How Will the ‘Battle for Damascus’ Resonate in Beirut and Baghdad?

A Syrian anti government fighter poses for a picture in front of one of the water wheels, or norias, of Hama, after forces captured of the city of Hama on December 6, 2024. (Photo by OMAR HAJ KADOUR / AFP)
A Syrian anti government fighter poses for a picture in front of one of the water wheels, or norias, of Hama, after forces captured of the city of Hama on December 6, 2024. (Photo by OMAR HAJ KADOUR / AFP)
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How Will the ‘Battle for Damascus’ Resonate in Beirut and Baghdad?

A Syrian anti government fighter poses for a picture in front of one of the water wheels, or norias, of Hama, after forces captured of the city of Hama on December 6, 2024. (Photo by OMAR HAJ KADOUR / AFP)
A Syrian anti government fighter poses for a picture in front of one of the water wheels, or norias, of Hama, after forces captured of the city of Hama on December 6, 2024. (Photo by OMAR HAJ KADOUR / AFP)

The chances of the Syrian conflict turning into an open and possibly long-lasting war between competing regional powers are growing, following a sudden shift in the balance of power.

For years, foreign forces have been drawn to Syria, using their military strength to support President Bashar al-Assad’s government.

The conflict reached its height after 2011 when Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and allied Iraqi factions, backed by Russia, joined the civil war. At the same time, the United States stationed troops in Syria to fight ISIS.

Later, key international players agreed to a political deal to reduce tensions, known as the “Astana Process.” However, Iran kept its military presence to secure the supply route between Tehran and Beirut, while the US set up military bases in northeastern Syria.

Roots of 2011

Response: When the Syrian uprising began in 2011, before it turned into a civil war, Türkiye was uncertain about its political and military options. The Turkish National Security Council spent weeks in May 2011 reviewing reports on the "Syrian crisis" from Hakan Fidan, then head of intelligence and now foreign minister.

Two years later, Türkiye saw Iran's Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias taking positions in Syria. Meanwhile, Türkiye focused on countering Kurdish forces in northern Syria with support from Arab allies. It also hosted millions of refugees, creating both an economic burden and political tensions at home between the ruling AKP and opposition CHP.

Extremist Groups: ISIS and other extremist groups expanded across Syria and Iraq, prompting a range of forces to join the fight. These included the US-led coalition, Kurdish factions, Iran’s Popular Mobilization Forces, the Revolutionary Guard, and the Syrian army.

Russian Role: Russia entered the Syrian conflict at a time when it was not yet focused on the war in Ukraine. It took control of Syria's coastline, strengthened its presence in the Middle East, and deepened its alliance with President Bashar al-Assad.

Syria’s ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

Tehran and Moscow: After the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon, Iran found itself unable to act. When Syrian armed factions launched a rapid advance beyond Aleppo and Idlib, Iran did not respond clearly. Meanwhile, Russia was too focused on the war in Ukraine to intervene.

Turkish Timing: Türkiye made its move clear, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stating just days ago that the situation in Syria is "managed calmly," showing Türkiye’s intentions to act ahead of others towards Damascus.

Syrian Factions’ Organization: The opposition groups fighting against both Assad and Iran showed increasing organization last week. While their leaders are linked to radical movements, the groups have so far avoided war crimes, maintaining discipline. It remains to be seen if this continues.

Syrian Army: The Syrian army’s retreat was notable as cities fell, including those after Aleppo. This could indicate a political decision to avoid fighting, weakening any political solution, or that the army is too weak and disorganized to protect the cities.

Battle for Damascus

“Iran’s options are now limited,” says an Iraqi political advisor who recently visited Washington and heard “new” views on Syria.

“Tehran has no bargaining power left, which makes it more dangerous if it decides to act with no political leverage,” the advisor warned.

Historically, Iran has never allowed Assad’s fall. However, sending forces now to support Assad would mean declaring war on Türkiye, especially with Russian hesitation and US indifference.

In Baghdad and Beirut, risks are growing as factions advance toward southern Syria, reaching the town of Qusayr and heading toward Damascus.

Iraqi faction leaders say, “Baghdad is tightening the pressure for the first time in years,” but “the religious and ideological factors won’t be easy to manage” if Syria’s minority groups or Shiite shrines in Damascus are threatened.

This depends heavily on the actions of the Syrian factions.

They acknowledge that moving now is difficult due to limited time, resources, and supply lines. However, retaliation could soon start in Beirut and Baghdad.



Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
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Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)

The Iranian government is scrambling to restore some of its influence in Syria as it still reels from the shock ouster of its close ally President Bashar al-Assad on December 8.

The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is already facing multiple domestic and international crises, including an economy in shambles and continued tensions over its nuclear program. But it is the sudden loss of influence in Syria after the fall of Assad to opposition groups that is exercising Iranian officials most, reported The Guardian on Friday.

“In the short term they want to salvage some influence with the opposition in Damascus. Iranian diplomats insist they were not wedded to Assad, and were disillusioned with his refusal to compromise,” it said.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview this week: “We had long ago reached the conclusion that the continuation of governance in Syria would face a fundamental challenge. Government officials were expected to show flexibility towards allowing the opposition to participate in power, but this did not happen.”

He added: “Tehran always had direct contacts with the Syrian opposition delegation. Since 2011, we have been suggesting to Syria the need to begin political talks with those opposition groups that were not affiliated with terrorism.”

At the same time, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson insisted it only entered Syria in 2012 at Assad’s request to help defeat ISIS, continued The Guardian. “Our presence was advisory and we were never in Syria to defend a specific group or individual. What was important to us was helping to preserve the territorial integrity and stability of Syria,” he said.

Such explanations have not cut much ice in Damascus. Iran remains one of the few countries criticized by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader.

Short honeymoon

Many Iranian officials are claiming the current victory lap being enjoyed by Türkiye in Syria may be brief as Ankara’s interests will start to diverge from the government led by the HTS.

Senior cleric Naser Makarem Shirazi said: “We must follow the Syrian issue with hope and know that this situation will not continue, because the current rulers of Syria will not remain united with each other”.

The conservative Javan newspaper predicted that “the current honeymoon period in Syria will end due to the diversity of groups, economic problems, the lack of security and diversity of actors.”.

Officially Iran blames the US and Israel for Assad’s collapse, but resentment at Ankara’s role is rife, ironically echoing Donald Trump’s claim that Syria has been the victim of an unfriendly takeover by Türkiye.

In his speech responding to Assad’s downfall supreme leader Ali Khamenei said a neighboring state of Syria played a clear role” in shaping events and “continues to do so now”. The Fars news agency published a poster showing the HTS leader in league with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Benjamin Netanyahu and Joe Biden.

Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations questioned whether HTS would remain allies with Türkiye for long. It said: “Although Türkiye is only one of the main winners of Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power in the short term, Ankara can never bring a government aligned with itself to power in Syria. Even if HTS attempts to form a stable government in Syria, which is impossible, in the medium term, it will become a major threat to Türkiye, which shares an 830-kilometer border with Syria.”

Reliance on Türkiye

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani predicted a bleak future for Syria and Türkiye. “In recent weeks, all of Syria’s military power has been destroyed by Israel, and unfortunately, the militants and Türkiye did not respond appropriately to Israel. It will take years to rebuild the Syrian army and armed forces.”

Mohsen Baharvand, a former Iranian ambassador to the UK, suggested the Damascus government may find itself overly reliant on Türkiye. “If the central government of Syria tries to consolidate its authority and sovereignty through military intervention and assistance from foreign countries – including Türkiye – Syria, or key parts of it, will be occupied by Türkiye, and Türkiye will enter a quagmire from which it will incur heavy human and economic costs.”

He predicted tensions between Türkiye and the HTS in particular about how to handle the Syrian Kurdish demand in north-east Syria for a form of autonomy. The Turkish-funded Syrian National Army is reportedly ready to mount an offensive against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in Kobani, a Kurdish-majority Syrian town on the northern border with Türkiye.

Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Wednesday that if the issue were addressed “properly” Ankara would not seek a military intervention. “There is a new administration in Damascus now. I think this is primarily their concern now,” Fidan said.

More broadly, the Syrian reverse is forcing Iran to accelerate a rethink of its foreign policy. The review centers on whether the weakening of its so-called Axis of Resistance – comprising allied groups in the region – requires Iran to become a nuclear weapon state, or instead strengthen Iran by building better relations in the region.

For years, Iran’s rulers have been saying that “defending Iran must begin from outside its borders.” This hugely costly strategy is largely obsolete, and how Iran explains its Syria reverse will be critical to deciding what replaces that strategy.