Gaza’s Child Amputees Struggle with Recovery, Especially after Israel’s Cutoff of Aid

 A doctor assists 13-year-old Palestinian Yamen Asfour as he learns to walk on a prosthetic leg at the Artificial Limbs and Polio Center in Gaza City on Tuesday, Feb. 18. 2025. (AP)
A doctor assists 13-year-old Palestinian Yamen Asfour as he learns to walk on a prosthetic leg at the Artificial Limbs and Polio Center in Gaza City on Tuesday, Feb. 18. 2025. (AP)
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Gaza’s Child Amputees Struggle with Recovery, Especially after Israel’s Cutoff of Aid

 A doctor assists 13-year-old Palestinian Yamen Asfour as he learns to walk on a prosthetic leg at the Artificial Limbs and Polio Center in Gaza City on Tuesday, Feb. 18. 2025. (AP)
A doctor assists 13-year-old Palestinian Yamen Asfour as he learns to walk on a prosthetic leg at the Artificial Limbs and Polio Center in Gaza City on Tuesday, Feb. 18. 2025. (AP)

Five-year-old Sila Abu Aqlan curled her lip in concentration as she practiced walking for the first time on a prosthetic leg at a clinic in Gaza City. The foot of the new leg had a little pink sneaker with a lacy frill, matching her pink hoodie.

It has been nearly 15 months since the little girl's leg was amputated after it was left severely burned from an Israeli airstrike. Finally, she is being fit for a prosthetic.

One of the most shocking sights in Gaza’s war has been the thousands of children with amputated limbs from Israel’s bombardment. The UN’s humanitarian aid organization OCHA called it the “largest cohort of child amputees in modern history.”

Throughout the 17-month war, supplies and services for children and adults with amputations have fallen far short of demand. Gaza’s ceasefire that began in mid-January offered a window for aid agencies to bring in an increased number of prosthetic limbs, wheelchairs, crutches and other devices.

Still, it only covered about 20% of the total need, said Loay Abu Saif, head of a disability program run by the aid group Medical Aid for Palestine, or MAP.

The window slammed shut when Israel barred entry of all medical supplies as well as food, fuel and other aid on March 2. Israel's resumption of its military campaign last week, killing hundreds of Palestinians, has only added to the ranks of amputees.

Children struggle with multiple traumas

With help limited, children wrestle with the psychological pain of losing a limb along with other traumas.

Sila's mother, father and sisters were all killed in an airstrike on her home in December 2023. Sila suffered severe burns to her right leg. A month of treatment had little effect, and Sila would scream in excruciating pain, her aunt Yasmine al-Ghofary said. Doctors amputated her leg above the knee.

“I try as much as I can to make her happy. But the truth is, there’s only so much she can be happy. Pain is pain, and amputation is amputation,” al-Ghofary said.

Sila sees other girls playing and tries to keep up with them using her walker but falls down. “She says, ’Why am I like this? Why am I not like them?” said al-Ghofary.

In October 2023, 11-year-old Reem lost her hand when an airstrike hit nearby as her family fled their home in Gaza City.

Reem can no longer dress on her own, brush her hair or tie her shoes. She gets angry and hits her siblings if she can’t find someone to help her, her mother said. Other times, she isolates herself and just watches other children playing.

“Once Reem told her dad that she wished to die,” said her mother, who goes by the traditional name, Umm Reem. “In another instance, we were talking about meat, and she said, ‘Slaughter me like a sheep,’ and she was laughing.”

Thousands need help

Some 3,000 to 4,000 children in Gaza had suffered amputations as of November 2024, according to Jamal al-Rozzi and Hussein ِAbu Mansour, two prominent experts with rehabilitation programs in the territory who spoke with The Associated Press.

Up to 17,500 adults and children suffered severe limb injuries, leaving them in need of rehabilitation and assistance, the World Health Organization estimated in September.

Throughout the war, hospitals lacked medicines that could have averted amputations. Doctors describe cutting off limbs because of infections that should have been easily treated.

In its campaign in Gaza, Israel has struck homes and shelters with families inside almost daily.

Gaza's Health Ministry on Monday put out a list of the names of more than 15,000 children, 17 and younger, killed by Israel’s offensive. The list included nearly 5,000 children younger than 6, including 876 infants who had not reached a year in age.

Israel's offensive has killed more than 50,000 Palestinians of all ages and wounded more than 113,000, according to the ministry, which does not say how many were civilians or combatants. Nearly 90% of the population of some 2.3 million have been displaced, and vast areas of Gaza have been destroyed.

Israel launched the campaign vowing to destroy Hamas after its Oct. 7, 2023, attack on southern Israel, in which gunmen killed some 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and abducted 251 others. Israel says it is targeting Hamas and blames the group for civilian deaths because it operates in residential areas.

Conditions in camps make it even harder for children

Last May, 13-year-old Moath Abdelaal's leg was amputated above the knee after an Israeli airstrike in the southern city of Rafah.

The family had to flee to a tent camp outside the neighboring city of Khan Younis. During the ceasefire, they moved back to their hometown Jabaliya in northern Gaza, but their home had been destroyed, so they live in a tent by the ruins, said his father, Hussein Abdelaal.

Moath’s psychological state is worsening, his father said. Moving with crutches around the rubble is difficult. Doctors had to amputate more from his leg, almost up to his hip, because of complications. The boy learned that a number of his friends in the neighborhood had been killed, Abdelaal said.

“He has been having a hard time coping with his new situation. He’s not sleeping well next to his siblings. It’s difficult to see our son like that,” said Abdelaal.

Aid agencies provide some services

Sila is being treated at the Artificial Limbs and Polio Center in Gaza City, a program launched by the International Committee of the Red Cross that has provided physical therapy, wheelchairs and prosthetics to hundreds of Palestinians suffering from amputations or paralysis.

But supplies are limited. Wheelchairs are urgently needed, with 50 to 60 people a day asking for them in northern Gaza alone, said Mahmoud Shalabi with MAP.

Al-Rozzi, executive director of the National Rehabilitation Society in the Gaza Strip, said Israel blocks materials to manufacture prosthetics from entering Gaza on grounds they could have dual or military uses.

COGAT, the Israeli military body overseeing aid, said there have never been limitations on medical supplies to Gaza, including wheelchairs, prosthetics and crutches.

Some hope for treatment abroad

Some child amputees have been evacuated out of Gaza for treatment. But the pace of medical evacuations has remained slow, at a few dozen a day, and was reduced after Israel's strikes last week. As many as 13,000 patients of all kinds are waiting their chance to get out.

Asmaa al-Nashash wants nothing more than for her 11-year-old son Abdulrahman to go abroad for a prosthetic leg.

The boy was selling items from a stand at a UN school-turned-shelter in the built-up Nuseirat refugee camp when an airstrike hit, she said. Shrapnel tore through his leg, and doctors couldn’t save it.

Since then, he often sits alone playing games on her phone because he can’t play football with other children, she said. Other kids bully him, calling him the “one-legged boy.”

“My heart gets torn into pieces when I see him like this and I can do nothing for him,” she said.



Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)

Only weeks after Iranian diplomat Mohammad Reza Sheibani returned to Beirut as ambassador, his name has become the focus of a diplomatic crisis.

Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry withdrew its approval and declared him “persona non grata”, reflecting rising tensions between Beirut and Tehran and drawing renewed attention to a career tied to some of the Middle East’s most complex issues.

The decision swiftly ended the mission of a diplomat Tehran had sent back to Beirut, relying on his long experience on Lebanon and Syria.

His return had collided with a Lebanese political climate increasingly sensitive to the limits of foreign diplomatic roles.

War experience and regional role

Sheibani is no stranger to Lebanon. He served as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut from 2005 to 2009, a period that coincided with the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, giving him direct experience managing ties under complex security and political conditions.

His reappointment in early 2026 reflected an Iranian preference for seasoned diplomats in areas where politics and security overlap.

He replaced former ambassador Mojtaba Amani, who was injured in a pager explosion in Beirut, at a time of regional escalation, giving his return added weight beyond routine diplomacy.

Between Beirut and Damascus

Born in 1960, Sheibani joined Iran’s Foreign Ministry in the 1980s and rose through its ranks, focusing on Middle East affairs.

He served as chargé d’affaires in Cyprus and as head of Iran’s interests section in Egypt, before being appointed ambassador to Lebanon and later to Syria from 2011 to 2016, during which he covered the early years of the war.

He later served as ambassador to Tunisia and non-resident ambassador to Libya, and as assistant foreign minister for Middle East affairs.

He also worked as a senior adviser and researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies at the Foreign Ministry, before returning to the forefront amid rising regional tensions.

Roles during escalation

In October 2024, he was named special representative of the Iranian foreign minister for West Asia, and in January 2025, he was appointed special envoy to Syria following developments in Damascus, including the closure of Iran’s embassy.

He was also tasked with following the Lebanese file as a special envoy during a sensitive phase, reinforcing his role as a crisis diplomat.

His career reflects a distinction within Iran’s diplomatic structure, as he is linked to the Ministry of Intelligence rather than the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting a division of roles in foreign policy.

Legal and constitutional debate

The move by Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry has also sparked legal debate over how such decisions are made and enforced.

Constitutional expert Saeed Malek said the decision is based on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state to declare a diplomat persona non grata without a specific procedure.

He said the measure does not amount to a break in diplomatic ties but falls within the management of diplomatic representation, adding that such decisions fall within the foreign minister’s authority under Article 66 of the constitution.

Malek said the decision is binding, and once the deadline to leave Lebanon expires, the ambassador’s presence becomes unlawful.

He added that security forces are required to enforce the decision and remove him once located.

However, he said enforcement remains bound by international rules, as the ambassador’s presence inside the embassy prevents Lebanese forces from entering under diplomatic immunity, meaning his expulsion can only be carried out once he leaves the premises.


Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.


Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.