Eight Key Iranian Developments Following ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
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Eight Key Iranian Developments Following ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website

As the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation by Hamas and the Gaza war began, Iran was already dealing with the fallout from protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, making the autumn of 2022 one of the bloodiest in the country’s recent history.

The war in Gaza erupted at a crucial time for Iran’s leadership, which was facing international pressure over its crackdown on protests, its drone supply to Russia, and stalled nuclear talks.

From the start, Tehran described Hamas’ attack as a “natural and spontaneous reaction” to what it called Israel's “provocative war policies” and actions by the far-right Israeli Prime Minister.

Iranian officials denied any role in planning the operation, but their diplomatic moves suggested they were prepared for the conflict’s impact on the region.

Less than a week after the attack, Iran’s late Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, began a regional tour, meeting with leaders of countries and groups allied with Iran, including in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar.

His aim was to coordinate efforts and send regional messages.

Iran also warned Israel that it could face multiple fronts if its military actions in Gaza didn’t stop.

Tehran has since worked to strengthen the image of armed groups in the region, pushing to legitimize its support for these factions amid the ongoing political and regional unrest.

This marked a key moment for Iran, as Tehran claimed it had elevated the “Resistance Axis” groups from a regional to a “global” level, referring to this shift as a move from the “World of Resistance” to the “Global Resistance.”

In doing so, Iran, which had been trying to ease tensions with its neighbors, adopted a more aggressive stance towards groups linked to it. Many saw this as part of Iran’s broader strategy to expand its influence across the region.

Officially, Iran told the international community that these groups act independently, make their own decisions, and produce their own weapons.

However, several Iranian officials have acknowledged the role of Gen. Qassem Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guards in supplying weapons and technology to these groups.

Iran’s second significant move after the Al-Aqsa Flood came a month into the Gaza war when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for cutting off Israel’s “economic lifelines,” especially oil and energy routes.

Iranian-backed groups, especially the Houthis, began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea, disrupting shipping for months.

At the same time, Iran-aligned militias in Iraq launched drone attacks on Israel and US bases in the region.

The US responded after one of its bases in Syria was attacked, striking positions held by these militias.

Politically, Iran insisted that its allied groups’ demands be met for any Gaza ceasefire, and it opposed international peace proposals, especially the “two-state solution.”

In December, Iran’s foreign minister even noted that both Iran and Israel rejected the two-state plan.

In the third phase, Israel ramped up airstrikes against Iranian forces in Syria. In December, an Israeli strike killed Razi Mousavi, a key Iranian logistics officer.

A month later, the Revolutionary Guards confirmed the death of their intelligence chief in Syria. The biggest blow came in April, when an Israeli airstrike on a meeting at the Iranian consulate killed Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahdi, Iran’s top military commander in Syria and Lebanon.

In its fourth major escalation, Iran nearly went to war with Israel after responding to the bombing of its consulate by launching hundreds of missiles and drones directly from its territory.

Israel claimed it intercepted the attack but retaliated by striking a radar system at a military airport in Isfahan, near a key nuclear site.

This clash heightened fears of a shift in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with growing talk in Tehran about developing deterrent weapons and Israel threatening to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The fifth key moment for Iran followed the deaths of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in a helicopter crash near the Azerbaijani border. Authorities quickly denied conspiracy theories, ruling out an Israeli attack.

Three months later, Iran’s military confirmed the crash was caused by bad weather, but some questions remained unanswered.

During this period, Iran’s political focus shifted away from the Gaza war due to the presidential election and efforts to form a new government.

Candidates in the election avoided discussing the Gaza conflict or Iran’s support for Hamas, despite criticism over ignoring pressing issues like sanctions and stalled nuclear negotiations.

Most candidates only praised Iran’s missile program and vowed to strengthen deterrence against Israel.

The sixth major event occurred during the inauguration of Iran's new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, on July 30, when Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated at a Quds Force facility in northern Tehran, marking a significant turn in the Gaza war.

Khamenei promised to respond to the “violation of Iranian sovereignty” following the assassination of a “guest of Iran.”

Officials and military leaders varied in their tone and language of threats but consistently stressed the need for a response as time passed and doubts about Iran’s actions increased.

Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran raised significant questions about the operation, especially regarding potential security breaches.

The seventh key moment was marked by the “Pager Bombings,” alongside a message of de-escalation from Pezeshkian, particularly towards the US and Israel.

Before traveling to New York, Pezeshkian stated at a press conference that Iran does not want to destabilize the region or export its revolution. He expressed a willingness to engage with the US if it shows it is not hostile, even referring to the US as “brotherly.”

During meetings at the UN General Assembly, he reiterated, “Iran is ready to set aside its weapons if Israel does the same,” according to an audio recording.

Pezeshkian explained that the delay in Iran’s response to Haniyeh’s assassination was due to indications that a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas was imminent, expressing frustration over the lack of progress and ongoing Israeli attacks.

Pezeshkian downplayed Hezbollah’s ability to confront Israel independently, challenging the narrative from officials close to Khamenei.

His remarks, along with concerns about possible security breaches during the “Pager Bombings” and the targeting of Hezbollah leaders, raised suspicions in Tehran about vulnerabilities in Iran’s defense and heightened fears of internal security lapses.

The eighth and most critical phase began with the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, a key figure in Iran’s regional strategy, second only to Gen. Soleimani.

The Israeli airstrike on Nasrallah’s headquarters also led to a significant loss for the Revolutionary Guards.

Nasrallah is highly regarded among Iran’s leaders, especially conservatives. His name has occasionally been mentioned as a potential successor to Khamenei, but such a candidacy would likely face opposition from various political factions due to his non-Iranian status.

In response to the assassinations of Haniyeh and Nasrallah, Iran launched its second direct missile attack on Israel.

This prompted Israel to threaten retaliation, indicating it could target various facilities, including oil refineries, fuel stations, and nuclear and military sites.

The situation between Israel and Iran remains highly volatile, with the potential for further escalation.



Will a Weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon Disarm? 

Hezbollah fighters shout slogans during the funeral procession of their top commander Fouad Shukur, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike on July 30, in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, Aug. 1, 2024. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters shout slogans during the funeral procession of their top commander Fouad Shukur, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike on July 30, in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, Aug. 1, 2024. (AP)
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Will a Weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon Disarm? 

Hezbollah fighters shout slogans during the funeral procession of their top commander Fouad Shukur, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike on July 30, in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, Aug. 1, 2024. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters shout slogans during the funeral procession of their top commander Fouad Shukur, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike on July 30, in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, Aug. 1, 2024. (AP)

Israel's latest airstrike on what it called a Hezbollah missile storage facility in Beirut's southern suburbs came during increasing pressure for the Iran-backed Lebanese group to disarm.

The disarmament of what has been the region's most powerful non-state armed group has come to look increasingly inevitable. Hezbollah is severely weakened after a war with Israel in which much of its top leadership was killed, and after losing a key ally with the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a conduit for Iran to send arms.

Israel and the US are pushing for swift disarmament, but when and how it will happen - if it does - is contested.

Lebanon's President Joseph Aoun has said he is committed to bringing all arms in the country under state control, but that it will happen through discussions around a national security plan and not through force.

Many fear that an attempt to force the issue would lead to civil conflict, which Aoun has called a “red line.”

Hezbollah officials have said in principle that they are willing to discuss the group's arsenal, but leader Sheikh Naim Qassem said in a speech earlier this month that any serious discussions are contingent on Israel withdrawing its forces from territory they occupy in southern Lebanon and halting near-daily airstrikes.

“The Lebanese have to strike a delicate balance” on disarmament, said Aram Nerguizian, a senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“Go too slow ... and you will lose internal momentum and international legitimacy. Go too fast and you get accused by a still-hurting and battered Shiite community” — who make up most of Hezbollah's constituency — “of acting as a proxy for Israel, while risking Hezbollah remnants ... waging an insurgency against the Lebanese government.”

What would disarmament look like? After Lebanon’s 15-year civil war ended in 1990, the country went through a process of disarming most of the militias that had taken part. Hezbollah was the exception, given special status as a “resistance force” fighting against Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon at the time.

Aoun has outlined his vision of a similar disarmament process. Former Hezbollah fighters could apply to join the Lebanese army as individuals, the president said. Weapons deemed “usable” by the army would become part of its arsenal, while those deemed “unusable” would be destroyed.

Nerguizian said that more than 90% of Hezbollah's “sophisticated and heavy weapons” — which once included tens of thousands of missiles and drones — are believed to have been destroyed already, the vast majority of them by Israel.

What remains, he said, would not be compatible with the Lebanese army's arsenal, which is largely Western-supplied, while Hezbollah uses Iranian, Russian and Chinese-made weapons.

Nerguizian said it is unlikely that large numbers of Hezbollah's tens of thousands of fighters would be incorporated into the army because their ideology has not been compatible as a paramilitary force that has largely been “tied to the preferences of Iran.”

Retired Lebanese army Gen. Hassan Jouni agreed that much of Hezbollah's arsenal would not be easily integrated but said the post-civil war era provides a precedent for integrating fighters.

After going through training, “they become like any other soldier,” he said. While there might be a “religious and ideological obstacle” for some Hezbollah fighters, “I do not think this is the case for everyone.”

Ibrahim Mousawi, a member of Hezbollah's parliamentary bloc, told The Associated Press that “everything is open for discussion.”

“We don’t want to jump into discussing the details,” he said. “This is something that is being left in the hands of the president and the Hezbollah leadership to deal with.”

Mousawi said the destruction of Hezbollah’s arsenal “shouldn’t be acceptable to Lebanon.”

The cash-strapped Lebanese army has struggled to maintain its aging arsenal. In recent years, it has turned to the US and Qatar to help pay soldiers' salaries.

“We are part of the Lebanese strength,” Mousawi said. “If the Americans are really keen to show us that they really respect Lebanon and they care for the Lebanese, ... why don’t they equip the Lebanese army with defensive weapons?”

When might disarming occur? US envoy Morgan Ortagus said earlier this month in an interview broadcast on Lebanese channel LBCI that Hezbollah should be disarmed “as soon as possible."

A Lebanese diplomat said there is ongoing pressure from the Americans on that front. He spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly.

Hezbollah’s stance that it will not discuss giving up its armed wing before Israel withdraws from five key border points in southern Lebanon appears likely to drag out the process. Israeli officials have said that they plan to remain there indefinitely to secure their border and guard against any ceasefire violations by Hezbollah.

Israeli officials did not respond to a request for comment on the issue of Lebanon's army integrating former Hezbollah weapons and fighters.

Lebanese officials say that the Israeli presence violates the ceasefire agreement in November, under which Israel and Hezbollah were supposed to withdraw their forces from southern Lebanon, with the Lebanese army taking control alongside UN peacekeepers.

The Lebanese diplomat said that US officials had acknowledged that Israeli forces remaining in the five border points constituted an “occupation” but had not put strong pressure on Israel to withdraw quickly.

A “smart way to break the deadlock” and avoid further escalation is for Washington to increase its support for the Lebanese army and push Israel to withdraw, said Bilal Saab, a former Pentagon official and senior managing director of the Washington-based TRENDS US consulting firm.

Retired Lebanese army Gen. Elias Hanna said he believes that Hezbollah is “still in the phase of denial” regarding the diminution of its military and political clout.

He said disarmament needs to take place as part of broader discussions about Lebanon's military doctrine and strategy. The Lebanese army could benefit from the experience of Hezbollah, which for many years maintained deterrence with Israel before the latest war, he said.

Saab said he believes the outcome is not in doubt.

“Hezbollah has a choice,” he said. “Either lay down its arms or have them removed by Israeli force.”