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Eight Key Iranian Developments Following ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
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Eight Key Iranian Developments Following ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website

As the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation by Hamas and the Gaza war began, Iran was already dealing with the fallout from protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, making the autumn of 2022 one of the bloodiest in the country’s recent history.

The war in Gaza erupted at a crucial time for Iran’s leadership, which was facing international pressure over its crackdown on protests, its drone supply to Russia, and stalled nuclear talks.

From the start, Tehran described Hamas’ attack as a “natural and spontaneous reaction” to what it called Israel's “provocative war policies” and actions by the far-right Israeli Prime Minister.

Iranian officials denied any role in planning the operation, but their diplomatic moves suggested they were prepared for the conflict’s impact on the region.

Less than a week after the attack, Iran’s late Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, began a regional tour, meeting with leaders of countries and groups allied with Iran, including in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar.

His aim was to coordinate efforts and send regional messages.

Iran also warned Israel that it could face multiple fronts if its military actions in Gaza didn’t stop.

Tehran has since worked to strengthen the image of armed groups in the region, pushing to legitimize its support for these factions amid the ongoing political and regional unrest.

This marked a key moment for Iran, as Tehran claimed it had elevated the “Resistance Axis” groups from a regional to a “global” level, referring to this shift as a move from the “World of Resistance” to the “Global Resistance.”

In doing so, Iran, which had been trying to ease tensions with its neighbors, adopted a more aggressive stance towards groups linked to it. Many saw this as part of Iran’s broader strategy to expand its influence across the region.

Officially, Iran told the international community that these groups act independently, make their own decisions, and produce their own weapons.

However, several Iranian officials have acknowledged the role of Gen. Qassem Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guards in supplying weapons and technology to these groups.

Iran’s second significant move after the Al-Aqsa Flood came a month into the Gaza war when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for cutting off Israel’s “economic lifelines,” especially oil and energy routes.

Iranian-backed groups, especially the Houthis, began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea, disrupting shipping for months.

At the same time, Iran-aligned militias in Iraq launched drone attacks on Israel and US bases in the region.

The US responded after one of its bases in Syria was attacked, striking positions held by these militias.

Politically, Iran insisted that its allied groups’ demands be met for any Gaza ceasefire, and it opposed international peace proposals, especially the “two-state solution.”

In December, Iran’s foreign minister even noted that both Iran and Israel rejected the two-state plan.

In the third phase, Israel ramped up airstrikes against Iranian forces in Syria. In December, an Israeli strike killed Razi Mousavi, a key Iranian logistics officer.

A month later, the Revolutionary Guards confirmed the death of their intelligence chief in Syria. The biggest blow came in April, when an Israeli airstrike on a meeting at the Iranian consulate killed Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahdi, Iran’s top military commander in Syria and Lebanon.

In its fourth major escalation, Iran nearly went to war with Israel after responding to the bombing of its consulate by launching hundreds of missiles and drones directly from its territory.

Israel claimed it intercepted the attack but retaliated by striking a radar system at a military airport in Isfahan, near a key nuclear site.

This clash heightened fears of a shift in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with growing talk in Tehran about developing deterrent weapons and Israel threatening to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The fifth key moment for Iran followed the deaths of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in a helicopter crash near the Azerbaijani border. Authorities quickly denied conspiracy theories, ruling out an Israeli attack.

Three months later, Iran’s military confirmed the crash was caused by bad weather, but some questions remained unanswered.

During this period, Iran’s political focus shifted away from the Gaza war due to the presidential election and efforts to form a new government.

Candidates in the election avoided discussing the Gaza conflict or Iran’s support for Hamas, despite criticism over ignoring pressing issues like sanctions and stalled nuclear negotiations.

Most candidates only praised Iran’s missile program and vowed to strengthen deterrence against Israel.

The sixth major event occurred during the inauguration of Iran's new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, on July 30, when Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated at a Quds Force facility in northern Tehran, marking a significant turn in the Gaza war.

Khamenei promised to respond to the “violation of Iranian sovereignty” following the assassination of a “guest of Iran.”

Officials and military leaders varied in their tone and language of threats but consistently stressed the need for a response as time passed and doubts about Iran’s actions increased.

Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran raised significant questions about the operation, especially regarding potential security breaches.

The seventh key moment was marked by the “Pager Bombings,” alongside a message of de-escalation from Pezeshkian, particularly towards the US and Israel.

Before traveling to New York, Pezeshkian stated at a press conference that Iran does not want to destabilize the region or export its revolution. He expressed a willingness to engage with the US if it shows it is not hostile, even referring to the US as “brotherly.”

During meetings at the UN General Assembly, he reiterated, “Iran is ready to set aside its weapons if Israel does the same,” according to an audio recording.

Pezeshkian explained that the delay in Iran’s response to Haniyeh’s assassination was due to indications that a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas was imminent, expressing frustration over the lack of progress and ongoing Israeli attacks.

Pezeshkian downplayed Hezbollah’s ability to confront Israel independently, challenging the narrative from officials close to Khamenei.

His remarks, along with concerns about possible security breaches during the “Pager Bombings” and the targeting of Hezbollah leaders, raised suspicions in Tehran about vulnerabilities in Iran’s defense and heightened fears of internal security lapses.

The eighth and most critical phase began with the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, a key figure in Iran’s regional strategy, second only to Gen. Soleimani.

The Israeli airstrike on Nasrallah’s headquarters also led to a significant loss for the Revolutionary Guards.

Nasrallah is highly regarded among Iran’s leaders, especially conservatives. His name has occasionally been mentioned as a potential successor to Khamenei, but such a candidacy would likely face opposition from various political factions due to his non-Iranian status.

In response to the assassinations of Haniyeh and Nasrallah, Iran launched its second direct missile attack on Israel.

This prompted Israel to threaten retaliation, indicating it could target various facilities, including oil refineries, fuel stations, and nuclear and military sites.

The situation between Israel and Iran remains highly volatile, with the potential for further escalation.

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Features

Russia, China Unlikely to Back Iran Against US Military Threats

A man stands by the wreckage of a burnt bus bearing a banner (unseen) that reads "This was one of Tehran’s new buses that was paid for with the money of the people’s taxes,” in Tehran's Sadeghieh Square on January 15, 2026. (AFP)
A man stands by the wreckage of a burnt bus bearing a banner (unseen) that reads "This was one of Tehran’s new buses that was paid for with the money of the people’s taxes,” in Tehran's Sadeghieh Square on January 15, 2026. (AFP)
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Russia, China Unlikely to Back Iran Against US Military Threats

A man stands by the wreckage of a burnt bus bearing a banner (unseen) that reads "This was one of Tehran’s new buses that was paid for with the money of the people’s taxes,” in Tehran's Sadeghieh Square on January 15, 2026. (AFP)
A man stands by the wreckage of a burnt bus bearing a banner (unseen) that reads "This was one of Tehran’s new buses that was paid for with the money of the people’s taxes,” in Tehran's Sadeghieh Square on January 15, 2026. (AFP)

While Russia and China are ready to back protest-rocked Iran under threat by US President Donald Trump, that support would diminish in the face of US military action, experts told AFP.

Iran is a significant ally to the two nuclear powers, providing drones to Russia and oil to China. But analysts told AFP the two superpowers would only offer diplomatic and economic aid to Tehran, to avoid a showdown with Washington.

"China and Russia don't want to go head-to-head with the US over Iran," said Ellie Geranmayeh, a senior policy expert for the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank.

Tehran, despite its best efforts over decades, has failed to establish a formal alliance with Moscow and Beijing, she noted.

If the United States carried out strikes on Iran, "both the Chinese and the Russians will prioritize their bilateral relationship with Washington", Geranmayeh said.

China has to maintain a "delicate" rapprochement with the Trump administration, she argued, while Russia wants to keep the United States involved in talks on ending the war in Ukraine.

"They both have much higher priorities than Iran."

- Ukraine before Iran -

Despite their close ties, "Russia-Iranian treaties don't include military support" -- only political, diplomatic and economic aid, Russian analyst Sergei Markov told AFP.

Alexander Gabuev, director of Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said Moscow would do whatever it could "to keep the regime afloat".

But "Russia's options are very limited," he added.

Faced with its own economic crisis, "Russia cannot become a giant market for Iranian products" nor can it provide "a lavish loan", Gabuev said.

Nikita Smagin, a specialist in Russia-Iran relations, said that in the event of US strikes, Russia could do "almost nothing".

"They don't want to risk military confrontation with other great powers like the US -- but at the same time, they're ready to send weaponry to Iran," he said.

"Using Iran as a bargaining asset is a normal thing for Russia," Smagin said of the longer-term strategy, at a time when Moscow is also negotiating with Washington on Ukraine.

Markov agreed. "The Ukrainian crisis is much more important for Russia than the Iranian crisis," he argued.

- Chinese restraint -

China is also ready to help Tehran "economically, technologically, militarily and politically" as it confronts non-military US actions such as trade pressure and cyberattacks, Hua Po, a Beijing-based independent political observer, told AFP.

If the United States launched strikes, China "would strengthen its economic ties with Iran and help it militarize in order to contribute to bogging the United States down in a war in the Middle East," he added.

Until now, China has been cautious and expressed itself "with restraint", weighing the stakes of oil and regional stability, said Iran-China relations researcher Theo Nencini of Sciences Po Grenoble.

"China is benefiting from a weakened Iran, which allows it to secure low-cost oil... and to acquire a sizeable geopolitical partner," he said.

However, he added: "I find it hard to see them engaging in a showdown with the Americans over Iran."

Beijing would likely issue condemnations, but not retaliate, he said.

Hua said the Iran crisis was unlikely to have an impact on China-US relations overall.

"The Iranian question isn't at the heart of relations between the two countries," he argued.

"Neither will sever ties with the other over Iran."

Features

Beirut’s Commodore Hotel, a Haven for Journalists During Lebanon’s Civil War, Shuts Down

People stand outside the closed Commodore hotel, in Beirut, Lebanon, Sunday, Jan. 11, 2026. (AP)
People stand outside the closed Commodore hotel, in Beirut, Lebanon, Sunday, Jan. 11, 2026. (AP)
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Beirut’s Commodore Hotel, a Haven for Journalists During Lebanon’s Civil War, Shuts Down

People stand outside the closed Commodore hotel, in Beirut, Lebanon, Sunday, Jan. 11, 2026. (AP)
People stand outside the closed Commodore hotel, in Beirut, Lebanon, Sunday, Jan. 11, 2026. (AP)

During Lebanon’s civil war, the Commodore Hotel in western Beirut's Hamra district became iconic among the foreign press corps.

For many, it served as an unofficial newsroom where they could file dispatches even when communications systems were down elsewhere. Armed guards at the door provided some sense of protection as sniper fights and shelling were turning the cosmopolitan city to rubble.

The hotel even had its own much-loved mascot: a cheeky parrot.

The Commodore endured for decades after the 15-year civil war ended in 1990 — until this week, when it closed for good.

The main gate of the nine-story hotel with more than 200 rooms was shuttered Monday. Officials at the Commodore refused to speak to the media about the decision to close.

Although the country’s economy is beginning to recover from a protracted financial crisis that began in 2019, tensions in the region and the aftermath of the Israel-Hezbollah war that was halted by a tenuous ceasefire in November 2024 are keeping many tourists away. Lengthy daily electricity cuts force businesses to rely on expensive private generators.

The Commodore is not the first of the crisis-battered country’s once-bustling hotels to shut down in recent years.

But for journalists who lived, worked and filed their dispatches there, its demise hits particularly hard.

“The Commodore was a hub of information — various guerrilla leaders, diplomats, spies and of course scores of journalists circled the cafes and lounges,” said Tim Llewellyn, a former BBC Middle East correspondent who covered the civil war. “On one occasion (late Palestinian leader) Yasser Arafat himself dropped in to sip coffee with” with the hotel manager's father, he recalled.

A line to the outside world

At the height of the civil war, when telecommunications were dysfunctional and much of Beirut was cut off from the outside world, it was at the Commodore where journalists found land lines and Telex machines that always worked to send reports to their media organizations around the globe.

Across the front office desk in the wide lobby of the Commodore, there were two teleprinters that carried reports of The Associated Press and Reuters news agencies.

“The Commodore had a certain seedy charm. The rooms were basic, the mattresses lumpy and the meal fare wasn’t spectacular,” said Robert H. Reid, the AP’s former Middle East regional editor, who was among the AP journalists who covered the war. The hotel was across the street from the international agency’s Middle East head office at the time.

“The friendly staff and the camaraderie among the journalist-guests made the Commodore seem more like a social club where you could unwind after a day in one of the world’s most dangerous cities,” Reid said.

Llewellyn remembers that the hotel manager at the time, Yusuf Nazzal, told him in the late 1970s “that it was I who had given him the idea” to open such a hotel in a war zone.

Llewellyn said that during a long chat with Nazzal on a near-empty Middle East Airlines Jumbo flight from London to Beirut in the fall of 1975, he told him that there should be a hotel that would make sure journalists had good communications, “a street-wise and well-connected staff running the desks, the phones, the teletypes.”

During Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and a nearly three-month siege of West Beirut by Israeli troops, journalists used the roof of the hotel to film fighter jets striking the city.

The parrot

One of the best-known characters at the Commodore was Coco the parrot, who was always in a cage near the bar. Patrons were often startled by what they thought was the whiz of an incoming shell, only to discover that it was Coco who made the sound.

AP’s chief Middle East correspondent Terry Anderson was a regular at the hotel before he was kidnapped in Beirut in 1985 and held for seven years, becoming one of the longest-held American hostages in history.

Videos of Anderson released by his kidnappers later showed him wearing a white T-shirt with the words “Hotel Commodore Lebanon.”

With the kidnapping of Anderson and other Western journalists, many foreign media workers left the predominantly-Muslim western part of Beirut, and after that the hotel lost its status as a safe haven for foreign journalists.

Ahmad Shbaro, who worked at different departments of the hotel until 1988, said the main reason behind the Commodore’s success was the presence of armed guards that made journalists feel secure in the middle of Beirut’s chaos as well as functioning telecommunications.

He added that the hotel also offered financial facilities for journalists who ran out of money. They would borrow money from Nazzal and their companies could pay him back by depositing money in his bank account in London.

Shbaro remembers a terrifying day in the late 1970s when the area of the hotel was heavily shelled and two rooms at the Commodore were hit.

“The hotel was full and all of us, staffers and journalists, spent the night at Le Casbah,” a famous nightclub in the basement of the building, he said.

In quieter times, journalists used to spend the night partying by the pool.

“It was a lifeline for the international media in West Beirut, where journalists filed, ate, slept, and hid from air raids, shelling, and other violence,” said former AP correspondent Scheherezade Faramarzi.

“It gained both fame and notoriety,” she said, speaking from the Mediterranean island of Cyprus.

The hotel was built in 1943 and kept functioning until 1987 when it was heavily damaged in fighting between Shiite and Druze militiamen at the time. The old Commodore building was later demolished and a new structure was build with an annex and officially opened again for the public in 1996.

But Coco the parrot was no longer at the bar. The bird went missing during the 1987 fighting. Shbaro said it is believed he was taken by one of the gunmen who stormed the hotel.

Features

Key Details of Greenland’s Rich but Largely Untapped Mineral Resources

Houses covered by snow are seen on the coast of a sea inlet of Nuuk, Greenland, on Monday, Jan. 12, 2026. (AP)
Houses covered by snow are seen on the coast of a sea inlet of Nuuk, Greenland, on Monday, Jan. 12, 2026. (AP)
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Key Details of Greenland’s Rich but Largely Untapped Mineral Resources

Houses covered by snow are seen on the coast of a sea inlet of Nuuk, Greenland, on Monday, Jan. 12, 2026. (AP)
Houses covered by snow are seen on the coast of a sea inlet of Nuuk, Greenland, on Monday, Jan. 12, 2026. (AP)

The Danish and Greenlandic foreign ministers will meet US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Wednesday after President Donald Trump recently
stepped up threats to take over Greenland.

The autonomous territory of Denmark could be useful for the ​United States because of its strategic location and rich mineral resources. A 2023 survey showed that 25 of 34 minerals deemed "critical raw materials" by the European Commission were found in Greenland.

The extraction of oil and natural gas is banned in Greenland for environmental reasons, while development of its mining sector has been snarled in red tape and opposition from indigenous people.

Below are details of Greenland's main mineral deposits, based on data from its Mineral Resources Authority:

RARE EARTHS
Three of Greenland's biggest deposits are located in the southern province of Gardar.

Companies ‌seeking to ‌develop rare-earth mines are Critical Metals Corp, which bought the ‌Tanbreez ⁠deposit, ​Energy Transition Minerals, ‌whose Kuannersuit project is stalled amid legal disputes, and Neo Performance Materials.

Rare-earth elements are key to permanent magnets used in electric vehicles (EV) and wind turbines.

GRAPHITE
Occurrences of graphite and graphite schist are reported from many localities on the island.
GreenRoc has applied for an exploitation license to develop the Amitsoq graphite project.
Natural graphite is mostly used in EV batteries and steelmaking.

COPPER
According to the Mineral Resources Authority, most copper deposits have drawn only limited exploration campaigns.

Especially interesting are the underexplored areas ⁠in the northeast and center-east of Greenland, it said.

London-listed 80 Mile is seeking to develop the Disko-Nuussuaq deposit, which has ‌copper, nickel, platinum and cobalt.

NICKEL
Traces of nickel accumulations are numerous, ‍according to the Mineral Resources Authority.

Major miner ‍Anglo American was granted an exploration license in western Greenland in 2019 and has ‍been looking for nickel deposits, among others.

ZINC
Zinc is mostly found in the north in a geologic formation that stretches more than 2,500 km (1,550 miles).

Companies have sought to develop the Citronen Fjord zinc and lead project, which had been billed as one of the world's largest undeveloped zinc resources.

GOLD
The most prospective ​areas for gold potential are situated around the Sermiligaarsuk fjord in the country's south.

Amaroq Minerals launched a gold mine last year in Mt Nalunaq in ⁠the Kujalleq Municipality.

DIAMONDS
While most small diamonds and the largest stones are found in the island's west, their presence in other regions may also be significant.

IRON ORE
Deposits are located at Isua in southern West Greenland, at Itilliarsuk in central West Greenland, and in North West Greenland along the Lauge Koch Kyst.

TITANIUM-VANADIUM
Known deposits of titanium and vanadium are in the southwest, the east and south.

Titanium is used for commercial, medical and industrial purposes, while vanadium is mainly used to produce specialty steel alloys. The most important industrial vanadium compound, vanadium pentoxide, is used as a catalyst for the production of sulfuric acid.

TUNGSTEN
Used for several industrial applications, tungsten is mostly found in the central-east and northeast of the country, with assessed deposits in the south and west.

URANIUM
In 2021, ‌the then-ruling left-wing Inuit Ataqatigiit party banned uranium mining, effectively halting development of the Kuannersuit rare-earths project, which has uranium as a byproduct.