What to Know about Israel's Ground Invasion in Southern Lebanon

A picture taken from northern Israel along the border with southern Lebanon shows smoke billowing above south Lebanon during Israeli bombardment on October 4, 2024. (Photo by Jalaa MAREY / AFP)
A picture taken from northern Israel along the border with southern Lebanon shows smoke billowing above south Lebanon during Israeli bombardment on October 4, 2024. (Photo by Jalaa MAREY / AFP)
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What to Know about Israel's Ground Invasion in Southern Lebanon

A picture taken from northern Israel along the border with southern Lebanon shows smoke billowing above south Lebanon during Israeli bombardment on October 4, 2024. (Photo by Jalaa MAREY / AFP)
A picture taken from northern Israel along the border with southern Lebanon shows smoke billowing above south Lebanon during Israeli bombardment on October 4, 2024. (Photo by Jalaa MAREY / AFP)

Israel’s ground invasion in Lebanon stretched into its second week, as the Hezbollah militant group fired hundreds of rockets deep into Israel — with no end in sight to the escalating conflict.
More than 1,400 people have been killed in Lebanon — mostly in airstrikes — and over a million displaced since the fighting intensified in mid-September. At least 15 Israeli soldiers and two civilians have been killed since the ground operation began, and more than 60,000 people have been displaced from towns along the border for more than a year.
Hezbollah began firing rockets into Israel on Oct. 8, 2023, a day after Hamas, the Palestinian militant group, attacked southern Israel, which sparked the war in Gaza. Israel and Hezbollah have exchanged fire almost every day since, coming close to a full-fledged war on several occasions but stepping back from the brink until this month, The Associated Press said.
Here’s what to know about the current ground incursion in southern Lebanon:
What is the aim of the Israeli military’s ground invasion? The Israeli military began what they called a “limited, localized and targeted ground raids” in southern Lebanon on Oct. 1. The same day, the military said that it had carried out dozens of secretive cross-border operations to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure over the past year. The aim, Israel says, is to allow its displaced residents to return home.
A military official said that thousands of Israeli troops are currently operating along the roughly 100-kilometer-long (62-mile) border, clearing the area just along the border to try to remove the launch pads where Hezbollah fires rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles into Israeli towns, as well as infrastructure they say would allow for an Oct. 7-style invasion of Israel.
The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the military’s strategy, said the troops haven’t ventured deep inside Lebanon so far, and have conducted operations from distances of a few hundred meters (yards) up to 2 to 3 kilometers (1.5 to 2 miles) into Lebanese territory.
The Israeli military has shared videos of what it says are underground tunnels chiseled into rock used by Hezbollah. The tunnels are used to store weapons and stage attacks. One tunnel stretched from Lebanon into Israeli territory, according to the military.
The goal is not to destroy Hezbollah, and the army is aware that this will not remove the threat of longer-range rockets and missiles, the official said.
Elijah Magnier, a Brussels-based military and counterterrorism analyst, said Israeli forces haven’t seized any ground positions yet.
“They need to go in, harass, test and come out,” Magnier said. In order to hold ground positions, Israel would need tanks to come in and take high critical ground overlooking territory, he said. He estimates it would require clearing some 10 kilometers of Hezbollah presence, which is still a long way off.
It is not clear how long the operation will last or how long Israel will maintain a presence in these towns. The official said the hope is that this can lead to a diplomatic arrangement pushing Hezbollah away from the border. But the plans could change. A previous Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, initially intended to push back Palestinian militants, turned into an 18-year occupation.
What is Hezbollah’s strategy? Hezbollah officials, including assassinated leader Hassan Nasrallah, have conceded that the Israeli military has the superior air force and intelligence. But Hezbollah has the advantage in direct confrontations on Lebanese turf.
Hezbollah forces have better equipment and training compared to Hamas, which Israel has been battling for more than a year in Gaza. Hezbollah forces gained experience in wars in Syria and Iraq. Lebanon’s terrain is also more rugged and challenging than the Palestinian enclave, which is mostly flat and sandy.
Hezbollah’s strategy, led by its elite Radwan Forces, has been drawing in and ambushing incoming Israeli troops, detonating explosive devices or firing rockets at them, and firing artillery and rockets at Israeli border towns. Although Hezbollah has lost many of its top officials and commanders in recent weeks, militants have continued to fire rockets deeper into Israel, including heavy barrages on the city of Haifa.
Former Lebanese Army General Hassan Jouni said that he assessed Israel is still conducting reconnaissance ahead of its main attack, but that it had already suffered heavy losses in the smaller operations. Jouni said Hezbollah had dug many tunnels in the south and were well equipped with weapons caches and ammunition.
“The land always works in the favor of those who own it,” he said.
How does this compare to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah? Israel and Hezbollah last went to war in 2006, a 34-day conflict that ended with the United Nations Resolution 1701, which was supposed to push Hezbollah further north and keep the border region exclusively under the control of the Lebanese army and UN peacekeepers.
Israeli leaders say they want Lebanon to implement the resolution. Hezbollah says Israel hasn’t held up its part of the treaty and will stop firing rockets when there is a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
Israel’s searing air campaign in southern Lebanon and Beirut in recent weeks is similar to the 2006 war, though this time, better intelligence has enabled Israel to kill several of Hezbollah’s top leadership.
“The Air Force is better and is using all kinds of methods to penetrate deeper into the ground, like dropping bomb after bomb after bomb,” said Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. Israel killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in September by dropping more than 80 bombs on an apartment complex built over an underground compound in quick succession.
In the 2006 war, Israel sent ground troops into Lebanon after 10 days of airstrikes before withdrawing them about four weeks later. Troops attempted to reach the Litani River, about 30 kilometers (18.5 miles) north of the border, but suffered heavy losses before a ceasefire ended the operation and the war.
Could there be a diplomatic solution? Hezbollah’s acting leader signaled Tuesday that the group is open to a cease-fire. Guzansky believes Israeli troops will stay on the ground in southern Lebanon until there is an internationally enforced diplomatic solution that’s stronger than the current UN peacekeeping force. If Israeli troops retreat, he said, they risk the same situation as 2006, where Hezbollah simply rearmed and resumed operations.
But former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who was Israel’s leader during the 2006 war, said that war served as a lesson that immediate diplomacy, rather than military force, is the only way to keep the border quiet.
“Why not try and make a deal now rather than to fight for half a year?” he asked in an interview with The Associated Press. “You lose how many soldiers, kill how many innocent people? And then in the end we’ll make a deal which may have been made in advance.”

 



Eight Key Iranian Developments Following ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
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Eight Key Iranian Developments Following ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website

As the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation by Hamas and the Gaza war began, Iran was already dealing with the fallout from protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, making the autumn of 2022 one of the bloodiest in the country’s recent history.

The war in Gaza erupted at a crucial time for Iran’s leadership, which was facing international pressure over its crackdown on protests, its drone supply to Russia, and stalled nuclear talks.

From the start, Tehran described Hamas’ attack as a “natural and spontaneous reaction” to what it called Israel's “provocative war policies” and actions by the far-right Israeli Prime Minister.

Iranian officials denied any role in planning the operation, but their diplomatic moves suggested they were prepared for the conflict’s impact on the region.

Less than a week after the attack, Iran’s late Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, began a regional tour, meeting with leaders of countries and groups allied with Iran, including in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar.

His aim was to coordinate efforts and send regional messages.

Iran also warned Israel that it could face multiple fronts if its military actions in Gaza didn’t stop.

Tehran has since worked to strengthen the image of armed groups in the region, pushing to legitimize its support for these factions amid the ongoing political and regional unrest.

This marked a key moment for Iran, as Tehran claimed it had elevated the “Resistance Axis” groups from a regional to a “global” level, referring to this shift as a move from the “World of Resistance” to the “Global Resistance.”

In doing so, Iran, which had been trying to ease tensions with its neighbors, adopted a more aggressive stance towards groups linked to it. Many saw this as part of Iran’s broader strategy to expand its influence across the region.

Officially, Iran told the international community that these groups act independently, make their own decisions, and produce their own weapons.

However, several Iranian officials have acknowledged the role of Gen. Qassem Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guards in supplying weapons and technology to these groups.

Iran’s second significant move after the Al-Aqsa Flood came a month into the Gaza war when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for cutting off Israel’s “economic lifelines,” especially oil and energy routes.

Iranian-backed groups, especially the Houthis, began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea, disrupting shipping for months.

At the same time, Iran-aligned militias in Iraq launched drone attacks on Israel and US bases in the region.

The US responded after one of its bases in Syria was attacked, striking positions held by these militias.

Politically, Iran insisted that its allied groups’ demands be met for any Gaza ceasefire, and it opposed international peace proposals, especially the “two-state solution.”

In December, Iran’s foreign minister even noted that both Iran and Israel rejected the two-state plan.

In the third phase, Israel ramped up airstrikes against Iranian forces in Syria. In December, an Israeli strike killed Razi Mousavi, a key Iranian logistics officer.

A month later, the Revolutionary Guards confirmed the death of their intelligence chief in Syria. The biggest blow came in April, when an Israeli airstrike on a meeting at the Iranian consulate killed Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahdi, Iran’s top military commander in Syria and Lebanon.

In its fourth major escalation, Iran nearly went to war with Israel after responding to the bombing of its consulate by launching hundreds of missiles and drones directly from its territory.

Israel claimed it intercepted the attack but retaliated by striking a radar system at a military airport in Isfahan, near a key nuclear site.

This clash heightened fears of a shift in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with growing talk in Tehran about developing deterrent weapons and Israel threatening to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The fifth key moment for Iran followed the deaths of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in a helicopter crash near the Azerbaijani border. Authorities quickly denied conspiracy theories, ruling out an Israeli attack.

Three months later, Iran’s military confirmed the crash was caused by bad weather, but some questions remained unanswered.

During this period, Iran’s political focus shifted away from the Gaza war due to the presidential election and efforts to form a new government.

Candidates in the election avoided discussing the Gaza conflict or Iran’s support for Hamas, despite criticism over ignoring pressing issues like sanctions and stalled nuclear negotiations.

Most candidates only praised Iran’s missile program and vowed to strengthen deterrence against Israel.

The sixth major event occurred during the inauguration of Iran's new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, on July 30, when Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated at a Quds Force facility in northern Tehran, marking a significant turn in the Gaza war.

Khamenei promised to respond to the “violation of Iranian sovereignty” following the assassination of a “guest of Iran.”

Officials and military leaders varied in their tone and language of threats but consistently stressed the need for a response as time passed and doubts about Iran’s actions increased.

Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran raised significant questions about the operation, especially regarding potential security breaches.

The seventh key moment was marked by the “Pager Bombings,” alongside a message of de-escalation from Pezeshkian, particularly towards the US and Israel.

Before traveling to New York, Pezeshkian stated at a press conference that Iran does not want to destabilize the region or export its revolution. He expressed a willingness to engage with the US if it shows it is not hostile, even referring to the US as “brotherly.”

During meetings at the UN General Assembly, he reiterated, “Iran is ready to set aside its weapons if Israel does the same,” according to an audio recording.

Pezeshkian explained that the delay in Iran’s response to Haniyeh’s assassination was due to indications that a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas was imminent, expressing frustration over the lack of progress and ongoing Israeli attacks.

Pezeshkian downplayed Hezbollah’s ability to confront Israel independently, challenging the narrative from officials close to Khamenei.

His remarks, along with concerns about possible security breaches during the “Pager Bombings” and the targeting of Hezbollah leaders, raised suspicions in Tehran about vulnerabilities in Iran’s defense and heightened fears of internal security lapses.

The eighth and most critical phase began with the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, a key figure in Iran’s regional strategy, second only to Gen. Soleimani.

The Israeli airstrike on Nasrallah’s headquarters also led to a significant loss for the Revolutionary Guards.

Nasrallah is highly regarded among Iran’s leaders, especially conservatives. His name has occasionally been mentioned as a potential successor to Khamenei, but such a candidacy would likely face opposition from various political factions due to his non-Iranian status.

In response to the assassinations of Haniyeh and Nasrallah, Iran launched its second direct missile attack on Israel.

This prompted Israel to threaten retaliation, indicating it could target various facilities, including oil refineries, fuel stations, and nuclear and military sites.

The situation between Israel and Iran remains highly volatile, with the potential for further escalation.