Its Economy and Infrastructure Battered, Can Lebanon Afford a War With Israel?


Passengers wait for their flights at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, following the exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 25 August 2024. EPA/ABBAS SALMAN
Passengers wait for their flights at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, following the exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 25 August 2024. EPA/ABBAS SALMAN
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Its Economy and Infrastructure Battered, Can Lebanon Afford a War With Israel?


Passengers wait for their flights at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, following the exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 25 August 2024. EPA/ABBAS SALMAN
Passengers wait for their flights at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, following the exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 25 August 2024. EPA/ABBAS SALMAN

The ferocious exchange of fire by Hezbollah and the Israeli military is raising fears of a regional war beyond the tense border.
The risks for Lebanon are far greater than in 2006, when a monthlong war with Israel ended in a draw. Lebanon has struggled with years of political and economic crises that left it indebted, without a stable electricity supply, a proper banking system and with rampant poverty, The Associated Press reported.
And with Hezbollah’s military power significantly greater, there are concerns that a new war would be far more destructive and prolonged.
Can Lebanon afford any of it?
Planning for a 2006 war repeat — or worse Since Hezbollah and Israel began firing rockets and drones at each other a day after the start of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza on Oct. 7, the conflict has been mostly limited to border towns. But with the threat of a wider war, Lebanon has scrambled to equip hospitals with supplies and prepare public schools to open up to people seeking shelter.
A rare Israeli airstrike in southern Beirut last month that killed a top Hezbollah commander set off a flurry of meetings between humanitarian organizations and the Lebanese government, said Laila Al Amine, who heads the Beirut office of international relief organization Mercy Corps. It's one of some 60 organizations helping the government with its relief efforts.
The government and UN agencies prepared a comprehensive response plan this month outlining two possible scenarios: a limited escalation that would resemble the 2006 war, with an estimated 250,000 people displaced, and a worst-case scenario of “uncontrolled conflict” that would displaced at least 1 million people.
The UN-drafted plan, a copy of which was obtained by The Associated Press, projects a monthly cost of $50 million in case of a limited escalation and $100 million if an all-out war breaks out.
The Lebanese government said that funding for the emergency will come from creditors and humanitarian aid organizations. But the authorities have struggled to find money to care for 100,000 currently displaced and an estimated 60,000 people living in conflict areas, which is costing about $24 million a month.
Environment Minister Nasser Yassin, who is spearheading relief operations, told reporters after an emergency government meeting Sunday that the morning attacks won't change the plan.
“It already presents scenarios of all the possibilities that could happen, among them is an expansion of the hostilities,” said Yassin.
Indebted and cash-strapped Lebanon desperate for aid money decades of corruption and political paralysis have left Lebanon’s banks barely functional, while electricity services are almost entirely in the hands of private diesel-run generator owners and fuel suppliers. Public service institutions rely on aid groups and international donors to function at a barebones level. Lebanese who once lived in relative comfort are receiving food and financial aid to survive.
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic further battered the economy, and the Beirut port explosion flattened several neighborhoods in the heart of the capital. Lebanon’s banks and the ruling elite have resisted painful reforms as a condition for an International Monetary Fund bailout while the infrastructure continued to wither and living conditions worsened.
Tourism, which officials had relied on to help rebuild the economy, has also taken a hit since the border conflict with Israel.
And unlike in 2006, Lebanon is hosting more than 1 million Syrian refugees who fled the conflict in their country. Health Minister Firas Abiad told the AP earlier this month that the Lebanese health system is ill-equipped to treat the additional population in the event of an all-out war, as international funding for Syrian refugees continues to decline.
In April, Yassin said the country had only half the money needed to respond to the conflict and ensuing humanitarian needs.
Lebanon faces tougher logistics In 2006, Israel bombed the runways of Lebanon’s only airport, putting it largely out of commission, and imposed an air and sea blockade. Its bombardment crippled critical infrastructure and flattened neighborhoods, with damage and losses worth $3.1 billion, according to the World Bank.
But aid groups eventually were able to send supplies through the country’s ports and at times through the airport using the remaining limited runway space. In their assessment of the war, the UN said that their relief efforts was not in response to a humanitarian crisis. “People did not die from poor sanitation, hunger or disease. They died from bombs and shells,” UN OCHA said in a report a month after the war.
Many Lebanese were able to flee to neighboring Syria, where an uprising in 2011 plunged the country into a civil war. It's unclear how easy crossing the border would be this time, both for civilians and aid groups.
It is also unclear whether the Beirut port, still not fully rebuilt after the devastating blast in 2020, would have sufficient capacity in case of a wider war. Its damaged grain silos collapsed in 2022, and the country relies on minimal food storage due to the financial crisis.
“Lebanon apparently has stocks of food and fuel for two-three months, but what happens beyond this duration?” Al Amine said. “We only have one airport and we can’t transport things through our land borders. It would be difficult to bring items into the country.”
An empowered Hezbollah In 2006, Hezbollah reportedly had some 15,000 rockets in its arsenal, “but more recent unofficial estimates suggest this number has multiplied by almost 10 times,” said Dina Arakji, associate analyst at UK-based risk consultancy firm Control Risks.
The group has also “acquired more advanced weaponry, including precision missiles and variants of Iranian arms, as well as Chinese and Russian weaponry,” she said.
Hezbollah, which relies on a network of Iran-backed allied groups that could enter the conflict, has also substantially expanded its drone arsenal and capabilities, against which Israeli air defenses are less effective.
Lebanese officials and international diplomats hope that an elusive cease-fire agreement in Gaza will bring calm in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has said it will halt its attacks along the border if there is a cease-fire in Gaza.



Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison

Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
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Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison

Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)

No history of the Arab world in the past seven decades could be written without stopping at length at the Palestinian Fatah movement. The history of the movement itself cannot be written without stopping at one of its founders, Farouk al-Qaddoumi (Abu al-Lutf), who passed away on Thursday at the age of 94.

Qaddoumi was one of the original founders of the movement in 1965, alongside Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and Khalil al-Wazir. He had moved away from the spotlight in the past 30 years over his opposition to the Oslo Accord and concern that Israel would use it against the Palestinian leadership and its people.

Before that, Qaddoumi was a prominent Palestinian figure who championed the cause as foreign minister of the Palestine Liberation Organization at international meetings. He was clear and firm in his speeches before the United Nations, Arab and Islamic summits and others.

A member of the Baath party, I asked him one day of his thoughts about Arafat (Abu Ammar) and his sole leadership of the Palestinians. He replied: “Abu Ammar is the leader of the Fatah tribe. According to our norms, the tribe leader enjoys privileges that others don't.” Whatever reservations he had about Arafat never led him to question his position as the top Palestinian leader.

I met Qaddoumi in Tunis in 1998 and will share some moments of that meeting in Asharq Al-Awsat in wake of his passing:

Early years

*How was the Fatah movement born?

Acts of resistance emerged after the occupation of Gaza in 1956. The Arab world was also being swept up in revolts from Algeria to Iraq and others. This left an impact on us. In fact, the success of the revolution in Algeria helped spur freedom fighter, “fidai”, work in our region.

Palestine’s Grand Mufti Amin al-Husseini had, during his stay in Egypt and then Lebanon, advocated for Palestinian resistance and struggle. The Higher Arab Commission existed at the time, paving the way eventually for the fidai movement. The armed struggle was also prompted by the lack of political achievements at the time.

With the dour political mood, Algeria’s independence was a beacon of hope that inspired the formation of fidai movements, and so Fatah began to take shape in Kuwait and later Qatar in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The formation of Fatah would pave the way for the formation of the PLO in 1964.

*When did you meet Arafat for the first time?

I was in Cairo in 1954. Along with Arafat, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), and I were members of the General Union of Palestine Students. Arafat was its president. I was a student at the American university, Arafat was a student at Cairo University and Abu Iyad went to al-Azhar University.

I was a member of the Baath part, Abu Iyad of the enlightened Muslim Brotherhood and Arafat was religious but independent. We spent three years in Cairo. Arafat graduated and then headed to Kuwait where he worked as an engineer. He was followed by Abu Iyad and I worked in the health ministry. I took up positions in Libya, then Saudi Arabia and later Kuwait in 1960.

We didn’t hold meetings together. Rather, we limited our talks to bilateral contacts to maintain secrecy. I used to get in touch with Arafat, and he with Abu Iyad. Adel Abdel Karim used to coordinate our meetings. Among the Fatah founders were Abu al-Adeeb and Khaled al-Hassan.

The central committee was formed later and it began to meet as a group in 1965. For years, we made contacts with brothers throughout the region, especially Arab and Palestinian national figures, including figures in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

Farouk al-Qaddoumi at an Organization of Islamic Cooperation conference in Malaysia in 2003. (Getty Images)

*How was the official launch of Fatah decided in 1965?

We debated whether to announce the formation of Fatah before the establishment of the PLO in 1964 or after. In the end, we decided to reinforce resistance movements and to garner Arab support for the Palestinian national identity embodied in the PLO. This facilitated the way for armed struggle and fidai operations.

The national congress was held in Jerusalem in 1964. It brought together Arafat, Khaled al-Hassan and others. It was followed by a resistance operation that called for striking water pipelines in northern Palestine. The fighters came in from the Syrian border. The operation resulted in our first prisoner Mahmoud Hijazi and first martyr Ahmed Moussa.

We later formed a “revolutionary council”, regional committees and a central committee.

*What was Arafat’s position during that time?

He was first appointed deputy to the general commander, Abu Youssef al-Najjar. He rose to general commander in 1966 and named official spokesman. I chaired the inaugural meeting of the central committee and was named its secretary.

*Where there any disputes between members during the early days of the central committee?

Fatah embodied work, ideology and organization. Meaning we enrich our thought and organization, and improve our work through operations and experiences on the ground. We used to say that carrying arms was the foundation of our work and that the purpose of carrying arms was not financial or material, but rather, it had national, moral and noble goals.

We were initially accused to roping in Egypt and Gamal Abdul Nasser in our operations. We were also accused of poorly timing our operations. We were accused of being an Arab nationalist movement. Soon, however, our armed struggle began to bear fruit and raise the morale of the people.

The Karameh battle of 1968 gave Fatah an accomplishment. With the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967, the people yearned for the formation of a revolutionary movement. People turned to Fatah and we built foundations along the River Jordan. Eventually our work became more organized and we reached out to various Palestinian groups to unite under a single banner and so, the PLO was formed with Arafat at the helm.

*How were relations with Abdel Nasser?

We always sought to establish ties with him. We tried to meet him once in late 1965 or early 1966. I was accompanied by Arafat and Mahmoud Sawda. We couldn’t manage an audience with him and instead were met with the head of intelligence. At the time, the Palestinian revolution had not yet rose to prominence and swept headlines. It was not the focus of attention in Egypt or by its president.

That changed after the 1967 defeat of Arab armies. We met with Mohammed Hassanein Haykal, who facilitated a meeting with Abdel Nasser.

Abdel Nasser loved Arafat and saw in him the spirit of Arab youths who had hope in the future. In 1969, Abdel Nasser invited Arafat to join him on a trip to the Soviet Union and so, relations between Moscow and the PLO were forged.

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. (Getty Images)

Ties with Syria

*When did you meet Syrian President Hafez al-Assad?

We’ve known each other since the 1960s when he was defense minister. In 1966, two Fatah officers were killed during an argument in Syria. Soon after, Syrian authorities imprisoned the Fatah leadership of Arafat, Mamdouh Saidam, Walid Ahmad Nimr, al-Wazir and others. Eleven leading members were sent to jail.

Along with a colleague, I traveled to Syria to tackle the situation. We contacted Salah Jadid, Hafez al-Assad and Ahmed Sweidan. The meeting with Assad was good. The truth was that Arafat and his comrades were suspected of being members of the Muslim Brotherhood. They were surprised to learn that I was part of the Palestinian revolution and knew that I was not a member of the Brotherhood, but of the Baath party.

Arafat was jailed for some 51 days in Mezzeh prison where he came under investigation. We sought out Assad, who was defense minister. We told him that we had heard rumors that the Syrian leadership wanted to execute the detainees. “Who told you this?” he asked. We told him that they were rumors we heard in Damascus. He replied: “Please, come and receive them.” And so, we secured the release of Arafat and the others.

Later, Arafat took part in an operation from Lebanese territories and was arrested by the Lebanese army. It also arrested the Palestinian group that carried out the operation. Through Syrian mediation, we succeeded in securing Arafat’s release.

*The Syrian and Palestinian leaderships had thorny relations. What was the toughest moment that you experienced with it?

The 1976 period when the Syrian army was deployed to Lebanon was the most difficult. The “national movement” in Lebanon was opposed to the deployment. We believed that the deployment would lead to a clash with the Palestinian revolution.

*Some Palestinians accused Syria of trying to seize Palestinian decision-making.

It wasn’t about seizing this power. The Palestinian cause was the top issue for Syria and the focus of its concern, otherwise it would never have offered us what it did. Assad and Syrian officials had repeatedly said that the Palestinians control Syrian decision-making, not the other way around.

Our relations with Assad were strong and coordination was always ongoing. Assad long underscored the strategic alliance between Syria and the Palestinian revolution. He is a member of the Baath and perhaps this background allows me to understand him since we are both members of the party. At the time, more than 60 percent of Syria’s budget went to supporting the Palestinian cause.

*Did Assad have reservations about the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon?

Not until the clash happened with the Syrian army. That prompted the question: Why did the Palestinian resistance oppose the deployment of the Syrian military? Assad is a calm, patient and persevering person. He listens to everyone and can discuss several issues at length. He has the patience that is lacking in several leaders and heads of state.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein receives Farouk al-Qaddoumi in Baghdad in 2002. (Getty Images)

Ties with Iraq

*What about your relations with Saddam Hussein?

We met Saddam in Cairo and used to travel to Baghdad, which had opened its doors to us after the Karameh battle. We even opened offices in Baghdad. Sabri al-Banna's (Abu Nidal) defection from Fatah though, created tensions between Iraq and the PLO.

*It was believed that the Iraqi leadership was influencing Banna.

Yes, we also sensed that. But Iraq acted out of a clear political vision. Iraq never hides its stances.

*What about Saddam?

He tried to understand who he was speaking with him. He was calm and focused on the person talking to him. He was never severe in dealing with us. Our requests were quickly met. He was generous with us and even more so after he became president. Iraq gave us so much. Iraq offered the PLO greater support after it was forced out of Beirut. The tensions between the PLO and Syria also helped bring us closer to Baghdad.

*Was Iraq a main backer of the PLO?

The truth is Saudi Arabia was. It provided us with so much. We must be fair in saying that Gulf countries helped the Palestinian people a lot.