RSF Fighters Sow Chaos in Sudan's Farming Heartland

Families displaced by RSF advances in Sudan's El Gezira and Sennar states shelter at the Omar ibn al-Khattab displacement site, Kassala state, Sudan, July 10, 2024. REUTERS/ Faiz Abubakr
Families displaced by RSF advances in Sudan's El Gezira and Sennar states shelter at the Omar ibn al-Khattab displacement site, Kassala state, Sudan, July 10, 2024. REUTERS/ Faiz Abubakr
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RSF Fighters Sow Chaos in Sudan's Farming Heartland

Families displaced by RSF advances in Sudan's El Gezira and Sennar states shelter at the Omar ibn al-Khattab displacement site, Kassala state, Sudan, July 10, 2024. REUTERS/ Faiz Abubakr
Families displaced by RSF advances in Sudan's El Gezira and Sennar states shelter at the Omar ibn al-Khattab displacement site, Kassala state, Sudan, July 10, 2024. REUTERS/ Faiz Abubakr

When fighters from Sudan's Rapid Support Forces began seizing vehicles from people in Sharafat Alhalaween village, local elders complained to the group’s commanders.

They assured the village during a March visit that the RSF would protect civilians, according to four residents. Soon afterward, the RSF posted a video on social media - reviewed by Reuters - claiming to have dealt with unspecified "rogue actors" in the area.

But the next morning, the residents told Reuters, dozens of fighters stormed in on motorcycles and pickup trucks, firing guns in the air. The fighters, some in uniforms, went door to door grabbing money and valuables, prompting an exodus of thousands of people, they said.

The residents' accounts echo ones from across Sudan's central El Gezira state, a key farming region and strategic crossroads just south of the capital, Khartoum. Reuters interviewed 43 people from 20 communities - including residents, activists and RSF recruits - who described a spiral of looting, kidnapping and killing after the group seized most of the state in December.

The RSF has sought to convey in videos like the one posted in March that it is protecting civilians and providing food and services. But residents said the paramilitary group relies on a mix of irregular fighters, many motivated by bounty, and it often struggles to control them.

The Sudanese Armed Forces, which shared power with the RSF in a military-led government until fighting erupted between them in April 2023, has carried out airstrikes in El Gezira but has few ground forces there, according to residents and local activists. The military mobilized civilians to defend their communities, triggering deadly retribution, they said.

The violence has driven over 850,000 people from their homes, the United Nations says, disrupted farming critical to Sudan's food production and raised questions about the RSF's ability to enforce any truce after nearly 16 months of war.

"Some RSF officials admit that the group will face huge internal challenges should the war ever stop," said Alan Boswell of the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think tank. "It is bound together by conquest and the spoils of war."

The RSF denied targeting civilians or lacking command and control of its forces.

"The army, Islamist militias and criminals looted the state systematically in order to scapegoat our forces," it said in a statement to Reuters. "Our forces clashed with these rogue actors, and our commanders and soldiers died in that effort."

A military spokesman, Brigadier General Nabil Abdullah, dismissed the RSF's allegations as lies, saying the group and its mercenaries "committed every conceivable violation" against El Gezira's citizens.
Across Sudan, the RSF has repeatedly overwhelmed the military thanks in part to alliances forged with tribal militias and other armed groups. In July, it used El Gezira as a springboard to push into Sennar, White Nile and Gedaref states, triggering new waves of displacement and expanding the conflict through Sudan's agricultural heartland.

A fifth of the country's 50 million inhabitants have fled their homes, and around half are facing food insecurity, mainly in areas under RSF control, according to UN officials who describe the humanitarian crisis as the world's worst.

International efforts to mediate between the sides have made little headway, though the United States is leading efforts to convene talks in Geneva.

The RSF says it is open to negotiating a ceasefire and humanitarian access. The military says it cannot negotiate until the RSF exits civilian areas and stops abuses.

EYEING LOOT

The RSF has roots in so-called Janjaweed militias, which helped the military crush a rebellion in Sudan's western Darfur region two decades ago, gaining recognition as a state-sanctioned security force in 2017.
It allied with the military to oust president Omar al-Bashir in 2019, but the sides fell out over an internationally backed plan to move toward civilian rule.

When the power struggle turned violent, the RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, quickly took over greater Khartoum. The military, headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, responded with airstrikes and heavy artillery, to little effect.

The RSF then consolidated its grip across Darfur before surging into El Gezira, a refuge for half a million people displaced from Khartoum, and capturing the state capital, Wad Madani.

In Darfur, the RSF and allied militiamen engaged in ethnically targeted violence, but in El Gezira, residents said the fighters seemed convinced they were Bashir loyalists.
Some are seeking to settle grievances against a political elite that has long controlled Sudan from its center - a problem for any future truce, said Suliman Baldo of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, a US-based watchdog.

Most are eyeing loot, he and residents said.

Three sources with direct knowledge of RSF recruitment said fighters are often drawn by the promise of a share of the spoils. The RSF denies this and says its fighters are paid monthly salaries.

The force includes units from rival tribes and militias, which sometimes clash among themselves, residents said.

Fighters based in Hasaheisa, the district that includes Sharafat Alhalaween, are under the command of Ahmed Adam Gouja, who was part of a militia active in Darfur before joining the RSF at the start of the war.

This area has seen some of the harshest attacks in El Gezira, especially after salaries dried up, residents and two local RSF recruits told Reuters.

"When you ask the soldiers about Hemedti, they say, 'He gave me this gun, but we don't trust him; we don't trust his soldiers; we only trust our brothers,'" said one young man reached by phone, who like many locals asked for anonymity for fear of retribution.

He described seeing fighters cock their weapons at superiors when ordered to shut down a satellite terminal they were using to sell internet access. Asked about the incident, the RSF said it did not control the terminal or prevent people from using it.

Across the Nile River in East Gezira district, residents have been spared the worst of the violence as the RSF's top commander in the state, Abuagla Keikal, is from the area. He charges a protection tax, according to locals and activists who said fighters based in the district have clashed with Gouja's forces when they strayed over the river.

Reuters could not reach the two commanders, and the RSF did not answer questions about them.
FARMERS THREATENED

Civilians described fleeing from village to village on foot and in cars, boats, buses and donkey carts to escape RSF fighters.

First they steal cars, gold and money, more than two dozen witnesses said, returning later for items such as clothes, electronics and food, which are sold in so-called "Dagalo markets" - a reference to Hemedti.

When they find nothing, they start kidnapping people for ransom, threatening to kill them if families don't pay, according to a group of activists, the Wad Madani Resistance Committee, who document RSF raids across the state.

A committee representative, who requested anonymity for safety, said hundreds of villages have been targeted and at least 800 people killed as of April, though a telecommunications blackout makes it impossible to confirm exact numbers.

The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, a rights group, has documented 75 cases of sexual assault by RSF fighters in the state, said its regional director, Hala al-Karib.

At least 17 people interviewed by Reuters said they had seen beatings, often with whips, and killings during the raids.

A mother of five who sought refuge in El Gezira after fleeing Khartoum said a nephew was killed in front of her.

"They said, 'Don't lift him, or we'll shoot you too.' We had to bury him where he was," said the woman, reached by phone in Port Sudan. She gave only one name, Hanan.

RSF fighters have cleaned out stocks of wheat, sorghum and other crops and blocked farmers from their fields, according to residents and agricultural officials.

"My fields are being eaten by cows because the farmers are scared to go out," said Mohamed Balla, a farming cooperative leader from Hasaheisa.
Diesel prices have soared; fertilizer and seeds are scarce, and tractors have been stolen.

A UN-backed food security monitoring network warned in June that parts of the state were at risk of famine.

The RSF did not answer questions about the disruptions to food production but has previously blamed a military blockade imposed on the state. The military did not comment on that.

Early in the war, the RSF set up an internal police force to tackle "negative phenomena," its term for abuses. This force has arrested more than 1,000 men in El Gezira, mostly locals, the RSF told Reuters in July.

Residents said the effect was limited. In several instances, RSF police clashed with fighters, but raids did not stop, they said.

Low on ground troops, the military has tried to encourage a so-called popular resistance. Burhan said in December that 40,000 men had joined the effort in El Gezira - many of them incensed by RSF attacks on women, according to the resistance committee.

"The RSF uses this as an excuse to attack," said the committee's representative, adding that few weapons and little training have been provided to civilian recruits.

One of the worst such incidents occurred in June, near the military's last base in El Gezira.

After men in Wad al-Noura village took up arms against the RSF, its fighters killed more than 100 people there, the committee said.

The RSF described the incident as a clash with army recruits and special forces. The military did not comment, though it pledged at the time to deliver a "harsh response.”

"My husband was a teacher," a woman widowed in the incident told Reuters. "He didn't know anything about fighting, and we had nothing to fight for, no car or store. But as a man, he felt he had to fight."



Yahya al-Sinwar: Hamas’ Top Leader as Recalled by Former Fellow Inmates

Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)
Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)
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Yahya al-Sinwar: Hamas’ Top Leader as Recalled by Former Fellow Inmates

Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)
Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)

The Palestinian group Hamas’ unprecedented attack against Israel on October 7 turned the spotlight on the movement’s prominent official Yahya al-Sinwar, who is the mastermind of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation.

Sinwar was named on Tuesday as Hamas’ new leader, succeeding Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in a presumed Israeli strike in Tehran last week.

Sinwar grew up in Gaza after his family was displaced there from the city of Majdal Aqab following the 1948 Nakba. His endured a difficult childhood and witnessed the 1967 setback, deepening his hatred towards Israel that was only compounded by the harsh and miserable life in Gaza and its camps.

The experience ingrained in him the “pressing need for revenge” that would shape the man he is today. His view of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was always marked by his recalling of the Nakba and the suffering endured by his parents and the Palestinians. He often spoke of his need to “create a shock and change the balances of power,” recalled those who know him.

Sinwar earned his education at schools in the Khan Younis camp. He later graduated with a degree in Arabic Studies from the Islamic University. He joined the “Islamic bloc” and eventually rose in prominence to form the “Al-Majd” agency – Hamas' internal security agency – that played a major role in pursuing agents linked to the Israeli security forces.

His security role drew the attention of Israeli forces and he was arrested in the late 1980s. Israel accused him of killing four “collaborators” and sentenced him to four life terms. He was held in various Israeli prisons and spent long periods in solitary confinement.

His imprisonment did not impact his work in Hamas. He led the movement from behind bars, while becoming increasingly paranoid. He learned Hebrew and led prisoner strikes and negotiations, winning some rounds and losing others.

He spent over two decades behind bars as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict witnessed intifadas, wars and periods of peace. It wasn’t until his brother kidnapped an Israeli soldier and Hamas exchanged him for a thousand Palestinian detainees, including Sinwar, that he gained his freedom and started carving the shape of a new phase in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to his colleagues, former inmates and other acquaintances who met Sinwar over the years to learn more about the mastermind of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation that has changed the conflict forever.

Sinwar speaks to the media in Gaza on October 28, 2019. (Reuters)

First meetings

Ismat Mansour, a former prisoner and member of the Democratic Front, spent years in prison where he met Sinwar in the late 1990s. “When you first meet him, you see a normal, simple and religious man,” he said. “But he also has a harsh streak and can be severe in demeanor.”

“He is religious, but not preachy. His religious background helps shape his relations,” he added.

Mansour said Sinwar’s difficult childhood helped shape his grudge and spite against Israel that has shaped his policies. “He is not one for compromise.”

Abdel Fattah al-Dawla, a former prisoner and Fatah member, spent years held in Israeli jails. He met Sinwar once in 2006. By that point, Sinwar’s reputation had already preceded him and Dawla had the impression of a severe and unpromising man.

This impression was confirmed when they met in the Bir al-Saba prison. Dawla remarked that the “social Sinwar is different than the Hamas leader. The Sinwar with whom you can discuss various general affairs is different than the Sinwar with whom you can discuss issues related to Palestinian factions.”

He may be sociable when discussing general issues, and firm and unyielding when discussing conflict. “It is as if he were two different people,” he added.

Salaheddine Taleb, a former prisoner and Hamas member, spent years in jail with Sinwar. He was released along with Sinwar in the exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011.

Recalling his first meeting with Sinwar, he said: “You are struck by his humility and jovial relations with others.” However, his security background and role set him apart from other Hamas leaders. “He isn’t a preacher, but the founder of the al-Majd security apparatus. This greatly impacts who he is as a person,” he went on to say. “Despite his strong social relations, when it came to security affairs, he was very strict and uncompromising.”

Security paranoia

Sinwar remained Hamas’ number one security official inside and outside prison. In the mid-90s, Israel dealt Hamas and its cells in the West Bank and Gaza a series of painful blows, including the assassination of top figures, such as Yahya Ayyash and Imad Aqel, and the arrest of numerous members.

These developments shook Hamas to the core and created a sense of paranoia among its members. Sinwar was the mover and shaker of this period. Taleb recalled this “difficult” phase during which he joined Sinwar in running security affairs from prison.

The paranoia led to investigations and interrogations within Hamas ranks. There were security breaches, assassinations and arrests. Hamas was not prepared or experienced enough to handle such challenges, said Taleb. Accusations of collaboration with Israel were thrown at several members. Some of these accusations turned out to be true, while others fell victim to the paranoia.

“It was a difficult phase and no one came out of it unscathed,” said Taleb.

Dawla revealed that investigations were carried out with anyone even remotely suspected of having ties with Israel, leading to tragic consequences. Sinwar oversaw several of these internal investigations. “Some members were killed under torture and we later learned that they were among the movement’s finest members,” he lamented.

Sinwar and al-Qassam

Sinwar was still in prison when the al-Qassam Brigade, Hamas’ military wing, was established in the early 90s and began carrying out operations against the Israeli army and settlers. Sinwar began to develop his ties with the Qassam from behind bars with the arrest of several of the Brigades’ members.

Mansour said: “Sinwar has a security-oriented mind. His security paranoia never leaves him.” The ties Sinwar that would forge with the Qassam would lead to the Shalit deal and his release from prison in 2011.

Sinwar’s younger brother, Mohammed, was a prominent member of the Qassam. He took part in the operation that led to Shalit’s kidnapping in 2006 and release years later.

Yahya’s release would consolidate his position in Hamas and elevate him among his members. He would take on a leading role in Hamas’ security and military operations, said Mansour.

Qassam Brigades members greet Sinwar in Gaza on April 30, 2022. (AFP)

Shalit and the exchange

Shalit’s kidnapping changed the equation and negotiations over the prisoner swap. Sinwar was at the top of the list of detainees it wanted to be released. In prison, the kidnapping changed Sinwar’s standing and he started to play a greater role in the negotiations.

Sinwar became a major figure after the kidnapping and after Hamas took control of Gaza. The movement was now in control of an entire territory and had an Israeli prisoner, who was being held by Sinwar’s brother, said Mansour.

The kidnapping gave Sinwar “unprecedented power inside prison that no other Hamas official had ever enjoyed safe for Ahmed Yassin and Salah Shehade, who were the first generation of prisoners,” he continued.

Sinwar became the key figure in the prisoner exchange and he used his new power to consolidate his position and influence in making decisions inside and outside prison.

Brain tumor

As the negotiations gained traction, Sinwar suffered a life-threatening brain tumor. The discovery left the Israelis at a loss because Sinwar was the main official in charge of the negotiations. Should they treat him or leave him to die? His death in the middle of the negotiations would prompt accusations that Israel had killed him and abort the prisoner swap. No one was going to believe that he had died from a tumor, regardless of the evidence.

Sinwar, meanwhile, was very adamant about rejecting treatment by the prison administration, said Dawla. Eventually his situation deteriorated, losing consciousness at one point, so he had to receive treatment at the prison. The administration declared an emergency at the prison and a helicopter was flown in to take Sinwar to hospital where he was soon operated on, recalled Dawla.

“It was a very complex and dangerous operation. He could have died,” he added.

In wake of the October 7 attack, Israelis lament that Sinwar was ever operated on, revealed Mansour. Then head of prison intelligence has recently repeatedly said she regrets saving Sinwar’s life.

2011 release

After his release in the 2011 swap, Sinwar went about consolidating his position in Hamas, especially in its military wing. He was elected member of the movement’s politburo in 2012 and immediately focused his attention on the military wing, deepening his ties with its officials.

Sinwar made it his mission to become the number one figure in Hamas as soon as he was released from prison, said Mansour.

His influence kept growing and he defeated Ismail Haniyeh and other prominent figures in the 2017 politburo elections.

The 2021 elections were marred with fraud allegations and the vote was “repeated three or four times” to ensure that Sinwar was the victor. Mansour said this was all part of the buildup to the October 7 attack. “It was clear that Sinwar and the Qassam had their plans,” he stated. Soon after, Sinwar worked tirelessly in developing the military wing.

“Sinwar only aspires to be the number one official in the movement. He is extremely ambitious. That drove him, even when he was in prison, to always be the top official in Hamas,” said Dawla.

“He believes that none of the current leaders have the right to be superiors over him. Not now, not ever,” he added.

Khalil al-Hayyah, Ismail Haniyeh and Sinwar visit the Rafah crossing on September 19, 2017. (Reuters)

Early signs of the Aqsa flood

Dawla said Sinwar always wanted “to do something big”. He believed that several Hamas and Qassam figures remained in prison and the Shalit swap was not enough to release them. Several of the remaining detainees sent angry messages to the Hamas leadership over this, leaving Sinwar with a “moral obligation to rectify what the Shalit deal could not achieve,” explained Dawla.

Several factors led to the buildup of the October 7 attack. Sinwar tried reconciliation with the Palestinian Authority and failed. He tried another prisoner swap and failed. He tried to lift the siege on Gaza and also failed, recalled Mansour. So, he had no choice but to carry out the al-Aqsa Flood Operation.

“Had other options been available, the attack may never have happened,” he added.

Symbol of the war

Sinwar has become Israel’s symbol of the Gaza war, stressed Mansour. He has become the biggest catch for its military and political institutions. Israel holds him fully responsible for the October 7 attack and wants the world to associate the war with him, putting him on the same level as Hitler, Saddam, Qaddafi and other dictators in the world, he added.

Israel is trying to lump all the current developments and the entire Palestinian cause in this “diabolical” figure, he said. The Israelis believe that the war will end with Sinwar’s assassination or arrest.

Those who knew Sinwar during his time in prison speak of his pragmatism. Mansour noted: “Some will be surprised to learn that he can strike deals. He has already struck them with the Israelis and can reach middle ground according to his views.”

The situation is different now. Israel views Sinwar as a “dead man walking.” It has razed Gaza to the ground searching for him. “The amount of hatred, incitement and accusations that have been thrown his way by Israel and across the globe make it impossible for Israel to take one step back by striking a deal with him,” stressed Mansour.

“Israel will never be at peace knowing that he is alive,” he remarked.

On Sinwar’s end, Taleb stated that after all the destruction, he is unlikely to show any flexibility in negotiations. “I believe that he planned and predicted that the war will continue for the months – if not years – to come.”