Asharq Al-Awsat is publishing a series of excerpts from a new book by former Lebanese MP Bassem al-Sabeh in which he recalls the thorny relationship between slain former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and members of the ruling elite in Syria. “Lebanon in the Shadows of Hell: from the Taif Accord to Hariri’s Assassination” is published by All Prints Distributors & Publishers.
Sabeh worked as an aide to Hariri until his killing in February 2005. He served as lawmaker from 1992 to 2009. He was also appointed information minister in Hariri’s government between 1996 and 1998. Sabeh is a member of Hariri’s Mustaqbal Movement and a pillar of the March 14 movement that opposed Syria’s political and security hegemony over Lebanon.
Anjar ... mandatory gate to Syria
Lebanese officials headed to Damascus must make a mandatory stop in the Lebanese Bekaa town of Anjar. For over 30 years, the town was the headquarters of the Syrian intelligence in Lebanon. Major General Mohammed Ghanem assumed that post from 1976 to 1982. He was succeeded by Major General Ghazi Kanaan from 1982 to 2001 and then Rustom Ghazaleh in 2001 until Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon following former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri's assassination in 2005.
Ghanem had also taken up Beirut as the headquarters of his command, allowing it to be closer to the Arab Deterrent Force that was formed in 1976 to help end the Lebanese civil war (1975-90). The force eventually withdrew from Lebanon shortly after, leaving behind the Syrian army in Lebanon. Syria initially deployed 25,000 soldiers, but that figure eventually grew to 40,000.
The deployment of the Syrian troops took place in March 1976 at the official request of President Suleiman Franjieh to President Hafez al-Assad. He asked for military intervention to stop Palestinian organizations and leftist militias from carrying out attacks against Christian regions.
Ghazi Kanaan acted as the Syrian “high commissioner” in Lebanon. He took up residence in Anjar and Beirut’s Ramlet al-Bayda area. I visited Anjar with Hariri and alone a handful of times. Throughout those visits, Kanaan was always courteous and never abused his position for political gain. I did notice, however, how he could be courteous to some visitors and deliberately offensive to others, including lawmakers, ministers, businessmen and clerics.
It was rare for any Lebanese official or public figure to head to Damascus without passing through Anjar or receiving its approval. I met several heads of political blocs, senior ministers, security officials, judicial officials, clerics, muftis, university professors, bank directors, businessmen and others in Anjar seeking favor with Damascus or “help” in passing a violation at a ministry or other public administration.
In 2001, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad decreed that Kanaan return to Damascus. He appointed Ghazaleh in his place with the direct support of Assef Shawkat, Assad’s brother-in-law and head of military intelligence – one the most important branches of Syrian intelligence. A rivalry would soon emerge between Kanaan and Ghazaleh.
The name Rustom Ghazaleh has haunted me in my personal and political life. One of my most shocking encounters with the official dates back to early 2001 when a Lebanese youth visited my home in Beirut’s Bir Hassan area. I usually received friends and citizens asking for services during morning hours. One such figure was a youth who asked to meet me alone.
After completing the morning meetings, I received him while my bodyguards remained by the door because they were suspicious of him. “I carry a political message. I am unarmed and I only want a one-on-one meeting,” he said in a Lebanese accent with a slightly southern lilt.
“It is unimportant for you to know my name, but it is important that you understand the purpose of my message,” he said, identifying himself Khaled. “I can humbly pave the way for PM Rafik Hariri to Assef Shawkat. My ties with Assef are greater than you can imagine.”
“I can play a positive role in PM Hariri’s favor. He is now the closest person to Bashar. I am the only one who can open the doors to Hariri. Try and you won’t lose. Khaddam’s role is finished. Shehabi has resigned and Kanaan will meet the same fate,” he said referring to Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam and army commander Hikmat al-Shehabi.
I quickly made my way to Hariri’s residence in Qoreitem in Beirut. I told him in detail everything that happened that morning. He picked up the phone, called Kanaan and informed him that he was heading to Anjar to inform him of “something important.” Kanaan replied that he would be out of the office and that I should meet with Ghazaleh.
I headed to the headquarters of Syrian intelligence in Ramlet al-Bayda to meet Ghazaleh. We sat alone in the office and I recounted the meeting with Khaled. He then got up and contacted Kanaan by phone. He held a military salute the entire time he was on the line, detailing to him what I had just told him. “As you wish, sir,” he kept on repeating.
At the end of the conversation, he turned to me and said: “Is this dog going to visit you again tomorrow?... Thank you for your cooperation. I hope that you will receive him and inform me of anything new.” Concerned, I returned to Qoreitem again and briefed Hariri on the meeting.
The next day, Khaled came to visit me. No sooner had he stepped foot into the house that I saw Ghazaleh storming in with two armed men. They beat Khaled up and Ghazaleh ordered them to “take the dog to the car. He will see what happens to those who undermine their masters.” He thanked me and hastily left. I was left in shock and quickly made my way to Qoreitem.
Hariri had not expected Ghazaleh’s reaction to be this severe. I expressed my concern that I may have inadvertently caused a dispute between Syrian intelligence branches. Hariri contacted Ghazaleh, who asked that I meet with him.
He stood behind his desk, holding the same club that he used to beat up Khaled. He showered me with thanks and praise, while I voiced my alarm over what happened. He replied: “There is no need to be afraid. He got what he deserved... He will rot away in prison. He is in the custody of the military police. He is a nobody and has no ties with anyone in the leadership.”
For months guilt ate away at me for what happened to Khaled. Was he killed or was he really imprisoned?
Syrian ‘high commissioner’
My attention then shifted to news of Ghazaleh’s appointment as Syria’s “high commissioner” in Lebanon and Kanaan’s transfer to Damascus. Ghazaleh’s appointment forced Hariri to change his approach. The PM had enjoyed good ties with Kanaan, Shehabi and Khaddam.
Ghazaleh celebrated his appointment to the “Anjar throne” for three days during which he received well-wishers. Syrian intelligence intensified its activities in Beirut’s Hamra neighborhood, the southern Beirut suburbs, northern Metn region and northern city of Tripoli. Local Lebanese parties and economic, judicial, security and media figures were expected to queue up in Anjar to gain Ghazaleh’s blessing.
Kanaan, meanwhile, carried out a farewell tour throughout Lebanon, starting with the presidential palace where President Emile Lahoud awarded him with the National Order of the Cedar - the country’s highest order - “in appreciation of his work for Lebanon”. Hariri threw a reception in his honor that was also attended by Ghazaleh. He bestowed upon him the key to the city of Beirut in recognition of his services. At the Defense Ministry, Kanaan was also bestowed with a medal in recognition of his work.
Hariri was aware that Kanaan’s transfer was the result of a secret meeting held between Lahoud, Shawkat, Ghazaleh and Jamil al-Sayyed, the head of Lebanon’s General Security. Lahoud had expressed his irritation with Kanaan’s role in the parliamentary elections and how he had joined Hariri’s celebrations in the western Bekaa town of al-Khiyara. Lahoud went so far as to contact Assad himself to request Kanaan’s transfer.
Ultimately, Hariri’s Lebanese and Syrian rivals worked together to clip Kanaan’s wings. They succeeded in taking out an ally of sorts out of the picture, replacing him with Ghazaleh, who relished political, financial and security blackmail and in playing the dirtiest of roles.
Days after his appointment, Ghazaleh sent Hariri a list of pressing demands related to furnishing his home in Chtaura, paving the road leading to it, and generally providing whatever the new Syrian high commissioner in Lebanon needed in his new house. It was from this home that Ghazaleh waged campaigns against Hariri, completely ungrateful to the man who had furnished it for him.
I visited that house in late 2004, when I was returning to Beirut from Damascus with Hariri. The visit took place weeks after the failed assassination attempt against minister Marwan Hamadeh. We were warmly greeted by Ghazaleh, who denied that he had anything to do with the extension of Lahoud’s term in office. He also stressed that Syria would never cover up the failed assassination attempt, amid accusations by the Lebanese opposition that Damascus was behind the attack.
As we got up to leave, Ghazaleh told me: “Brother Bassem, rest assured. Don’t be afraid of anything. We won’t let what they did to Marwan happen to you. Your brother is here whenever you want.” I was shocked. In the car, Hariri said: “Did you hear what he said? He is crazy. He is either dumb or threatening you.” I replied: “Those words were for you.”
Ghazaleh reaped the rewards of Syria’s intelligence operations in Lebanon. He gained a fortune that was not simply a product of whatever payments he received from Hariri, politicians, businessmen and people asking for favors. He used to receive 50,000 dollars a month from Hariri. He also took part in looting the Al-Madina Bank following its scandal in Lebanon.
Kanaan himself was affected by the scandal and soon after, his influence in Lebanon ended with Ghazaleh taking over completely. Hariri and I visited Kanaan in Damascus less than two months after his transfer. He appeared defeated, telling Hariri: “You have given so much to Lebanon and Syria. We wronged you at times, but you stood tall.” Out of respect, Hariri did not bring up Ghazaleh, who on the contrary, used to bring up Kanaan whenever he could to deride his work.
Extension of Lahoud’s term
Tensions over the extension of Lahoud’s term in office reached boiling point in early 2004. For once, Lebanese politicians were no longer afraid of speaking out against Syria’s role in Lebanon.
The Council of Maronite Bishops issued a strongly worded statement expressing their rejection of the extension and undermining of the constitution. “Syria is dealing with Lebanon as though it were a Syrian province. It has the final say in everything, appoints governors and organizes elections. It appoints whoever it wants and interferes in all state affairs,” it said. Hariri remarked at the time: “Lebanon is headed towards a dead end if the way in which it is governed does not change.”
In late March 2004, Hariri was summoned for an urgent meeting with Assad. He believed the meeting would be an opportunity to reconsider the extension of Lahoud’s term given Lebanon’s opposition to it. He had high hopes, especially with international pressure on Syria and efforts to draft United Nations Security Council resolution 1559 that would be issued in September and call for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.
The Syrian leadership had other things in mind completely. It received Hariri for an unprecedented meeting in the history of Lebanese-Syrian relations.
Hariri arrived at the meeting on time. He was met with Bashar and all senior officers who had overseen Syria’s operations in Lebanon: Kanaan, Ghazaleh, and Mohammed Khalouf. Assad had set only one article on the meeting agenda: Insulting Hariri.
He said: “Comrades Ghazi, Rustom and Mohammed had dedicated their work in service of Lebanon and they helped you in assuming your responsibility. While you, you dedicated all your relations to strike Syria. You will fail in preventing the extension of Lahoud’s term. Lahoud is me and I am Lahoud. What you are doing with your French and American friends will backfire against you. The extension will happen and you will not stand in its way, neither will statements nor pressure from your friends.”
Assad then gave the way for Kanaan to launch his own attack. He deliberately tried to soften the blow by detailing the support Syria has offered Lebanon and the history of relations between them. He warned of the danger of using Lebanon and the position of its prime minister to attack Syria. He also hailed Hariri’s role during the rule of late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.
It was then Ghazaleh’s turn. Like Bashar, he did not hold back. “Who are you without Syria and its president?” he told Hariri. “You are just a businessman. You would never have dreamed of becoming prime minister were it not for Syria’s approval. We helped you. We supported your policies. We opened doors for you here and in Lebanon. But you have been ungrateful for everything we have done for you. You stand with [French President Jacques] Chirac against us. You are inciting him to harm Syria. You, Chirac and the Americans will not have your way. Syria is your master. If the president wants the extension to happen, then you will make it happen. You have no choice in this.”
Bashar watched the blows rain down on Hariri in a state of nothing short of elation.
The meeting ended with Hariri not uttering a word in his defense.
Back in Beirut, he said: “Never in my life have I ever been hurt this way. I almost stormed out of there without permission and could have created a big problem. A problem with whom? The president of Syria. Should I have spoken back right in front of his officers?! I chose silence and patience ... and left afraid for Syria and Lebanon.”
Hariri did not speak of the meeting to Khaddam, who had telephoned to ask about it. Hariri told him: “Ask Abou Arab, he was there. I will stay at home. You won’t see me in Syria anymore.” Khaddam realized that the situation was dangerous, and I was summoned to meet him the next day.
What happened to Hariri is “unacceptable”, Khaddam told me. He said he had contacted Bashar to express his alarm at the meeting, bluntly telling him that it was not right for the president of Syria to insult the prime minister of Lebanon, whether in the presence of his officers or not. “Rafik Hariri is my friend and was your father’s friend, but he is also the prime minister of a brotherly country and debasing him is just not done by the president of Syria,” he added.
He also said that he had advised Assad to rectify the situation. Assad listened and “told me to tackle it with the best of my ability. You can apologize and do what you deem fit,” he remarked.
