‘Cubs of the Caliphate’... ISIS Threatens New Syria

 A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)
A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)
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‘Cubs of the Caliphate’... ISIS Threatens New Syria

 A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)
A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)

Ahmed el-Jouri

Khaled (a pseudonym) never expected this interview to reopen a door to the past.

At first, he hesitated, as if choosing his words carefully. But as he spoke, his tone felt strangely familiar. Then, as the conversation unfolded, a moment came that made my heart race.

"I was 13 when I became a prison guard. We had no choice. They gave orders, and if we refused, we were punished. I opened cell doors, brought food, and watched the prisoners. Some cried, some screamed, and some stayed silent. We treated them as enemies, though we didn’t know why they were there," Khaled recounted.

His words sent a chill down my spine. Al-Mayadeen Prison. 2015. A 13-year-old was guarding me and the other detainees. My mind flashed back to that dark time when I was arrested in Syria for refusing to work as a pharmacist for ISIS.

The group demanded total loyalty, especially from medical professionals. Those who resisted faced threats, arrests, or worse.

One night, they came for me. I later learned my neighbor, an ISIS member, had turned me in for listening to music. That was enough to send me to prison - where I met my young jailer.

As I conducted this interview - one of 17 testimonies I gathered on ISIS youth or the so-called "Cubs of the Caliphate" - questions filled my mind, but I held back. I didn’t want to be too direct, yet curiosity gnawed at me.

I asked careful questions, trying to confirm my suspicions without alarming Khaled, now in his mid-20s. But when he described the prison - the corridors, the meager meals, the way he was ordered to open and close cell doors - I knew the truth. He had been my jailer.

A wave of emotions hit me. Part of me wanted to tell him I had been there, that he had stood before me, holding the keys. But another part hesitated.

How could I say it? What difference would it make? I now see that Khaled was just a child, a pawn in a larger system. Any anger or resentment I felt couldn’t be directed at him. Still, I struggled to separate the man before me from his past.

"Were you cruel to the prisoners?" I finally asked.

He sighed, lowering his head. "Sometimes, I tried to be kind - giving extra food or leaving a door open a little longer. But other times... I was harsh. I was afraid. If I showed weakness, they would have locked me up too."

His words struck me.

I don’t know if Khaled remembers me or if I was just another prisoner. But I see now - he is still fighting his own battle.

Khaled’s story is just one of 17 firsthand accounts gathered over the past six months, revealing how past trauma collides with present and future struggles. This report follows two key figures: Khaled, a former prison guard trying to move on, and Sami (a pseudonym), who once faced his captor at his weakest moment.

Their experiences, along with others, highlight the lasting impact of violence and forced recruitment on a generation robbed of its childhood. But they also raise a crucial question: Has ISIS truly been defeated, or could it return?

With Syria’s shifting power dynamics - Bashar al-Assad’s downfall and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham taking control - young men like Khaled and Sami now face new challenges in an increasingly unstable country. The ongoing security chaos and power struggles among armed factions have fueled fears of ISIS regaining strength.

At the center of this uncertainty is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which still controls thousands of ISIS detainees, including men, women, and children. This detainee issue has become a bargaining tool, with SDF using it to secure military and political support from global and regional powers.

Without clear solutions, these prisoners risk being used for political or military gain. The possible closure of Syria’s al-Hol camp, where many are held, only adds to concerns about what happens next - and where they will go.

A generation of children was born in the camp that mostly holds ISIS families in Syria. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

ISIS threatens Syria’s new government

ISIS has warned Syria’s new government against "straying from the right path," fueling fears that its threats are more than just propaganda - they could be part of a plan to regain influence.

Though the group’s remnants remain active in Syria’s and Iraq’s deserts, launching occasional attacks, the real danger lies in its ability to exploit security gaps and rebuild.

Adding to concerns, some local forces - including remnants of the old regime and the SDF - might use the ISIS threat to their advantage. By keeping the danger alive, they could seek more support from international players, raising fears that ISIS operations might be tolerated or even leveraged in ongoing power struggles.

ISIS is determined to avenge its defeats, understanding that losing land doesn’t mean the end of its ideology. The group is rebuilding by taking advantage of local grievances, tribal divisions, economic decline, and the hopelessness of many former fighters, especially those recruited as children.

These young people, raised in a war-torn environment, now face rejection from their communities, lack of job opportunities, and a stigma they can’t escape. Without proper rehabilitation programs, the risk of them returning to ISIS remains high, as the group continues to exploit their isolation and lack of future prospects.

So, are these former child soldiers a threat to Syria’s stability? Or are they victims of tough circumstances, hoping for reintegration into society as part of the solution?

Despite the fall of its so-called "caliphate," ISIS is still trying to regain its power, using more complex and decentralized methods. These tactics make it harder to track or eliminate the group.

With tasks now handled outside the central leadership, recruits sometimes receive multiple offers from different ISIS factions, unaware of their true connections to the original group.

Khaled recalled: "After I was freed, a man I didn’t know approached me. He didn’t directly say he was from ISIS, but he hinted that the past wasn’t over and there was a chance to return to the group. He knew personal details about me, even things I’d never told anyone. How did he know?"

Like Khaled, Sami also received indirect offers, but through social media. ISIS uses fake accounts on Telegram and WhatsApp to reach young people. Sami said: "I got a message from an unknown person on Telegram. He said he knew my struggles and that there was a way for me to rebuild my life. He spoke about injustice, how we were used and abandoned. His words felt like a therapist exploiting my weaknesses."

In addition to traditional methods, ISIS is now using modern technology, video games that spread extremist ideas, and private forums. They sometimes send links disguised as educational offers or scholarships, but they are traps to recruit individuals.

At one point, the group also relied on civilians working in accepted jobs, like aid workers or logistics staff, to spread their influence. Khaled revealed: "A friend told me he was working with a man distributing food and supplies to poor villages. Later, I found out it was just a cover, and some of the workers were former ISIS members."

Police affiliated with the new Syrian authorities are seen near a mosque in Palmyra on February 7, 2025. (AFP)

ISIS’ continued influence

The tough economic situation and social stigma faced by former ISIS members play a major role in the group's ongoing recruitment. Many young people from these backgrounds live in areas with few job opportunities and are marginalized by society, making them vulnerable to ISIS’s financial offers.

Sami said: "When I was released, I couldn’t find work. I tried to start over, but everyone saw me as a threat. I had nothing, no future. In my desperation, I thought, ‘What if I go back? At least I’d get something for the risk. No one will hire me here.’"

Khaled, like many others, feels isolated. "Society rejects us, and the government doesn’t trust us. We’re stuck, not knowing where to go. When someone says, ‘We haven’t forgotten you, you’re still one of us,’ you start thinking about it."

One witness added: "When there’s no food and no one will hire you because of your past, you start to consider your options. Some are strong enough to resist, but others may not be."

Psychological struggles persist

The survivors also feel as if ISIS is still watching them. It’s not just messages or attempts to meet; sometimes they are approached by people who know private details about their lives.

Khaled recalled: "After my release, I lived far from anything related to the group. But suddenly, a man appeared at the mosque where I prayed in. He spoke about how some of us had lost our way but could still return. When I asked him what he meant, he said, ‘You were there. You know what I mean.’"

Though ISIS’ physical caliphate has fallen, its ideology remains. The group’s tactics continue to change to adapt to new situations. For Khaled, Sami, and others, the fight is not just about weapons. It’s a psychological struggle to hold onto their new identities, while dealing with the past and the persistent attempts to bring them back into the fold, all in a Syria filled with uncertainty.



Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
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Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)

A US defense agreement with Ethiopia was announced days before an important visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Cairo that saw agreements and memorandums of understanding signed in several fields and coincided with joint Egyptian-Chinese air exercises.

The timing raised questions over whether Washington’s military cooperation with Addis Ababa was driven by “US anger at Cairo” and what objectives it serves amid tensions in the Horn of Africa.

The United States and Ethiopia signed a defense agreement on Aug. 21 during an official visit by an Ethiopian military delegation to Washington. Both sides described it as a strategic framework aimed at strengthening military and security cooperation, protecting national interests and securing mutual benefits.

Raafat Mahmoud, head of the African Affairs Research Unit at the Egyptian Cabinet's Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC), told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington was seeking to rebuild ties with Addis Ababa after years of tension, particularly over the Tigray war and US criticism of Ethiopia’s human rights record.

He argued that the agreement showed Ethiopia had become part of broader US calculations involving Red Sea security, countering Chinese and Russian influence and combating armed groups in the Horn.

Ethiopian lawmaker Mohammed Al-Arusi noted that Washington views the Horn as directly linked to Red Sea security, international trade and maritime routes, while also facing terrorist threats.

“Ethiopia lies at the heart of this geography, with its demographic, political and military weight across a broad region, and it hosts the permanent headquarters of the African Union,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. Washington, he added, was not seeking a temporary stance but it is “rebuilding its position in a region where the balance of power is changing.”

US Republican and strategic affairs expert Adolfo Franco cautioned that the agreement lacks formally binding treaties and direct financial funding, adding that future defense exports remain subject to strict restrictions and case-by-case assessments, including human rights considerations.

Al-Arusi pointed to a US-Ethiopian dialogue launched in May covering economics, trade, investment, defense and security. The defense track advanced just three months later, a sequence he said showed Washington was approaching Ethiopia with long-term considerations.

Mahmoud said growing US support could strengthen Ethiopia’s negotiating position not only on water but also in its efforts to secure maritime access and expand its presence in the Red Sea region.

Recent media reports have portrayed the US-Ethiopian rapprochement as Washington’s response to Egypt’s growing ties with China, highlighted by Xi’s visit to Cairo this week.

Mahmoud countered that Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement was not new, although recent developments naturally raised sensitivities in Washington, particularly amid expanding economic and security cooperation.

In January 2026, Ethiopia and China elevated their relations to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” nearly two years after Egypt and China upgraded their ties to a “strategic partnership” in 2024.

Al-Arusi argued that Washington’s expanding partnership with Addis Ababa should not be viewed as replacing one partner with another, but rather as evidence of Ethiopia’s growing strategic value.

Former US diplomat Henry Ensher told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington wants a security partner in the Horn and that Ethiopia is the best option given its capabilities.

While China and the United States compete in Africa, Egypt is the more important partner, he said, making it unlikely that Washington would use this approach to confront or punish Cairo.


Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
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Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)

Ahmad al-Hilali, deputy governor of Hasakah, told Asharq Al-Awsat on Friday that the integration process stipulated in the “January 29, 2026 Agreement” has moved, following the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the former Kurdish Autonomous Administration, from “the stage of understandings and negotiations to actual implementation, whether in civilian institutions or in the security and military sectors.”

He described the security situation as “much better” and said “stability is gradually strengthening,” stressing that the process “is moving toward completion, and what we want is for it to take place calmly.”

Since SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced from the presidential palace in Damascus on August 25 the dissolution of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration, Hasakah has witnessed a series of developments and changes signaling the emergence of a new phase in the governorate. Its defining features are the restoration of state authority across all sectors, stronger security and stability, the unification of institutions, and the end of administrative duplication, in accordance with the January 29 Agreement.

In his remarks, al-Hilali said that “the integration process is not simply a matter of transferring buildings or changing names. It is about reunifying institutional authority, administrative decision-making, and security and military command under the umbrella of the Syrian state.”

He said significant steps had already been completed in this direction, while work was underway to address the remaining files in an orderly manner that would prevent any institutional or security vacuum and preserve stability in the governorate.

Before the announcement of the SDF's dissolution, most cities and areas in Hasakah had experienced security disorder involving the Revolutionary Youth. Such incidents increased after the signing of the January 29 Agreement, when members of the group prevented the handover of institutions to the government. That situation, however, has now disappeared.

Al-Hilali attributed the disappearance of the previous unrest primarily to the fact that “the phase has changed.”

“Previously, there were attempts to obstruct the process of transferring state institutions, and some activities emerged aimed at disrupting this course. But as implementation of the agreement progressed and the direction toward ending institutional and security duplication became clear, these manifestations declined significantly,” he said.

According to al-Hilali, “There is now a growing conviction among everyone that state institutions should not be a subject of conflict or confrontation, and that the integration process is moving toward completion.”

“What we want is for this process to take place calmly, away from provocation and tension, and for all residents of the governorate to feel that the return of state institutions means the return of services, the rule of law and stability, and is not directed against any component of society,” he said.

Asked when the integration of military, security and civilian institutions would be fully completed, the deputy governor said: “I do not want to set an artificial date for a process of this scale and complexity, because some files require technical, administrative and security procedures before they can be formally closed.”

He added: “But I can say that we are at a very advanced stage and that the overall direction is clearly toward completing the integration as soon as possible.”

He noted that “the bulk of the work is now in the implementation phase, while what remains consists of detailed files requiring the completion of arrangements, verification and coordination among the ministries and relevant authorities.”

Women fighters from the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) take part in military traning in Hasakah, Syria, August 22, 2026. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman

Pending Files

Al-Hilali said: “What matters most to us is that the integration be complete, genuine and sustainable, rather than merely a political announcement whose impact fades after a short period.”

Asked about the main outstanding issues preventing the completion of the integration process, al-Hilali said the remaining files could be divided into three main tracks.

“First is the military and security file, involving the completion of the restructuring of personnel and cadres and the integration of those who meet the requirements into the Ministries of Defense and Interior in accordance with the established procedures,” he said.

“The second is the administrative and civilian file, particularly the status of employees and staff, the mechanisms for confirming their positions and paying their entitlements, and the integration of institutions and departments whose transfer to the state has not yet been completed.”

“The third involves a number of service-related, technical and administrative files linked to the transfer of powers and the reunification of operating systems, databases and resources.”

Al-Hilali said these issues “do not represent an obstacle to the integration process so much as they are implementation files that need to be completed.”

“The political decision is clear and the overall direction has been settled: state institutions will be unified, authority will rest with the Syrian state, and the rights of all citizens and components of the governorate will be preserved,” he said.

The rise of the Autonomous Administration

The first foundations of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, which sought to establish a “Kurdish project in Syria,” emerged through the formation of the Kurdish Supreme Committee. It was established by Syria's Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council following the signing of the Erbil Agreement on July 12, 2012.

A military wing was subsequently established for the committee, comprising the People's Protection Units (YPG), the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) and the Asayish security forces. The SDF was later formed in 2015, under predominantly Kurdish leadership.

The geographic footprint of the Autonomous Administration expanded from three cantons in 2014 to six in 2016 and seven by 2023. This territorial expansion was accompanied by the growth of its military and security apparatus and civilian institutions, which collectively included tens of thousands of personnel.

The SDF subsequently lost a significant portion of its territory during armed clashes that erupted between its fighters and the Syrian army in late 2025 and early 2026. The fighting lasted about two weeks and was followed by the signing of the January 29, 2026 Agreement.

The agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF called for a ceasefire and the gradual integration into Syrian state institutions of the military and civilian institutions established by the Kurds during the years of conflict. It also called for the handover of border crossings and oil and gas fields, as well as the withdrawal of foreign fighters from the region.


Lebanon's Ali Al-Taher Ridge, Strategic Hezbollah Position Israel Says It Seized

31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
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Lebanon's Ali Al-Taher Ridge, Strategic Hezbollah Position Israel Says It Seized

31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)

Southern Lebanon's Ali al-Taher ridge, which the Israeli army on Thursday said it captured, was a strategic position for Iran-backed Hezbollah, where it was believed to have established a command center.

Hezbollah did not confirm losing the highland, which is around 10 kilometers (six miles) from the border with Israel and was targeted by several Israeli strikes in recent weeks despite a ceasefire.

The ridge, a flashpoint since Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war in March, lies close to the major city of Nabatieh and the Litani River.

It is just a few kilometers from UNESCO-listed Beaufort castle, another strategic site that Israel captured in recent months and continues to occupy.

Ali al-Taher ridge, on the edge of the Israeli-proclaimed occupied "security zone", overlooks surrounding areas and key districts further north, and sits atop a network of tunnels.

During US-mediated negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, Washington proposed the Lebanese military take over the ridge, but Hezbollah refused, according to a source close to the talks.

Military expert Riad Kahwaji told AFP that the ridge is "in between several villages and adjacent to the city of Nabatieh" with a "web of tunnels (that) connects these villages around it".

On Friday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the capture "marks the completion of the phase of securing control in the security zone in southern Lebanon", meaning the Lebanese territory Israel occupied during the war.

- 'Command centers' -

The Israeli military on Thursday said that the tunnel network included "command centers (and) weapons storage rooms".

"The infrastructure is a strategic underground network that was built over two decades and funded and planned by the Iranian terror regime," it added.

Kahwaji, who heads the INEGMA military analysis institute, said the hilltops overlook Iqlim al-Tuffah, an area further from the border where Hezbollah holds sway, as well as part of the country's east.

Control of the area would therefore "give the Israelis an easy passage to move on both sides".

Speaking to journalists including AFP last month, Hezbollah spokesman Youssef al-Zein refused to say how many of the group's fighters were at the Ali al-Taher position. He denied any Iranian personnel were there, as had been reported in some media outlets.

He claimed that Israel had "exaggerated the importance of Ali al-Taher" as a military objective but also vowed that Hezbollah would "defend this position as much as it can".

The ridge is located right above the Litani. Hezbollah agreed to disarm in areas south of the river under a 2024 ceasefire that sought to end its previous war with Israel.

Two years later, Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into the broader Middle East war by attacking Israel in support of Iran.

Israel responded with airstrikes and a ground invasion that Lebanon says have killed more than 4,300 people.

The conflict has calmed since a US-Iran memorandum of understanding and a framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel agreed in June. But Israeli strikes continue and violence persisted around Ali al-Taher.

On August 15, Israel's army launched its deadliest strikes in weeks in response to what it said was a Hezbollah attack against its soldiers in the area.

In June, Israel's army published an updated map showing the parts of south Lebanon it considers within its "security zone" where its troops are operating, expanding the area to include the Ali al-Taher ridge.