Its Economy and Infrastructure Battered, Can Lebanon Afford a War With Israel?


Passengers wait for their flights at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, following the exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 25 August 2024. EPA/ABBAS SALMAN
Passengers wait for their flights at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, following the exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 25 August 2024. EPA/ABBAS SALMAN
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Its Economy and Infrastructure Battered, Can Lebanon Afford a War With Israel?


Passengers wait for their flights at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, following the exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 25 August 2024. EPA/ABBAS SALMAN
Passengers wait for their flights at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, following the exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 25 August 2024. EPA/ABBAS SALMAN

The ferocious exchange of fire by Hezbollah and the Israeli military is raising fears of a regional war beyond the tense border.
The risks for Lebanon are far greater than in 2006, when a monthlong war with Israel ended in a draw. Lebanon has struggled with years of political and economic crises that left it indebted, without a stable electricity supply, a proper banking system and with rampant poverty, The Associated Press reported.
And with Hezbollah’s military power significantly greater, there are concerns that a new war would be far more destructive and prolonged.
Can Lebanon afford any of it?
Planning for a 2006 war repeat — or worse Since Hezbollah and Israel began firing rockets and drones at each other a day after the start of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza on Oct. 7, the conflict has been mostly limited to border towns. But with the threat of a wider war, Lebanon has scrambled to equip hospitals with supplies and prepare public schools to open up to people seeking shelter.
A rare Israeli airstrike in southern Beirut last month that killed a top Hezbollah commander set off a flurry of meetings between humanitarian organizations and the Lebanese government, said Laila Al Amine, who heads the Beirut office of international relief organization Mercy Corps. It's one of some 60 organizations helping the government with its relief efforts.
The government and UN agencies prepared a comprehensive response plan this month outlining two possible scenarios: a limited escalation that would resemble the 2006 war, with an estimated 250,000 people displaced, and a worst-case scenario of “uncontrolled conflict” that would displaced at least 1 million people.
The UN-drafted plan, a copy of which was obtained by The Associated Press, projects a monthly cost of $50 million in case of a limited escalation and $100 million if an all-out war breaks out.
The Lebanese government said that funding for the emergency will come from creditors and humanitarian aid organizations. But the authorities have struggled to find money to care for 100,000 currently displaced and an estimated 60,000 people living in conflict areas, which is costing about $24 million a month.
Environment Minister Nasser Yassin, who is spearheading relief operations, told reporters after an emergency government meeting Sunday that the morning attacks won't change the plan.
“It already presents scenarios of all the possibilities that could happen, among them is an expansion of the hostilities,” said Yassin.
Indebted and cash-strapped Lebanon desperate for aid money decades of corruption and political paralysis have left Lebanon’s banks barely functional, while electricity services are almost entirely in the hands of private diesel-run generator owners and fuel suppliers. Public service institutions rely on aid groups and international donors to function at a barebones level. Lebanese who once lived in relative comfort are receiving food and financial aid to survive.
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic further battered the economy, and the Beirut port explosion flattened several neighborhoods in the heart of the capital. Lebanon’s banks and the ruling elite have resisted painful reforms as a condition for an International Monetary Fund bailout while the infrastructure continued to wither and living conditions worsened.
Tourism, which officials had relied on to help rebuild the economy, has also taken a hit since the border conflict with Israel.
And unlike in 2006, Lebanon is hosting more than 1 million Syrian refugees who fled the conflict in their country. Health Minister Firas Abiad told the AP earlier this month that the Lebanese health system is ill-equipped to treat the additional population in the event of an all-out war, as international funding for Syrian refugees continues to decline.
In April, Yassin said the country had only half the money needed to respond to the conflict and ensuing humanitarian needs.
Lebanon faces tougher logistics In 2006, Israel bombed the runways of Lebanon’s only airport, putting it largely out of commission, and imposed an air and sea blockade. Its bombardment crippled critical infrastructure and flattened neighborhoods, with damage and losses worth $3.1 billion, according to the World Bank.
But aid groups eventually were able to send supplies through the country’s ports and at times through the airport using the remaining limited runway space. In their assessment of the war, the UN said that their relief efforts was not in response to a humanitarian crisis. “People did not die from poor sanitation, hunger or disease. They died from bombs and shells,” UN OCHA said in a report a month after the war.
Many Lebanese were able to flee to neighboring Syria, where an uprising in 2011 plunged the country into a civil war. It's unclear how easy crossing the border would be this time, both for civilians and aid groups.
It is also unclear whether the Beirut port, still not fully rebuilt after the devastating blast in 2020, would have sufficient capacity in case of a wider war. Its damaged grain silos collapsed in 2022, and the country relies on minimal food storage due to the financial crisis.
“Lebanon apparently has stocks of food and fuel for two-three months, but what happens beyond this duration?” Al Amine said. “We only have one airport and we can’t transport things through our land borders. It would be difficult to bring items into the country.”
An empowered Hezbollah In 2006, Hezbollah reportedly had some 15,000 rockets in its arsenal, “but more recent unofficial estimates suggest this number has multiplied by almost 10 times,” said Dina Arakji, associate analyst at UK-based risk consultancy firm Control Risks.
The group has also “acquired more advanced weaponry, including precision missiles and variants of Iranian arms, as well as Chinese and Russian weaponry,” she said.
Hezbollah, which relies on a network of Iran-backed allied groups that could enter the conflict, has also substantially expanded its drone arsenal and capabilities, against which Israeli air defenses are less effective.
Lebanese officials and international diplomats hope that an elusive cease-fire agreement in Gaza will bring calm in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has said it will halt its attacks along the border if there is a cease-fire in Gaza.



Libya Political Process Deadlocked

Col. Muammar Gaddafi
Col. Muammar Gaddafi
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Libya Political Process Deadlocked

Col. Muammar Gaddafi
Col. Muammar Gaddafi

Libya has undergone significant changes since the fall of Col. Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The Libyans have struggled to establish a stable government, leading to the country being split into two main factions: One in the west backed by Türkiye and another in the east supported by Russia.

However, the reality is more complex than just two competing governments.

This report highlights the main players in the power struggle in Libya today, focusing on the Government of National Unity led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh in Tripoli and the eastern government backed by parliament and Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces.

The report also explains why the UN-led political process has stalled and explores the influence of five key figures in Libya’s political landscape, the armed groups in Tripoli, and the rise of powerful families in both the east and west.

In 2011, Libyan rebels closed in on Tripoli, Gaddafi’s stronghold, and stormed his heavily fortified complex at Bab al-Aziziya. Armed groups, including some with ties to extremist movements, took over the complex, signaling the collapse of Gaddafi’s rule, though he continued to resist until he was killed near Sirte in October of that year.

Thirteen years after Gaddafi’s fall, Libya remains divided between two rival governments.

The Libyan army, which fell with Gaddafi’s regime, has largely been rebuilt in the east under Haftar’s command. In the west, the situation is more chaotic, with various armed groups operating under Dbeibeh’s government, each controlling different areas.

The conflict is further complicated by foreign involvement: Türkiye supports the western forces with troops and allied Syrian mercenaries, while Russia backs Haftar in the east and south, first through the Wagner Group and now with a direct military presence, raising concerns about a new Russian foothold on the Mediterranean.

The political process to reach a settlement in Libya has been stalled for years. International envoys come and go, but none have succeeded, and there is no solution in sight.

Since Gaddafi’s fall, Libya has changed a lot, but the new system remains unclear. To help explain the current situation, we spoke with Tim Eaton, a top Libya analyst at Chatham House in London.

Political Process... Dead in the Water

When asked about the status of the UN-led political process in Libya, Eaton started by clarifying that it is currently in the hands of Stephanie Khouri, the acting head of the UN mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

She was initially appointed as the deputy to UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily, but after his resignation, she ended up leading the mission. However, since Khouri wasn’t appointed by the UN Security Council, she’s not an official special envoy, and her role is less defined, coming directly from the UN Secretary-General.

There’s ongoing discussion about who will be the next special envoy to Libya, but given the challenges within the Security Council, appointing someone has been difficult and remains a tough task. In short, it’s increasingly hard to get a new envoy through a Security Council vote.

As for the political stalemate that Libya is suffering from nowadays, Eaton stressed that the reason behind this is that the political process is dead and hasn't moved at all.

In 2021, under the then deputy head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for political affairs Stephanie Williams, the Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed.

It was the first government since 2014 to be recognized by both eastern and western Libya, and it was supposed to hold elections by the end of that year. But that didn’t happen.

Critics accused the GNU of blocking the elections, and there were disputes over who could run, with Saif al-Islam Gaddafi’s return causing particular controversy.

After the elections failed to happen in 2022, the eastern House of Representatives formed a new government, but it wasn’t accepted by the broader political scene. So, Libyans were back to having two rival governments.

Jan Kubis, who succeeded Williams, couldn’t move the election process forward. When he left, it was clear elections wouldn’t happen. Williams briefly returned, but was then replaced by Abdoulaye Bathily, the UN special envoy.

Instead of pushing the process forward, Bathily decided to take time to assess the situation and engage in shuttle diplomacy. He focused on trying to get agreement among the five key players but hasn’t made much progress.

The Big Five

According to Eaton, Libya’s “Big Five” are Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity; Mohamed Takala, President of the High Council of State (recently replaced by Khaled al-Mishri); Aguila Saleh, Speaker of the House of Representatives; Mohamed al-Menfi, Head of the Presidential Council; and military leader Khalifa Haftar.

Bathily’s plan focused on getting these five leaders to sit down and agree on the future, but he couldn’t make it happen. Each of them set conditions that blocked progress.

For example, Dbeibeh refused to participate if the talks were about forming a new government, as it would mean replacing him. Haftar demanded that if the western government was involved, the eastern one must be too. These obstacles led Bathily to resign, as there was nothing solid to build on.

This is where things stand now.

Despite seeming like rivals, the Big Five do cooperate in certain areas. For example, Haftar and Dbeibeh have an understanding on dividing oil revenues.

Family Rule

Eaton doesn’t think that the ongoing division between eastern and western Libya could lead to a real split of the country.

The connection between east and west Libya is stronger than many realize, the analyst affirmed.

What’s happening now is more about powerful families and their networks competing for control, rather than just an east-versus-west divide. In the east, those in power are closely linked to Haftar, while in the west, Dbeibeh’s family has strengthened its control and appointed people with ties to them.

Foreign Fighters

Foreign fighters and mercenaries have been involved in Libya since 2011. Initially, they came from places like Darfur and Chad. Recently, the situation has changed significantly.

During Haftar’s attempts to take Tripoli, he relied on Wagner Group mercenaries, which led Tripoli authorities to seek Turkish support. Türkiye established a permanent presence in the west and brought in Syrian mercenaries. Meanwhile, Wagner expanded its presence in Haftar’s areas.

Wagner’s involvement now seems more like a state relationship with Russia rather than just a mercenary group. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov has visited eastern Libya frequently, and there is significant Russian military equipment flowing into the region. This growing Russian presence is a major concern for the US.

In the west, the situation is more chaotic. No single family controls all security forces, and Türkiye supports specific groups, such as the 444 Brigade in Tripoli. Türkiye also took control of the Al-Watiya airbase.

Both Türkiye and Russia are firmly established in Libya now. Their presence makes a large-scale war less likely, as the costs would be high. Haftar cannot advance on Tripoli due to Turkish opposition, and when Misrata forces considered moving east, they were deterred by Russian aircraft and Egypt’s declared “red line.”

Foreign fighters have become a permanent part of the Libyan landscape and are likely to stay.