SDF Factions: Uncertain Scenarios in Complex Relations with Damascus

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
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SDF Factions: Uncertain Scenarios in Complex Relations with Damascus

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) pose the main challenge to Syria’s new administration, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, as it seeks to move past the conflict and rebuild the state.

While efforts focus on forming a unified army under state control, most factions have agreed to join the Defense Ministry. However, the SDF insists on keeping its independent military structure and refuses to disband or integrate its fighters individually. Instead, it wants to remain a single unit within the new army.
This stance contradicts the administration’s position, which rejects any military force outside the new national army.

Syrian Administration’s Stance on the SDF

The new Syrian administration has repeatedly emphasized that negotiations remain its primary approach to resolving its dispute with the SDF, with several rounds of talks held in recent months.

Syrian government sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that “negotiations are still the main option, and preparations are underway for new rounds in an effort to reach a comprehensive solution that eliminates any risk of future conflict.”

They added that the government’s policy is based on “unifying the country and preventing any military factions from operating outside the Defense Ministry’s authority.”

The sources also stressed that “the Kurdish issue is an internal Syrian matter and should not rely on external actors for a resolution.

Competing Agendas

Khaled al-Shuayti, one of the few Arab military commanders within the SDF in Deir Ezzor, said Arab tribes involved in the SDF through alliances and fighters “will not engage in a confrontation with the new Syrian state.”

Given the geography in which the SDF operates, it has forged alliances with local Arab communities and tribes in surrounding areas. Arab fighters number around 2,000 or slightly more, but they have little influence over the SDF’s internal and external policies.

“If the Kurdish leadership insists on pursuing non-Syrian agendas, Arab fighters will break away from the SDF,” al-Shuayti told Asharq Al-Awsat.

A faction within the SDF, led by Mazloum Abdi, supports talks with Damascus but faces opposition from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leadership, which refuses to disarm before securing key demands.

These include keeping the SDF as a single unit within Syria’s Defense Ministry and granting Kurds some form of autonomy.

Abdi, born Ferhad Abdi Sahin in Ain al-Arab (Kobani) in 1967, fought alongside the PKK and is a close associate of its jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan. He helped establish the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which later became the military wing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD).

Abdi’s push for negotiations with Damascus coincides with expectations that Ocalan may soon call for disarmament and an end to military action.

Al-Shuayti believes Abdi is stalling to ease pressure while securing political gains for Syria’s Kurds, including a role in governance and constitutional guarantees.

Researcher Firas Faham from the Abaad Center for Strategic Studies told Asharq Al-Awsat that the new Syrian administration prefers diplomacy with the SDF, using Türkiye’s military threats as leverage to push the group into talks with Damascus.

However, the SDF is unlikely to make major decisions until US President Donald Trump clarifies his stance on withdrawing American troops from Syria.

“The SDF wants to retain its military structure within the Syrian army and maintain special administrative control over its territories,” Faham said.

“Damascus, on the other hand, may be open to granting Kurdish local councils some autonomy and recognizing certain cultural rights. But when it comes to military control, the Syrian government remains firm on maintaining a unified command,” he added.

Possible Scenarios

According to Faham, the future of relations between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces hinges largely on whether Trump decides to keep or withdraw American troops from Syria.

The first scenario is a negotiated agreement in which the SDF drops what Damascus considers unrealistic demands, including maintaining its forces as a unified bloc within the Syrian army and abandoning its push for federal autonomy in areas under its control.

The second scenario is military confrontation if the SDF refuses to reach an agreement with Damascus. In this case, Türkiye could intervene alongside the new Syrian army, leading to a likely military defeat for the SDF without securing any gains.

The third scenario is maintaining the status quo, with the SDF retaining control over its forces and continuing to govern areas east of the Euphrates separately from the new Syrian administration. Currently, the SDF operates like a state within a state, with its own military and security forces and territory beyond Damascus’ control.

Internal divisions within the SDF further complicate the situation. One faction, led by Abdi, aligns with the West, while another, the Qandil faction—considered the most powerful—maintains close ties with Iran. This faction is dominated by PKK leaders from both Syria and Türkiye.

Faham noted that Iran is strengthening its alliance with the Qandil faction within the SDF, viewing it as a tool to maintain influence in Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Kurds within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Kurdish activist Kurdi Ayubi, an Islamist who opposes the nationalist ideology represented by the SDF and who previously fought with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), estimates that only a few hundred Kurds share his views.

He argues that the real power in SDF-controlled areas remains in the hands of the PKK.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ayubi explained that “cadres” — fighters who initially served with the PKK and later joined the SDF after the Syrian revolution began — became involved in fighting with the start of the battle of Kobani against ISIS.

These cadres come from various nationalities, including Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian Kurds.

“The Syrian cadres work almost openly, as seen with figures like Abdi, Farhad Shami, and Bulat Jan, alongside prominent women leaders such as Ilham Ahmed, who was a key fighter in the PKK,” added Ayubi.

Ayubi said any agreement with the Syrian government would need approval from Qandil, with the final solution depending on the relationship between Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan and imprisoned PKK leader Ocalan.

He suggested the best approach for Damascus is to follow two paths: one, direct talks with the Qandil faction, and two, engaging with Kurdish tribal leaders in Kobani, Qamishli, and nearby areas.

Ayubi said: “Qandil wants a normal relationship with Damascus, as long as it remains discreet.”

He added that reaching an agreement with Qandil would allow Damascus to enter the region peacefully.



Iran Faces Power Struggle Over Nuclear Talks Management

Photo posted on Larijani’s Telegram account last May
Photo posted on Larijani’s Telegram account last May
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Iran Faces Power Struggle Over Nuclear Talks Management

Photo posted on Larijani’s Telegram account last May
Photo posted on Larijani’s Telegram account last May

A renewed debate is simmering in Tehran over whether Iran’s nuclear file should remain under the Foreign Ministry or be returned to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), after Ali Larijani’s reinstatement as the council’s secretary sparked speculation of a shift in control.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi dismissed the rumors, telling the Khabar Online news site, which is close to Larijani and had floated the possibility, that “there is currently no such plan on the agenda, and I do not think it will happen.”

His comments appeared aimed at cooling media chatter over a redistribution of authority, fueled by Larijani’s comeback and the council’s historic dominance in shaping nuclear strategy.

The remarks come a month after parliament passed a law suspending cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog and requiring SNSC approval for future inspections of atomic sites. While not a breakthrough, the law was seen as a tactical move to pressure Western powers and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

A joint subcommittee of the SNSC and Defense Ministry – with operational protection handled by a special Revolutionary Guards unit – currently coordinates inspector access with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.

Analysts say the legislation reflects a broader push to boost the security council’s influence over the nuclear file, tightening its grip on future talks.

Shifting Authority, Same Ultimate Arbiter

The tug-of-war over who runs the negotiations is not new. While tactics have shifted with changes in government, ultimate authority has always rested with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The most notable shift came in 2013 under former president Hassan Rouhani, when responsibility for negotiations was handed to the Foreign Ministry. The SNSC, however, remained the main decision-making “kitchen,” with all major policy choices vetted by Khamenei.

The move gave the ministry a higher profile internationally but did not strip the council of its veto power.

Larijani’s return has revived speculation about a reversal.

Between 2004 and 2006, he served as SNSC secretary and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator before resigning in a dispute with then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose hardline stance triggered UN Security Council sanctions later frozen under the 2015 nuclear deal.

Power struggles over the file go back further, including attempts in the Rafsanjani era to transfer oversight to the Expediency Council, the Supreme Leader’s top advisory body now chaired by Larijani’s brother, Sadeq.

Those efforts were part of a bid to continue the negotiation track started in 2003 under reformist president Mohammad Khatami, when Rouhani held the SNSC post.

Khamenei’s Signals

In March 2024, reports suggested Khamenei wanted the nuclear file moved back under bodies directly answerable to him, after appointing political adviser Ali Shamkhani to run parallel talks alongside the late president Ebrahim Raisi’s government.

Shamkhani oversaw negotiations for a decade as SNSC secretary, a period when the file was formally under the Foreign Ministry but still shaped by the council.

Critics of the current structure say the ministry’s limited powers make indirect talks with Washington harder. Rouhani himself complained about this during the final months of his presidency, when near-final Vienna talks with the Biden administration collapsed in March 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Parallel Channels

Larijani’s return may reassure pro-diplomacy factions, given his role in shepherding the 2015 deal as parliament speaker. His exclusion from the 2021 and 2024 presidential races was partly due to conservative backlash over his support for the accord.

But others fear he may revert to closer alignment with hardliners, given his mandate to execute Khamenei’s policies. In June, Larijani posted a video on X threatening IAEA chief Rafael Grossi during the 12-day war with Israel.

Khamenei underscored his oversight on July 16, in only his second public appearance since the conflict began, urging diplomats to act with “precision” and follow “guidance” – remarks widely read as direct orders reflecting the sensitivity of the moment.

Adding to the intrigue, former foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi revealed this month the existence of an influential, unnamed parallel committee directing negotiations outside the SNSC framework. He gave no details on its members but called it “effective and active.”

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said the ministry works within a clear hierarchy and communicates its views to relevant decision-makers. While an imminent transfer of the file appears unlikely, current signs point to Larijani having a greater hand in shaping Iran’s strategy, given his experience and direct access to Khamenei.

The tussle over control of the nuclear file, analysts say, reflects Iran’s internal balance of power more than any technical procedural dispute.

The Foreign Ministry brings diplomatic tools and international reach, but the SNSC – and its shadow committees – retain final authority under the Supreme Leader. Larijani’s return could centralize decision-making and unify messaging, but at the cost of limiting the diplomats’ room for maneuver.

Success in any future talks, they say, will depend on how well Tehran balances internal discipline with external pressure.