Perhaps the worst-case scenario long feared in decision-making circles has come true. With the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Washington and Tel Aviv used the same “shock and awe” approach Israel has relied on in recent years, one that delivers rapid gains before losing momentum by the end of a campaign.
This time, however, US President Donald Trump broke a taboo and opened a Pandora’s box, pushing the region into war on shaky grounds and with no clear end. He forced a confrontation of mutual deterrence with an Iranian system that has lost its regional deterrent image.
The expansion of these rival projects in the Middle East, shifting between confrontation and coexistence, has reached a breaking point.
The Khamenei project, which dominated four Arab capitals for decades, has suffered repeated setbacks over the past ten years after peaking in the wake of the Arab Spring. It drained its limited resources and drew the attention of Washington, and Israel’s determination to confront it.
The failure of coexistence made a clash inevitable, one the current US administration has not handled with the patience of a major power.
In the first US military intervention of its kind since 2003, Trump’s war on Iran has lacked a clear endgame. His rhetoric mixed shifting goals with flexible timelines to pressure Tehran. Over time, his administration lost control of the war’s narrative and psychological edge, while hesitating to escalate militarily. The failure to quickly weaken Iran led Washington to conclude that following Israel’s pace would deepen US involvement.
Who decides in Tehran?
Uncertainty also surrounds decision-making in Tehran. The system appears to be paying the price of successive assassinations, from Qassem Soleimani to Ismail Haniyeh and Hassan Nasrallah.
Now it faces a new deterrence phase after Khamenei’s killing, a leader who balanced conservatives and reformists, and the Revolutionary Guard with negotiators.
The new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, deepens concerns over hereditary rule and strengthens the security establishment over the religious one. The transition remains unclear, including loyalties and decision-making centers.
Will power be collective and contested, or will Mojtaba consolidate control, if he is not targeted? His legitimacy depends on the continuation of the war in the near term. Ending it would raise questions about his authority and force decisions on dealing with Washington, including easing the air blockade and rebuilding after war and sanctions.
A fragile deterrence balance
Washington believed the cost of confronting Iran was low, concluding with Israel that military action offered better results than diplomacy. That calculation proved wrong.
The United States destroyed much of Iran’s conventional capabilities but has not stopped its ballistic missile launches or its ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has used the strait as economic leverage, linking pressure on the regime to damage to the global economy.
The result has been the biggest supply disruption since the 1970s energy crisis, forcing the Trump administration to temporarily ease sanctions on Iranian oil.
Iran’s strategy unfolded in three phases. First, survival, preventing collapse and internal unrest. In a leadership vacuum, Tehran’s security system escalated deterrence sharply. As US rhetoric hinted at regime change, Iran treated the war as existential, despite knowing it could not win a conventional fight.
Second, raising the cost of war for Washington and the global economy. Credibility of deterrence became central. Without a response to a strike as major as Khamenei’s assassination, Iran risks appearing defeated, weakening its regional deterrence and internal stability.
Both sides turned to what Thomas Schelling called the “diplomacy of violence,” using constant military threats as pressure.
Another goal for Tehran has been internal cohesion, using external war to limit divisions and strengthen hardliners.
The past week marked a peak in tensions over Hormuz and energy infrastructure. Both sides stepped back from full escalation after recognizing the cost of retaliation would be too high. Signals of restraint emerged, along with a need for communication and clear red lines.
Trump moved first by announcing negotiations, surprising both Iran and Israel. The fight shifted from the battlefield to diplomacy, where the side that moves first shapes the outcome.
Mediation on three tracks
Arab diplomatic sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that mediation is underway, led by Pakistan, Egypt and Türkiye through three channels in Iran: the Revolutionary Guard, the foreign ministry and parliament speaker Mohammad Qalibaf.
Each country is using its own channels. No other states are currently positioned to mediate, especially as these three have not been targeted by Iranian missiles. The sources also point to advanced US proposals seeking a middle ground.
The challenge is timing. Washington wants a quick deal, while Tehran says time is tight, especially with communication risks under Israeli surveillance.
Iran’s proxies under strain
Iran’s regional proxies form the second pillar of deterrence. The idea of unified, simultaneous fronts proved largely unrealistic. It materialized only once after the 2023 “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation before the axis suffered repeated blows.
In the 2025 Iran-Israel war, these groups stayed neutral. Now, after Khamenei’s assassination, they have entered the conflict.
Assassinations by Israel and the United States weakened the network, while sanctions since 2019 cut resources. Supply routes through Iraq and Syria have also been strained.
Iran now leads from the front as its proxy network narrows. Its strategy focuses on expanding battlefields, not unifying them, with centralized control in Tehran. The Revolutionary Guard is now coordinating directly with Hezbollah and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces.
Hezbollah is fighting with depleted resources and a strained base. The Popular Mobilization Forces, long avoiding direct confrontation with US troops, have now targeted American forces and interests in Iraq and beyond, potentially reshaping deterrence and boosting Iran’s influence.
But the group is divided. Some factions continue attacks, others prioritize political interests. The result is fragmented deterrence and weaker credibility.
What comes next?
The key question is whether Tehran will insist on including Hezbollah in any deal, or whether Israel will impose a new reality south of the Litani River.
Even if Washington ends the war, Israel may keep pressure on Iran. Tehran’s proxies remain under pressure but not defeated. This ambiguity may weaken them over time without leading to full settlements.
Neither war nor truce will resolve local crises across these arenas.
As Carl von Clausewitz said, war continues politics by other means. Tehran is now shifting from deterrence to negotiation as part of its survival strategy. Signals point to pragmatic figures within hardline structures who can engage across factions.
Washington is trying to reach them, while Israel has targeted some, including Ali Larijani.
The key shift is now between Washington and Israel. Trump surprised Israel by considering de-escalation and sending Vice President JD Vance to deliver that message to Benjamin Netanyahu.
Both sides have moved to negotiating under fire, raising stakes while testing intentions. Washington favors Qalibaf, Tehran prefers Vance.
Gains and losses
Victory is relative. For Iran, staying at the table is a win despite heavy losses. Early talk of regime change has faded, even in Israel, under US pressure.
The narrative has shifted from regime change to control of Hormuz. Trump negotiates through pressure, Iran deters through endurance. Nuclear deadlock is now mirrored on the battlefield.
Both sides want to end the war, but on terms they can sell at home.
Russia and China prefer that Trump does not dominate global energy routes. Iran is part of a wider struggle over influence. If Trump falls short, Washington risks its image as a guarantor of global navigation.
Trump has hinted at joint management of Hormuz with Iran’s new leader, echoing US-China competition in the South China Sea.
A limited US intervention, combined with hesitation and economic risks, may give Iran an edge in the near term, strengthening its internal control, though long-term recovery depends on a clear deal with the West.
