Iran’s Rulers Caught Between Trump’s Crackdown and a Fragile Economy 

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei speaks during a meeting with Iranian students in Tehran, Iran, March 12, 2025. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters
Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei speaks during a meeting with Iranian students in Tehran, Iran, March 12, 2025. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters
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Iran’s Rulers Caught Between Trump’s Crackdown and a Fragile Economy 

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei speaks during a meeting with Iranian students in Tehran, Iran, March 12, 2025. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters
Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei speaks during a meeting with Iranian students in Tehran, Iran, March 12, 2025. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters

For Iran's clerical leaders, engaging with the "Great Satan" to hammer out a nuclear deal and ease crippling sanctions may for once be the lesser of two evils.

Though it harbors deep mistrust of the United States, and President Donald Trump in particular, Tehran is increasingly concerned that mounting public anger over economic hardships could erupt into mass protests, four Iranian officials said.

That's why, despite the unyielding stance and defiant rhetoric of Iran's clerical leaders in public, there is a pragmatic willingness within Tehran's corridors of power to strike a deal with Washington, the people said.

Tehran's concerns were exacerbated by Trump's speedy revival of his first term's "maximum pressure" campaign to drive Iran's oil exports towards zero with more sanctions and bring the country's already fragile economy to its knees, they said.

President Masoud Pezeshkian has repeatedly highlighted the severity of the economic situation in the country, stating that it is more challenging than during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and pointing this month to the latest round of US sanctions targeting tankers carrying Iranian oil.

One of the Iranian officials said leaders were concerned that cutting off all diplomatic avenues might further fuel domestic discontent against Ali Khamenei - given he is the ultimate decision maker in the country.

"There is no question whatsoever that the man who has been the Supreme Leader since 1989 and his foreign policy preferences are more guilty than anybody else for the state of affairs," said Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute think-tank in Washington.

It was Iran's weak economy that pushed Khamenei to give tentative backing to the nuclear agreement struck with major powers in 2015, leading to a lifting of Western sanctions and an improvement in economic conditions. But then-President Trump's renewed onslaught against Iran after he pulled out of the nuclear pact in 2018 squeezed living standards once more.

"The situation worsens daily. I can't afford my rent, pay my bills, or buy clothes for my children," said Alireza Yousefi, 42, a teacher from Isfahan. "Now, more sanctions will make survival impossible."

Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to a Reuters request for comment.

'ON EQUAL TERMS'

At the same time as upping the pressure on Iran with new sanctions and threats of military action, Trump also opened the door to negotiations by sending a letter to Khamenei proposing nuclear talks.

Khamenei spurned the offer on Wednesday, saying repeatedly that Washington was imposing excessive demands and that Tehran would not be bullied into negotiations.

"If we enter negotiations while the other side is imposing maximum pressure, we will be negotiating from a weak position and will achieve nothing," Iran's top diplomat Abbas Araqchi told the Iran newspaper in an interview published on Thursday.

"The other side must be convinced that the policy of pressure is ineffective - only then can we sit at the negotiating table on equal terms," he said.

One senior Iranian official said there was no alternative but to reach an agreement, and that it was possible, though the road ahead would be bumpy given Iran's distrust of Trump after he abandoned the 2015 deal.

Iran has staved off economic collapse largely thanks to China, the main buyer of its oil and one of the few nations still trading with Tehran despite sanctions.

Oil exports slumped after Trump ditched the nuclear deal but have recovered in the past few years, bringing in more than $50 billion in revenue in both 2022 and 2023 as Iran found ways to skirt sanctions, according to US Energy Information Administration estimates.

Yet uncertainty looms over the sustainability of the exports as Trump's maximum pressure policy aims to throttle Iran's crude sales with multiple rounds of sanctions on tankers and entities involved in the trade.

PUBLIC ANGER SIMMERS

Iran's rulers are also facing a string of other crises - energy and water shortages, a collapsing currency, military setbacks among regional allies and growing fears of an Israeli strike on its nuclear facilities - all intensified by Trump's tough stance.

The energy and water sectors are suffering from a lack of investment in infrastructure, overconsumption driven by subsidies, declining natural gas production and inefficient irrigation, all leading to power blackouts and water shortages.

The Iranian rial has shed more than 90% of its value against the dollar since the sanctions were reimposed in 2018, according to foreign exchange websites, officials and lawmakers.

Amid concerns about Trump's tough approach, Iranians seeking safe havens for their savings have been buying dollars, other hard currencies, gold or cryptocurrencies, suggesting further weakness for the rial, according to state media reports.

The price of rice has soared 200% since last year, state media has reported. Housing and utility costs have spiked sharply, climbing roughly 60% in some Tehran districts and other major cities in recent months, driven by the rial's steep fall and soaring raw material costs, according to media reports.

Official inflation hovers around 40%, though some Iranian experts say it is running at over 50%. The Statistical Center of Iran reported a significant rise in food prices, with over a third of essential commodities increasing by 40% in January to leave them more than double the same month the previous year.

In January, the Tasnim news agency quoted the head of Iran's Institute of Labor and Social Welfare, Ebrahim Sadeghifar, as saying 22% to 27% of Iranians were now below the poverty line.

Iran's Jomhuri-ye Eslami newspaper, meanwhile, said last week that poverty rates stood at around 50%.

"I can barely cover the rent for my carpet shop or pay my workers' salaries. No one has the money to buy carpets. If this continues, I will have to lay off my staff," Morteza, 39, said by phone from Tehran's Grand Bazaar, giving only his first name.

"How do they expect to solve the economic crisis if they refuse to talk to Trump? Just talk to him and reach a deal. You cannot afford pride on an empty stomach."

NUCLEAR RED LINE

Based on Iranian state media reports, there were at least 216 demonstrations across Iran in February, involving retirees, workers, healthcare professionals, students and merchants. The protests largely focused on economic hardships, including low wages and months of unpaid salaries, according to the reports.

While the protests were mostly small-scale, officials fear a deterioration in living standards could be explosive.

"The country is like a powder keg, and further economic strain could be the spark that sets it off," said one of the four officials, who is close to the government.

Iran's ruling elite is acutely aware of the risk of a resurgence of the unrest similar to the 2022-2023 protests over Mahsa Amini's death in custody, or the nationwide protests in 2019 over fuel price rises, the officials said.

The senior Iranian official said there had been several high-level meetings to discuss the possibility of new mass protests - and potential measures to head them off.

Nevertheless, despite the worries about potential unrest, Iranian officials said Tehran was only prepared to go so far in any talks with Trump, stressing that "excessive demands", such as dismantling Iran's peaceful nuclear program or its conventional missile capabilities, were off the table.

"Yes, there are concerns about more economic pressure, there are concerns about the nation's growing anger, but we cannot sacrifice our right to produce nuclear energy because Trump wants it," the senior official said.

Ali Vaez, Iran project director at the International Crisis Group, said Iran's rulers believed that negotiating with Trump under coercion would signal weakness, ultimately attracting more pressure than reducing it.

"That is why Khamenei seems to believe that the only thing that is more dangerous than suffering from sanctions is surrendering to them," he said.



Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat

Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
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Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat

Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)

Journalists sometimes hear shocking statements—ones they lock away in their memory, fearing their repercussions. Some are too violent, too damaging, or too costly to repeat. Others risk swift denial from those who made them.

That was the case in late January 1987, when Kuwait hosted the fifth Islamic Summit.

Among the leaders in attendance were Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat.

I had requested an interview with Arafat, and he agreed to meet. After an exchange of pleasantries, he delivered a series of startling remarks.

“What’s happening in Beirut?” he asked.

“You know the country is grappling with the aftermath of the war of the camps,” I replied.

“No, Ghassan,” he shot back. “This is not the ‘war of the camps.’ The real name is the ‘war on the camps.’ It was personally ordered by Hafez al-Assad. Regrettably, the Amal Movement, led by Nabih Berri, is carrying out the decision, aided—unfortunately—by the Lebanese Army’s Sixth Brigade.”

Arafat must have noticed my surprise at his bluntness, because he raised his voice in anger.

“Assad is trying to finish what Ariel Sharon started in the 1982 invasion but failed to achieve. This is a continuation of Sharon’s mission to eliminate the PLO,” he charged.

Veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Assad: A Souk Al-Hamidiya merchant

I pointed out that his accusations were grave, targeting Syria’s head of state. His frustration only grew.

“Assad is not Syria’s president,” Arafat fumed.

“He is a merchant from Souk al-Hamidiya. If only he focused on reclaiming the Golan instead of blocking Palestinian independence to please America and Israel. Mark my words: time will prove me right. Hafez al-Assad does not recognize Palestine, nor Lebanon. He loathes Iraq under the guise of hating Saddam Hussein.”

Stunned, I listened as he went on.

“What they call an ‘uprising’ within Fatah is a conspiracy orchestrated by Assad and funded by [Libyan leader Moammar] al-Gaddafi. Assad’s only dream is to turn the Palestinian cause into a bargaining chip and to dominate Lebanon.”

As Arafat’s anger subsided, our conversation shifted to other topics.

A few days ago, I met with veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan—a man who carries the collective memory of two cities. Born in Tripoli, he has also witnessed Beirut’s political twists and turns, having been a close associate of Kamal Jumblatt and his son, Walid, as well as former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and his son, Saad.

He maintained ties with Arafat and participated in meetings with Assad and other Arab leaders. His recollections are rich with pivotal moments, particularly from his time as deputy leader of the National Movement, a coalition of leftist and nationalist forces led by Kamal Jumblatt.

Rocky start: Assad and Arafat’s strained relationship

Arafat’s relationship with Damascus was troubled from the outset. After a bloody internal dispute within Fatah, he was briefly detained in Syria, where the defense minister at the time was Hafez al-Assad.

Following the violent clashes between Palestinian factions and the Jordanian army in 1970, Assad came to view the presence of armed Palestinian groups as a source of chaos. This belief shaped his stance toward Arafat and the Palestinian resistance movement for years to come.

Assad grew uneasy when Palestinian factions relocated to Beirut and forged a broad alliance with Lebanon’s leftist parties and nationalist forces. He closely monitored Arafat’s rise as the dominant player on the Lebanese scene.

Despite Syria’s attempts to control the Palestinian file, Damascus struggled to rein in Fatah’s overwhelming influence and Arafat’s growing stature. His power extended to Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, where he effectively held decision-making authority.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Sultan recalled: “Hafez al-Assad never truly respected the idea of Palestinian resistance. I heard it from him directly and from those around him. His prevailing view was that there was no real resistance—just armed groups operating in coordination with intelligence agencies. The divide between Assad and Arafat was clear from the start.”

Sultan recounted an episode that underscored the deep divide between Assad and Arafat.

“One day, Assad told Arafat that Palestine did not exist—it was simply southern Syria. Arafat fired back, saying there was no such thing as Syria, only northern Palestine. There was an attempt to mask the exchange with humor, but the reality was that Assad genuinely viewed the issue through this lens,” Sultan said.

He explained that several Arab regimes sought to control the Palestinian cause, hoping to benefit from it without bearing its consequences.

“From the Baathist perspective, both in Baghdad and Damascus, there was a belief that the issue was too significant for the PLO to unilaterally determine its fate.”

Crackdown on Palestinian media

Sultan recalled a particularly tense moment in the PLO’s relationship with the Syrian regime.

“The organization operated a radio station in Syria. One day, it aired a segment quoting Arafat, including the phrase ‘There is water in my mouth’—a cryptic remark hinting at unspoken grievances. Syrian authorities responded swiftly, sending bulldozers to demolish the station and arresting several staff members.”

That night, Palestinian officials approached Sultan, urging him to speak with Kamal Jumblatt.

“Jumblatt suggested we arrange a meeting with Assad. It was Ramadan, so I contacted Hikmat al-Shihabi, then head of Syrian intelligence and our liaison,” recalled Sultan.

As the meeting neared sunset, Jumblatt sat across from Assad, with Sultan seated beside the Syrian president. The discussion quickly turned hostile toward Arafat.

“The conversation was filled with insults. Phrases like ‘We’ll bring him in’—implying they’d arrest him—and ‘We’ll flip him over’—a reference to how prisoners were beaten—were thrown around. Jumblatt, always polite and measured, stopped eating. Sensing his discomfort, Assad turned to me and asked me to intervene.”

Sultan responded: “Mr. President, the Palestinian fighters are not our schoolmates. We are committed to the Palestinian cause, and today, the PLO and Arafat represent that cause. These men have endured extreme hardships.”

Assad listened and then conceded: “Abu Rashid is right. Consider it settled, Kamal Bey.” The detainees were subsequently released.

A meeting between Kamal Jumblatt and Arafat attended by Toufic Sultan, George Hawi, Mohsen Ibrahim, and Yasser Abed Rabbo. (Courtesy of Toufic Sultan)

Deep-seated mutual hatred

Asked whether the animosity between Assad and Arafat was evident at the time, Sultan did not hesitate.

“Of course. It was well known,” he said. “One way to ingratiate oneself with Assad was to openly attack Arafat.”

He recalled a meeting with Walid Jumblatt, Assem Kanso—the head of Lebanon’s Baath Party—and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“When Arafat’s name came up, Khaddam abruptly declared, ‘Yasser Arafat is an Israeli spy.’ I remained silent. He turned to me and asked for my opinion. I simply said, ‘I heard you.’”

Khaddam pressed further: “What do you think?”

Sultan replied: “I respect your opinion, and this is your office. But if you want my honest view, it won’t please you.”

The atmosphere surrounding Assad was particularly hostile toward Fatah. Syrian authorities used every means at their disposal to infiltrate the group.

After years of effort, they succeeded in orchestrating major defections, the most notable led by Abu Saleh, Abu Musa, and Abu Khaled al-Omleh. Damascus provided these factions with logistical support, training camps, and other resources.

“Syria had the power to shrink or amplify political movements,” remembered Sultan.

Despite knowing that geography gave Assad a strategic advantage, Arafat was not an easy adversary.

He countered Syria’s animosity with his trademark defiance—flashing the victory sign and invoking phrases like “the Palestinian bloodbath” and “the longest Arab-Israeli war.”

These references underscored the resilience of Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies during Israel’s 1982 siege of Beirut, led by then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.

At the time, many believed that Arafat’s relentless emphasis on “independent Palestinian decision-making” was aimed more at Assad than at any other party.

Damascus, in turn, saw Arafat as dismissive of the sacrifices made by the Syrian army during Israel’s invasion of Beirut.

Syrian officials also suspected that he was waiting for an opportunity to join peace negotiations with Israel—an option that had eluded him after he failed to follow in the footsteps of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in the late 1970s.