‘Caesar’s’ Partner ‘Sami’: I Wept at First When I Saw Pictures, Then Became Emotionally Numb

Syrians gather outside a prison in Damascus the day after Assad’s fall, hoping to uncover the fate of their missing loved ones (AFP)
Syrians gather outside a prison in Damascus the day after Assad’s fall, hoping to uncover the fate of their missing loved ones (AFP)
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‘Caesar’s’ Partner ‘Sami’: I Wept at First When I Saw Pictures, Then Became Emotionally Numb

Syrians gather outside a prison in Damascus the day after Assad’s fall, hoping to uncover the fate of their missing loved ones (AFP)
Syrians gather outside a prison in Damascus the day after Assad’s fall, hoping to uncover the fate of their missing loved ones (AFP)

In the final installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Osama Othman, the man who smuggled the “Caesar Files” documenting Syrian torture victims, described how the photos became a haunting part of his life.
“I lived with these images for years until the victims felt like friends,” he said.
Othman recalled his early emotional struggles.
“At first, I cried whenever I saw the photos,” he said.
“But over time, my feelings went numb. When I cried, I felt human. But when I started looking at the pictures coldly, just searching for specific ones, I felt like a stranger to myself. Bashar al-Assad disfigured the victims physically and destroyed us emotionally.”
For 11 years, Othman was known only by his codename “Sami” until he revealed his identity through Asharq Al-Awsat.
He shared one of the most heartbreaking moments: “Hearing a mother or wife recognize a loved one in the photos and say, ‘Thank God they’re dead. At least the waiting is over.’ It’s a pain that breaks your heart.”
Among the nearly 27,000 photos, some left a lasting impression on Othman. He mentioned victims with large tattoos of Assad on their chests and security officers smiling next to mutilated bodies, as if posing for a tourist photo.
The following is the text of the interview:
How did you handle seeing so many torture photos?
“The first images I got from ‘Caesar’ were devastating. You can’t imagine,” said Othman. “It’s one thing to see someone killed in a battle or a crime—you can understand it. But when you see photos of victims with burn marks all over their chests, it’s beyond comprehension.”
Othman shared how he coped.
“I saw these victims as my family—my brother, my father. That made it hurt even more. I felt their pain as if it was my own. What kind of person tortures someone like this? If they were going to die in prison, just kill them. Why subject them to such barbaric torture?”
“No regime in history has gone to such lengths to detain and torture its own people in ways no sane mind can comprehend. The cruelty is unimaginable,” he added.
Did you suffer from sleepless nights and tears?
“In the beginning, I couldn’t stop crying,” said Othman.
“These victims aren’t just numbers. They had mothers waiting for them, children, siblings, and lives. Assad turned them into photos with numbers. Even now, 10 years later, we have thousands of images with no names. We hoped to access records linking these numbers to identities when the regime fell, but that hasn’t happened.”
Othman and the Caesar Files for Justice organization are now working on a solution.
“We’re creating an app to match missing persons’ photos from families with our files, using forensic methods like skull measurements and other details beyond what the eye can see.”
Over time, Othman’s emotions changed.
“After looking at thousands of photos, certain details stick with you. For example, Branch 227 reminds me of victims with eyes gouged out, while Branch 215 committed over half of the recorded violations. These numbers and images are burned into my memory. I’ve seen so many that I can often tell which branch they came from at a glance.”
“These victims felt like my friends,” said Osama Othman.
“In some photos, you could see a victim screaming in their final moments, their mouth frozen open. That silent scream, heard only by God, reached us through the images. I felt as if they were entrusting me with a responsibility.”
Over time, Othman’s emotions dulled.
“At first, I cried and knew I was still human. But later, as I searched through the photos without feeling, I felt like a stranger to myself. Assad didn’t just destroy the victims physically—he broke us emotionally too.”
Were doctors involved in torture?
“There were reports of killings in hospitals,” confirmed Othman.
“We had photos of victims with medical tubes still in their arms and bandages on their bodies. It’s unclear what happened—were they arrested and taken to the hospital, or detained directly from there? I don’t know.”
Othman emphasized the lack of evidence.
“Without proof, I can’t confirm these claims. Some doctors have faced trials in Germany for alleged abuses against detainees, but many stories circulating publicly lack the legal backing to hold up in court.”
“Unfortunately,” he added, “any claims of torture or killings without solid evidence can’t withstand scrutiny in any court.”
The pictures uncovered the fate of some missing people, did the relatives of those missing contact you and how did you feel about them?
Othman frequently received photos from families of the missing, hoping to find their loved ones among the Caesar Files.
“Relatives would send me images, asking if their loved ones were in the files,” Othman said.
“I would compare these photos with thousands in the Caesar Files, searching for similarities.”
Othman explained that the process was slow and painstaking.
“It took a lot of time, but often I was able to find a match.”
Othman described the emotional toll of working with the Caesar Files.
“Often, when we send full-body images of victims to their families, it’s not their loved one. But sometimes, it is. What’s most heartbreaking is hearing them say ‘Thank God, thank God.’ Why? Because they’re relieved their loved one has died. A mother or wife says this in agony, grateful that their suffering has ended. This makes you wonder—how could a mother see her son tortured and dead, yet say ‘thank God’?”
Othman also recalled disturbing images.
“We have photos of victims who lost their eyes. One photo shows a man with a tattoo of Bashar al-Assad’s face, and the words ‘Syria, Assad’ under it. This man was tortured to death in the Air Force Intelligence branch in Damascus.”
One image, Othman said, still haunts him.
“In another, there are many bodies in a cart, from different branches, not just one. Some bodies are piled up outside a garage, decaying. What’s chilling is a soldier smiling in the background. It makes you question—why is he smiling? Is it happiness, or has he lost all sense of feeling in the face of such cruelty?”
Othman described a disturbing photo of hospital staff smiling, seemingly unaware of the horror around them.
“In the background, you can see bodies wrapped in plastic, others on tables, and some limbs visible. Hospital corridors were used to wrap up the bodies,” he said.
Othman also pointed to detailed images of victims’ eyes, which forensic experts can use to assess injuries and decay caused by insects.
He emphasized the pain of sharing these images.
“I don’t want to show more—it’s too painful for viewers and the victims’ families. But our message has reached the world. After 10 years, the Caesar Files exposed the regime’s crimes, and today, institutions and former prisoners are revealing even more about these atrocities.”
How did you feel about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s asylum offer to Assad?
Othman expressed his reaction to Russian President Vladimir Putin granting Assad asylum.
“Since Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, the Russian regime has been a partner in the Syrian regime’s crimes,” Othman said.
“We viewed the Russian officials as true partners in these atrocities, and they likely bear greater responsibility than the Syrian regime itself.”
Othman was not surprised by Assad seeking refuge in Russia.
“I don’t think this asylum will last long. We are committed to working tirelessly to bring Assad back to Syria, recover the stolen funds, and ensure he is prosecuted in Damascus.”
Othman shared his hopes for justice in Syria, expressing his desire to see Assad in the defendant’s cage.
“I pray I live long enough to witness that moment, just as I lived to hear the news of Assad's fall and the liberation of Damascus,” he said.
Asked whether Assad knew about the atrocities taking place in Syrian prisons, Othman was firm.
“In Syria, nothing happens without the president knowing. This is a repressive, security-driven regime led by Assad, or previously by his father, Hafez al-Assad. No security official under this regime would act without the president’s approval.”
Othman acknowledged that while they lack direct evidence linking Assad to specific crimes, the responsibility falls on the heads of the security agencies.
“Legally, the blame lies directly with the heads of security agencies, as the chain of command flows from them. But in Syria, everyone knows that even the smallest actions in any security branch or prison are part of a systematic plan known and approved by the regime's top leadership.”
On whether the victims in the Caesar Files were from specific regions or sects, Othman clarified, “The victims in the Caesar Files are Syrians, and we defend all Syrians. Since the victims are identified by numbers, not names, I can’t determine if they belong to a particular sect or group.”
However, he noted signs of certain affiliations.
“Some victims have tattoos on their bodies. You might be surprised to learn that several victims have a large tattoo of Bashar al-Assad on their chests. You could assume these men were Assad supporters. I don’t know their sects, but someone who tattoos Bashar al-Assad on their body surely has strong support for him.”
Othman pointed out that some tattoos found on victims might provide clues about their identity, but not with certainty.
“A tattoo of Palestine, for example, isn’t unique to Palestinians. We all support Palestine. But it’s likely this person was Palestinian, especially from the Palestinian community in Syria,” he said.
He emphasized that tattoos could hint at political beliefs or nationalities, but he wouldn't make assumptions.
“These tattoos may suggest political views or connections to certain countries, but I can't say for sure if the victims belonged to a specific sect or group.”
Othman added that once names are linked to numbers, he may be able to provide more concrete answers.
“When we can match names to numbers, I'll be able to say if many of these victims came from a particular sect.”
Do you believe that Syria is on its way to a rebirth?
Othman shared cautious hope for Syria’s future.
“God willing, a new Syria will be born,” he said, but added a note of caution.
“I don’t want to be pessimistic, but the real fight for Syria's rebuilding began on December 8, 2024, with Assad’s fall and Damascus’ liberation. Everything before that was just about toppling the regime and removing its leader.”
When will you return to Syria?
Othman said he is eager to return to Syria but faces administrative hurdles.
“I’m waiting for the right moment, but there are still many bureaucratic obstacles,” he explained.
“If it were possible, I would have gone back earlier.”
Regarding his fears due to his involvement in the Caesar Files, Othman admitted the risks remain.
“The fear is still there. We hid our identities to protect ourselves and our families, and that need still exists,” he said.
“The risks are greater now because we are pushing for accountability. This puts us in conflict with many people. I know the dangers, but I’m committed to this path and prepared for whatever comes. If I could do more from hiding, I would, but now it's important to be visible and move the case forward.”



Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)

Only weeks after Iranian diplomat Mohammad Reza Sheibani returned to Beirut as ambassador, his name has become the focus of a diplomatic crisis.

Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry withdrew its approval and declared him “persona non grata”, reflecting rising tensions between Beirut and Tehran and drawing renewed attention to a career tied to some of the Middle East’s most complex issues.

The decision swiftly ended the mission of a diplomat Tehran had sent back to Beirut, relying on his long experience on Lebanon and Syria.

His return had collided with a Lebanese political climate increasingly sensitive to the limits of foreign diplomatic roles.

War experience and regional role

Sheibani is no stranger to Lebanon. He served as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut from 2005 to 2009, a period that coincided with the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, giving him direct experience managing ties under complex security and political conditions.

His reappointment in early 2026 reflected an Iranian preference for seasoned diplomats in areas where politics and security overlap.

He replaced former ambassador Mojtaba Amani, who was injured in a pager explosion in Beirut, at a time of regional escalation, giving his return added weight beyond routine diplomacy.

Between Beirut and Damascus

Born in 1960, Sheibani joined Iran’s Foreign Ministry in the 1980s and rose through its ranks, focusing on Middle East affairs.

He served as chargé d’affaires in Cyprus and as head of Iran’s interests section in Egypt, before being appointed ambassador to Lebanon and later to Syria from 2011 to 2016, during which he covered the early years of the war.

He later served as ambassador to Tunisia and non-resident ambassador to Libya, and as assistant foreign minister for Middle East affairs.

He also worked as a senior adviser and researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies at the Foreign Ministry, before returning to the forefront amid rising regional tensions.

Roles during escalation

In October 2024, he was named special representative of the Iranian foreign minister for West Asia, and in January 2025, he was appointed special envoy to Syria following developments in Damascus, including the closure of Iran’s embassy.

He was also tasked with following the Lebanese file as a special envoy during a sensitive phase, reinforcing his role as a crisis diplomat.

His career reflects a distinction within Iran’s diplomatic structure, as he is linked to the Ministry of Intelligence rather than the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting a division of roles in foreign policy.

Legal and constitutional debate

The move by Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry has also sparked legal debate over how such decisions are made and enforced.

Constitutional expert Saeed Malek said the decision is based on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state to declare a diplomat persona non grata without a specific procedure.

He said the measure does not amount to a break in diplomatic ties but falls within the management of diplomatic representation, adding that such decisions fall within the foreign minister’s authority under Article 66 of the constitution.

Malek said the decision is binding, and once the deadline to leave Lebanon expires, the ambassador’s presence becomes unlawful.

He added that security forces are required to enforce the decision and remove him once located.

However, he said enforcement remains bound by international rules, as the ambassador’s presence inside the embassy prevents Lebanese forces from entering under diplomatic immunity, meaning his expulsion can only be carried out once he leaves the premises.


Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.


Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.