Tomato Diplomacy Breaks Ankara-Tel Aviv Boycott with Palestinian Mediation

A vegetable seller arranges boxes of tomatoes at a market in Tel Aviv (Getty Images)
A vegetable seller arranges boxes of tomatoes at a market in Tel Aviv (Getty Images)
TT
20

Tomato Diplomacy Breaks Ankara-Tel Aviv Boycott with Palestinian Mediation

A vegetable seller arranges boxes of tomatoes at a market in Tel Aviv (Getty Images)
A vegetable seller arranges boxes of tomatoes at a market in Tel Aviv (Getty Images)

At the start of the war in Gaza, Israelis were angered by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He not only compared Israel’s military action to Nazi crimes but also called for an economic boycott of Israel.

In response, Israeli Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz announced a counter-boycott, and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich imposed a 100% tariff on imports from Türkiye.

Direct flights between the two countries, which had reached 40 a day during peak tourist season, were also canceled.

The trade target set by both countries to increase commerce from $9 billion in 2022 to $10 billion in 2023 fell short, dropping to $7.5 billion. Of this, $5.3 billion was Turkish imports, with the remainder being Israeli exports.

Türkiye supplied Israel with key materials, including 22% of its construction goods and 9% of its agricultural products. This left Israel’s construction sector facing a major crisis, and the agricultural sector under pressure, as Israel also relied on produce from Gaza.

The effects were felt quickly, with fruit and vegetable prices soaring, pushing inflation higher. This added to the broader economic losses Israel faced due to the war.

On his part, Smotrich confirmed that the war would cost Israel up to 250 billion shekels (around $67 billion) by 2025, echoing earlier warnings from Bank of Israel Governor Amir Yaron.

The Israeli finance minister also warned against unchecked military spending, confirming that Tel Aviv was fighting the longest and most expensive war in Israel’s history, with direct costs of 200 to 250 billion shekels (the dollar is currently 3.7 shekels).

Before the war, Israel imported about 1,200 tons of tomatoes per week from Türkiye, accounting for 30% of its consumption. When these imports stopped, a crisis emerged, as Israel’s domestic tomato production—centered in western Negev near Gaza—was disrupted by the conflict.

Israel initially imported 500 tons of tomatoes from Jordan, but it wasn’t enough to meet demand, and no other alternatives were available. As fruit and vegetable prices soared, frustrating the public, a solution quietly came from Türkiye.

After long government discussions, accusations against Erdogan were dropped, and Israel decided not to enforce a boycott. The reason became clear: tomatoes. Behind the scenes, Israel received nearly 700 tons of Turkish tomatoes in just one week, along with other goods, helping ease the crisis.

In short, both Israel and Türkiye agreed on a way to bypass the boycott. Traders in both countries, with government approval, handled the process. To avoid breaking laws or defying top officials, the goods are labeled as bound for Palestine and registered under Palestinian traders from the West Bank, who earn a hefty commission.

Typically, goods for the Palestinian Authority pass through Israeli ports. After clearing customs, Palestinian agents receive the goods and hand them over to Israeli traders. As the system became routine, Palestinian traders no longer needed to show up, and Israeli agents took over, sending the commission directly to the Palestinians.

This week, it was revealed that an August 26 order from the Ministry of Agriculture allowed Turkish tomatoes to be imported despite the ban, using a third country as a cover, as long as the route was clearly documented.

The question is: Is Türkiye’s approach unique, or are other countries also announcing boycotts but finding ways to keep ties with Israel?

Dr. Moshe Ben-David, a 72-year-old historian and former Israeli intelligence officer, argues that boycotts are ineffective today.

Ben-David, a close ally of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, believes Israel’s war costs are heavy but manageable.

Speaking in Tel Aviv, he noted that estimates from the Bank of Israel and the Finance Ministry put the total cost of the war between 2023 and 2025 at 250 billion shekels. This includes direct costs like aircraft, ammunition, fuel, food, reservist pay, and evacuations, as well as indirect costs such as tourism losses and compensation for damaged properties.

Despite this, Israel has $200 billion in reserves, and Ben-David pointed out that stockpiles of essential goods have recovered since the war began.

Israel’s GDP, now around $400 billion, is almost back to pre-war levels. Daily credit card spending, which makes up 50% of GDP, has risen by 25%, showing strong consumer confidence.

The annual yield on government bonds has also increased to 5%, slightly higher than during the COVID-19 peak, but has since stabilized.



How Much Damage Have Israeli Strikes Caused to Iran’s Nuclear Program?

A satellite image shows new vehicle tracks and dirt piles over underground centrifuge facility at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran after airstrike in Iran in this handout image dated June 15, 2025. (Maxar Technologies/Handout via Reuters)
A satellite image shows new vehicle tracks and dirt piles over underground centrifuge facility at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran after airstrike in Iran in this handout image dated June 15, 2025. (Maxar Technologies/Handout via Reuters)
TT
20

How Much Damage Have Israeli Strikes Caused to Iran’s Nuclear Program?

A satellite image shows new vehicle tracks and dirt piles over underground centrifuge facility at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran after airstrike in Iran in this handout image dated June 15, 2025. (Maxar Technologies/Handout via Reuters)
A satellite image shows new vehicle tracks and dirt piles over underground centrifuge facility at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran after airstrike in Iran in this handout image dated June 15, 2025. (Maxar Technologies/Handout via Reuters)

Israel has carried out wide-ranging military strikes on Iran, hitting sites including some of its most important nuclear facilities.

Below is a summary of what is known about the damage inflicted on Iran's nuclear program, incorporating data from the last quarterly report by the UN nuclear watchdog on May 31.

OVERVIEW

Iran is enriching uranium to up to 60% purity. This could easily be refined further to the roughly 90% which is weapons grade.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, which inspects Iran's nuclear sites including its enrichment plants, says that is of "serious concern" because no other country has enriched to that level without producing nuclear weapons. Western powers say there is no civil justification for enrichment to that level.

Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons. It points to its right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including enrichment, as a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Israel, which is not a party to the NPT, is the only country in the Middle East widely believed to have nuclear weapons. Israel does not deny or confirm that.

HEART OF THE PROGRAM: URANIUM ENRICHMENT

Iran had three operating uranium enrichment plants when Israel began its attacks:

* The Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz (power supply hit)

A vast underground facility designed to house 50,0000 centrifuges, the machines that enrich uranium.

There has long been speculation among military experts about whether Israeli airstrikes could destroy the facility given that it is several floors underground.

There are about 17,000 centrifuges installed there, of which around 13,500 were operating at last count, enriching uranium to up to 5%.

Electricity infrastructure at Natanz was destroyed, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi told the UN Security Council on Friday, specifically an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, emergency power supply and back-up generators.

While there was no indication of a physical attack on the underground hall containing the FEP, "the loss of power ... may have damaged the centrifuges there", he said.

Grossi has cited unspecified "information available to the IAEA". While Iran has provided the agency with some information, the IAEA generally makes extensive use of satellite imagery.

* The Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz (destroyed)

The smallest and, being above-ground, the softest target of the three enrichment plants. Long a research and development center, it used fewer centrifuges than the other plants, often connected in smaller clusters of machines known as cascades.

It did, however, have two interconnected, full-size cascades of up to 164 advanced centrifuges each, enriching uranium to up to 60%. Apart from that, there were only up to 201 centrifuges operating at the PFEP enriching to up to 2%.

Most of the research and development work attributed to the PFEP had recently been moved underground to the FEP, where more than 1,000 of its advanced centrifuges were enriching to up to 5%.

The PFEP was destroyed in the Israeli attack, Grossi said.

* The Fordo Fuel Enrichment Plant (no visible damage)

Iran's most deeply buried enrichment site, dug into a mountain, suffered no visible damage, Grossi reiterated on Monday.

While it has only about 2,000 centrifuges in operation, it produces the vast majority of Iran's uranium enriched to up to 60%, using roughly the same number of centrifuges as the PFEP did, because it feeds uranium enriched to up to 20% into those cascades compared to 5% at the PFEP.

Fordo therefore produced 166.6 kg of uranium enriched to up to 60% in the most recent quarter. According to an IAEA yardstick, that is enough in principle, if enriched further, for just under four nuclear weapons, compared to the PFEP's 19.2 kg, less than half a bomb's worth.

OTHER FACILITIES

Israeli strikes damaged four buildings at the nuclear complex at Isfahan, the IAEA has said, including the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) and facilities where work on uranium metal was conducted.

While it has other uses, mastering uranium metal technology is an important step in making the core of a nuclear weapon. If Iran were to try to make a nuclear weapon, it would need to take weapons-grade uranium and turn it into uranium metal.

Uranium conversion is the process by which "yellowcake" uranium is turned into uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for centrifuges, so that it can be enriched. If the UCF is out of use, Iran will eventually run out of uranium to enrich unless it finds an outside source of uranium hexafluoride.

SCIENTISTS

At least 14 Iranian nuclear scientists have been killed in Israeli attacks since Friday, including in car bombs, two sources said on Sunday.

Israel's armed forces named nine of them on Saturday, saying they "played a central part of the progress toward nuclear weapons" and that "their elimination represents a significant blow to the Iranian regime's ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction". That assertion could not immediately be verified.

Western powers have often said Iran's nuclear advances provide it with an "irreversible knowledge gain", suggesting that while losing experts or facilities may slow progress, the advances are permanent.

URANIUM STOCKPILE

Iran has a large stock of uranium enriched to different levels.

As of May 17, Iran was estimated to have enough uranium enriched to up to 60% for it to make nine nuclear weapons, according to an IAEA yardstick.

At lower enrichment levels it has enough for more bombs, though it would take more effort: enough enriched to up to 20% for two more, and enough enriched to up to 5% for 11 more.

Much of Iran's most highly enriched uranium stockpile is stored at Isfahan under IAEA seal, officials have said. The IAEA does not report where it is stored, nor has it said whether it was affected by the strikes.

OPEN QUESTIONS

* How will Iran respond?

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi told state TV on Saturday Iran would take measures to protect nuclear materials and equipment that would not be notified to the IAEA and it would no longer cooperate with the IAEA as before.

Lawmakers are also preparing a bill that could prompt Iran to pull out of the NPT, following in the footsteps of North Korea, which announced its withdrawal in 2003 and went on to test nuclear weapons.

The IAEA does not know how many centrifuges Iran has outside its enrichment plants. Any further reduction in cooperation with the IAEA could increase speculation that it will or has set up a secret enrichment plant using some of that supply.

Existing centrifuge cascades can also be reconfigured to enrich to a different purity level within a week, officials have said.

* What is the status of the uranium stock?

If Iran can no longer convert, its existing stock of uranium hexafluoride and enriched uranium becomes even more important.

* How bad is the damage?

The IAEA has not yet been able to carry out inspections to assess the damage there in detail.

* Will there be more attacks?

Soon after the attacks started on Friday, US President Donald Trump urged Iran to make a deal with the United States to impose fresh restrictions on its nuclear program "before there is nothing left". Talks scheduled for June 15 were called off.