Yahya al-Sinwar: Hamas’ Top Leader as Recalled by Former Fellow Inmates

Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)
Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)
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Yahya al-Sinwar: Hamas’ Top Leader as Recalled by Former Fellow Inmates

Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)
Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)

The Palestinian group Hamas’ unprecedented attack against Israel on October 7 turned the spotlight on the movement’s prominent official Yahya al-Sinwar, who is the mastermind of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation.

Sinwar was named on Tuesday as Hamas’ new leader, succeeding Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in a presumed Israeli strike in Tehran last week.

Sinwar grew up in Gaza after his family was displaced there from the city of Majdal Aqab following the 1948 Nakba. His endured a difficult childhood and witnessed the 1967 setback, deepening his hatred towards Israel that was only compounded by the harsh and miserable life in Gaza and its camps.

The experience ingrained in him the “pressing need for revenge” that would shape the man he is today. His view of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was always marked by his recalling of the Nakba and the suffering endured by his parents and the Palestinians. He often spoke of his need to “create a shock and change the balances of power,” recalled those who know him.

Sinwar earned his education at schools in the Khan Younis camp. He later graduated with a degree in Arabic Studies from the Islamic University. He joined the “Islamic bloc” and eventually rose in prominence to form the “Al-Majd” agency – Hamas' internal security agency – that played a major role in pursuing agents linked to the Israeli security forces.

His security role drew the attention of Israeli forces and he was arrested in the late 1980s. Israel accused him of killing four “collaborators” and sentenced him to four life terms. He was held in various Israeli prisons and spent long periods in solitary confinement.

His imprisonment did not impact his work in Hamas. He led the movement from behind bars, while becoming increasingly paranoid. He learned Hebrew and led prisoner strikes and negotiations, winning some rounds and losing others.

He spent over two decades behind bars as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict witnessed intifadas, wars and periods of peace. It wasn’t until his brother kidnapped an Israeli soldier and Hamas exchanged him for a thousand Palestinian detainees, including Sinwar, that he gained his freedom and started carving the shape of a new phase in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to his colleagues, former inmates and other acquaintances who met Sinwar over the years to learn more about the mastermind of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation that has changed the conflict forever.

Sinwar speaks to the media in Gaza on October 28, 2019. (Reuters)

First meetings

Ismat Mansour, a former prisoner and member of the Democratic Front, spent years in prison where he met Sinwar in the late 1990s. “When you first meet him, you see a normal, simple and religious man,” he said. “But he also has a harsh streak and can be severe in demeanor.”

“He is religious, but not preachy. His religious background helps shape his relations,” he added.

Mansour said Sinwar’s difficult childhood helped shape his grudge and spite against Israel that has shaped his policies. “He is not one for compromise.”

Abdel Fattah al-Dawla, a former prisoner and Fatah member, spent years held in Israeli jails. He met Sinwar once in 2006. By that point, Sinwar’s reputation had already preceded him and Dawla had the impression of a severe and unpromising man.

This impression was confirmed when they met in the Bir al-Saba prison. Dawla remarked that the “social Sinwar is different than the Hamas leader. The Sinwar with whom you can discuss various general affairs is different than the Sinwar with whom you can discuss issues related to Palestinian factions.”

He may be sociable when discussing general issues, and firm and unyielding when discussing conflict. “It is as if he were two different people,” he added.

Salaheddine Taleb, a former prisoner and Hamas member, spent years in jail with Sinwar. He was released along with Sinwar in the exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011.

Recalling his first meeting with Sinwar, he said: “You are struck by his humility and jovial relations with others.” However, his security background and role set him apart from other Hamas leaders. “He isn’t a preacher, but the founder of the al-Majd security apparatus. This greatly impacts who he is as a person,” he went on to say. “Despite his strong social relations, when it came to security affairs, he was very strict and uncompromising.”

Security paranoia

Sinwar remained Hamas’ number one security official inside and outside prison. In the mid-90s, Israel dealt Hamas and its cells in the West Bank and Gaza a series of painful blows, including the assassination of top figures, such as Yahya Ayyash and Imad Aqel, and the arrest of numerous members.

These developments shook Hamas to the core and created a sense of paranoia among its members. Sinwar was the mover and shaker of this period. Taleb recalled this “difficult” phase during which he joined Sinwar in running security affairs from prison.

The paranoia led to investigations and interrogations within Hamas ranks. There were security breaches, assassinations and arrests. Hamas was not prepared or experienced enough to handle such challenges, said Taleb. Accusations of collaboration with Israel were thrown at several members. Some of these accusations turned out to be true, while others fell victim to the paranoia.

“It was a difficult phase and no one came out of it unscathed,” said Taleb.

Dawla revealed that investigations were carried out with anyone even remotely suspected of having ties with Israel, leading to tragic consequences. Sinwar oversaw several of these internal investigations. “Some members were killed under torture and we later learned that they were among the movement’s finest members,” he lamented.

Sinwar and al-Qassam

Sinwar was still in prison when the al-Qassam Brigade, Hamas’ military wing, was established in the early 90s and began carrying out operations against the Israeli army and settlers. Sinwar began to develop his ties with the Qassam from behind bars with the arrest of several of the Brigades’ members.

Mansour said: “Sinwar has a security-oriented mind. His security paranoia never leaves him.” The ties Sinwar that would forge with the Qassam would lead to the Shalit deal and his release from prison in 2011.

Sinwar’s younger brother, Mohammed, was a prominent member of the Qassam. He took part in the operation that led to Shalit’s kidnapping in 2006 and release years later.

Yahya’s release would consolidate his position in Hamas and elevate him among his members. He would take on a leading role in Hamas’ security and military operations, said Mansour.

Qassam Brigades members greet Sinwar in Gaza on April 30, 2022. (AFP)

Shalit and the exchange

Shalit’s kidnapping changed the equation and negotiations over the prisoner swap. Sinwar was at the top of the list of detainees it wanted to be released. In prison, the kidnapping changed Sinwar’s standing and he started to play a greater role in the negotiations.

Sinwar became a major figure after the kidnapping and after Hamas took control of Gaza. The movement was now in control of an entire territory and had an Israeli prisoner, who was being held by Sinwar’s brother, said Mansour.

The kidnapping gave Sinwar “unprecedented power inside prison that no other Hamas official had ever enjoyed safe for Ahmed Yassin and Salah Shehade, who were the first generation of prisoners,” he continued.

Sinwar became the key figure in the prisoner exchange and he used his new power to consolidate his position and influence in making decisions inside and outside prison.

Brain tumor

As the negotiations gained traction, Sinwar suffered a life-threatening brain tumor. The discovery left the Israelis at a loss because Sinwar was the main official in charge of the negotiations. Should they treat him or leave him to die? His death in the middle of the negotiations would prompt accusations that Israel had killed him and abort the prisoner swap. No one was going to believe that he had died from a tumor, regardless of the evidence.

Sinwar, meanwhile, was very adamant about rejecting treatment by the prison administration, said Dawla. Eventually his situation deteriorated, losing consciousness at one point, so he had to receive treatment at the prison. The administration declared an emergency at the prison and a helicopter was flown in to take Sinwar to hospital where he was soon operated on, recalled Dawla.

“It was a very complex and dangerous operation. He could have died,” he added.

In wake of the October 7 attack, Israelis lament that Sinwar was ever operated on, revealed Mansour. Then head of prison intelligence has recently repeatedly said she regrets saving Sinwar’s life.

2011 release

After his release in the 2011 swap, Sinwar went about consolidating his position in Hamas, especially in its military wing. He was elected member of the movement’s politburo in 2012 and immediately focused his attention on the military wing, deepening his ties with its officials.

Sinwar made it his mission to become the number one figure in Hamas as soon as he was released from prison, said Mansour.

His influence kept growing and he defeated Ismail Haniyeh and other prominent figures in the 2017 politburo elections.

The 2021 elections were marred with fraud allegations and the vote was “repeated three or four times” to ensure that Sinwar was the victor. Mansour said this was all part of the buildup to the October 7 attack. “It was clear that Sinwar and the Qassam had their plans,” he stated. Soon after, Sinwar worked tirelessly in developing the military wing.

“Sinwar only aspires to be the number one official in the movement. He is extremely ambitious. That drove him, even when he was in prison, to always be the top official in Hamas,” said Dawla.

“He believes that none of the current leaders have the right to be superiors over him. Not now, not ever,” he added.

Khalil al-Hayyah, Ismail Haniyeh and Sinwar visit the Rafah crossing on September 19, 2017. (Reuters)

Early signs of the Aqsa flood

Dawla said Sinwar always wanted “to do something big”. He believed that several Hamas and Qassam figures remained in prison and the Shalit swap was not enough to release them. Several of the remaining detainees sent angry messages to the Hamas leadership over this, leaving Sinwar with a “moral obligation to rectify what the Shalit deal could not achieve,” explained Dawla.

Several factors led to the buildup of the October 7 attack. Sinwar tried reconciliation with the Palestinian Authority and failed. He tried another prisoner swap and failed. He tried to lift the siege on Gaza and also failed, recalled Mansour. So, he had no choice but to carry out the al-Aqsa Flood Operation.

“Had other options been available, the attack may never have happened,” he added.

Symbol of the war

Sinwar has become Israel’s symbol of the Gaza war, stressed Mansour. He has become the biggest catch for its military and political institutions. Israel holds him fully responsible for the October 7 attack and wants the world to associate the war with him, putting him on the same level as Hitler, Saddam, Qaddafi and other dictators in the world, he added.

Israel is trying to lump all the current developments and the entire Palestinian cause in this “diabolical” figure, he said. The Israelis believe that the war will end with Sinwar’s assassination or arrest.

Those who knew Sinwar during his time in prison speak of his pragmatism. Mansour noted: “Some will be surprised to learn that he can strike deals. He has already struck them with the Israelis and can reach middle ground according to his views.”

The situation is different now. Israel views Sinwar as a “dead man walking.” It has razed Gaza to the ground searching for him. “The amount of hatred, incitement and accusations that have been thrown his way by Israel and across the globe make it impossible for Israel to take one step back by striking a deal with him,” stressed Mansour.

“Israel will never be at peace knowing that he is alive,” he remarked.

On Sinwar’s end, Taleb stated that after all the destruction, he is unlikely to show any flexibility in negotiations. “I believe that he planned and predicted that the war will continue for the months – if not years – to come.”



Why Israel Fears Military Rapprochement Between Egypt and Türkiye

Egyptian Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets Turkish Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation summit in Egypt’s New Administrative Capital in December 2024. (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets Turkish Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation summit in Egypt’s New Administrative Capital in December 2024. (Egyptian Presidency)
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Why Israel Fears Military Rapprochement Between Egypt and Türkiye

Egyptian Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets Turkish Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation summit in Egypt’s New Administrative Capital in December 2024. (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets Turkish Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation summit in Egypt’s New Administrative Capital in December 2024. (Egyptian Presidency)

The growing rapprochement between Egypt and Türkiye is raising concern in Israel, particularly as military cooperation expands through joint training and exercises between two of the region’s largest and most strategically significant armed forces.

Those concerns resurfaced after international military drills involving Egyptian and Turkish forces concluded in the Libyan city of Sirte.

Experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat said the unease stems from several factors, including the two countries’ military weight and their growing alignment on regional issues and defense manufacturing.

They expect the rapprochement could evolve into a regional alliance with expanding influence, while ruling out any imminent military confrontation.

Israeli concerns

The Israeli newspaper Maariv published an article by retired general Yitzhak Brik warning that Tel Aviv could face a “difficult war” against a potential Egyptian-Turkish alliance as both countries strengthen their military capabilities.

Brik warned that strategic cooperation between Cairo and Ankara could extend to joint military production and defense integration.

Any military rapprochement between Egypt and Türkiye, he said, could reshape deterrence dynamics in the region and pose new security challenges for Israel, requiring a comprehensive reassessment of its military doctrine and defense strategies.

Israeli channel i24NEWS reported on April 18 that talks between Egypt and Türkiye were accelerating, noting that in-depth discussions had been referred to Turkish parliamentary committees on security, defense, and intelligence.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Cairo in February, where several agreements were signed, including in the defense sector. During a joint press conference, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said the two countries share converging views on regional and international issues, particularly Gaza, Sudan, Libya and the Horn of Africa.

Israel has also expressed reservations about the possibility of Ankara participating in international stabilization forces in Gaza, after Türkiye became involved in mediation and guarantees for implementing a ceasefire agreement in October. Media reports have also pointed to the possibility of a future military confrontation between Israel and Türkiye following tensions linked to Iran.

‘Cold peace’

Egyptian military and strategic expert Samir Ragheb said Türkiye’s direct presence in the region, combined with its rapprochement with Egypt, reinforces what he described as a “cold peace” with Israel.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Cairo and Ankara command the region’s two largest armies and maintain strong ties with key regional powers, something Israel views with concern.

One of the most sensitive issues for Israel, he said, is cooperation in drone manufacturing.

Both Egypt and Türkiye have significant capabilities in this field, and joint production could meet their domestic needs while positioning them as strong competitors to Israeli drones in regional markets, particularly as negative perceptions of Israeli products grow due to ongoing conflicts, making Egyptian-Turkish alternatives more appealing.

Coordination between Egypt and Türkiye spans a broad geographic arc from Somalia to Syria, including Libya. This, Ragheb said, adds to Israeli concerns, particularly as Türkiye seeks to expand its footprint in Africa through Egypt, the continent’s main gateway.

Turkish affairs researcher Taha Ouda Oglu told Asharq Al-Awsat that cooperation between Egypt and Türkiye on Gaza, Libya and Africa is further raising Israeli concerns.

Rising military cooperation

Military cooperation between Egypt and Türkiye has accelerated in recent months. In late 2025, for the first time in 13 years, Egyptian forces took part in joint naval exercises on Turkish soil, involving Turkish frigates, attack boats, a submarine and F-16 fighter jets, alongside Egyptian naval units.

Türkiye’s Defense Ministry said on Thursday that the “Flintlock 2026” exercises, which were in Sirte from April 13 to 30, had concluded. The drills, which included Egyptian forces, aimed to enhance military cooperation and combat readiness through integrated land, air and naval scenarios.

In September, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in a televised interview that Ankara is seeking to strengthen cooperation with Egypt in defense industries and joint security, noting that regional threats are driving deeper discussions on security as ties develop.

Egypt and Türkiye also signed an agreement in late August to locally produce the “Turkha” drone in Egypt, a step aimed at localizing drone technology and boosting domestic defense industries. The aircraft features advanced surveillance and reconnaissance systems and vertical takeoff and landing capabilities.

Ragheb ruled out the possibility of Israel waging a military confrontation against either Egypt or Türkiye, saying Israeli military doctrine does not allow for fighting on multiple fronts simultaneously against major powers.

He added that the United States would be unlikely to support Israel in a war against countries the size of Egypt or Türkiye, noting both nations rely on deterrence through strength rather than rhetoric.

He said the rapprochement, while not directed against Israel, could evolve into a broader regional alliance that may include major countries, such as Pakistan.

Oglu said military cooperation between Egypt and Türkiye is likely to deepen further and expand across multiple arenas, increasing their influence in the region, without leading to a direct confrontation with Israel.


Sudanese Schoolchildren Race to Make Up for Years Lost to War

Displaced Sudanese students attend a class at an elementary school run by the Sudanese Coalition for Education in partnership with the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), south of Port Sudan, on April 26, 2026. (AFP)
Displaced Sudanese students attend a class at an elementary school run by the Sudanese Coalition for Education in partnership with the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), south of Port Sudan, on April 26, 2026. (AFP)
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Sudanese Schoolchildren Race to Make Up for Years Lost to War

Displaced Sudanese students attend a class at an elementary school run by the Sudanese Coalition for Education in partnership with the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), south of Port Sudan, on April 26, 2026. (AFP)
Displaced Sudanese students attend a class at an elementary school run by the Sudanese Coalition for Education in partnership with the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), south of Port Sudan, on April 26, 2026. (AFP)

Sudanese 13-year-old Afrah wants to become a surgeon, and nothing will stop her, not even the war that has ravaged her country and forced millions of children out of school.

Quiet and determined, she kept learning on her own for months, uprooted by the now three-year conflict between Sudan's army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

"I would study my lessons again and again," she told AFP at a displacement camp in Port Sudan, where she is again receiving an education thanks to UNICEF and local organization SCEFA.

Afrah is one of more than 25 million minors in Sudan, or half the total population, of whom eight million are currently out of school, according to the UN children's agency.

At the Al-Hishan camp, tents arranged in a square function as an elementary school for more than 1,000 children -- nearly a third of whom required an accelerated curriculum to make up for lost time.

Laughter fills the camp now, but most of the children arrived traumatized by horrors including starvation and rocket fire.

Their drawings, educators said, were at first dominated by war: depictions of the tanks, weapons and death they saw as their families fled.

"They come here scared, exhausted, isolated, but over time you see their drawings change," UNICEF spokesperson Mira Nasser told AFP.

"They start to adapt and process."

In one tent, children repeated hand-washing instructions after a social worker, while in another, they recited a poem in choral unison.

Elsewhere, a teacher -- herself displaced and living at the camp -- explained chemical and physical reactions to her class, as her three-year-old son pulled at her skirt.

"These children's future is at stake, and education is itself a form of protection," Nasser said.

"Here they can at least get a sense of normalcy, even in a displacement site. They can resume their education, they can play, they can make friends."

Displaced Sudanese students attend a class at an elementary school run by the Sudanese Coalition for Education in partnership with the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), south of Port Sudan, on April 26, 2026. (AFP)

- DIY operation -

Awatef al-Ghaly, a 48-year-old Arabic teacher who was displaced from North Darfur, remembered her first days at the site, when thousands of families were left listless with their kids in tow.

"There were 60 teachers here. We just got to work," she told AFP, at the same empty plot where they started, in the shadow of the Red Sea mountains.

They lined the students up by grade, threw together a schedule and started going through old lessons.

Soad Awadallah, 52, taught English for four decades in South Darfur before arriving in Port Sudan.

"It took a lot of patience, we had the kids all sat on the ground at first," she said, gesturing towards the rows of desks that now fill the tents, a welcome addition even if students have to squeeze in four to a bench.

According to Nasser, because of the time that students lost, ranging from months to years, "some even forgot how to read and write".

But their determination was indomitable, and the makeshift school recently graduated its first class from elementary to middle school, Ghaly said with pride.

"Even when things were difficult, in the heat of summer with bugs everywhere, the kids wanted to learn," she said.

Before the final exam, "some of them would follow us teachers home begging for more review sessions".

Sudanese students leave a school operated by the Sudanese Coalition for Education for All, in partnership with the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), south of Port Sudan on April 26, 2026. (AFP)

- 'Want to help people' -

Fatma, 16, wants to become a psychiatrist to help those hurt by the fighting in Sudan.

"This war has destroyed people emotionally... My father was in the main market in Khartoum when the RSF went through killing people. He ran away, and he still feels that pain," she told AFP.

"When I sit with the social worker, I feel better. I want to help people like that."

One little girl, who came up to an AFP journalist's hip, was missing her right arm, amputated after she was wounded in the capital Khartoum.

She high-fived with her left hand.

Across Sudan, five million children are internally displaced, according to UNICEF. Millions are going hungry, including over 825,000 children under five suffering severe acute malnutrition.

The use of child soldiers has been reported across the country, and rampant sexual violence against minors has prevented many from returning to school even in areas now safe from the fighting.

Many just want to go home.

"I miss my friends and my family, I miss my school in Khartoum -- it was full of trees," 14-year-old Ibrahim said.

But he has a goal. "I want to become a petroleum engineer," he told AFP, as the sound of children playing outside filled the tent.

During recess, dozens of pupils dashed around their teachers, laughing, playing and making hearts at AFP's cameras.

One boy named Rizeq, clad in a red Manchester United jersey, steeled himself and walked up to the adults.

His voice a little shaky but his chest puffed out, he said: "I want more English classes in the evening."


Timeline of Decades of Conflict Between Israel and Hezbollah

 Mourners carry coffins during a funeral ceremony of four Hezbollah fighters and two civilians, amid a temporary ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, in the village of Maaroub, southern Lebanon, April 26, 2026. (Reuters)
Mourners carry coffins during a funeral ceremony of four Hezbollah fighters and two civilians, amid a temporary ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, in the village of Maaroub, southern Lebanon, April 26, 2026. (Reuters)
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Timeline of Decades of Conflict Between Israel and Hezbollah

 Mourners carry coffins during a funeral ceremony of four Hezbollah fighters and two civilians, amid a temporary ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, in the village of Maaroub, southern Lebanon, April 26, 2026. (Reuters)
Mourners carry coffins during a funeral ceremony of four Hezbollah fighters and two civilians, amid a temporary ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, in the village of Maaroub, southern Lebanon, April 26, 2026. (Reuters)

The ongoing war between Israel and the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah is far from the first conflict between them. The two have an enmity that goes back more than four decades, with outbursts of fighting or outright war punctuated by periods of tense calm.

Here is a timeline of some significant events in the hostilities between the two:

1982: Israel invades Lebanon in an offensive against the Palestine Liberation Organization and allied groups. Hezbollah is formed, with Iranian backing and based on the Iran's revolution model, to fight Israel’s ensuing occupation of southern Lebanon. It launches a guerrilla war against Israel.

1992: Hezbollah leader Abbas Mousawi is killed by an Israeli helicopter attack. His successor is Hassan Nasrallah, who will lead the group for the next three decades.

1996: Israel launches an offensive aiming to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River, some 30 kilometers (20 miles) from the border. Israeli artillery shelling on a United Nations compound housing hundreds of displaced people in Qana kills at least 100 civilians and wounds scores more.

2000: After a long war of attrition, Israel withdraws its forces from southern Lebanon, which is heralded around the Arab world as a major victory for Hezbollah.

2006: Hezbollah fighters ambush an Israeli patrol, killing three Israeli soldiers and taking two hostage in a cross-border raid, sparking a monthlong war between Hezbollah and Israel that ends in a draw. Israeli bombardment razes villages and residential blocks in southern Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburbs, a scorched-earth approach that is dubbed the “Dahiyeh Doctrine.”

2008: Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah’s military chief, is killed when a bomb planted in his car exploded in Damascus. The assassination is blamed on Israel.

2012: Hezbollah enters the Syrian civil war in support of then-President Bashar Assad. In the years that follow, Israel begins periodically carrying out airstrikes in Syria targeting Iranian and Hezbollah facilities and officials or weapons shipments that it said were bound for Hezbollah. Israel still avoided carrying out strikes on Hezbollah on Lebanese territory during this period.

OCT. 8, 2023: One day after the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel sparks the war in Gaza, Hezbollah fires missiles across the border. Israel responds with airstrikes and shelling and the two enter into a low-level conflict that initially remains mainly confined to the border area.

SEPT. 17, 2024: Israel launches an attack in Lebanon using remotely-triggered explosive-laden pagers issued to Hezbollah fighters and civilian employees. A day later, a similar attack targets walkie-talkies. The attacks kill dozens of people and maim thousands, most of them Hezbollah members but also including women and children.

SEPT. 27, 2024: Hassan Nasrallah is killed in a series of massive airstrikes in Beirut's southern suburbs.

NOV. 27, 2024: A US-brokered ceasefire nominally ends the Israel-Hezbollah war. Israel continues to carry out regular strikes in Lebanon that it says aim to stop Hezbollah from rebuilding.

MARCH 2, 2026: Two days after Israel and the US attacked Iran, triggering a wide-reaching war in the Middle East, Hezbollah launches missiles toward Israel. It says the salvo is in retaliation for the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and for “repeated Israeli aggressions” in Lebanon.