Iranian Leaks: How Rouhani Persuaded Putin to Keep Assad in Powerhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5110913-iranian-leaks-how-rouhani-persuaded-putin-keep-assad-power
Iranian Leaks: How Rouhani Persuaded Putin to Keep Assad in Power
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks with former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani during their talks after the third Gas Exporting Countries Forum summit in Tehran, November 23, 2015 (File - Getty)
Iranian Leaks: How Rouhani Persuaded Putin to Keep Assad in Power
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks with former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani during their talks after the third Gas Exporting Countries Forum summit in Tehran, November 23, 2015 (File - Getty)
Two months after Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria was overthrown, an Iranian magazine revealed details of the first meeting between former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September 2013.
The meeting took place in an atmosphere of concern and uncertainty about Assad’s future.
The reformist-leaning magazine “Agahi-ye No” published a full account of the conversation, which happened on September 13, 2013, a month after Rouhani took office. The meeting occurred during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
Putin had known Rouhani from their time as national security chiefs in their countries.
In a report titled “When Did Russia Abandon Syria?” Agahi-ye No said the meeting between the two presidents lasted an hour and 20 minutes. The first part of the discussion covered general issues between Russia and Iran, before moving on to Iran’s nuclear program and the situation in Syria.
The discussion on Syria began when Rouhani asked Putin, “What do you want to do in Syria?” Putin responded cautiously, "Do you think Assad can stay in power?" Rouhani replied, “Yes, but with reforms.” Putin asked, “How?”
Rouhani explained that Syria is a multi-sectarian country with a divide between Alawites and Sunnis. He said the Baath Party is secular and unconcerned with social freedoms. “In this situation, Assad is the only one who can keep Syria united. There's no alternative,” he said.
Rouhani added, “We’ve tried to find an alternative, but we weren’t alone. The French, the British, and even you Russians couldn’t find one.”
Putin disagreed, saying, “It's unlikely Assad will remain.”
Rouhani responded, “Who is the alternative? The army only follows Assad’s orders.”
Putin then asked, “What if Assad is overthrown?” Rouhani said, “Syria will collapse. He must be protected.”
Putin said, “I can secure weapons for Assad,” but Rouhani argued, “Military help alone isn’t enough. We need political support.”
The two leaders agreed to appoint special representatives to discuss Assad’s future. As Rouhani left, Putin whispered in his ear: “I’ve prepared a ship on the Mediterranean and a plane in our bases for Assad to come to Moscow in an emergency.”
This surprised Rouhani. Was Putin planning an escape for Assad? Rouhani didn’t ask, unsure if Putin was worried about Assad or already planning his escape.
Before getting in the car, Rouhani whispered back, “It’s a good idea, but Assad must not know. He must think there’s no escape. He needs to understand that resistance is his only option.”
Later, Putin raised a question that unsettled Rouhani: “Why does the US hate Assad so much?” Rouhani replied, “Because the US wants someone loyal to them in Damascus, while Assad isn’t trusted by Washington.”
This exchange sparked debate in Tehran.
These details were published amid growing criticism of Iran’s support for Assad, especially from senior officials and the Revolutionary Guard. As Assad’s position weakened, concerns about Iran’s military presence in Syria grew louder.
Moreover, this is the second widely shared account from President Hassan Rouhani's team about Iranian-Russian discussions on Syria, following the controversial March 2021 leak of a recording with former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and current Vice President for Strategic Affairs.
In his audio testimony to the presidential archive, Zarif accused Russia of trying multiple times to disrupt the nuclear deal, either at the last minute during negotiations or in the months before it was implemented.
He also discussed how Putin invited General Qasem Soleimani to Moscow to convince him to expand military cooperation between Russia and Iran, just two months before the nuclear agreement took effect.
Zarif downplayed the “heroic” version of events promoted by the Revolutionary Guard and its allies about Soleimani’s visit to Moscow, which they claimed helped persuade Putin to intervene in Syria.
Zarif criticized how military activities on the ground, led by Soleimani before his death in a US airstrike in early 2020, had undermined the role of diplomacy.
In 2017, Rouhani’s government joined the Astana talks with Russia and Türkiye to find a political solution to the Syrian crisis.
However, decisions on Syria remained under the control of Iran’s National Security Council and the Revolutionary Guard, both led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafathttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5122443-toufic-sultan-recalls-asharq-al-awsat-mutual-hatred-between-hafez-al-assad-and
Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Journalists sometimes hear shocking statements—ones they lock away in their memory, fearing their repercussions. Some are too violent, too damaging, or too costly to repeat. Others risk swift denial from those who made them.
That was the case in late January 1987, when Kuwait hosted the fifth Islamic Summit.
Among the leaders in attendance were Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat.
I had requested an interview with Arafat, and he agreed to meet. After an exchange of pleasantries, he delivered a series of startling remarks.
“What’s happening in Beirut?” he asked.
“You know the country is grappling with the aftermath of the war of the camps,” I replied.
“No, Ghassan,” he shot back. “This is not the ‘war of the camps.’ The real name is the ‘war on the camps.’ It was personally ordered by Hafez al-Assad. Regrettably, the Amal Movement, led by Nabih Berri, is carrying out the decision, aided—unfortunately—by the Lebanese Army’s Sixth Brigade.”
Arafat must have noticed my surprise at his bluntness, because he raised his voice in anger.
“Assad is trying to finish what Ariel Sharon started in the 1982 invasion but failed to achieve. This is a continuation of Sharon’s mission to eliminate the PLO,” he charged.
Veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Assad: A Souk Al-Hamidiya merchant
I pointed out that his accusations were grave, targeting Syria’s head of state. His frustration only grew.
“Assad is not Syria’s president,” Arafat fumed.
“He is a merchant from Souk al-Hamidiya. If only he focused on reclaiming the Golan instead of blocking Palestinian independence to please America and Israel. Mark my words: time will prove me right. Hafez al-Assad does not recognize Palestine, nor Lebanon. He loathes Iraq under the guise of hating Saddam Hussein.”
Stunned, I listened as he went on.
“What they call an ‘uprising’ within Fatah is a conspiracy orchestrated by Assad and funded by [Libyan leader Moammar] al-Gaddafi. Assad’s only dream is to turn the Palestinian cause into a bargaining chip and to dominate Lebanon.”
As Arafat’s anger subsided, our conversation shifted to other topics.
A few days ago, I met with veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan—a man who carries the collective memory of two cities. Born in Tripoli, he has also witnessed Beirut’s political twists and turns, having been a close associate of Kamal Jumblatt and his son, Walid, as well as former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and his son, Saad.
He maintained ties with Arafat and participated in meetings with Assad and other Arab leaders. His recollections are rich with pivotal moments, particularly from his time as deputy leader of the National Movement, a coalition of leftist and nationalist forces led by Kamal Jumblatt.
Rocky start: Assad and Arafat’s strained relationship
Arafat’s relationship with Damascus was troubled from the outset. After a bloody internal dispute within Fatah, he was briefly detained in Syria, where the defense minister at the time was Hafez al-Assad.
Following the violent clashes between Palestinian factions and the Jordanian army in 1970, Assad came to view the presence of armed Palestinian groups as a source of chaos. This belief shaped his stance toward Arafat and the Palestinian resistance movement for years to come.
Assad grew uneasy when Palestinian factions relocated to Beirut and forged a broad alliance with Lebanon’s leftist parties and nationalist forces. He closely monitored Arafat’s rise as the dominant player on the Lebanese scene.
Despite Syria’s attempts to control the Palestinian file, Damascus struggled to rein in Fatah’s overwhelming influence and Arafat’s growing stature. His power extended to Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, where he effectively held decision-making authority.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Sultan recalled: “Hafez al-Assad never truly respected the idea of Palestinian resistance. I heard it from him directly and from those around him. His prevailing view was that there was no real resistance—just armed groups operating in coordination with intelligence agencies. The divide between Assad and Arafat was clear from the start.”
Sultan recounted an episode that underscored the deep divide between Assad and Arafat.
“One day, Assad told Arafat that Palestine did not exist—it was simply southern Syria. Arafat fired back, saying there was no such thing as Syria, only northern Palestine. There was an attempt to mask the exchange with humor, but the reality was that Assad genuinely viewed the issue through this lens,” Sultan said.
He explained that several Arab regimes sought to control the Palestinian cause, hoping to benefit from it without bearing its consequences.
“From the Baathist perspective, both in Baghdad and Damascus, there was a belief that the issue was too significant for the PLO to unilaterally determine its fate.”
Crackdown on Palestinian media
Sultan recalled a particularly tense moment in the PLO’s relationship with the Syrian regime.
“The organization operated a radio station in Syria. One day, it aired a segment quoting Arafat, including the phrase ‘There is water in my mouth’—a cryptic remark hinting at unspoken grievances. Syrian authorities responded swiftly, sending bulldozers to demolish the station and arresting several staff members.”
That night, Palestinian officials approached Sultan, urging him to speak with Kamal Jumblatt.
“Jumblatt suggested we arrange a meeting with Assad. It was Ramadan, so I contacted Hikmat al-Shihabi, then head of Syrian intelligence and our liaison,” recalled Sultan.
As the meeting neared sunset, Jumblatt sat across from Assad, with Sultan seated beside the Syrian president. The discussion quickly turned hostile toward Arafat.
“The conversation was filled with insults. Phrases like ‘We’ll bring him in’—implying they’d arrest him—and ‘We’ll flip him over’—a reference to how prisoners were beaten—were thrown around. Jumblatt, always polite and measured, stopped eating. Sensing his discomfort, Assad turned to me and asked me to intervene.”
Sultan responded: “Mr. President, the Palestinian fighters are not our schoolmates. We are committed to the Palestinian cause, and today, the PLO and Arafat represent that cause. These men have endured extreme hardships.”
Assad listened and then conceded: “Abu Rashid is right. Consider it settled, Kamal Bey.” The detainees were subsequently released.
A meeting between Kamal Jumblatt and Arafat attended by Toufic Sultan, George Hawi, Mohsen Ibrahim, and Yasser Abed Rabbo. (Courtesy of Toufic Sultan)
Deep-seated mutual hatred
Asked whether the animosity between Assad and Arafat was evident at the time, Sultan did not hesitate.
“Of course. It was well known,” he said. “One way to ingratiate oneself with Assad was to openly attack Arafat.”
He recalled a meeting with Walid Jumblatt, Assem Kanso—the head of Lebanon’s Baath Party—and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam.
“When Arafat’s name came up, Khaddam abruptly declared, ‘Yasser Arafat is an Israeli spy.’ I remained silent. He turned to me and asked for my opinion. I simply said, ‘I heard you.’”
Khaddam pressed further: “What do you think?”
Sultan replied: “I respect your opinion, and this is your office. But if you want my honest view, it won’t please you.”
The atmosphere surrounding Assad was particularly hostile toward Fatah. Syrian authorities used every means at their disposal to infiltrate the group.
After years of effort, they succeeded in orchestrating major defections, the most notable led by Abu Saleh, Abu Musa, and Abu Khaled al-Omleh. Damascus provided these factions with logistical support, training camps, and other resources.
“Syria had the power to shrink or amplify political movements,” remembered Sultan.
Despite knowing that geography gave Assad a strategic advantage, Arafat was not an easy adversary.
He countered Syria’s animosity with his trademark defiance—flashing the victory sign and invoking phrases like “the Palestinian bloodbath” and “the longest Arab-Israeli war.”
These references underscored the resilience of Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies during Israel’s 1982 siege of Beirut, led by then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.
At the time, many believed that Arafat’s relentless emphasis on “independent Palestinian decision-making” was aimed more at Assad than at any other party.
Damascus, in turn, saw Arafat as dismissive of the sacrifices made by the Syrian army during Israel’s invasion of Beirut.
Syrian officials also suspected that he was waiting for an opportunity to join peace negotiations with Israel—an option that had eluded him after he failed to follow in the footsteps of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in the late 1970s.
