Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.



Its Economy and Infrastructure Battered, Can Lebanon Afford a War With Israel?


Passengers wait for their flights at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, following the exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 25 August 2024. EPA/ABBAS SALMAN
Passengers wait for their flights at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, following the exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 25 August 2024. EPA/ABBAS SALMAN
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Its Economy and Infrastructure Battered, Can Lebanon Afford a War With Israel?


Passengers wait for their flights at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, following the exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 25 August 2024. EPA/ABBAS SALMAN
Passengers wait for their flights at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport, following the exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, 25 August 2024. EPA/ABBAS SALMAN

The ferocious exchange of fire by Hezbollah and the Israeli military is raising fears of a regional war beyond the tense border.
The risks for Lebanon are far greater than in 2006, when a monthlong war with Israel ended in a draw. Lebanon has struggled with years of political and economic crises that left it indebted, without a stable electricity supply, a proper banking system and with rampant poverty, The Associated Press reported.
And with Hezbollah’s military power significantly greater, there are concerns that a new war would be far more destructive and prolonged.
Can Lebanon afford any of it?
Planning for a 2006 war repeat — or worse Since Hezbollah and Israel began firing rockets and drones at each other a day after the start of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza on Oct. 7, the conflict has been mostly limited to border towns. But with the threat of a wider war, Lebanon has scrambled to equip hospitals with supplies and prepare public schools to open up to people seeking shelter.
A rare Israeli airstrike in southern Beirut last month that killed a top Hezbollah commander set off a flurry of meetings between humanitarian organizations and the Lebanese government, said Laila Al Amine, who heads the Beirut office of international relief organization Mercy Corps. It's one of some 60 organizations helping the government with its relief efforts.
The government and UN agencies prepared a comprehensive response plan this month outlining two possible scenarios: a limited escalation that would resemble the 2006 war, with an estimated 250,000 people displaced, and a worst-case scenario of “uncontrolled conflict” that would displaced at least 1 million people.
The UN-drafted plan, a copy of which was obtained by The Associated Press, projects a monthly cost of $50 million in case of a limited escalation and $100 million if an all-out war breaks out.
The Lebanese government said that funding for the emergency will come from creditors and humanitarian aid organizations. But the authorities have struggled to find money to care for 100,000 currently displaced and an estimated 60,000 people living in conflict areas, which is costing about $24 million a month.
Environment Minister Nasser Yassin, who is spearheading relief operations, told reporters after an emergency government meeting Sunday that the morning attacks won't change the plan.
“It already presents scenarios of all the possibilities that could happen, among them is an expansion of the hostilities,” said Yassin.
Indebted and cash-strapped Lebanon desperate for aid money decades of corruption and political paralysis have left Lebanon’s banks barely functional, while electricity services are almost entirely in the hands of private diesel-run generator owners and fuel suppliers. Public service institutions rely on aid groups and international donors to function at a barebones level. Lebanese who once lived in relative comfort are receiving food and financial aid to survive.
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic further battered the economy, and the Beirut port explosion flattened several neighborhoods in the heart of the capital. Lebanon’s banks and the ruling elite have resisted painful reforms as a condition for an International Monetary Fund bailout while the infrastructure continued to wither and living conditions worsened.
Tourism, which officials had relied on to help rebuild the economy, has also taken a hit since the border conflict with Israel.
And unlike in 2006, Lebanon is hosting more than 1 million Syrian refugees who fled the conflict in their country. Health Minister Firas Abiad told the AP earlier this month that the Lebanese health system is ill-equipped to treat the additional population in the event of an all-out war, as international funding for Syrian refugees continues to decline.
In April, Yassin said the country had only half the money needed to respond to the conflict and ensuing humanitarian needs.
Lebanon faces tougher logistics In 2006, Israel bombed the runways of Lebanon’s only airport, putting it largely out of commission, and imposed an air and sea blockade. Its bombardment crippled critical infrastructure and flattened neighborhoods, with damage and losses worth $3.1 billion, according to the World Bank.
But aid groups eventually were able to send supplies through the country’s ports and at times through the airport using the remaining limited runway space. In their assessment of the war, the UN said that their relief efforts was not in response to a humanitarian crisis. “People did not die from poor sanitation, hunger or disease. They died from bombs and shells,” UN OCHA said in a report a month after the war.
Many Lebanese were able to flee to neighboring Syria, where an uprising in 2011 plunged the country into a civil war. It's unclear how easy crossing the border would be this time, both for civilians and aid groups.
It is also unclear whether the Beirut port, still not fully rebuilt after the devastating blast in 2020, would have sufficient capacity in case of a wider war. Its damaged grain silos collapsed in 2022, and the country relies on minimal food storage due to the financial crisis.
“Lebanon apparently has stocks of food and fuel for two-three months, but what happens beyond this duration?” Al Amine said. “We only have one airport and we can’t transport things through our land borders. It would be difficult to bring items into the country.”
An empowered Hezbollah In 2006, Hezbollah reportedly had some 15,000 rockets in its arsenal, “but more recent unofficial estimates suggest this number has multiplied by almost 10 times,” said Dina Arakji, associate analyst at UK-based risk consultancy firm Control Risks.
The group has also “acquired more advanced weaponry, including precision missiles and variants of Iranian arms, as well as Chinese and Russian weaponry,” she said.
Hezbollah, which relies on a network of Iran-backed allied groups that could enter the conflict, has also substantially expanded its drone arsenal and capabilities, against which Israeli air defenses are less effective.
Lebanese officials and international diplomats hope that an elusive cease-fire agreement in Gaza will bring calm in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has said it will halt its attacks along the border if there is a cease-fire in Gaza.