Impact of Sinwar’s Death on Hamas and the Gaza War

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in 2021 (AP)
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in 2021 (AP)
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Impact of Sinwar’s Death on Hamas and the Gaza War

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in 2021 (AP)
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in 2021 (AP)

No one in Israel or Palestine expected the Israeli army to kill Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in what is described as an “accidental” strike, according to Israel’s account since Oct.7.

Israel officially announced Sinwar’s death in an strike on a house in Rafah, southern Gaza, just hours after the army began investigating whether he had been killed. Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz called it a “major victory.”

Since Sinwar orchestrated Hamas’ “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack in October last year, he has become Israel’s top target.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi had vowed to kill him, using military and intelligence resources, along with US and Western support, to make his death a key war objective.

Turning Point

The war has reached a significant “turning point” with the killing of Sinwar, which may allow Israel to end the conflict. This development could also give Hamas more flexibility after losing its hardline leader, who has reshaped the group in recent years.

Before Israel confirmed Sinwar’s death, Gallant, Halevi, and Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar visited the Gaza border for a security assessment. They also briefed US President Joe Biden about the situation.

Political analyst Mustafa Ibrahim told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sinwar’s assassination will have major impacts on future events.

A Hamas source described the news as a “shock.”

Following confirmation of Sinwar’s death, the source said Hamas leaders began discussions about their future, including the selection of a new leader, current confrontations, and ceasefire negotiations.

Sources familiar with Hamas’ decision-making suggest that Sinwar’s absence will shift control back to the leadership outside Gaza. This change could make negotiations for a ceasefire easier and quicker, which may align with Israeli interests.

Israeli public broadcaster Kan reported that urgent discussions occurred between the negotiation team and security officials following Sinwar’s killing.

Sinwar was among those released in the 2011 prisoner exchange between Hamas and Israel.

After his release, he quickly rose to power and was first elected head of Hamas in Gaza in 2017, succeeding Ismail Haniyeh, who then became the overall leader of the movement. Sinwar took over the leadership role in August.

Radical Control

One key change Sinwar made in Hamas was a “firmness of leadership,” according to a source close to the group. The source explained that Sinwar was a strong leader who made significant decisions about who would rise or fall within the organization.

He successfully pushed the military faction's agenda and took firm control of decision-making, even when communication with him became difficult for a time.

Most of Hamas’ leadership abroad, including members from Gaza and the West Bank, participated in crucial meetings and unanimously approved Sinwar as the leader without any competition.

Sinwar’s selection highlights the continued control of Gaza’s leadership within Hamas for the second consecutive term. This leadership, which includes Ismail Haniyeh and now Sinwar, has worked to align Hamas with the Iranian-led axis, according to analysts.

Comprehensive Review

A source close to Hamas told Asharq Al-Awsat that the movement has been significantly weakened by the loss of many of its hardline leaders. He suggested that Hamas is likely to conduct a thorough review of its policies, though a complete change is not guaranteed.

Regarding potential impacts, the source noted several key points: first, decision-making may shift back to leaders abroad, leading to significant changes; second, Hamas may have to make concessions that were difficult under Sinwar’s leadership, especially concerning the conflict, prisoner exchanges, and relations with the Palestinian Authority; and third, Hamas will seek to navigate current challenges, requiring extensive discussions.

The assassination of Sinwar is another setback for Hamas, which is already facing multiple difficulties.



Inside Hezbollah’s Kamikaze Drone That Hit Israel's Binyamina

A photo released by the Israeli army spokesperson of the “Sayyad 107” drone.
A photo released by the Israeli army spokesperson of the “Sayyad 107” drone.
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Inside Hezbollah’s Kamikaze Drone That Hit Israel's Binyamina

A photo released by the Israeli army spokesperson of the “Sayyad 107” drone.
A photo released by the Israeli army spokesperson of the “Sayyad 107” drone.

The Israeli security apparatuses are investigating the type of kamikaze drone that Hezbollah used on Sunday evening to hit a Golani Brigade base near Binyamina south of Haifa, killing four soldiers and wounding about 90 others, including 12 soldiers with serious injuries.

Ron Ben-Yishai, a security expert at the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, said that from the limited details currently available, the drone was likely a Sayyad 107 model, a UAV manufactured in Iran and widely used by Hezbollah, which also produces it in large quantities in Lebanon.

“The model’s flight path can be programmed to frequently change altitude and direction, making it difficult to detect and track,” Ben-Yishai said.

“It has a range of up to 100 kilometers (62 miles) and is small, with a very low radar signature compared to larger, metal-made UAVs. Its detection relies on the heat emitted by the engine, which is also challenging to identify via optical means,” he added.

According to the security expert, the military is examining all possibilities, but it's almost certain that the UAV, which hit a critical target and caused many casualties, wasn't only a specialized model but also Hezbollah managed to overwhelm or disrupt the Israeli army’s detection systems by launching a mixed salvo of rockets and two other drones aimed at the Western Galilee.

Ben-Yishai noted that the UAVs continued toward the sea off the northern coast and the Iron Dome system intercepted one.

The Israeli army dispatched fighter jets and combat helicopters to track the remaining UAV, but contact with it was lost, he said.

The expert said it is possible that the UAV was pre-programmed to sharply descend toward the ground or the sea and continue flying at low altitude, exploiting the coastal terrain and then the hills of the coastal plain to evade interceptors.

“Hezbollah has gained considerable experience in operating UAVs over the past year, successfully causing numerous casualties among civilians and primarily IDF soldiers at remote bases,” Ben-Yishai wrote, adding that over half of the drones launched by Hezbollah are intercepted, either by the Israeli army fighter jets sent to engage them or by the Iron Dome and David's Sling systems.

However, he noted, due to the UAV's small size and very weak radar signature, the Iron Dome's fire control radars and the optical sensors on fighter jets and helicopters often lose track of them, especially in hilly areas where radar echoes from the terrain are dominant and misleading.

Ben-Yishai revealed that the Israeli army and defense industries have been trying to find a solution to this issue at least since the current war began, but there is still no effective detection and interception solution.

He said the sophisticated UAVs manufactured by Iran are equipped with inertial navigation systems in addition to satellite navigation, enabling them to stay on course and strike their targets even when faced with GPS jamming.

“This is intended to mislead them, but Iran and Hezbollah sometimes bypass the American GPS jamming by using unique satellite navigation systems developed by Russia or China,” Ben-Yishai said.