Syrians Left in the Dark as the Interim Government Struggles to Restore Electricity 

Lights illuminate a few windows of a damaged building in Damascus, Syria, early Thursday, March 27, 2025. (AP)
Lights illuminate a few windows of a damaged building in Damascus, Syria, early Thursday, March 27, 2025. (AP)
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Syrians Left in the Dark as the Interim Government Struggles to Restore Electricity 

Lights illuminate a few windows of a damaged building in Damascus, Syria, early Thursday, March 27, 2025. (AP)
Lights illuminate a few windows of a damaged building in Damascus, Syria, early Thursday, March 27, 2025. (AP)

Rana Al-Ahmad opens her fridge after breaking fast at sundown with her husband and four children during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

Apart from eggs, potatoes and some bread, it’s empty because state electricity in Syria only comes two hours a day.

“We can’t leave our food in the fridge because it will spoil,” she said.

Her husband, a taxi driver in Damascus, is struggling to make ends meet, so the family can’t afford to install a solar panel in their two-room apartment in Jaramana on the outskirts of the capital.

Months after a lightning insurgency ended over half a century of the Assad dynasty’s rule in Syria, the interim government has been struggling to fix battered infrastructure after a 14-year conflict decimated much of the country. Severe electricity shortages continue to plague the war-torn country.

The United Nations estimates that 90% of Syrians live in poverty and the Syrian government has only been able to provide about two hours of electricity every day. Millions of Syrians, like Al-Ahmad and her family, can’t afford to pay hefty fees for private generator services or install solar panels.

Syria's new authorities under interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa have tried to ease the country's electricity crisis, but have been unable to stop the outages with patchwork solutions.

Even with a recent gas deal with Qatar and an agreement with Kurdish-led authorities that will give them access to Syria's oil fields, the country spends most of its days with virtually no power. Reports of oil shipments coming from Russia, a key military and political ally of Assad, shows the desperation.

Pitch black

At Al-Ahmad’s home, she and her husband were only able to get a small battery that could power some lights.

“The battery we have is small and its charge runs out quickly,” said Al-Ahmad, 37. It’s just enough that her children can huddle in the living room to finish their homework after school.

And the family is not alone. Everywhere in Syria, from Damascus to Daraa in the south, neighborhoods turn pitch black once the sun sets, lit only from street lamps, mosque minarets and car headlights.

The downfall of Assad in December brought rare hope to Syrians. But the new interim authorities have scrambled to establish control across the country and convince Western nations to lift economic sanctions to make its economy viable again.

The United States in January eased some restrictions for six months, authorizing some energy-related transactions. But it doesn’t appear to have made a significant difference on the ground just yet.

Battered and bruised fields

Washington and other Western governments face a delicate balance with Syria’s new authorities, and appear to be keen on lifting restrictions only if the war-torn country’s political transition is democratic and inclusive of Syrian civil society, women and minorities.

Fixing Syria’s damaged power plants and oil fields takes time, so Damascus is racing to get as much fuel as it can to produce more energy.

Damascus is now looking towards the northeastern provinces, where its oil fields under Kurdish-led authorities are to boost its capacity, especially after reaching a landmark ceasefire deal with them.

Political economist Karam Shaar said 85% of the country’s oil production is based in those areas, and Syria once exported crude oil in exchange for refined oil to boost local production, though the fields are battered and bruised from years of conflict.

These crucial oil fields fell into the hands of the extremist ISIS group, which held large swaths of Syria and Iraq from 2014 to 2017.

“It’s during that period where much of the damage to the (oil) sector happened,” said Shaar, highlighting intense airstrikes and fighting against the group by a US-led international coalition.

After ISIS fell, the US-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) took control of key fields, leaving them away from the central government in Damascus. The new authorities hope to resolve this in a landmark deal with the SDF signed earlier this month.

Kamran Omar, who oversees oil production in the Rmeilan oil fields in the northeastern city of Hassakeh, says shortages in equipment and supplies and clashes that persisted with Türkiye and Turkish-backed forces have slowed down production, but told the AP that some of that production will eventually go to households and factories in other parts of Syria.

The fields only produce a fraction of what they once did. The Rmeilan field sends just 15,000 of the approximately 100,000 barrels they produce to other parts of Syria to ease some of the burden on the state.

The authorities in Damascus also hope that a recent deal with Qatar that would supply them with gas through Jordan to a major plant south of the capital will be the first of more agreements.

The cornerstone of recovery

Syria's authorities have not acknowledged reports of Russia sending oil shipments to the country. Moscow once aided Assad in the conflict against the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group that toppled the former president, but this shows that they are willing to stock up on fuel from whoever is offering.

Interim Electricity Minister Omar Shaqrouq admitted in a news conference that bringing back electricity to Syrian homes 24 hours a day is not on the horizon.

“It will soon be four hours, but maybe some more in the coming days.”

Increasing that supply will be critical for the battered country, which hopes to ease the economic woes of millions and bring about calm and stability. Shaar, who has visited and met with Syria’s new authorities, says that the focus on trying to bring fuel in the absence of funding for major infrastructural overhauls is the best Damascus can do given how critical the situation is.

“Electricity is the cornerstone of economic recovery,” said Shaar. “Without electricity you can’t have a productive sector, (or any) meaningful industries.”



The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.