Targeting of Deif: Symbolic Blow to Al-Qassam Brigades Deepens Leadership Crisis

Palestinians stand near covered bodies after an Israeli air strike in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, 13 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
Palestinians stand near covered bodies after an Israeli air strike in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, 13 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
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Targeting of Deif: Symbolic Blow to Al-Qassam Brigades Deepens Leadership Crisis

Palestinians stand near covered bodies after an Israeli air strike in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, 13 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
Palestinians stand near covered bodies after an Israeli air strike in the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, southern Gaza Strip, 13 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER

Israel killed dozens of Palestinians on Saturday in an attempt to assassinate Mohammed Deif, leader of Hamas’ military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, alongside his deputy, the head of the Khan Younis brigade, Rafa Salama.

This is at least the seventh attempt in 30 years to eliminate Deif.

Israel awaits confirmation of Deif’s death, which, if confirmed, would be a significant propaganda victory during the current Gaza conflict. Hamas denies Israel’s claims, calling the incident another civilian massacre.

The potential success of this operation raises questions about its impact on the Al-Qassam Brigades, whose leaders have been targeted since Israel’s recent conflict escalation following the Oct.7 attacks.

Understanding Deif’s role is crucial—he is the second leader of the Al-Qassam Brigades, assuming his position after the assassination by the Israeli army of its former commander, Salah Shahada, on July 23, 2002.

However, he is widely regarded as the architect of the group’s significant military strength.

Sources informed Asharq Al-Awsat that shortly after assuming leadership of Al-Qassam Brigades, specifically in 2003, Deif swiftly obtained authorization from Hamas’ political leadership to establish a large military force, effectively an army, and immediately began implementation.

Despite numerous assassination attempts and the loss of many of his aides and family members, Deif has never ceased in his efforts, persisting in building this “large army” which has over the years become the foremost Palestinian force and to some extent, a deterrent against Israel.

Since the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel’s repeated attempts to assassinate Deif have intensified, following six previous failed efforts.

Deif’s ability to evade capture elevated him beyond his role in Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades to a symbol of Palestinian resilience.

Israel claims Deif was the driving force behind Hamas’ military strength and the mastermind behind their tunnel network.

His potential absence could impact morale within Al-Qassam Brigades.

Nevertheless, Al-Qassam Brigades have a history of displaying flexibility in their military structure.

For example, when Israel assassinated Ahmed Jabari, known as Hamas’ “Chief of Staff,” in 2012, Marwan Issa was immediately appointed as his successor. In the aftermath of the Oct.7 attacks, Israel killed Issa.

Al-Qassam Brigades have a comprehensive military structure encompassing military justice, manufacturing, oversight, support and combat weapons, operations, intelligence, internal front, human resources, and institutes and colleges.

If Israel succeeds in assassinating Deif and Salama, it would have eliminated nearly all members of the military council.

The exceptions include Mohammed Shabana, leader of the Rafah Brigade, Azzedine al-Haddad, commander of the Gaza Brigade, and the uncertain fate of Raed Saad, previously claimed to be assassinated by Israel without confirmation, along with Mohammed al-Sinwar, brother of Gaza’s Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar.

The Sinwar brothers are known to be close associates of Deif and are believed to be alive.

Despite the ongoing assassinations that have targeted 14 brigade commanders and other leaders across Gaza, Hamas sources suggest that if Deif is killed and the Sinwar brothers survive, Mohammed al-Sinwar is likely to take over leadership of the Al-Qassam Brigades.

According to Hamas sources, the brigades’ future leadership will be decided by the political bureau, adapting to the operational situation.

Operations will continue under a structure established since the fourth month of the ongoing conflict, with each brigade following a hierarchical command from the brigade commander down to unit leaders, factions, and other military groups.

Despite losing many political and military leaders over the years, including its founders, Hamas remains strong in Gaza.



How Much Has US-built Gaza Aid Pier Helped Get Aid into Gaza?

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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How Much Has US-built Gaza Aid Pier Helped Get Aid into Gaza?

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

A US-built pier designed to increase flows of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip has been beset by challenges and is now expected to be permanently dismantled.
US officials have said they will attempt to reinstall the pier to clear a backlog of Gaza-bound aid in Cyprus, and that it is then likely to be permanently dismantled.
Aid workers and others have long questioned the project, saying delivering aid by land is the only effective way to get supplies at scale into Gaza, where Israeli forces are fighting a war against the Palestinian militant group Hamas.
Here are some details on the pier.
WHY WAS THE PIER BUILT?
US President Joe Biden announced a plan to put the pier in place in March, following warnings that famine could spread across Gaza and increasing difficulties sending aid through land crossings, most of which were kept shut by Israel for months.
Biden made the announcement as he sought to cool anger among many in his Democratic Party over support for Israel during its offensive in Gaza, given the heavy toll on civilians.
During the war - which began after Hamas-led gunmen attacked Israel on Oct. 7 last year, triggering Israel's military retaliation - humanitarian conditions have deteriorated rapidly for Gaza's 2.3 million residents. Almost all its residents have been displaced within the coastal enclave, many of them multiple times.
HOW IS THE PIER OPERATED?
The about 1,200-foot-long (370-meter-long) floating pier is located offshore a little north of the Wadi Gaza coastal wetland. Construction of the pier, which was partially pre-assembled in the Israeli port of Ashdod, started in April. Aid first began arriving on May 17.
Food and other aid supplies have been transported to the pier from Cyprus, which spearheaded efforts to open a sea route for humanitarian assistance.
Supplies have been X-rayed in Cyprus in the presence of Israeli officials, who have closely monitored aid entering Gaza, saying it could benefit Hamas.
Aid has then been transported to the pier by ship before being loaded onto trucks to be driven onto the coast.
The operation is complex, involving about 1,000 US military personnel, some stationed on the pier. The Pentagon estimated that the first 90 days of operation would cost about $230 million.
WHAT PROBLEMS HAS THE PIER FACED?
The pier has been temporarily removed several times because of rough seas. On one occasion it was towed to the southern Israeli port city of Ashdod for repairs after a section broke off.
Shipments have also been held up by delays in distributing supplies into Gaza, a process that is fraught with risk and requires Israeli approvals.
When considering whether to bring back the pier after bad weather in late June, US officials said there would be little point in doing so immediately because the marshaling area next to the pier was nearly full.
As has been the case with aid delivered on other routes, supplies coming off the pier have sometimes been seized by desperate Gazans or subject to more organized looting.
The UN World Food Program, tasked with overseeing distribution of aid from the pier, paused operations in June because of security concerns.
Some aid workers expressed concern that a pier operated by the US military could put humanitarian staff and operations at risk because locals might question their neutrality or see them as undercover agents.
In June, the Pentagon sought to dispel what it said were false social media reports that Israel used a floating US pier off Gaza in a hostage rescue mission.
HOW MUCH AID HAS BEEN DELIVERED
As of June 25, almost 7,000 metric tons of assistance had arrived in Gaza via Cyprus, US aid officials said, roughly the equivalent of 350 aid trucks.
Aid officials say about 600 trucks of humanitarian and commercial supplies are needed in Gaza daily to meet the needs of the population.
Before Israel expanded its military operation in the southern Gazan city of Rafah in early May, most aid had been arriving in Gaza via the Rafah crossing with Egypt, or through the nearby Israeli-controlled crossing of Kerem Shalom. In April, an average of 189 trucks entered daily through the Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings, according to UN data.
WHAT'S THE PIER'S FUTURE?
The pier was authorized to remain in operation up to July 31. A senior US official had said in June that it could be extended by at least another month.
Pentagon officials have cautioned that the sea could become too rough for the pier after the summer.