him beyond his role in Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades to a symbol of Palestinian resilience.

Israel claims Deif was the driving force behind Hamas’ military strength and the mastermind behind their tunnel network.

His potential absence could impact morale within Al-Qassam Brigades.

Nevertheless, Al-Qassam Brigades have a history of displaying flexibility in their military structure.

For example, when Israel assassinated Ahmed Jabari, known as Hamas’ “Chief of Staff,” in 2012, Marwan Issa was immediately appointed as his successor. In the aftermath of the Oct.7 attacks, Israel killed Issa.

Al-Qassam Brigades have a comprehensive military structure encompassing military justice, manufacturing, oversight, support and combat weapons, operations, intelligence, internal front, human resources, and institutes and colleges.

If Israel succeeds in assassinating Deif and Salama, it would have eliminated nearly all members of the military council.

The exceptions include Mohammed Shabana, leader of the Rafah Brigade, Azzedine al-Haddad, commander of the Gaza Brigade, and the uncertain fate of Raed Saad, previously claimed to be assassinated by Israel without confirmation, along with Mohammed al-Sinwar, brother of Gaza’s Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar.

The Sinwar brothers are known to be close associates of Deif and are believed to be alive.

Despite the ongoing assassinations that have targeted 14 brigade commanders and other leaders across Gaza, Hamas sources suggest that if Deif is killed and the Sinwar brothers survive, Mohammed al-Sinwar is likely to take over leadership of the Al-Qassam Brigades.

According to Hamas sources, the brigades’ future leadership will be decided by the political bureau, adapting to the operational situation.

Operations will continue under a structure established since the fourth month of the ongoing conflict, with each brigade following a hierarchical command from the brigade commander down to unit leaders, factions, and other military groups.

Despite losing many political and military leaders over the years, including its founders, Hamas remains strong in Gaza.



West Bank Palestinians Rely on Israel for Essentials, Fear Collective Punishment

The body of 13-year-old Ghassan Gharib is carried on shoulders after he was shot dead by Israeli forces near Ramallah this July (AFP)
The body of 13-year-old Ghassan Gharib is carried on shoulders after he was shot dead by Israeli forces near Ramallah this July (AFP)
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West Bank Palestinians Rely on Israel for Essentials, Fear Collective Punishment

The body of 13-year-old Ghassan Gharib is carried on shoulders after he was shot dead by Israeli forces near Ramallah this July (AFP)
The body of 13-year-old Ghassan Gharib is carried on shoulders after he was shot dead by Israeli forces near Ramallah this July (AFP)

Palestinians in the West Bank, unlike those in Gaza, do not want an open war between Israel and Hezbollah. They know from past experiences that such a conflict would bring significant political and economic costs, impacting their daily lives and essential needs.

If they become prisoners in their own land, Israel would have no hesitation in harming or detaining them.

In a possible war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel would likely isolate itself and close its borders, cutting off the Palestinians in the West Bank to prevent another front. This would mean restricted movement, halted travel, and a stop to the flow of goods to the West Bank.

Israel would also cut off electricity, water, and fuel to Palestinians, reserving these resources for itself during the crisis.

While Israel might manage such a situation, the Palestinian Authority, already in financial and security turmoil, would struggle severely. Israel is preparing for extreme scenarios, including prolonged blackouts, infrastructure damage, and shortages of basic supplies, which would also affect the Palestinians.

Life Support Cut

Recent remarks by Shaul Goldstein, head of Israel’s state-owned electricity company, about a potential power grid collapse if war breaks out with Hezbollah, have alarmed not only Israelis but also Palestinians in the West Bank who buy electricity from Israel.

“We are not in a good situation, and we are not prepared for a real war. We are living in a fantasy,” said Goldstein.

“We cannot promise electricity if there is a war in the north. After 72 hours without electricity, it will be impossible to live here. We are not prepared for a real war,” he added.

This issue extends to water and fuel as well.

Even before any potential conflict this summer, Palestinians are already experiencing water shortages. The Israeli national water company “Mekorot” has reduced water supplies to the West Bank, a punitive measure Palestinians have grown accustomed to.

Official figures show that the average daily water consumption per person in Israel, including the settlements, is 247 liters. This is nearly three times the average for a Palestinian in the West Bank, which is 82.4 liters. In Palestinian communities without a water network, it falls to just 26 liters.

Stockpiling Essentials

Many Palestinians in the West Bank already face severe water shortages, receiving running water for less than 10 days a month, while the rest goes to Israelis.

Statistics show that Israelis consume ten times more water than Palestinians in the West Bank. This disparity is expected to grow even further this year.

With the threat of a potential war, Palestinians understand they could be left without water, electricity, medicine, or fuel. This fear has led many to start stockpiling essentials like flour, canned goods, and bottled water.

“I didn’t want to wait any longer. I bought some flour, canned goods, and water,” said Saeed Abu Sherkh.

“Once war starts, panic will set in. Prices will skyrocket, and supplies will disappear. We might face the same harsh conditions Gazans experienced,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Gaza has suffered severe shortages of electricity, water, medicine, and basic supplies, reaching a point of famine.

Abu Sherkh, like many of his friends, prefers to be prepared. He has stocked up on flour, canned goods, bottled water, and even gasoline or diesel.

A recent test occurred when Iranian drones and rockets targeted Israel, making it difficult to access grocery stores. People rushed to buy essential food, while fuel stations ran out for several days, serving as a “simulation” for a real war.

Abdul Azim Awad does not want to face another such test.

“One hour after the Iranian drones hit, I couldn’t find many food items. I couldn't get fuel for days. I feared the war had actually started. I wasn’t prepared,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Despite this, Awad hopes not to endure another, more severe experience and does not want to see another war.

“We’re tired of war. The situation is tough. Businesses are suffering, the economy is collapsing. There are no salaries, and workers can’t go to Israel. Traders are complaining. Another long war with Lebanon would mean real devastation here. I think it would be catastrophic,” he added.