‘Cubs of the Caliphate’... ISIS Threatens New Syria

 A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)
A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)
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‘Cubs of the Caliphate’... ISIS Threatens New Syria

 A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)
A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)

Ahmed el-Jouri

Khaled (a pseudonym) never expected this interview to reopen a door to the past.

At first, he hesitated, as if choosing his words carefully. But as he spoke, his tone felt strangely familiar. Then, as the conversation unfolded, a moment came that made my heart race.

"I was 13 when I became a prison guard. We had no choice. They gave orders, and if we refused, we were punished. I opened cell doors, brought food, and watched the prisoners. Some cried, some screamed, and some stayed silent. We treated them as enemies, though we didn’t know why they were there," Khaled recounted.

His words sent a chill down my spine. Al-Mayadeen Prison. 2015. A 13-year-old was guarding me and the other detainees. My mind flashed back to that dark time when I was arrested in Syria for refusing to work as a pharmacist for ISIS.

The group demanded total loyalty, especially from medical professionals. Those who resisted faced threats, arrests, or worse.

One night, they came for me. I later learned my neighbor, an ISIS member, had turned me in for listening to music. That was enough to send me to prison - where I met my young jailer.

As I conducted this interview - one of 17 testimonies I gathered on ISIS youth or the so-called "Cubs of the Caliphate" - questions filled my mind, but I held back. I didn’t want to be too direct, yet curiosity gnawed at me.

I asked careful questions, trying to confirm my suspicions without alarming Khaled, now in his mid-20s. But when he described the prison - the corridors, the meager meals, the way he was ordered to open and close cell doors - I knew the truth. He had been my jailer.

A wave of emotions hit me. Part of me wanted to tell him I had been there, that he had stood before me, holding the keys. But another part hesitated.

How could I say it? What difference would it make? I now see that Khaled was just a child, a pawn in a larger system. Any anger or resentment I felt couldn’t be directed at him. Still, I struggled to separate the man before me from his past.

"Were you cruel to the prisoners?" I finally asked.

He sighed, lowering his head. "Sometimes, I tried to be kind - giving extra food or leaving a door open a little longer. But other times... I was harsh. I was afraid. If I showed weakness, they would have locked me up too."

His words struck me.

I don’t know if Khaled remembers me or if I was just another prisoner. But I see now - he is still fighting his own battle.

Khaled’s story is just one of 17 firsthand accounts gathered over the past six months, revealing how past trauma collides with present and future struggles. This report follows two key figures: Khaled, a former prison guard trying to move on, and Sami (a pseudonym), who once faced his captor at his weakest moment.

Their experiences, along with others, highlight the lasting impact of violence and forced recruitment on a generation robbed of its childhood. But they also raise a crucial question: Has ISIS truly been defeated, or could it return?

With Syria’s shifting power dynamics - Bashar al-Assad’s downfall and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham taking control - young men like Khaled and Sami now face new challenges in an increasingly unstable country. The ongoing security chaos and power struggles among armed factions have fueled fears of ISIS regaining strength.

At the center of this uncertainty is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which still controls thousands of ISIS detainees, including men, women, and children. This detainee issue has become a bargaining tool, with SDF using it to secure military and political support from global and regional powers.

Without clear solutions, these prisoners risk being used for political or military gain. The possible closure of Syria’s al-Hol camp, where many are held, only adds to concerns about what happens next - and where they will go.

A generation of children was born in the camp that mostly holds ISIS families in Syria. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

ISIS threatens Syria’s new government

ISIS has warned Syria’s new government against "straying from the right path," fueling fears that its threats are more than just propaganda - they could be part of a plan to regain influence.

Though the group’s remnants remain active in Syria’s and Iraq’s deserts, launching occasional attacks, the real danger lies in its ability to exploit security gaps and rebuild.

Adding to concerns, some local forces - including remnants of the old regime and the SDF - might use the ISIS threat to their advantage. By keeping the danger alive, they could seek more support from international players, raising fears that ISIS operations might be tolerated or even leveraged in ongoing power struggles.

ISIS is determined to avenge its defeats, understanding that losing land doesn’t mean the end of its ideology. The group is rebuilding by taking advantage of local grievances, tribal divisions, economic decline, and the hopelessness of many former fighters, especially those recruited as children.

These young people, raised in a war-torn environment, now face rejection from their communities, lack of job opportunities, and a stigma they can’t escape. Without proper rehabilitation programs, the risk of them returning to ISIS remains high, as the group continues to exploit their isolation and lack of future prospects.

So, are these former child soldiers a threat to Syria’s stability? Or are they victims of tough circumstances, hoping for reintegration into society as part of the solution?

Despite the fall of its so-called "caliphate," ISIS is still trying to regain its power, using more complex and decentralized methods. These tactics make it harder to track or eliminate the group.

With tasks now handled outside the central leadership, recruits sometimes receive multiple offers from different ISIS factions, unaware of their true connections to the original group.

Khaled recalled: "After I was freed, a man I didn’t know approached me. He didn’t directly say he was from ISIS, but he hinted that the past wasn’t over and there was a chance to return to the group. He knew personal details about me, even things I’d never told anyone. How did he know?"

Like Khaled, Sami also received indirect offers, but through social media. ISIS uses fake accounts on Telegram and WhatsApp to reach young people. Sami said: "I got a message from an unknown person on Telegram. He said he knew my struggles and that there was a way for me to rebuild my life. He spoke about injustice, how we were used and abandoned. His words felt like a therapist exploiting my weaknesses."

In addition to traditional methods, ISIS is now using modern technology, video games that spread extremist ideas, and private forums. They sometimes send links disguised as educational offers or scholarships, but they are traps to recruit individuals.

At one point, the group also relied on civilians working in accepted jobs, like aid workers or logistics staff, to spread their influence. Khaled revealed: "A friend told me he was working with a man distributing food and supplies to poor villages. Later, I found out it was just a cover, and some of the workers were former ISIS members."

Police affiliated with the new Syrian authorities are seen near a mosque in Palmyra on February 7, 2025. (AFP)

ISIS’ continued influence

The tough economic situation and social stigma faced by former ISIS members play a major role in the group's ongoing recruitment. Many young people from these backgrounds live in areas with few job opportunities and are marginalized by society, making them vulnerable to ISIS’s financial offers.

Sami said: "When I was released, I couldn’t find work. I tried to start over, but everyone saw me as a threat. I had nothing, no future. In my desperation, I thought, ‘What if I go back? At least I’d get something for the risk. No one will hire me here.’"

Khaled, like many others, feels isolated. "Society rejects us, and the government doesn’t trust us. We’re stuck, not knowing where to go. When someone says, ‘We haven’t forgotten you, you’re still one of us,’ you start thinking about it."

One witness added: "When there’s no food and no one will hire you because of your past, you start to consider your options. Some are strong enough to resist, but others may not be."

Psychological struggles persist

The survivors also feel as if ISIS is still watching them. It’s not just messages or attempts to meet; sometimes they are approached by people who know private details about their lives.

Khaled recalled: "After my release, I lived far from anything related to the group. But suddenly, a man appeared at the mosque where I prayed in. He spoke about how some of us had lost our way but could still return. When I asked him what he meant, he said, ‘You were there. You know what I mean.’"

Though ISIS’ physical caliphate has fallen, its ideology remains. The group’s tactics continue to change to adapt to new situations. For Khaled, Sami, and others, the fight is not just about weapons. It’s a psychological struggle to hold onto their new identities, while dealing with the past and the persistent attempts to bring them back into the fold, all in a Syria filled with uncertainty.



Venice Ovation Fuels Hopes for Gaza Girl Film to Reach Global Audience

Venice Ovation Fuels Hopes for Gaza Girl Film to Reach Global Audience
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Venice Ovation Fuels Hopes for Gaza Girl Film to Reach Global Audience

Venice Ovation Fuels Hopes for Gaza Girl Film to Reach Global Audience

Tunisian director Kaouther Ben Hania said on Thursday she hopes the rapturous reception given to her new film "The Voice of Hind Rajab" at the Venice Film Festival would help carry its harrowing story to audiences worldwide.

Recounting the final hours of a 5-year-old girl from Gaza who died in 2024 after she was trapped in a car under Israeli fire, the movie drew a 24-minute standing ovation at its premiere on Wednesday - by far the longest so far this year.

"It was overwhelming because I didn't expect that," Ben Hania told Reuters. "I'm so, so grateful to Venice for the selection (of the film) and to give us such an incredible beginning of the career of the movie."

The applause only ended when officials had to ask the audience to leave because another film was due to be screened.

Amer Hlehel, an actor who plays a Red Crescent dispatcher trying to organise the girl's rescue, said he had mixed emotions over the thunderous reception.

"There is a guilty feeling that we are celebrating while people are still suffering from starvation and mass killing," he said, adding that the cast and crew felt they were "on a mission" to tell Rajab's story to the rest of the world.

The girl was trying to flee Gaza City on January 29, 2024, when the vehicle in which she was riding came under attack by Israeli forces. She survived the initial gunfire and pleaded with Red Crescent staff - in heart-rending audio used in the film - to save her.

Israel finally gave the green light for the rescue after a three-hour wait, but contact with the ambulance crew was cut shortly after they arrived at the scene. The bodies of Rajab, some of her relatives and the two medics were found days later.

The Israel Defence Forces initially denied that its troops had been within firing range of the car. However, a subsequent UN report blamed Israel. The Israeli army said this week that the incident was still under review and declined further comment.

SEEKING US DISTRIBUTION

"The Voice of Hind Rajab" has yet to secure a US distributor, but Ben Hania said she remained hopeful.

Films critical of Israel can struggle to get a broad release in the United States. A hard-hitting film about the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, "No Other Land," won this year's best documentary feature Oscar, but despite its critical success, no major US distributor bought the project.

However, Ben Hania's film has attracted some top Hollywood names as executive producers, giving it added industry heft, including actors Brad Pitt, Joaquin Phoenix and Rooney Mara.

"I hope it will be seen in the US," Ben Hania said, noting that Tunisia has already chosen it as its submission for best international feature at the 2026 Academy Awards.

"The most important thing is that 'The Voice of Hind Rajab' reaches everybody all over the world and the Oscars and Venice here are a great doorway," she said, dismissing any suggestion that the film might prove controversial.

"The killing of a child should not be divisive. ... It's a crime," she said.


The Worst Drought in Decades Is Threatening Syria’s Fragile Recovery from Years of Civil War

A drone view shows the dried up Orontes River in Jisr al-Shughour, west of Idlib, Syria, on Aug. 14, 2025. (AP)
A drone view shows the dried up Orontes River in Jisr al-Shughour, west of Idlib, Syria, on Aug. 14, 2025. (AP)
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The Worst Drought in Decades Is Threatening Syria’s Fragile Recovery from Years of Civil War

A drone view shows the dried up Orontes River in Jisr al-Shughour, west of Idlib, Syria, on Aug. 14, 2025. (AP)
A drone view shows the dried up Orontes River in Jisr al-Shughour, west of Idlib, Syria, on Aug. 14, 2025. (AP)

The worst drought in decades is gripping much of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, drying out rivers and lakes, shriveling crops and leading to dayslong tap water cutoffs in major cities.

The situation is particularly dire in Syria, where experts say rainfall has been declining for decades and where the fledgling government is trying to stitch the country back together following a 14-year civil war that left millions impoverished and reliant on foreign aid.

Small-farmer Mansour Mahmoud al-Khatib said that during the war, he couldn't reach his fields in the Damascus suburb of Sayyida Zeinab some days because fighters from the Lebanese Hezbollah party allied with then-President Bashar Assad would block the roads. That problem vanished when Hezbollah withdrew after Assad fell in a December opposition offensive, but the drought has devastated his farm, drying up the wells that irrigate it.

"The land is missing the water," al-Khatib told The Associated Press recently as he watched workers feed the wheat he did manage to harvest into a threshing machine. "This season is weak — you could call it half a season. Some years are better and some years are worse, but this year is harsh."

In a good year, his land could produce as much as 800 to 900 kilograms (1,764 to 1,984 pounds) of wheat per dunam, an area equal to 0.1 hectares and 0.25 acres. This year, it yielded about a quarter that much, he said. He hired only six or seven workers this harvest season instead of last year’s 15.

Syria's withering crops

Because the drought followed a prolonged war, farmers who were already financially stretched have had little ability to cope with its effects, said Jalal Al Hamoud, national food security officer for the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization in Syria.

Before the uprising-turned-civil war that began in 2011, Syrian farmers produced an average of 3.5 million to 4.5 million tons of wheat per year, which was enough to meet the country’s domestic needs, according to Saeed Ibrahim, director of agricultural planning and economics in Syria’s Agriculture Ministry.

That annual yield dropped to 2.2 million to 2.6 million tons during the war, and in recent years, the government has had to import 60% to 70% of its wheat to feed its roughly 23 million people. This year's harvest is expected to yield only 1 million tons, forcing the country to spend even more of its strained resources on imports.

Mudar Dayoub, a spokesperson for Syria's Ministry of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection, said this year’s wheat crop will only last for two or three months and that the government is "currently relying on signing contracts to import wheat from abroad" and on donations, including from neighboring Iraq.

But in a country where the World Food Program estimates that half the population is food-insecure, Ibrahim warned that "total reliance on imports and aid threatens food security" and is "unsustainable."

The drought isn't the only major issue facing Syria, where postwar reconstruction is projected to cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Since Assad fled, the country has been rattled by outbreaks of sectarian violence, and there's growing doubt about whether the new authorities will be able to hold it together. Without jobs or stability, millions of refugees who fled during the war are unlikely to come home.

A drone view shows dramatically low water levels at Lake Qaraoun, one of the Lebanon's largest reservoirs, as the result of a drought following heatwaves and a winter with very scarce precipitation, in Qaraoun village, eastern Lebanon, Aug. 6, 2025. (AP)

Interconnected crises

A dam on the Litani River in neighboring Lebanon's fertile Bekaa Valley forms Lake Qaraoun, a reservoir that spans about 12 square kilometers (4.6 square miles).

Over the years, climate change has led to a gradual decline in the water flowing into the reservoir, said Sami Alawieh, head of the Litani River National Authority.

This summer, after an unusually dry winter left Lebanon without the water reserves its usually banks through snow and rainfall, it has shrunk to the size of a pond, surrounded by a vast expanse of parched land.

Although an average of 350 million cubic meters (12.4 billion cubic feet) of water flows into the lake during the rainy season each year, meeting about one-third of Lebanon's annual demand, this year the incoming water didn't exceed 45 million cubic meters (1.6 billion cubic feet), he said.

Lebanon’s water woes have further exacerbated the drought in Syria, which partially relies on rivers flowing in from its western neighbor.

The largest of those is the Orontes, also known as the Assi. In Syria’s Idlib province, the river is an important source of irrigation water, and fishermen make their living from its banks. This year, dead fish littered the dried-out river bed.

"This is the first time it’s happened that there was no water at all," said Dureid Haj Salah, a farmer in Idlib’s Jisr al-Shugour. Many farmers can't afford to dig wells for irrigation, and the drought destroyed not only summer vegetable crops but decades-old trees in orchards, he said.

"There is no compensation for the loss of crops," Haj Salah said. "And you know the farmers make just enough to get by."

Mostafa Summaq, director of water resources in Idlib province, said the groundwater dropped by more than 10 meters (33 feet) in three months in some monitoring wells, which he attributed to farmers over-pumping due to a lack of rain. Local officials are considering installing metered irrigation systems, but it would be too expensive to do without assistance, he said.

Syrian farmers harvest wheat in the outskirts of Damascus, Syria, July 2, 2025. (AP)

A drier climate

Most experts agree that Syria and the broader region appear headed toward worse climate shocks, which they aren't prepared to absorb.

Climate change makes some regions wetter and others drier, and the Middle East and Mediterranean are among those that are drying out, said Matti Kummu, a professor at Aalto University in Finland who specializes in global food and water issues. Syria, specifically, has shown a trend of reduced rainfall over the past 40 years, while it has been using water at an unsustainable rate.

"There’s not enough water from rainfall or from snowmelt in the mountains to recharge the groundwater," Kummu said. Due to increasing irrigation needs, he said, "the groundwater table is going lower and lower, which means that it’s less accessible and requires more energy (to pump)." At some point, the groundwater might run out.

Even with limited means, the country could take measures to mitigate the impacts, such as increased rainwater harvesting, switching to more drought-tolerant crops and trying to put more effective irrigation systems in place, even simple ones.

But "in the long term, if the situation in terms of the climate change impacts continues" as currently projected, how much of the croplands will be arable in the coming decades is an open question, Kummu said.


Inside Israel’s Settler State and its Hidden Strategy

Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)
Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)
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Inside Israel’s Settler State and its Hidden Strategy

Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)
Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)

For decades, settler attacks in the West Bank were largely concentrated in “Area C,” under full Israeli control. But since the Hamas-led Oct. 7 assault on Israel, violence has spread deeper, reaching “Area B” and reshaping life across the territory.

The assaults, carried out day and night, have coincided with a surge in settlement activity. There are now 243 new settlement outposts that did not exist before the 1993 Oslo accords, and 129 additional “shepherding outposts” established since October 7, 2023, alone.

Officially, Israeli settlements cover 3.6% of the West Bank. But their de facto footprint — including roads, security zones and areas of influence — extends to nearly 10%, according to Palestinian monitoring groups.

Nature reserves are also part of the land Israel has moved to place under its control as part of a sovereignty plan driven by far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.

In what analysts say could be the most decisive step yet toward blocking the creation of a Palestinian state, Smotrich in late August 2025 secured final approval for the long-stalled “E1” project.

The plan, frozen for decades due to international pressure, received a green light from the Civil Administration’s Supreme Planning Council, an arm of Israel’s Defense Ministry.

A Village Turned Into a Cage

In Sinjil, a town of 9,000 people about 21 km north of Ramallah, residents say daily life has come to resemble imprisonment. Fences, gates, settlements and military outposts ring the community, leaving villagers hemmed in and fearful.

The scars of a July 11 attack are still visible. On that day, settlers killed two young Palestinian men in one of the deadliest assaults since the Oct. 7 attack on Israel.

The victims were not from Sinjil but from the nearby town of al-Mazra’a al-Sharqiya. They had come to help defend their neighbors when hundreds of settlers stormed the village.

“It was a wide-scale assault,” said Mohammad Alwan, coordinator of the Popular Committee Against Settlements. “More than 300 settlers gathered in the mountains and attacked the village. It was a tough battle. Neighbors rushed to defend each other.”

Two young men went missing during the clashes. Hours later, villagers found 22-year-old Saif Musallat dead in a valley. “He had just come from America to visit Palestine ...

They hit him until he died,” Alwan said, his voice breaking. “The bruises were all over his body.”

The second victim, Mohammad Shalabi, was shot dead. “Criminals and savages were unleashed on us,” Alwan added.

Alwan, who has lived through decades of settler attacks, said the brutality has escalated sharply since Oct. 7. “After October they built fences, put up gates and seized the rest of the land - 8,000 out of 14,000 dunams. Look how they turned the village into a cage.”

Gates, Closures and Economic Strain

Beyond the human toll, villagers describe economic suffocation. Mechanic Gharib Khalil’s shop lies just behind a yellow gate sealing the village entrance. “Since they put the gate up a year ago, business collapsed. People can’t reach me anymore,” he said.

Nearby, Abed al-Nasser Alwan stood by his broken-down truck trapped on the other side of the gate. “It looks open, but cameras are everywhere. If you move it, they shoot you or arrest you. We’re stuck.”

Palestinian officials say these restrictions are part of a deliberate policy. The Palestinian Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission counts 898 military checkpoints and gates across the West Bank, including 146 added since Oct. 7, 2023.

“These barriers reflect Israel’s closure policy since 1967,” said Amir Dawood, the commission’s publishing director. “They are designed to create a new geographic reality - one of exclusion and surveillance.”

Boundaries Drawn with Fire

The violence has spread to neighboring Kafr Malik, where settlers killed four men in July. Posters of the victims cover village walls, alongside slogans of defiance. Settlements loom from the hilltops above, expanding since Oct. 7.

“From there, they attack the village,” said activist Montaser al-Maliki. “Before October, attacks happened, but not like this. Now they are larger, more organized, and more violent.”

Almost daily, footage circulates of settlers blocking roads or pelting Palestinian cars with stones.

The Vanishing Oslo Map

Maps of the West Bank illustrate how Oslo’s partition into Areas A, B and C has eroded.

Area A, once under full Palestinian control, has become a patchwork of isolated enclaves.

“They’ve built a state within a state,” said Issa Zboun, head of GIS at the Applied Research Institute in Jerusalem. “Instead of giving Palestinians their promised state, they took the land and turned it into a settlers’ state.”

Figures compiled by Palestinian groups show the transformation:

1967: 69 settlements, 98,000 settlers, covering 0.2% of the West Bank.

1993 (Oslo Accords): 172 settlements, 248,000 settlers, covering 1.2%.

2025: 200 official settlements, 243 outposts — including 129 built after Oct. 7 — housing more than 940,000 settlers.

While settlements officially cover 3.6% of the West Bank, their effective footprint — including security zones, bypass roads and areas of influence — reaches nearly 10%.

Zboun said Israel once needed laws to seize land for settlements. “Today they do it without orders, without announcements, without laws,” he said.

In his office, Zboun displayed maps showing how every major Palestinian city is surrounded by settlements and bypass roads. “They turned Area A into isolated islands,” he said. “They’ve built something larger than the Palestinian state Oslo promised.”

For villagers like those in Sinjil and Kafr Malik, the map is redrawn not with ink but with blood. Boundaries, they say, are now “drawn with fire.”

Restricted Zones for the Palestinian Authority

Palestinian security forces are formally allowed to access parts of Areas B and C of the West Bank only with Israeli coordination. Yet even when entry is possible, analysts and residents say it is unthinkable for Palestinian officers to confront armed settlers or the Israeli army directly.

Israel’s military is often present during settler raids, ostensibly to keep order, but Palestinians say soldiers routinely shield settlers rather than restrain them. Many Palestinians have been killed during these attacks, with no record of Israeli law enforcement prosecuting settlers beyond brief detentions.

US Pressure Eased Under Trump

Since the start of the occupation in 1967, no Israeli settler has been jailed for killing Palestinians in West Bank attacks, despite periodic US pressure. The Biden administration sought to curb settler violence by imposing sanctions on settler leaders and their political backers. But President Donald Trump revoked those sanctions on his first day in office, a move that emboldened settler leaders and the Israeli defense minister to scrap a policy allowing administrative detention of violent settlers.

Trump’s arrival in power marked a turning point for both Israel’s right-wing leaders and the settler movement, who viewed his presidency as a rare chance to entrench Israeli sovereignty across the West Bank.

The period after Trump’s election saw what Palestinians describe as “unprecedented terror.” Settler raids became more frequent, larger, and more violent.

According to The Palestinian Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, Israel carried out 11,280 attacks in the first half of 2025, of which 2,154 were by settler militias, killing six Palestinians.

The Trump administration remained silent even after high-profile killings, including that of Musallat.

Only after Musallat’s family launched legal action and US media spotlighted the case did US ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, call for accountability.

This was a criminal and terrorist act, Huckabee said, before visiting the nearby Christian town of Taybeh, where settlers had recently torched an old cemetery.

Despite his words - calling the attacks “absolute terrorism” and the desecration of holy sites a “crime against humanity” - no arrests were made, and settlers continued their assaults, including fresh raids on Taybeh.

The Desert Raids

Settler attacks have also spread to remote desert communities near Bethlehem, in what locals say is a campaign of intimidation.

In the village of al-Minya, council head Zayed Kawazba pointed to burned-out cars as evidence of recent raids. “They can come at any time,” he said. “Wherever they go, destruction follows.”

Nearby Kisan and the desert hamlet of Deir al-Ahmar have also faced near-daily violence. Residents describe settlers beating villagers, burning homes, killing livestock and then accusing Palestinians of theft.

“Before Oct. 7, the attacks were limited, but afterwards the orders came,” said Adnan Abayat of Deir al-Ahmar, showing a scar from a settler beating. “Now they are relentless. People can’t defend themselves, many have already left.”

A Secret Plan in Plain Sight

Palestinians and rights groups say these raids are not random but part of a broader Israeli strategy led by Smotrich, who also holds sweeping powers over the West Bank’s Civil Administration.

Since being appointed in 2022, Smotrich has overseen what critics call the most dramatic transformation of West Bank governance since 1967. By transferring powers once reserved for the Israeli military to civilian officials loyal to him, Smotrich has blurred the line between military occupation and outright annexation.

Though Israel denies officially annexing the West Bank, Smotrich has openly declared his aim of blocking any Palestinian state and entrenching Jewish settlement. A leaked recording captured him calling the process “a dramatic shift that changes the DNA of the system.”

In August 2025, Smotrich secured final approval for the long-stalled E1 settlement plan, linking Jerusalem to the vast Maale Adumim bloc. The project, frozen for decades under international pressure, will effectively bisect the West Bank, severing north from south and crippling the territorial viability of a Palestinian state.

“This is historic,” Smotrich said. “The Palestinian state has been erased from the table — not with slogans but with deeds. Every settlement, every house, every neighborhood is another nail in the coffin of that dangerous idea.”

Israeli rights group B’Tselem warned that the move cements a system of apartheid by entrenching “a bi-national state of separation.”

The E1 approval followed a July 23 Knesset vote endorsing annexation of the West Bank - condemned by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas alike. Netanyahu framed the decision as “a response to Western recognition plans for Palestine” and vowed to accelerate settlement expansion.

Infrastructure work on E1 could begin within months, with housing construction starting as early as next year, Israeli officials said.

B’Tselem argues that Israel has already created a dual system of governance in the occupied West Bank, with separate legal regimes for settlers and Palestinians, amounting to apartheid.

Smotrich has made little effort to disguise his intentions. His 2017 manifesto openly called for dismantling the Palestinian Authority, preventing statehood, and forcing Palestinians to choose between emigration, second-class citizenship, or resistance.

In two years of the current government, observers say Smotrich has delivered a historic shift, consolidating Israeli civilian rule over occupied land and accelerating settlement expansion at a pace unseen in decades.

As settlers push deeper into Palestinian villages and deserts, residents say they are left with only three choices: flee, submit, or resist.

“Their plan is to erase us,” said Abayat. “They beat us, burn our homes, kill our sheep and the world says nothing. We have nothing left but survival.”