A renewed debate is simmering in Tehran over whether Iran’s nuclear file should remain under the Foreign Ministry or be returned to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), after Ali Larijani’s reinstatement as the council’s secretary sparked speculation of a shift in control.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi dismissed the rumors, telling the Khabar Online news site, which is close to Larijani and had floated the possibility, that “there is currently no such plan on the agenda, and I do not think it will happen.”
His comments appeared aimed at cooling media chatter over a redistribution of authority, fueled by Larijani’s comeback and the council’s historic dominance in shaping nuclear strategy.
The remarks come a month after parliament passed a law suspending cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog and requiring SNSC approval for future inspections of atomic sites. While not a breakthrough, the law was seen as a tactical move to pressure Western powers and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
A joint subcommittee of the SNSC and Defense Ministry – with operational protection handled by a special Revolutionary Guards unit – currently coordinates inspector access with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.
Analysts say the legislation reflects a broader push to boost the security council’s influence over the nuclear file, tightening its grip on future talks.
Shifting Authority, Same Ultimate Arbiter
The tug-of-war over who runs the negotiations is not new. While tactics have shifted with changes in government, ultimate authority has always rested with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The most notable shift came in 2013 under former president Hassan Rouhani, when responsibility for negotiations was handed to the Foreign Ministry. The SNSC, however, remained the main decision-making “kitchen,” with all major policy choices vetted by Khamenei.
The move gave the ministry a higher profile internationally but did not strip the council of its veto power.
Larijani’s return has revived speculation about a reversal.
Between 2004 and 2006, he served as SNSC secretary and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator before resigning in a dispute with then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose hardline stance triggered UN Security Council sanctions later frozen under the 2015 nuclear deal.
Power struggles over the file go back further, including attempts in the Rafsanjani era to transfer oversight to the Expediency Council, the Supreme Leader’s top advisory body now chaired by Larijani’s brother, Sadeq.
Those efforts were part of a bid to continue the negotiation track started in 2003 under reformist president Mohammad Khatami, when Rouhani held the SNSC post.
Khamenei’s Signals
In March 2024, reports suggested Khamenei wanted the nuclear file moved back under bodies directly answerable to him, after appointing political adviser Ali Shamkhani to run parallel talks alongside the late president Ebrahim Raisi’s government.
Shamkhani oversaw negotiations for a decade as SNSC secretary, a period when the file was formally under the Foreign Ministry but still shaped by the council.
Critics of the current structure say the ministry’s limited powers make indirect talks with Washington harder. Rouhani himself complained about this during the final months of his presidency, when near-final Vienna talks with the Biden administration collapsed in March 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Parallel Channels
Larijani’s return may reassure pro-diplomacy factions, given his role in shepherding the 2015 deal as parliament speaker. His exclusion from the 2021 and 2024 presidential races was partly due to conservative backlash over his support for the accord.
But others fear he may revert to closer alignment with hardliners, given his mandate to execute Khamenei’s policies. In June, Larijani posted a video on X threatening IAEA chief Rafael Grossi during the 12-day war with Israel.
Khamenei underscored his oversight on July 16, in only his second public appearance since the conflict began, urging diplomats to act with “precision” and follow “guidance” – remarks widely read as direct orders reflecting the sensitivity of the moment.
Adding to the intrigue, former foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi revealed this month the existence of an influential, unnamed parallel committee directing negotiations outside the SNSC framework. He gave no details on its members but called it “effective and active.”
Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said the ministry works within a clear hierarchy and communicates its views to relevant decision-makers. While an imminent transfer of the file appears unlikely, current signs point to Larijani having a greater hand in shaping Iran’s strategy, given his experience and direct access to Khamenei.
The tussle over control of the nuclear file, analysts say, reflects Iran’s internal balance of power more than any technical procedural dispute.
The Foreign Ministry brings diplomatic tools and international reach, but the SNSC – and its shadow committees – retain final authority under the Supreme Leader. Larijani’s return could centralize decision-making and unify messaging, but at the cost of limiting the diplomats’ room for maneuver.
Success in any future talks, they say, will depend on how well Tehran balances internal discipline with external pressure.
