Three Conditions for Israeli War on Lebanon, Last One is Political

Lebanese army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a car after an Israeli airstrike targeted the village of Bourj el-Moulouk, approximately 18 kilometers from the city of Nabatieh, last week (AFP)
Lebanese army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a car after an Israeli airstrike targeted the village of Bourj el-Moulouk, approximately 18 kilometers from the city of Nabatieh, last week (AFP)
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Three Conditions for Israeli War on Lebanon, Last One is Political

Lebanese army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a car after an Israeli airstrike targeted the village of Bourj el-Moulouk, approximately 18 kilometers from the city of Nabatieh, last week (AFP)
Lebanese army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a car after an Israeli airstrike targeted the village of Bourj el-Moulouk, approximately 18 kilometers from the city of Nabatieh, last week (AFP)

Before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ended his recent visit to Washington, he announced to the US Congress that his government aims to neutralize the security threats posed by the Lebanon-based Hezbollah on Israel’s northern front.

The Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation reported that the Israeli army has informed the political leadership that preparations for a large-scale ground maneuver are complete, and a strong aerial operation in Lebanon is planned before the maneuver.

Opinions differ on the scope and timing of this maneuver, but there is agreement that Tel Aviv is pressing forward with plans for a major attack on Lebanon unless Hezbollah withdraws from south of the Litani River.

Military expert Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou commented that “three new military units have moved to the northern front and are on alert for a significant military operation.”

He explained that these units need training to work together and coordinate on the front lines.

“When the Israeli army announces a maneuver, it might just be an exercise, but it could also be a prelude to a surprise military attack, leading to a major ground operation,” added Helou.

Helou reminded that “since the end of the 2006 war, Israel has been preparing for a new and extended conflict with Hezbollah, which requires three main components: logistical, military, and political readiness.”

“Our biggest concern is that Israel has achieved political readiness following Netanyahu’s visit to Washington,” cautioned Helou.

Before announcing the maneuver, the commander of the northern front visited the Lebanon border, emphasizing that the airstrike on Yemen’s Hodeidah port was a clear message to Iran and Hezbollah about the reach of the Israeli Air Force.

Helou noted that Israel “is determined to push Hezbollah away from the northern border at any cost, including military action, as Netanyahu outlined in his speech to the US Congress.”

He highlighted that “while ground units are preparing, the Israeli Air Force plays a crucial role in the conflict.”

This announcement follows a large-scale exercise conducted by the Israeli army on May 28, which tested the readiness of its forces for a full-scale war on the northern front.

The Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation stated that the exercise was carried out unexpectedly to enhance the army's preparedness for various scenarios with Lebanon.

Dr. Sami Nader, Director of the Levant Institute for Strategic Affairs, explained that the new maneuver is part of “pressure on Lebanon, especially as it coincides with Netanyahu’s visit to the US and meetings with top American officials from both parties.”

Nader told Asharq Al-Awsat that “Tel Aviv is determined to remove the threat on the northern front, whether through diplomatic efforts or military action, while Hezbollah insists on maintaining the situation as it was before the October 6, 2023, Al-Aqsa Flood operation.”

“It appears that the Israeli army is moving towards implementing Netanyahu’s threats, despite reported disagreements between him and the military leadership,” said Nader.

Despite efforts by the US and other major powers to prevent new conflicts, particularly with Lebanon, Nader stressed that Israel “is determined to change the rules of engagement, especially after Hezbollah's recent unveiling of significant aerial capabilities that threaten Israel’s security, though these capabilities are not comparable to Tel Aviv’s extensive military assets.”



Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
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Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he would meet former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime fell in Damascus. But what will Putin say to his former ally? And how might their first exchange unfold, given Russia’s role in helping Assad escape on a chaotic night?

The Kremlin, known for staging Putin’s meetings with precision, might opt to limit media coverage this time. Putin could be seen sitting at a small table with Assad, now on asylum

in Moscow, in a soundless scene—one that leaves little room for formal pleasantries.

Why has Putin announced plans to meet Assad? Is it to reprimand him? Many in Russia believe Assad’s stubbornness has hurt Moscow’s efforts, threatened its gains in Syria, and could eventually risk its key military presence there.

As details remain unclear, Russian experts are racing to analyze developments in Syria and outline scenarios for the next phase.

Some Russian experts have painted grim scenarios. A member of the prestigious Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy warned of potential risks, including a prolonged conflict with civil war elements, a humanitarian catastrophe with millions of refugees, escalating migration in Europe, and rising tensions among nations like Israel, the US, and Iran.

He also predicted a new wave of international terrorism that could reach far beyond the region.

Other experts echoed this pessimism. One posted an image of a Syrian dissident stepping on a statue of Assad’s father, warning that “this is just the beginning.” Another blamed the crisis on the “Obama curse,” citing the West’s interference, while a third shared a bleak analysis titled, “We Must Pray for Syria.”

So far, Russian media and think tanks have avoided any optimistic outlooks for Syria’s future.

Experts, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, believe Moscow may be preparing to handle one of three possible scenarios in Syria.

The first, most favorable for Russia’s interests, involves Moscow reaching an agreement with the new Syrian authorities to maintain its military presence for a limited period.

This could mean replacing the current 49-year agreements with a five-year deal to facilitate a gradual Russian withdrawal. Such an arrangement could help the new leadership in Syria manage Western pressure to cut ties with Moscow.

The second scenario envisions Russia giving up its airbase in Hmeimim while retaining a significant presence in Tartus. This would mirror agreements from 1972, which allowed Russian naval vessels to use the Tartus logistics center in the Mediterranean. This compromise would preserve Russia’s interests while reducing Western pressure on Damascus.

The third scenario involves a full Russian withdrawal from both bases, with Moscow later seeking agreements for shared use of air and sea ports. Such agreements, similar to those Russia has signed with other countries, are less likely to provoke Western opposition.

Regardless of the outcome, the Kremlin has yet to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the emerging situation in Syria.

Key questions remain, including how to curb Iran’s regional influence, manage Türkiye and Israel’s growing roles in Syria, and establish a new regional balance that secures Moscow’s minimum interests.