Sudan War Enters Third Year as Civilians Remain Under Fire

Soldiers arrive in an area recaptured by the Sudanese army south of Khartoum, March 27. (AP)
Soldiers arrive in an area recaptured by the Sudanese army south of Khartoum, March 27. (AP)
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Sudan War Enters Third Year as Civilians Remain Under Fire

Soldiers arrive in an area recaptured by the Sudanese army south of Khartoum, March 27. (AP)
Soldiers arrive in an area recaptured by the Sudanese army south of Khartoum, March 27. (AP)

Sudan’s civil war entered its third year on Monday, with the conflict growing increasingly brutal by the hour. Images of atrocities, summary executions, and ethnically targeted violence flood social media, underscoring a war that has turned into a relentless assault on civilians.

What began as a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has morphed into a nationwide catastrophe engulfing every region — north to south, east to west. Field killings are intensifying, and civilians are frequently shot based on their identity, ethnicity, or origin. For many Sudanese, stepping outside or speaking up can be a death sentence.

The violence has not been confined to military targets. According to the United Nations, the war has unfolded in cities, not battlefields, with both sides deeply entrenched in urban zones, directing shelling and airstrikes toward civilian neighborhoods. It’s a war against the people, UN agencies say.

A nation in ruins

The toll is staggering. UN and media reports estimate the war has caused more than $200 billion in economic losses and damaged nearly 60% of Sudan’s infrastructure. More than 60,000 people have been killed, and hundreds of thousands wounded or permanently disabled.

Smoke is seen rising in Khartoum, Sudan, April 15, 2023. (AP)

One-third of the country’s population — roughly 14 million people — has been displaced internally or fled to neighboring countries. The EU has described Sudan’s humanitarian crisis as the worst of the 21st century.

With no political resolution in sight despite recent advances by the army, the suffering continues to deepen. Nearly half of Sudan’s 42 million people now live below the poverty line, and around 20 million face acute hunger, according to UN figures.

Hospitals, schools, bridges, and essential infrastructure have been decimated, leaving a broken nation struggling to survive amid a conflict that shows no sign of ending.

In a grim reflection of the deepening conflict, two nonagenarian men were executed in cold blood in the town of Tayba Al-Hasanab, south of Khartoum, simply for revealing their ethnic identity.

Local sources said Osman Mohamed and his companion, Hasbullah Abu Taqiyya, both originally from western Sudan, were targeted by armed extremists accusing them of “collaborating with the other side.”

The two men were reportedly slaughtered near their homes by militants who accused them of ethnic affiliation with rival factions in the war.

The town lies close to the Tayba military camp, one of the most strategic RSF bases near Jebel Aulia, established before the 2018 fall of Sudan’s Islamist regime. Now, the very identity of residents can serve as a death sentence in a capital divided and terrorized by ethnic violence.

As Sudan’s war enters its third year, fighters on both sides have increasingly turned their weapons on civilians they perceive as “sympathetic” to the enemy. Extremists often refer to those who have not fled their homes or who belong to certain ethnic groups as “social incubators” for the opposing side.

In some cases, all it takes is a question — “What is your tribe?” — or a glance at someone’s facial features for them to be executed without trial.

Instead of offering safety, militants have overrun Khartoum, unleashing waves of retaliatory violence on already traumatized communities. Bullets aimed at heads and hearts leave no room for mercy — just swift executions under the pretext of “collaboration”.

Supporters of the Sudanese armed popular resistance, which backs the army, ride on trucks in Gedaref in eastern Sudan on March 3, 2024. (AFP)

Industrial sector near collapse

Sudan has lost a quarter of its capital stock and seen the near-total collapse of its industrial sector as war grinds into a third year, a leading economist told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Abdel Azim Al-Amawi, an economic adviser and head of market research at Gulf-based “Aswaq Al-Mal", said the war has caused devastating damage across political, social, and economic fronts. Key infrastructure — including roads, bridges, airports, factories, and development projects — has been severely damaged or destroyed.

“The continued conflict has led to the loss of about 25% of Sudan’s capital reserves,” Al-Amawi said, adding that macroeconomic indicators have sharply deteriorated. Sudan’s economy contracted by 37.5% in the first year of war, the fiscal deficit surged to 9.1% of GDP, and annual inflation soared to 245%, according to his estimates.

Al-Amawi noted that Sudan’s economy is largely dependent on the services sector, which makes up 46.3% of GDP, followed by agriculture at 32.7% and industry at 21%. “The industrial sector is heavily concentrated in Khartoum, accounting for 85% of its activity,” he said.

“With the capital’s factories either damaged or destroyed, the industrial base has effectively collapsed.”

The destruction underscores the broader economic freefall facing Sudan, where businesses are shuttered, investment has evaporated, and millions are displaced with little hope of recovery in sight.

Sudan’s already fragile energy and agriculture sectors have been pushed to the brink by war, with the country now relying entirely on fuel imports and facing a steep drop in food production.

Al-Amawi told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sudan previously met 30% of its fuel needs through domestic production, while importing the remaining 70%.

But since the outbreak of war, repeated airstrikes have destroyed the Al-Jaili refinery north of Khartoum — the country’s largest, which once produced 3,800 tons of diesel, 2,700 tons of petrol, and 800 tons of cooking gas per day.

“With the refinery offline, Sudan now imports 100% of its petroleum needs, putting immense pressure on already strained foreign currency reserves,” Al-Amawi explained.

The war has also taken a heavy toll on agriculture, with grain production falling by 46% compared to pre-war levels and 41% below the five-year average. The 2023/2024 harvest saw sorghum output drop by 42% and millet by 64%, worsening an already dire food security crisis.

According to Al-Amawi, 14 million people have been displaced by the conflict, and around 1.7 million have fled the country — making Sudan home to the world’s largest displacement crisis.

Sudanese Children suffering from malnutrition are treated at an MSF clinic in Metche Camp, Chad, near the Sudanese border, April 6, 2024. (AP)

Currency in freefall, revenues dry up

The Sudanese pound has collapsed under the weight of war. Al-Amawi said the currency lost 74% of its value in the first year of the conflict and continued its slide in 2024, reaching an 81% devaluation. As of 2025, the US dollar is trading at 2,107 Sudanese pounds on the parallel market.

“The war has crippled the economy, wiping out 85% of government revenues,” Al-Amawi said. “Sudan has shifted into a full-scale war economy, with an unregulated shadow economy expanding across much of the country.”

With infrastructure in ruins, state revenues gutted, and basic services collapsing, Sudan’s economic future — like its political one — remains dangerously uncertain.

Agricultural backbone crumbling

Sudan’s once-critical agricultural sector — the backbone of its economy and primary source of employment — has suffered a 65% collapse since war broke out, with supply chains severed, farmers displaced, and two consecutive planting seasons lost, a leading economist has said.

Omer Sid Ahmed, writing in a commentary on the Sudanese news site “Al-Rakoba,” said the sector, which employs around 80% of the workforce and contributes 32.7% to GDP, is facing near-total disruption.

Fuel, seed, and fertilizer shortages have deepened the crisis, and the upcoming agricultural season is already under threat due to continued insecurity and logistical paralysis.

“Farmers have been displaced from their land, supply routes are no longer operational, and inputs are unavailable,” Sid Ahmed wrote. “The sector has been devastated.”

While he estimated agricultural and infrastructure losses could reach $100 billion by the end of 2024, media reports suggest overall war-related losses now exceed $200 billion.

“With war still raging and infrastructure continuing to be destroyed, calculating the true cost is nearly impossible,” Sid Ahmed said. “The damage is not static — it is escalating day by day.”

Sudan’s agricultural collapse has exacerbated an already dire humanitarian crisis, with food insecurity surging and millions relying on aid, much of which is unable to reach conflict-hit regions.

Health system in collapse as hospitals targeted

Sudan’s health system is buckling under the weight of war, with more than two-thirds of hospitals and health centers out of service and medical infrastructure repeatedly targeted by shelling and occupation, according to the country’s acting health minister.

Dr. Haitham Mohamed Ibrahim told Asharq Al-Awsat that 70% of public and private medical facilities in Khartoum, Darfur, Kordofan, Gezira, Sennar and parts of the Nile states are no longer operational. The collapse has created what he described as an “unprecedented health crisis.”

The minister accused the RSF of launching repeated attacks on hospitals. In El Fasher, the main city in North Darfur, hospitals have reportedly been struck more than 15 times.

Ibrahim also said the country’s main public health laboratory in Khartoum was bombed and later converted into a military base in the early days of the conflict. Specialized medical centers have also been destroyed or looted.

He estimated damages to the health sector at more than $11 billion, as doctors flee, medical supplies run dry, and critical services grind to a halt.

Aid agencies have warned that millions are now without access to basic healthcare, while disease outbreaks are spreading rapidly in displacement camps amid poor sanitation and shortages of medicine.

More than 60 doctors and medical staff have been killed since Sudan's civil war erupted, including seven dialysis specialists who were treating patients when they came under attack, said Ibrahim.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the RSF was responsible for the deaths, accusing it of targeting healthcare workers in areas under its control. He said the war has triggered a mass exodus of doctors abroad, leaving hospitals critically understaffed.

Students are seen in Port Sudan on December 28. (AFP)

“The shortage of medical personnel is severe,” he warned, noting that many have sought refuge outside the country amid growing insecurity.

Despite the grim toll, Ibrahim said Sudanese doctors had received recognition from the Arab Health Ministers Council, which awarded the “Arab Doctor” prize to a Sudanese physician in honor of the profession’s sacrifices during the war.

The minister also warned that widespread destruction of health facilities and environmental degradation have contributed to the rapid spread of disease. Outbreaks of malaria, dengue fever, and cholera have taken hold in displacement camps and conflict-affected areas, killing tens of thousands, he stressed.

Health experts say Sudan is now facing one of the worst public health crises in its history, with millions lacking access to clean water, vaccines, or emergency care.

Schools turned into barracks as war devastates education

The war has devastated the country’s education system, forcing millions of children out of school, with thousands of facilities either destroyed, occupied by fighters, or repurposed as shelters — and in some cases, even as makeshift cemeteries.

“This war is a catastrophe that has struck at the very foundation of education in Sudan,” said Sami Al-Baqir, spokesperson for the Teachers’ Committee, an independent union, in comments to Asharq Al-Awsat.

He said there are no comprehensive figures on the total damage, but estimates indicate that up to 20,000 schools have been either partially or completely affected by the conflict. Before the war, Sudan had around 12 million school-aged children. Now, between 6 and 7 million have been out of school for the entire duration of the two-year conflict. Fewer than 4 million have managed to continue their studies, he added.

“Some schools have been turned into military barracks, others bombed, and many transformed into shelters for displaced families. Tragically, some have even been used as mass graves,” Al-Baqir said. “This is destruction beyond Sudan’s capacity to recover from in the near future.”

He also warned of a looming educational and social divide, as schools remain operational only in areas controlled by the army. “I fear the fragmentation of the Sudanese national identity,” he said, referring to the 2024 national exams, which were held only in government-controlled zones.

According to Al-Baqir, only 200,000 out of 570,000 students who were expected to sit for the Sudanese certificate exam were able to do so. “The future of those left behind is already slipping away,” he said.



Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)

Only weeks after Iranian diplomat Mohammad Reza Sheibani returned to Beirut as ambassador, his name has become the focus of a diplomatic crisis.

Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry withdrew its approval and declared him “persona non grata”, reflecting rising tensions between Beirut and Tehran and drawing renewed attention to a career tied to some of the Middle East’s most complex issues.

The decision swiftly ended the mission of a diplomat Tehran had sent back to Beirut, relying on his long experience on Lebanon and Syria.

His return had collided with a Lebanese political climate increasingly sensitive to the limits of foreign diplomatic roles.

War experience and regional role

Sheibani is no stranger to Lebanon. He served as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut from 2005 to 2009, a period that coincided with the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, giving him direct experience managing ties under complex security and political conditions.

His reappointment in early 2026 reflected an Iranian preference for seasoned diplomats in areas where politics and security overlap.

He replaced former ambassador Mojtaba Amani, who was injured in a pager explosion in Beirut, at a time of regional escalation, giving his return added weight beyond routine diplomacy.

Between Beirut and Damascus

Born in 1960, Sheibani joined Iran’s Foreign Ministry in the 1980s and rose through its ranks, focusing on Middle East affairs.

He served as chargé d’affaires in Cyprus and as head of Iran’s interests section in Egypt, before being appointed ambassador to Lebanon and later to Syria from 2011 to 2016, during which he covered the early years of the war.

He later served as ambassador to Tunisia and non-resident ambassador to Libya, and as assistant foreign minister for Middle East affairs.

He also worked as a senior adviser and researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies at the Foreign Ministry, before returning to the forefront amid rising regional tensions.

Roles during escalation

In October 2024, he was named special representative of the Iranian foreign minister for West Asia, and in January 2025, he was appointed special envoy to Syria following developments in Damascus, including the closure of Iran’s embassy.

He was also tasked with following the Lebanese file as a special envoy during a sensitive phase, reinforcing his role as a crisis diplomat.

His career reflects a distinction within Iran’s diplomatic structure, as he is linked to the Ministry of Intelligence rather than the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting a division of roles in foreign policy.

Legal and constitutional debate

The move by Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry has also sparked legal debate over how such decisions are made and enforced.

Constitutional expert Saeed Malek said the decision is based on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state to declare a diplomat persona non grata without a specific procedure.

He said the measure does not amount to a break in diplomatic ties but falls within the management of diplomatic representation, adding that such decisions fall within the foreign minister’s authority under Article 66 of the constitution.

Malek said the decision is binding, and once the deadline to leave Lebanon expires, the ambassador’s presence becomes unlawful.

He added that security forces are required to enforce the decision and remove him once located.

However, he said enforcement remains bound by international rules, as the ambassador’s presence inside the embassy prevents Lebanese forces from entering under diplomatic immunity, meaning his expulsion can only be carried out once he leaves the premises.


Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.


Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.