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Negotiators Zero in on Potential Deal to Disarm Syria’s Last Battleground

A member of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stands along a street after opposition fighters seized the capital and ousted Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in Hasakah, Syria, December 11, 2024. (Reuters)
A member of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stands along a street after opposition fighters seized the capital and ousted Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in Hasakah, Syria, December 11, 2024. (Reuters)
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Negotiators Zero in on Potential Deal to Disarm Syria’s Last Battleground

A member of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stands along a street after opposition fighters seized the capital and ousted Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in Hasakah, Syria, December 11, 2024. (Reuters)
A member of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stands along a street after opposition fighters seized the capital and ousted Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in Hasakah, Syria, December 11, 2024. (Reuters)

Negotiators are zeroing in on a potential deal to resolve one of the most explosive questions looming over Syria's future: the fate of Kurdish forces that the US considers key allies against ISIS but neighboring Türkiye regards as a national security threat.

Diplomatic and military negotiators from the United States, Türkiye, Syria and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are showing more flexibility and patience than their public statements suggest, a dozen sources told Reuters, including five directly involved in the intensive web of discussions in recent weeks.

This could set the stage for an accord in the coming months that would see some Kurdish fighters leave Syria's restive northeast and others brought under the authority of the new defense ministry, six of the sources said.

However, many thorny issues need to be resolved, they said. These include how to integrate the SDF alliance's well-armed and trained fighters into Syria's security framework and administer territory under their control, which includes key oil and wheat fields.

In an interview with Saudi Arabia's Asharq News channel on Tuesday, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said the alliance's "basic demand" is for decentralized administration - a potential challenge to Syria's new leadership, which wants to bring all of the country back under the government's authority after ousting Bashar al-Assad last month.

Abdi indicated that the SDF has no intention of dissolving, saying it was open to linking with the defense ministry and operating according to its rules, but as "a military bloc".

Syria's new defense minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, rejected that approach in an interview with Reuters on Sunday, saying the suggestion that the SDF remain one bloc "is not right."

The former opposition fighters now in power in Damascus have said they want all armed groups to integrate into Syria's official forces, under a unified command. The SDF, when asked for comment, referred Reuters to its commander's interview.

How much autonomy Kurdish factions retain likely hinges on whether incoming US president Donald Trump continues Washington's longtime support of its Kurdish allies, according to diplomats and officials on all sides.

Trump has not spoken publicly about his intentions, including his plans for some 2,000 US troops stationed in Syria. A Trump representative did not comment.

Any deal also depends on whether Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan holds off on a threatened military offensive against the People's Protection Units (YPG), the Kurdish group that spearheads the SDF alliance.

Ankara views them as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been waging an insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984 and is deemed a terrorist group by both Türkiye and the US.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said this month that Syria's new authorities "should be given an opportunity to ... end the occupation and terror the YPG created", but he did not say how long Ankara would wait for it to disarm before launching an incursion.

A Turkish Foreign Ministry source said disarming armed groups and the departure of "foreign terrorist fighters" were essential for Syria's stability and territorial integrity, so the sooner this happens the better.

"We are voicing this expectation of ours in the strongest terms during our contacts with both the United States and the new administration in Damascus," the source said.

INTENSIVE TALKS

US and Turkish officials have been holding "very intensive" discussions since fighters led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, a former al-Qaeda affiliate, launched a lightning offensive from their northwestern stronghold that deposed Assad on Dec. 8, a senior US diplomat told Reuters.

The two countries share a "common view of where things should end up", including a belief that all foreign fighters should exit Syrian territory, the diplomat said, noting Turkish negotiators "have a very high sense of urgency" to settle things.

However, the diplomat, who like some other sources requested anonymity to discuss sensitive negotiations, said the talks were "hugely complex" and would take time.

Parallel talks are taking place between the US and both the SDF and HTS, Türkiye and HTS, and the SDF and HTS, officials from all sides say.

Part of a stateless ethnic group straddling Iraq, Iran, Türkiye, Armenia and Syria, Kurds had been among the few winners of the Syrian conflict, gaining control over Arab-majority areas as the US partnered with them in the campaign against ISIS. They now hold nearly a quarter of the country.

But Assad's fall has left Syrian Kurdish factions on the back foot, with Türkiye-backed armed groups gaining ground in the northeast and the country's new rulers in Damascus friendly with Ankara.

Türkiye, which provided direct support to some opposition groups against Assad, has emerged as one of the most influential power brokers in Syria since his fall. Like the US, it has designated HTS a terrorist group because of its al-Qaeda past, but Ankara is believed to have significant sway over the group.

Officials on all sides worry that failure to reach a ceasefire and longer-term political accord in the northeast could destabilize Syria as it seeks to recover from a 13-year civil war that killed hundreds of thousands, displaced millions and drew in countries including Russia, Iran and Israel.

Dozens of people in northern Syria have been reported killed since December in clashes between the Kurdish-led SDF and Türkiye’s allies, and in cross-border Turkish airstrikes.

Failure to resolve the fate of Kurdish factions in Syria could also undermine nascent efforts to end the PKK's insurgency in Türkiye.

The United Nations has warned of "dramatic consequences" for Syria and the region if a political solution is not found in the northeast.

POTENTIAL TRADE-OFFS

US support for the SDF has been a source of tension with its NATO ally, Türkiye.

Washington views the SDF as a key partner in countering ISIS, which Secretary of State Antony Blinken has warned will try to use this period to re-establish capabilities in Syria. The SDF is still guarding tens of thousands of detainees linked to the group.

Erdogan said on Wednesday that Türkiye has the power to "crush" all terrorists in Syria, including ISIS and Kurdish militants.

Türkiye wants the management of camps and prisons where ISIS detainees are being held transferred to Syria's new rulers and has offered to help them. It has also demanded that the SDF expel all foreign fighters and senior PKK members from its territory and disarm the remaining members in a way it can verify.

Abdi, the SDF commander, has shown flexibility regarding some Turkish demands, telling Reuters last month that its foreign fighters, including PKK members, would leave Syria if Türkiye agrees to a ceasefire.

The PKK said in a statement to Reuters on Thursday that it would agree to leave if the SDF maintains control of the northeast or a significant role in joint leadership.

Such assurances are unlikely to satisfy Ankara at a time when the SDF is "trying to stay alive and autonomous" in Syria, Omer Onhon, Türkiye’s last ambassador to Damascus, told Reuters.

In Ankara on Wednesday, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shibani said the extensive US-backed SDF presence was no longer justified, and the new administration would not allow Syrian land to be a source of threats to Türkiye. Standing next to him, his Turkish counterpart, Fidan, said it was time to put anti-terror pledges into practice.

Abdi told Asharq News that he has met with Syria's de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the two sides agreed to set up a joint military committee to decide how the SDF would integrate with the defense ministry. He described the meeting with Sharaa, who heads HTS, as positive.

Abu Qasra, the defense minister, accused SDF leaders on Sunday of "procrastinating" on the issue, saying "consolidation of all areas under the new administration ... is a right of the Syrian state."

The new leadership believes that allowing SDF fighters to continue operating as a bloc would "risk destabilization, including a coup", a ministry official told Reuters.

Abdi argued that a decentralized administration would not threaten Syria's unity, saying the SDF is not demanding the kind of federalism introduced in Iraq, where Kurds have their own regional government.

Some Syrian officials and diplomats say the SDF will likely need to relinquish control of significant territory and oil revenues, gained during the war, as part of any political settlement.

In return, Kurdish factions could be granted protections for their language and culture within a decentralized political structure, said Bassam al-Kuwatli, president of the small Syrian Liberal Party, which supports minority rights but is not involved in the talks.

A senior Syrian Kurdish source acknowledged that some such trade-offs would likely be needed but did not elaborate.

Abdi told Asharq News that the SDF was open to handing over responsibility for oil resources to the new administration, provided the wealth was distributed fairly to all provinces.

Washington has called for a "managed transition" of the SDF's role.

The US diplomat said Assad's ouster opens the door for Washington to eventually consider withdrawing its troops from Syria, though much depends on whether trusted forces like its Kurdish allies remain engaged in efforts to counter any ISIS resurgence.

Trump's return to the White House on Monday has raised hopes in Türkiye of a favorable deal, given the rapport he established with Erdogan during his first term.

Trump has spoken approvingly about Erdogan's role in Syria, calling him a "very smart guy", and said Türkiye would "hold the key" to what happens there.

"The Americans won't abandon (the SDF)," said Onhon, Türkiye’s former ambassador. "But the arrival of someone as unpredictable as Trump must worry them in a way too."

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Sweida’s Druze, Bedouin Tribes Locked in Historic Grievances

Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)
Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)
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Sweida’s Druze, Bedouin Tribes Locked in Historic Grievances

Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)
Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)

Sweida, a province in southern Syria, is teetering on the brink after days of deadly violence and clashes between local communities and government security forces, an unrest that signals deeper turmoil across the war-battered country.

The latest flare-up has laid bare tensions that go beyond the provincial borders, raising concerns about the future of coexistence and civil peace in a region long known for its rich tapestry of religious, social, and cultural diversity.

While the Syrian government in Damascus seeks to reassert control over all of its territory, local groups are renewing calls for greater recognition of their rights and “distinct identity.” The result is a fragile and combustible equation in a strategically vital region.

Sweida has long been a flashpoint, shaped by decades of uneasy relations between Druze communities and neighboring Bedouin tribes. That legacy of mistrust now intersects with a crumbling economy, a lack of essential services, the rise of armed factions, and a newly entrenched central authority in Damascus, factors that together threaten to turn the province into a flashpoint for wider instability.

Competing narratives have further muddied the waters, with each side offering starkly different versions of recent events, accounts that are often shaped not just by what happened in the past few days, but by long-standing grievances and buried animosities. The deepening rift and absence of trust among local communities highlight just how far Syria remains from reconciliation.

As pressure builds, observers warn that without a sustainable political solution that acknowledges local demands while maintaining national cohesion, Sweida may be a harbinger of further unrest in Syria’s uncertain future.

Power Struggles and Fractured Alliances

In Syria’s Sweida, power is fragmented among a complex web of religious authorities, influential families, and rival armed factions, a fractured landscape that reflects the broader divisions tearing at the country.

Local leadership is split between traditional Druze clerical authorities and prominent families, each with their own loyalties and varying degrees of influence on the ground. Political rivalries run deep, and military factions are equally divided, some aligning with the government in Damascus, while others openly challenge it.

Among the most prominent pro-government groups is the “Madafat al-Karama” faction led by Laith al-Balous, son of the late Druze leader Sheikh Wahid al-Balous. He is seen as a key ally of Damascus, alongside Suleiman Abdel-Baqi, commander of the “Ahrar Jabal al-Arab” group.

On the opposing side are factions such as the “Military Council in Sweida” and “Liwa al-Jabal” (Mountain Brigade), which collectively field around 3,000 fighters. These groups are seen as aligned with the views of influential Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who has been increasingly critical of the central government.

A newer alliance has also emerged under the banner of “Counter-Terrorism Forces” or the “Syrian Brigade Party,” bringing together factions such as “Dir’ al-Tawhid,” “Forces of Al-Ulya,” “Sheikh al-Karama,” “Saraya al-Jabal,” and “Jaysh al-Muwahideen.” This coalition formally severed ties with Damascus following Sheikh Hijri’s speech on July 15, in which he rejected the government’s announcement of a ceasefire agreement with local notables.

Also active in the province is the “Men of Dignity Movement,” a relatively large faction led by Abu Hassan Yehya al-Hajjar. Though not officially aligned with the new coalition, the group is also staunchly opposed to the Syrian government.

The growing number of factions and rival power centers has deepened instability in Sweida.

Bedouin Tribes in Sweida Say They Are Marginalized, Blamed and Forgotten

Even after government forces withdrew and a fragile ceasefire took hold in Sweida, clashes reignited, this time between Druze residents and Bedouin tribes, underscoring the deep and historical grievances simmering beneath the surface of the country’s sectarian fault lines.

The Bedouin, who see themselves as long-marginalized stakeholders in the region, say they have been caught in the crossfire - blamed for violence they did not initiate and excluded from political life and public services.

“We are the perpetual scapegoats,” said Mohammad Abu Thulaith, a lawyer and member of the Sweida Tribal Council. A descendant of one of the Bedouin tribes long at odds with the Druze population, he told Asharq Al-Awsat that “Bedouins are the weakest link in the local power struggle.”

The sense of injustice voiced by Abu Thulaith runs deep and is rooted in historical narratives. According to his account, the Druze - who migrated to the Jabal al-Arab area around two centuries ago - gradually expanded their influence, curbing the pastoral livelihoods of the Bedouin, particularly livestock herding. This, he said, led to the forced migration of nearly half of the Bedouin tribes from the mountain region toward Jordan, rural Damascus, and Daraa.

He cited the example of Saad Hayel al-Surour, a former speaker of the Jordanian parliament, who remains a Syrian citizen to this day. His father, Hayel al-Surour, once headed the Syrian parliament before the 1958 union between Syria and Egypt.

Many in the Bedouin community consider themselves the original inhabitants of the land, victims of what they describe as “a prolonged injustice” that denied them citizenship rights, political representation, and even basic services.

Abu Thulaith argues that the source of current tensions must be addressed at its roots. “We are blamed because the other side does not dare confront the real actors behind the violence,” he said, referring to armed groups operating in the area.

He called on the Druze tribal leadership - often referred to as “the people of the mountain” - to assume responsibility for protecting the Bedouin community and ending decades of exclusion. “We’ve suffered from a double injustice,” he said. “One at the hands of the Assad regime and Baathist rule, and the other from our neighbors. We have no access to employment, no political representation, and we’re deprived of the most basic public services.”

Despite the mounting frustration, Abu Thulaith insists that the Bedouin do not seek confrontation. “We don’t have the means to fight,” he said. “All we want is to live in peace with our neighbors. No one can erase the other. Since the fall of the former regime, tribal communities have hoped the state would step in to offer protection and ensure the most basic rights.”

As tensions in Sweida continue to spiral, voices like Abu Thulaith’s are demanding a deeper national conversation about identity, land, and the future of Jabal al-Arab - one that addresses long-neglected wounds before they erupt into further conflict.

Druze Grapple with a Perpetual Identity Crisis

For Syria’s Druze minority, identity is not just a question of culture or belief, it is a matter of survival. That fear of erasure has long shaped their political instincts, social structures, and geographic presence in the country.

“The Druze, like many minorities, live with a constant sense of threat,” said Khaldoun Al-Nabbouani, a professor of political philosophy at the University of Paris and a native of Sweida. “This persistent anxiety drives them to close ranks around their identity in a collective effort of self-preservation.”

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Nabbouani explained that the community’s inward turn is not only symbolic or cultural - it also manifests demographically. “Just as the Alawites are concentrated in the coastal mountains, the Druze have built their stronghold in Jabal al-Arab. It reflects a broader pattern among minorities to cluster in specific regions where they can reinforce their social cohesion and safeguard a perpetually anxious identity.”

That reflex dates back centuries. The very formation of the Druze sect, he said, was a political and cultural rebellion against traditional Islam. “Since its inception, the community has developed a deep need for internal solidarity and social insulation,” he said. “Even today, that’s visible in things like marriage practices - interfaith unions remain extremely rare.”

This insularity, he noted, extends to the political realm. The community has historically resisted the appointment of governors or officials from outside the Druze fold, a trend dating back to the 1930s and continuing into recent decades. One of the more controversial examples was the appointment of a non-Druze governor under the government of Ahmad Al-Sharaa, which sparked uproar, resignation, and a political standoff before the governor ultimately returned.

Tensions between the Druze and the central government are nothing new. Under President Adib Shishakli in the early 1950s, relations with Damascus deteriorated sharply. Shishakli accused the Druze of plotting against the state and in 1954 ordered artillery strikes on Jabal al-Arab, an assault that killed civilians, displaced families, and left deep scars that still echo in local memory.

When the Baath Party seized power in 1963, Damascus shifted tactics, pursuing what Al-Nabbouani described as a policy of “soft containment.” Symbolic appointments of Druze figures to government positions were coupled with tight security oversight in Sweida, a strategy aimed at managing rather than integrating the province.

As new waves of unrest ripple through southern Syria, the Druze community once again finds itself wrestling with existential questions caught between historical trauma, present instability, and an uncertain future.