‘Fear and Anxiety’: Bangkok Residents Seek Quake-Proof Homes 

This photo taken on March 29, 2025 shows cracks on the exterior of a residential condominium building in Bangkok after the March 28 earthquake struck central Myanmar and Thailand. (AFP)
This photo taken on March 29, 2025 shows cracks on the exterior of a residential condominium building in Bangkok after the March 28 earthquake struck central Myanmar and Thailand. (AFP)
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‘Fear and Anxiety’: Bangkok Residents Seek Quake-Proof Homes 

This photo taken on March 29, 2025 shows cracks on the exterior of a residential condominium building in Bangkok after the March 28 earthquake struck central Myanmar and Thailand. (AFP)
This photo taken on March 29, 2025 shows cracks on the exterior of a residential condominium building in Bangkok after the March 28 earthquake struck central Myanmar and Thailand. (AFP)

Shaken hours earlier by a massive earthquake, Phatsakon Kaewkla's terror was magnified when he came home to find gaping cracks in the walls of his 22nd-floor Bangkok apartment.

Feeling unsafe in the building damaged by the biggest tremors to hit the capital in generations, the 23-year-old Thai decided to stay away for two days until experts gave the high-rise the all-clear.

The sales coordinator is now one of many Bangkok residents wondering if they should seek safer housing in a city where hundreds of residential buildings were damaged by the 7.7-magnitude quake that struck neighboring Myanmar on March 28.

The owners of Phatsakon's condominium assured him that engineers had checked every part of the building and concluded it was habitable.

But he is still spooked about the cracks.

"I feel a little bit scared. And also my mum told me to move out from here," he said.

Over 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) away from the epicenter, the Thai capital -- its skyline dotted with hundreds of towers and glinting high-rises -- virtually never experiences such tremors.

Bangkok-based real estate consultant Owen Zhu, 40, told AFP that the impact on his sector had been "significant".

"People seem to have realized that living in high-rise buildings might carry greater risks when it comes to earthquake resistance compared to two-story or low-rise structures," the Chinese property expert said.

The earthquake prompted a flurry of enquiries from residents looking to relocate in the past week, he says, due to widespread "fear and anxiety" of living far above ground.

- 'Gap in perception' -

Yigit Buyukergun from Türkiye was at home in Bangkok with his wife when the quake struck. After it subsided, they emerged from under a table to inspect the damage on their 22nd-floor flat.

"Everywhere is cracked, especially in the corridor. You can see all the roof is really bad condition," the 25-year-old said.

Despite Buyukergun's safety concerns, the owners of the block seemed unfazed.

They say it is "100 percent safe, but I don't believe it," he said.

A large number of studio apartments in Bangkok's sprawling residential projects are rented out on annual leases requiring a two-month deposit.

Most condos do not permit short-term rentals for security reasons, and only hotels may lease for under 30 days.

Zhu says tenants and property owners often disagree over the habitability of quake-damaged apartments, with disputes becoming more common.

There is "a gap in perception and judgment between the two parties," he told AFP.

"The landlord sees the unit as safe, while the tenant feels it's unsafe and insists on moving out and getting their deposit back".

- Raising the bar -

Earthquake safety standards for buildings in Thailand were "not particularly strict" before the disaster and not something property-seeking clients specifically asked about, Zhu said.

Heightening anxiety since the quake was the shocking total collapse of a 30-storey construction in Bangkok that trapped dozens of workers, most of whom remain unaccounted for over a week later.

City authorities are now investigating whether substandard building materials had been used in its construction.

Zhu says more of his clients are now opting for low-rises.

For house hunters still considering high-rises, they often require that the property sustained "minimal or no damage during the recent earthquake, or at least was not severely affected".

He believes property prices will grow in the long-term as demand for safer buildings drives the adoption of costly seismic resistance measures, adding that "the bar for Thailand's real estate sector has been raised".

But for Buyukergun, talk of improving building regulations is not enough to calm his fears about the uncontrollable factors of geology.

While the prevalence of earthquakes in his home country of Türkiye made him feel uneasy, he had not expected to feel the same way about Thailand.

"Thailand is safe," he recalled thinking before.

"That's why I couldn't believe (the) earthquake (happened)."



The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.