Tomato Diplomacy Breaks Ankara-Tel Aviv Boycott with Palestinian Mediation

A vegetable seller arranges boxes of tomatoes at a market in Tel Aviv (Getty Images)
A vegetable seller arranges boxes of tomatoes at a market in Tel Aviv (Getty Images)
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Tomato Diplomacy Breaks Ankara-Tel Aviv Boycott with Palestinian Mediation

A vegetable seller arranges boxes of tomatoes at a market in Tel Aviv (Getty Images)
A vegetable seller arranges boxes of tomatoes at a market in Tel Aviv (Getty Images)

At the start of the war in Gaza, Israelis were angered by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He not only compared Israel’s military action to Nazi crimes but also called for an economic boycott of Israel.

In response, Israeli Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz announced a counter-boycott, and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich imposed a 100% tariff on imports from Türkiye.

Direct flights between the two countries, which had reached 40 a day during peak tourist season, were also canceled.

The trade target set by both countries to increase commerce from $9 billion in 2022 to $10 billion in 2023 fell short, dropping to $7.5 billion. Of this, $5.3 billion was Turkish imports, with the remainder being Israeli exports.

Türkiye supplied Israel with key materials, including 22% of its construction goods and 9% of its agricultural products. This left Israel’s construction sector facing a major crisis, and the agricultural sector under pressure, as Israel also relied on produce from Gaza.

The effects were felt quickly, with fruit and vegetable prices soaring, pushing inflation higher. This added to the broader economic losses Israel faced due to the war.

On his part, Smotrich confirmed that the war would cost Israel up to 250 billion shekels (around $67 billion) by 2025, echoing earlier warnings from Bank of Israel Governor Amir Yaron.

The Israeli finance minister also warned against unchecked military spending, confirming that Tel Aviv was fighting the longest and most expensive war in Israel’s history, with direct costs of 200 to 250 billion shekels (the dollar is currently 3.7 shekels).

Before the war, Israel imported about 1,200 tons of tomatoes per week from Türkiye, accounting for 30% of its consumption. When these imports stopped, a crisis emerged, as Israel’s domestic tomato production—centered in western Negev near Gaza—was disrupted by the conflict.

Israel initially imported 500 tons of tomatoes from Jordan, but it wasn’t enough to meet demand, and no other alternatives were available. As fruit and vegetable prices soared, frustrating the public, a solution quietly came from Türkiye.

After long government discussions, accusations against Erdogan were dropped, and Israel decided not to enforce a boycott. The reason became clear: tomatoes. Behind the scenes, Israel received nearly 700 tons of Turkish tomatoes in just one week, along with other goods, helping ease the crisis.

In short, both Israel and Türkiye agreed on a way to bypass the boycott. Traders in both countries, with government approval, handled the process. To avoid breaking laws or defying top officials, the goods are labeled as bound for Palestine and registered under Palestinian traders from the West Bank, who earn a hefty commission.

Typically, goods for the Palestinian Authority pass through Israeli ports. After clearing customs, Palestinian agents receive the goods and hand them over to Israeli traders. As the system became routine, Palestinian traders no longer needed to show up, and Israeli agents took over, sending the commission directly to the Palestinians.

This week, it was revealed that an August 26 order from the Ministry of Agriculture allowed Turkish tomatoes to be imported despite the ban, using a third country as a cover, as long as the route was clearly documented.

The question is: Is Türkiye’s approach unique, or are other countries also announcing boycotts but finding ways to keep ties with Israel?

Dr. Moshe Ben-David, a 72-year-old historian and former Israeli intelligence officer, argues that boycotts are ineffective today.

Ben-David, a close ally of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, believes Israel’s war costs are heavy but manageable.

Speaking in Tel Aviv, he noted that estimates from the Bank of Israel and the Finance Ministry put the total cost of the war between 2023 and 2025 at 250 billion shekels. This includes direct costs like aircraft, ammunition, fuel, food, reservist pay, and evacuations, as well as indirect costs such as tourism losses and compensation for damaged properties.

Despite this, Israel has $200 billion in reserves, and Ben-David pointed out that stockpiles of essential goods have recovered since the war began.

Israel’s GDP, now around $400 billion, is almost back to pre-war levels. Daily credit card spending, which makes up 50% of GDP, has risen by 25%, showing strong consumer confidence.

The annual yield on government bonds has also increased to 5%, slightly higher than during the COVID-19 peak, but has since stabilized.



What Has Assad’s Fall Revealed about the Captagon Drug Trade in Syria?

 A Syrian member of the opposition shows amphetamine pills known as Captagon hidden inside an electrical component at a warehouse where the drug was manufactured before the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government at a facility in Douma city, outskirts of Damascus, Syria, Friday, Dec. 13, 2024. (AP)
A Syrian member of the opposition shows amphetamine pills known as Captagon hidden inside an electrical component at a warehouse where the drug was manufactured before the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government at a facility in Douma city, outskirts of Damascus, Syria, Friday, Dec. 13, 2024. (AP)
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What Has Assad’s Fall Revealed about the Captagon Drug Trade in Syria?

 A Syrian member of the opposition shows amphetamine pills known as Captagon hidden inside an electrical component at a warehouse where the drug was manufactured before the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government at a facility in Douma city, outskirts of Damascus, Syria, Friday, Dec. 13, 2024. (AP)
A Syrian member of the opposition shows amphetamine pills known as Captagon hidden inside an electrical component at a warehouse where the drug was manufactured before the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government at a facility in Douma city, outskirts of Damascus, Syria, Friday, Dec. 13, 2024. (AP)

Since the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, industrial-scale manufacturing facilities of Captagon have been uncovered around the country, which experts say helped flourish a $10 billion annual global trade in the highly addictive drug.

Among the locations used for manufacturing the drug were the Mazzeh air base in Damascus, a car-trading company in Latakia and a former potato chips factory on the outskirts of Damascus.

The factory that once produced the crunchy snack in the suburb of Douma under the name, Captain Corn, was seized by government forces in 2018.

"Assad’s collaborators controlled this place. After the regime fell... I came here and found it on fire," Firas al-Toot, the original owner of the factory, told The Associated Press. "They came at night and lit the drugs on fire but couldn’t burn everything."

"From here, Captagon pills emerged to kill our people," said Abu Zihab, an activist with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the main group now ruling the country, as his group gave access to journalists to the site.

Syria's nearly 14-year-old civil war fragmented the country, crumbled the economy and created fertile ground for the production of the drug. Militias, warlords and the Assad government transformed Captagon from a small-scale operation run by small criminal groups into a billion-dollar industrial revenue stream.

The recent ousting of Assad has disrupted these networks and has given a closer look at its operations — revealing the workings of a war economy that sustained Assad’s power over Syria. Experts say the change in Syria might create an opportunity to dismantle the Captagon industry.

How did Syria build its Captagon empire?

Captagon was first developed in Germany in the 1960s as a prescription stimulant for conditions like narcolepsy. It was later outlawed due to heart issues and its addictive properties.

Its amphetamine-like effects made it popular in the Middle East among both elites and fighters, as it enhanced focus and reduced fatigue.

Assad's government recognized an opportunity in the cheaply manufactured drug amid Syria’s economic turmoil and the heavy sanctions imposed on it.

Captagon is produced through a simple chemical process that involves mixing amphetamine derivatives with excipients to form tablets, typically in makeshift labs.

The Captagon trade began industrializing around 2018-2019 as the Assad regime — and other armed groups in Syria -- invested in production facilities, warehouses and trafficking networks. This allowed Syria to emerge as the largest producer of Captagon globally, with some production also occurring in Lebanon.

Most seized consignments of Captagon originated from Syria, according to data by the New Lines Captagon Trade Project, an initiative of the New Lines Institute think tank.

Evidence of the Assad regime’s sponsorship of the Captagon industry is overwhelming, the report published in May said. The Security Office of the 4th Armored Division of the Syrian Arab Army, headed by Bashar al-Assad’s brother Maher oversaw operations and created a coordinated production system, the report added.

Where and how was Captagon smuggled?

Captagon was smuggled across the border using various methods, hiding Captagon in trucks, cargo shipments and goods. Some shipments are concealed in food, electronics and construction materials to evade detection.

The primary smuggling routes were Syria’s porous borders with Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, from which the drug is distributed throughout the region. Some were also shipped from Latakia port.

In Lebanon, the Captagon trade has flourished, particularly near the Syrian border and in the Bekaa Valley. Lebanese authorities struggled to curb the flow of Captagon from Syria, which analysts say was facilitated by the Hezbollah group, a key Assad ally.

Following the discovery of crates of fruit meticulously packed with bundles of the drug hidden among pomegranates and oranges, Saudi Arabia and the UAE implemented bans on Lebanese agricultural products.

Captagon has also found its way into international markets, reaching as far as Southeast Asia and parts of Europe.

How much revenue did it produce for the Assad regime?

The annual global trade in Captagon has an estimated value of $10 billion, with the ousted Assad family's annual profit reaching around $2.4 billion, according to Caroline Rose, director of the New York-based New Lines Institute Captagon Trade Project.

"Seeing the uncovering of so many industrial-scale facilities affiliated with the regime was shocking but not surprising. There was extensive evidence linking key regime-aligned cronies and Assad family members to the trade," said Rose, whose organization tracks all publicly recorded Captagon seizures and lab raids. The discovery of the facilities, she said, confirmed "the concrete relationship between Captagon and the former regime."

The exact number of factories in Syria remains unclear, but experts and HTS members estimate that there are likely hundreds spread throughout the country.

The future of Captagon in post-Assad Syria

Assad has turned Syria into "the largest Captagon factory in the world," HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa stated in a victory speech at Damascus’s Umayyad Mosque on Dec. 8. "Today, Syria is being cleansed, thanks to the grace of Almighty God."

While Assad and his circle may have been the primary beneficiaries, there is also evidence that Syrian opposition groups were involved in drug smuggling, opposition groups, local militias and organized crime networks manufactured and smuggled the drug to finance their operations, analysts say.

"Likely, we will see a short-term supply reduction in the trade, with a decline in the size and frequency of seizures as industrial-scale production is largely halted. However, criminal actors are innovative, likely seeking out new locations to engage in production and smuggling, particularly as demand levels remain stable," Rose said.

They may also "seek out alternative illicit trades to engage in instead," she said.

In addition to dismantling the Captagon trade, the country's transitional government should "establish programs for economic development that will incentivize Syrians to participate in the country’s formal, licit economic sphere," Rose said.