‘Cubs of the Caliphate’... ISIS Threatens New Syria

 A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)
A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)
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‘Cubs of the Caliphate’... ISIS Threatens New Syria

 A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)
A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)

Ahmed el-Jouri

Khaled (a pseudonym) never expected this interview to reopen a door to the past.

At first, he hesitated, as if choosing his words carefully. But as he spoke, his tone felt strangely familiar. Then, as the conversation unfolded, a moment came that made my heart race.

"I was 13 when I became a prison guard. We had no choice. They gave orders, and if we refused, we were punished. I opened cell doors, brought food, and watched the prisoners. Some cried, some screamed, and some stayed silent. We treated them as enemies, though we didn’t know why they were there," Khaled recounted.

His words sent a chill down my spine. Al-Mayadeen Prison. 2015. A 13-year-old was guarding me and the other detainees. My mind flashed back to that dark time when I was arrested in Syria for refusing to work as a pharmacist for ISIS.

The group demanded total loyalty, especially from medical professionals. Those who resisted faced threats, arrests, or worse.

One night, they came for me. I later learned my neighbor, an ISIS member, had turned me in for listening to music. That was enough to send me to prison - where I met my young jailer.

As I conducted this interview - one of 17 testimonies I gathered on ISIS youth or the so-called "Cubs of the Caliphate" - questions filled my mind, but I held back. I didn’t want to be too direct, yet curiosity gnawed at me.

I asked careful questions, trying to confirm my suspicions without alarming Khaled, now in his mid-20s. But when he described the prison - the corridors, the meager meals, the way he was ordered to open and close cell doors - I knew the truth. He had been my jailer.

A wave of emotions hit me. Part of me wanted to tell him I had been there, that he had stood before me, holding the keys. But another part hesitated.

How could I say it? What difference would it make? I now see that Khaled was just a child, a pawn in a larger system. Any anger or resentment I felt couldn’t be directed at him. Still, I struggled to separate the man before me from his past.

"Were you cruel to the prisoners?" I finally asked.

He sighed, lowering his head. "Sometimes, I tried to be kind - giving extra food or leaving a door open a little longer. But other times... I was harsh. I was afraid. If I showed weakness, they would have locked me up too."

His words struck me.

I don’t know if Khaled remembers me or if I was just another prisoner. But I see now - he is still fighting his own battle.

Khaled’s story is just one of 17 firsthand accounts gathered over the past six months, revealing how past trauma collides with present and future struggles. This report follows two key figures: Khaled, a former prison guard trying to move on, and Sami (a pseudonym), who once faced his captor at his weakest moment.

Their experiences, along with others, highlight the lasting impact of violence and forced recruitment on a generation robbed of its childhood. But they also raise a crucial question: Has ISIS truly been defeated, or could it return?

With Syria’s shifting power dynamics - Bashar al-Assad’s downfall and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham taking control - young men like Khaled and Sami now face new challenges in an increasingly unstable country. The ongoing security chaos and power struggles among armed factions have fueled fears of ISIS regaining strength.

At the center of this uncertainty is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which still controls thousands of ISIS detainees, including men, women, and children. This detainee issue has become a bargaining tool, with SDF using it to secure military and political support from global and regional powers.

Without clear solutions, these prisoners risk being used for political or military gain. The possible closure of Syria’s al-Hol camp, where many are held, only adds to concerns about what happens next - and where they will go.

A generation of children was born in the camp that mostly holds ISIS families in Syria. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

ISIS threatens Syria’s new government

ISIS has warned Syria’s new government against "straying from the right path," fueling fears that its threats are more than just propaganda - they could be part of a plan to regain influence.

Though the group’s remnants remain active in Syria’s and Iraq’s deserts, launching occasional attacks, the real danger lies in its ability to exploit security gaps and rebuild.

Adding to concerns, some local forces - including remnants of the old regime and the SDF - might use the ISIS threat to their advantage. By keeping the danger alive, they could seek more support from international players, raising fears that ISIS operations might be tolerated or even leveraged in ongoing power struggles.

ISIS is determined to avenge its defeats, understanding that losing land doesn’t mean the end of its ideology. The group is rebuilding by taking advantage of local grievances, tribal divisions, economic decline, and the hopelessness of many former fighters, especially those recruited as children.

These young people, raised in a war-torn environment, now face rejection from their communities, lack of job opportunities, and a stigma they can’t escape. Without proper rehabilitation programs, the risk of them returning to ISIS remains high, as the group continues to exploit their isolation and lack of future prospects.

So, are these former child soldiers a threat to Syria’s stability? Or are they victims of tough circumstances, hoping for reintegration into society as part of the solution?

Despite the fall of its so-called "caliphate," ISIS is still trying to regain its power, using more complex and decentralized methods. These tactics make it harder to track or eliminate the group.

With tasks now handled outside the central leadership, recruits sometimes receive multiple offers from different ISIS factions, unaware of their true connections to the original group.

Khaled recalled: "After I was freed, a man I didn’t know approached me. He didn’t directly say he was from ISIS, but he hinted that the past wasn’t over and there was a chance to return to the group. He knew personal details about me, even things I’d never told anyone. How did he know?"

Like Khaled, Sami also received indirect offers, but through social media. ISIS uses fake accounts on Telegram and WhatsApp to reach young people. Sami said: "I got a message from an unknown person on Telegram. He said he knew my struggles and that there was a way for me to rebuild my life. He spoke about injustice, how we were used and abandoned. His words felt like a therapist exploiting my weaknesses."

In addition to traditional methods, ISIS is now using modern technology, video games that spread extremist ideas, and private forums. They sometimes send links disguised as educational offers or scholarships, but they are traps to recruit individuals.

At one point, the group also relied on civilians working in accepted jobs, like aid workers or logistics staff, to spread their influence. Khaled revealed: "A friend told me he was working with a man distributing food and supplies to poor villages. Later, I found out it was just a cover, and some of the workers were former ISIS members."

Police affiliated with the new Syrian authorities are seen near a mosque in Palmyra on February 7, 2025. (AFP)

ISIS’ continued influence

The tough economic situation and social stigma faced by former ISIS members play a major role in the group's ongoing recruitment. Many young people from these backgrounds live in areas with few job opportunities and are marginalized by society, making them vulnerable to ISIS’s financial offers.

Sami said: "When I was released, I couldn’t find work. I tried to start over, but everyone saw me as a threat. I had nothing, no future. In my desperation, I thought, ‘What if I go back? At least I’d get something for the risk. No one will hire me here.’"

Khaled, like many others, feels isolated. "Society rejects us, and the government doesn’t trust us. We’re stuck, not knowing where to go. When someone says, ‘We haven’t forgotten you, you’re still one of us,’ you start thinking about it."

One witness added: "When there’s no food and no one will hire you because of your past, you start to consider your options. Some are strong enough to resist, but others may not be."

Psychological struggles persist

The survivors also feel as if ISIS is still watching them. It’s not just messages or attempts to meet; sometimes they are approached by people who know private details about their lives.

Khaled recalled: "After my release, I lived far from anything related to the group. But suddenly, a man appeared at the mosque where I prayed in. He spoke about how some of us had lost our way but could still return. When I asked him what he meant, he said, ‘You were there. You know what I mean.’"

Though ISIS’ physical caliphate has fallen, its ideology remains. The group’s tactics continue to change to adapt to new situations. For Khaled, Sami, and others, the fight is not just about weapons. It’s a psychological struggle to hold onto their new identities, while dealing with the past and the persistent attempts to bring them back into the fold, all in a Syria filled with uncertainty.



Israel’s Elections: Four Possible Scenarios

A partially-torn billboard for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party is displayed in southern Tel Aviv on October 20, 2026. (AFP)
A partially-torn billboard for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party is displayed in southern Tel Aviv on October 20, 2026. (AFP)
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Israel’s Elections: Four Possible Scenarios

A partially-torn billboard for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party is displayed in southern Tel Aviv on October 20, 2026. (AFP)
A partially-torn billboard for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party is displayed in southern Tel Aviv on October 20, 2026. (AFP)

Israel goes to the polls on October 27 with results forecast to be close, meaning that the next government will be determined by whoever can cobble together a coalition in a fragmented political landscape.

Israel votes through proportional representation based on the nationwide vote and it is highly unlikely that any single party would come even close to the 61 seats needed for a majority in the 120-seat parliament, or Knesset.

Here are four possible scenarios:

Coalition

Immediately after the election, the parties will begin negotiations to try to reach the 61-seat threshold.

After the official announcement of the results, President Isaac Herzog will consult with party representatives and name a candidate who has the chance to form a government -- not necessarily the party with the most seats, but the one deemed best positioned to secure enough seats in parliament.

The negotiations can be arduous and lengthy, with parties insisting on parochial interests, and can produce unstable governments.

Following the previous election in November 2022, it took Benjamin Netanyahu 58 days to form his government.

People walk past a Likud party campaign billboard featuring Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu alongside opposition party leaders and bearing the Hebrew slogan "Right or Palestine," ahead of Israel's general election, in Beni Brak, Israel, Sunday, Oct. 18, 2026. (AP)

Polls show that Netanyahu's right-wing and far-right coalition and the opposition bloc, whose most prominent figure is former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, are neck and neck, with approximately 50 to 52 seats each.

The two sides have been nearly even in polls for weeks, foreshadowing a mathematical puzzle that both sides will have to solve to find the 10 or so seats needed for a coalition.

Israeli political history is full of twists and turns, with defections and other unexpected shifts in alliances.

Israel also has two new right-wing parties that are seen as scratching the threshold of entering parliament, where they could throw their decisive support to one of the two blocs.

Minority government

If no bloc manages to secure 61 seats, a candidate could attempt to govern without a majority but rather through support on an ad hoc basis by other lawmakers.

In this scenario, lawmakers from Israel's Arab minority -- who make up 20 percent of the population and generally identify as Palestinians -- could play a critical role. Polls show that two Arab-Israeli lists, the Joint List and Raam, could win 12 to 14 seats in total.

Raam, led by Mansour Abbas, a kingmaker in the past, has stated its willingness to work with Eisenkot's bloc, and the Joint List has offered to provide a "safety net" for any coalition that ousts Netanyahu from power.

But the leading figures in the opposition bloc are reluctant to publicly acknowledge such a possibility, due to the hostility of a large segment of the Jewish electorate towards any form of alliance with Israeli Arabs.

This has not prevented Netanyahu from focusing his campaign on the possibility of Eisenkot working with Arab parties, campaigning on the slogan, "Either the right wing or Palestine."

Gadi Eisenkot, former Israeli military chief of staff and leader of the centrist Yashar "Straight" party delivers a statement ahead of Israel's general election near Israel-Gaza border, southern Israel, Thursday, Oct. 15, 2026. (AP)

National unity government

Considering Israel's extreme polarization, a national unity government would appear fanciful, but it could theoretically create a less extreme government.

Israeli commentators have often mused on the possibility of a national unity government in which Netanyahu would jettison his provocative far-right allies as well as ultra-Orthodox parties and team up with Eisenkot, who shares Netanyahu's views on many security issues.

The grand coalition would also exclude Arab parties.

A poll published on October 16 found that 55 percent of Israelis would prefer a national unity government over new elections if the vote did not produce a clear majority.

This scenario has a recent precedent. In 2020, Netanyahu and Benny Gantz, like Eisenkot a retired general appealing to the center, reached a power-sharing agreement after three elections in less than a year, which stipulated a rotation of the prime ministership.

But the partnership fell apart after a year, triggering a new election. According to media reports, Herzog is working behind the scenes to bring Netanyahu and Eisenkot together to repeat the experiment should a deadlock occur after October 27.

However, the scenario would face strong opposition from both sides, particularly from the opposition bloc, which is treating the election as a referendum against Netanyahu and has questioned his character.

Deadlock and new elections

If no candidate manages to form a government, Israel will have to return to the polls.

The country held four elections between April 2019 and March 2021 due to the inability of politicians to forge a lasting coalition.

The candidate designated by the president will, in principle, have 28 days to form a coalition, with a possible 14-day extension, although there are other procedural ways to prevent an immediate calling of new elections.


Iran Prolongs Talks in Stalemate to Influence US Midterms, Officials Say

An Iranian woman walks past a mural of late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on a street in Tehran, Iran, 14 October 2026, amid the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States. (EPA)
An Iranian woman walks past a mural of late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on a street in Tehran, Iran, 14 October 2026, amid the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States. (EPA)
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Iran Prolongs Talks in Stalemate to Influence US Midterms, Officials Say

An Iranian woman walks past a mural of late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on a street in Tehran, Iran, 14 October 2026, amid the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States. (EPA)
An Iranian woman walks past a mural of late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on a street in Tehran, Iran, 14 October 2026, amid the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States. (EPA)

Iran has deliberately prolonged talks with the US to try to weaken Donald Trump politically ahead of November's US midterm elections, senior officials say, while fears of renewed military action and deep distrust of Washington have reinforced Tehran's reluctance to strike a quick deal to end the war.

Three senior Iranian officials and an Iranian insider, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, said Tehran was convinced the US president was ready to resort to renewed attacks to try to break the stalemate in the eight-month-old war.

"Iran is preparing for renewed Israeli and US attacks, not for a deal with America to end the war," one of the officials said. "The clerical establishment is determined not to give Trump a political victory."

Tehran analyst Saeed Leylaz said that, by prolonging the talks, "Iran is influencing the US election without taking any unlawful action".

IRAN CAN EXPLOIT TRUMP'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The war, which began in February when the US and its ally Israel launched strikes on Iran, has helped drive Trump’s approval rating to a record low as polls suggest that Americans worried about high gasoline prices will punish his Republican Party in the November 3 congressional elections.

Trump has repeatedly said he expects oil prices to drop after the ‌elections, but has ‌not offered a detailed plan to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a vital ‌global ⁠energy shipping route effectively ⁠closed by Iran since the war began.

Iranian attacks both threatened and real have kept ship traffic through the strait to a trickle, while a US maritime blockade and trade sanctions have cut off Iran's oil export revenues and exacerbated growing domestic economic woes.

With Tehran refusing to make concessions it believes could benefit Trump politically, there is little chance of a breakthrough before the elections, the officials said.

Under pressure from Israel, Washington wants Iran’s decades-long nuclear program - which Iran says is purely peaceful and Western powers allege has military dimensions - on the table from the outset.

For its part, Tehran insists that its conditions under a "seven-day plan" must be met before nuclear negotiations begin. It offers no prospect of giving up the leverage over the Strait of Hormuz that the conflict prompted it to ⁠seize.

Iran's Foreign Ministry and the US White House did not respond to Reuters requests for comment.

An Iranian couple walks near an anti-Israel billboard featuring Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu and a sentence reading in Persian “Day by day isolated” at the Enghelab square in Tehran, Iran, 12 October 2026. (EPA)

IRAN CANNOT ‌TRUST WASHINGTON, OFFICIALS SAY

Iran’s proposal, conveyed through Qatari mediators, offered to reopen the strait within seven ‌days, albeit under Iranian control, provided that Washington lifted its maritime blockade, eased restrictions on Iranian oil exports, released frozen assets and ended hostilities on all fronts.

Iranian Foreign ‌Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Sunday that the offer remained on the table, with messages being exchanged through mediators.

Tehran's view that Washington cannot be ‌trusted to commit to diplomacy stems from the attacks on Iran that have derailed previous negotiations, one Iranian official said.

In June 2025, an Israeli attack wrecked plans for a sixth round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Oman. And last February, the US and Israel launched their war just after another round of talks ended, with further technical discussions scheduled.

Maintaining a state somewhere between war and peace through the US midterms allows Iran to sustain pressure on Washington while reiterating its commitment to diplomacy.

Trump has ‌said the US will not bomb Iran again before November 3. However, the officials said Tehran continues to expect that bombing will resume, sooner or later.

Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran program at the ⁠Middle East Institute in Washington, said the ⁠clerical establishment clearly wanted to hurt Trump politically.

"But the fundamental issue is that Tehran believes that Trump is interested in regime change ... and following Israeli Prime Minister (Benjamin) Netanyahu’s policy of seeking to bring down Iran’s ruling establishment," he said.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth discussed Iran with Netanyahu on Monday, three Israeli officials said, in an unannounced visit to Israel a week before a parliamentary election in which Netanyahu's position is at risk.

US President Donald Trump looks on during a campaign rally at the Heartland Credit Union Arena in Park City, Kansas, a suburb of Wichita, on October 19, 2026. (AFP)

RETURN TO PRE-WAR STATUS IMPOSSIBLE FOR IRAN, SAYS ANALYST

Iran’s strategy of keeping negotiations alive without rushing towards agreement comes at a cost.

Prolonged uncertainty is weighing on Iran’s already crippled economy and wearing down public patience. Thousands were killed at the turn of the year when the security forces crushed spiraling anti-government protests.

Annual inflation hit 73.6% in September, according to the Statistical Centre of Iran, and the rial currency has fallen nearly 35% against the dollar since Washington reapplied its naval blockade in July.

Iran’s seaborne crude exports fell to zero in the second week of September from a 14-day average of 230,000 barrels per day at the start of the month, and remained there as of October 5, according to energy intelligence platform Vortexa.

But the leadership's distrust of Washington extends beyond the current conflict to existential concerns. Iran believes the US has repeatedly broken agreements even when Tehran honored its commitments, Leylaz said, leaving little confidence that any comprehensive deal would endure.

“Reaching a sustainable deal with the US, even after the Trump administration, is no longer possible because of the deepened distrust,” Leylaz said. "Nothing will go back to the pre-war status quo."


Can Trump’s Endorsement Boost Netanyahu’s Election Chances?

An ultra-Orthodox Jewish man walks past an electoral banner for the Reservist party's list led by Yoaz Hendel (R) and Yaron Zelekha (L) in Bnei Barak near Tel Aviv on October 18, 2026. (Photo by Ilia YEFIMOVICH / AFP)
An ultra-Orthodox Jewish man walks past an electoral banner for the Reservist party's list led by Yoaz Hendel (R) and Yaron Zelekha (L) in Bnei Barak near Tel Aviv on October 18, 2026. (Photo by Ilia YEFIMOVICH / AFP)
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Can Trump’s Endorsement Boost Netanyahu’s Election Chances?

An ultra-Orthodox Jewish man walks past an electoral banner for the Reservist party's list led by Yoaz Hendel (R) and Yaron Zelekha (L) in Bnei Barak near Tel Aviv on October 18, 2026. (Photo by Ilia YEFIMOVICH / AFP)
An ultra-Orthodox Jewish man walks past an electoral banner for the Reservist party's list led by Yoaz Hendel (R) and Yaron Zelekha (L) in Bnei Barak near Tel Aviv on October 18, 2026. (Photo by Ilia YEFIMOVICH / AFP)

US President Donald Trump’s endorsement of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ahead of the October 27 election has given the ruling right-wing camp a boost. But whether it can reverse Netanyahu’s declining electoral fortunes remains uncertain.

Netanyahu and his Republican allies had lobbied hard to secure Trump’s backing. According to Israel’s Channel 12 and Channel 13, White House officials struggled with the decision, holding numerous meetings with figures from Israel’s governing coalition and opposition and requesting in-depth opinion polls.

Aware that Trump dislikes backing losers and prefers strong leaders, Netanyahu assembled a team to convince Washington that his electoral prospects had improved.

Meanwhile, the opposition’s “change camp” sought to discourage US interference. Former Prime Minister Yair Lapid met officials from both American parties, promising that an alternative Israeli government would maintain closer ties with the Trump administration and cooperate more fully in implementing his peace plan.

But Washington’s proposal for a unity government bringing together Netanyahu and his main rival, Gadi Eisenkot, exposed divisions and hesitation within the opposition. Its apparent reluctance to cooperate reportedly frustrated Trump and contributed to his decision to endorse Netanyahu.

(FILES) US President Donald Trump greets Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he arrives at the West Wing of the White House in Washington, DC on September 29, 2025. (Photo by Jim WATSON / AFP)

Can Trump revive Netanyahu’s fortunes?

The president’s backing is likely to resonate primarily with right-wing voters rather than the Israeli electorate as a whole, reflecting sharply divided attitudes toward him.

In 2024, Trump enjoyed support from 60% to 72% of Israelis. By early 2025, 61% considered him the preferred US president for advancing Israel’s interests, including 96% of right-wing respondents, 52% of centrists, 30% of left-wing voters and 32% of Arab citizens.

Confidence in Trump rose to 75% in March 2026 before plunging to 26% that summer following Washington’s agreement with Tehran. Surveys also found that 81% of left-wing respondents, 73% of centrists and 65% of right-wing voters believed Israel’s security was not a priority for him.

Israeli media have frequently greeted Trump’s shifting positions with skepticism and even ridicule.

His clashes with Netanyahu have particularly unsettled the right. In 2025, when the Israeli leader opposed Washington’s proposed negotiations with Iran, Israeli outlets reported that Trump had demanded he fall into line with the American approach, telling him that he and his government were now part of Trump’s plan, not the other way around.

In June 2026, Axios and CNN reported details of a heated telephone conversation in which Trump allegedly shouted at Netanyahu over strikes on Beirut and attempts to obstruct US-Iran negotiations. According to those accounts, the American president called him completely “crazy,” claimed to have kept him out of prison and accused his policies of turning public opinion against Israel.

With Likud holding 36 seats in the Knesset but polling at just 18 to 21, Netanyahu hopes Trump’s intervention will persuade disillusioned right-wing supporters to return to the party.

Its impact may be limited, however, among voters who view Trump unfavorably, including some on the right and a larger share of the political center.

Much of the Israeli media, described in the analysis as aligned with the opposition’s “change camp” and the country’s entrenched establishment, has played down the announcement. Some commentators have even called it a bad omen, pointing to Trump’s previous support for Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, both of whom subsequently lost elections.

What might Netanyahu offer in return?

Israeli political analysts have advanced several theories about what Trump hopes to gain from supporting the prime minister.

One is that Netanyahu pledged to strike Iran independently, with US forces providing assistance from a distance rather than participating directly, as they did in June.

Trump appeared to reinforce that interpretation by describing Netanyahu as the only Israeli prime minister both willing and able to attack Iran. He added that while he could order US strikes himself, he had no interest in doing so.

Another explanation centers on Washington’s interest in a post-election unity government involving Netanyahu and Eisenkot, who would share the premiership.

Under this scenario, Trump wants a strong, predominantly right-wing Israeli government reflecting the country’s political majority and capable of making far-reaching decisions to implement his peace plan.

The endorsement could therefore give Netanyahu an opportunity to stage an “October surprise,” borrowing a term from US politics for a late campaign development capable of dramatically reshaping electoral prospects.

But the Israeli leader must still prove that he can turn Trump’s support into votes.

Netanyahu moved quickly to capitalize on the announcement Sunday evening, posting a video on Telegram urging Israelis to pay close attention to the president’s remarks.

Fifteen minutes later, he released another recording describing Trump’s endorsement as unconditional and emphasizing their partnership.

Netanyahu credited their cooperation with major achievements against Iran and its regional allies, claiming they had dealt crushing blows to both and removed the immediate threat of nuclear bombs.

He also portrayed Trump as determined to work alongside him to complete the task of eliminating the Iranian threat within the next two years, or possibly sooner.

Vehicles drive past an election billboard featuring images of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (R) and Yashar party leader Gadi Eisenkot (L) in Ramat Gan near Tel Aviv, Israel, 18 October 2026. EPA/ABIR SULTAN

Opposition caught off guard

Opposition leaders were stunned by the announcement.

An associate of Lapid disclosed that people close to Trump had indicated earlier Sunday that the president did not intend to interfere in Israel’s election.

The official suggested that the endorsement might have been compensation for Netanyahu after Trump refused to launch another attack on Iran.

Eisenkot’s allies were divided over whether to ignore the development to preserve good relations with Washington or publicly suggest that Netanyahu had offered concessions in return, potentially including advancing Trump’s Gaza plan and accepting a Palestinian state.

Speaking at Tel Aviv University on Sunday evening, Eisenkot expressed appreciation for Trump’s contribution to Israel’s security and the hostage agreement but insisted that Israeli voters alone would choose their government.

He added that the US administration would be able to cooperate with any government elected in Israel.