Sudan War Enters Third Year as Civilians Remain Under Fire

Soldiers arrive in an area recaptured by the Sudanese army south of Khartoum, March 27. (AP)
Soldiers arrive in an area recaptured by the Sudanese army south of Khartoum, March 27. (AP)
TT

Sudan War Enters Third Year as Civilians Remain Under Fire

Soldiers arrive in an area recaptured by the Sudanese army south of Khartoum, March 27. (AP)
Soldiers arrive in an area recaptured by the Sudanese army south of Khartoum, March 27. (AP)

Sudan’s civil war entered its third year on Monday, with the conflict growing increasingly brutal by the hour. Images of atrocities, summary executions, and ethnically targeted violence flood social media, underscoring a war that has turned into a relentless assault on civilians.

What began as a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has morphed into a nationwide catastrophe engulfing every region — north to south, east to west. Field killings are intensifying, and civilians are frequently shot based on their identity, ethnicity, or origin. For many Sudanese, stepping outside or speaking up can be a death sentence.

The violence has not been confined to military targets. According to the United Nations, the war has unfolded in cities, not battlefields, with both sides deeply entrenched in urban zones, directing shelling and airstrikes toward civilian neighborhoods. It’s a war against the people, UN agencies say.

A nation in ruins

The toll is staggering. UN and media reports estimate the war has caused more than $200 billion in economic losses and damaged nearly 60% of Sudan’s infrastructure. More than 60,000 people have been killed, and hundreds of thousands wounded or permanently disabled.

Smoke is seen rising in Khartoum, Sudan, April 15, 2023. (AP)

One-third of the country’s population — roughly 14 million people — has been displaced internally or fled to neighboring countries. The EU has described Sudan’s humanitarian crisis as the worst of the 21st century.

With no political resolution in sight despite recent advances by the army, the suffering continues to deepen. Nearly half of Sudan’s 42 million people now live below the poverty line, and around 20 million face acute hunger, according to UN figures.

Hospitals, schools, bridges, and essential infrastructure have been decimated, leaving a broken nation struggling to survive amid a conflict that shows no sign of ending.

In a grim reflection of the deepening conflict, two nonagenarian men were executed in cold blood in the town of Tayba Al-Hasanab, south of Khartoum, simply for revealing their ethnic identity.

Local sources said Osman Mohamed and his companion, Hasbullah Abu Taqiyya, both originally from western Sudan, were targeted by armed extremists accusing them of “collaborating with the other side.”

The two men were reportedly slaughtered near their homes by militants who accused them of ethnic affiliation with rival factions in the war.

The town lies close to the Tayba military camp, one of the most strategic RSF bases near Jebel Aulia, established before the 2018 fall of Sudan’s Islamist regime. Now, the very identity of residents can serve as a death sentence in a capital divided and terrorized by ethnic violence.

As Sudan’s war enters its third year, fighters on both sides have increasingly turned their weapons on civilians they perceive as “sympathetic” to the enemy. Extremists often refer to those who have not fled their homes or who belong to certain ethnic groups as “social incubators” for the opposing side.

In some cases, all it takes is a question — “What is your tribe?” — or a glance at someone’s facial features for them to be executed without trial.

Instead of offering safety, militants have overrun Khartoum, unleashing waves of retaliatory violence on already traumatized communities. Bullets aimed at heads and hearts leave no room for mercy — just swift executions under the pretext of “collaboration”.

Supporters of the Sudanese armed popular resistance, which backs the army, ride on trucks in Gedaref in eastern Sudan on March 3, 2024. (AFP)

Industrial sector near collapse

Sudan has lost a quarter of its capital stock and seen the near-total collapse of its industrial sector as war grinds into a third year, a leading economist told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Abdel Azim Al-Amawi, an economic adviser and head of market research at Gulf-based “Aswaq Al-Mal", said the war has caused devastating damage across political, social, and economic fronts. Key infrastructure — including roads, bridges, airports, factories, and development projects — has been severely damaged or destroyed.

“The continued conflict has led to the loss of about 25% of Sudan’s capital reserves,” Al-Amawi said, adding that macroeconomic indicators have sharply deteriorated. Sudan’s economy contracted by 37.5% in the first year of war, the fiscal deficit surged to 9.1% of GDP, and annual inflation soared to 245%, according to his estimates.

Al-Amawi noted that Sudan’s economy is largely dependent on the services sector, which makes up 46.3% of GDP, followed by agriculture at 32.7% and industry at 21%. “The industrial sector is heavily concentrated in Khartoum, accounting for 85% of its activity,” he said.

“With the capital’s factories either damaged or destroyed, the industrial base has effectively collapsed.”

The destruction underscores the broader economic freefall facing Sudan, where businesses are shuttered, investment has evaporated, and millions are displaced with little hope of recovery in sight.

Sudan’s already fragile energy and agriculture sectors have been pushed to the brink by war, with the country now relying entirely on fuel imports and facing a steep drop in food production.

Al-Amawi told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sudan previously met 30% of its fuel needs through domestic production, while importing the remaining 70%.

But since the outbreak of war, repeated airstrikes have destroyed the Al-Jaili refinery north of Khartoum — the country’s largest, which once produced 3,800 tons of diesel, 2,700 tons of petrol, and 800 tons of cooking gas per day.

“With the refinery offline, Sudan now imports 100% of its petroleum needs, putting immense pressure on already strained foreign currency reserves,” Al-Amawi explained.

The war has also taken a heavy toll on agriculture, with grain production falling by 46% compared to pre-war levels and 41% below the five-year average. The 2023/2024 harvest saw sorghum output drop by 42% and millet by 64%, worsening an already dire food security crisis.

According to Al-Amawi, 14 million people have been displaced by the conflict, and around 1.7 million have fled the country — making Sudan home to the world’s largest displacement crisis.

Sudanese Children suffering from malnutrition are treated at an MSF clinic in Metche Camp, Chad, near the Sudanese border, April 6, 2024. (AP)

Currency in freefall, revenues dry up

The Sudanese pound has collapsed under the weight of war. Al-Amawi said the currency lost 74% of its value in the first year of the conflict and continued its slide in 2024, reaching an 81% devaluation. As of 2025, the US dollar is trading at 2,107 Sudanese pounds on the parallel market.

“The war has crippled the economy, wiping out 85% of government revenues,” Al-Amawi said. “Sudan has shifted into a full-scale war economy, with an unregulated shadow economy expanding across much of the country.”

With infrastructure in ruins, state revenues gutted, and basic services collapsing, Sudan’s economic future — like its political one — remains dangerously uncertain.

Agricultural backbone crumbling

Sudan’s once-critical agricultural sector — the backbone of its economy and primary source of employment — has suffered a 65% collapse since war broke out, with supply chains severed, farmers displaced, and two consecutive planting seasons lost, a leading economist has said.

Omer Sid Ahmed, writing in a commentary on the Sudanese news site “Al-Rakoba,” said the sector, which employs around 80% of the workforce and contributes 32.7% to GDP, is facing near-total disruption.

Fuel, seed, and fertilizer shortages have deepened the crisis, and the upcoming agricultural season is already under threat due to continued insecurity and logistical paralysis.

“Farmers have been displaced from their land, supply routes are no longer operational, and inputs are unavailable,” Sid Ahmed wrote. “The sector has been devastated.”

While he estimated agricultural and infrastructure losses could reach $100 billion by the end of 2024, media reports suggest overall war-related losses now exceed $200 billion.

“With war still raging and infrastructure continuing to be destroyed, calculating the true cost is nearly impossible,” Sid Ahmed said. “The damage is not static — it is escalating day by day.”

Sudan’s agricultural collapse has exacerbated an already dire humanitarian crisis, with food insecurity surging and millions relying on aid, much of which is unable to reach conflict-hit regions.

Health system in collapse as hospitals targeted

Sudan’s health system is buckling under the weight of war, with more than two-thirds of hospitals and health centers out of service and medical infrastructure repeatedly targeted by shelling and occupation, according to the country’s acting health minister.

Dr. Haitham Mohamed Ibrahim told Asharq Al-Awsat that 70% of public and private medical facilities in Khartoum, Darfur, Kordofan, Gezira, Sennar and parts of the Nile states are no longer operational. The collapse has created what he described as an “unprecedented health crisis.”

The minister accused the RSF of launching repeated attacks on hospitals. In El Fasher, the main city in North Darfur, hospitals have reportedly been struck more than 15 times.

Ibrahim also said the country’s main public health laboratory in Khartoum was bombed and later converted into a military base in the early days of the conflict. Specialized medical centers have also been destroyed or looted.

He estimated damages to the health sector at more than $11 billion, as doctors flee, medical supplies run dry, and critical services grind to a halt.

Aid agencies have warned that millions are now without access to basic healthcare, while disease outbreaks are spreading rapidly in displacement camps amid poor sanitation and shortages of medicine.

More than 60 doctors and medical staff have been killed since Sudan's civil war erupted, including seven dialysis specialists who were treating patients when they came under attack, said Ibrahim.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the RSF was responsible for the deaths, accusing it of targeting healthcare workers in areas under its control. He said the war has triggered a mass exodus of doctors abroad, leaving hospitals critically understaffed.

Students are seen in Port Sudan on December 28. (AFP)

“The shortage of medical personnel is severe,” he warned, noting that many have sought refuge outside the country amid growing insecurity.

Despite the grim toll, Ibrahim said Sudanese doctors had received recognition from the Arab Health Ministers Council, which awarded the “Arab Doctor” prize to a Sudanese physician in honor of the profession’s sacrifices during the war.

The minister also warned that widespread destruction of health facilities and environmental degradation have contributed to the rapid spread of disease. Outbreaks of malaria, dengue fever, and cholera have taken hold in displacement camps and conflict-affected areas, killing tens of thousands, he stressed.

Health experts say Sudan is now facing one of the worst public health crises in its history, with millions lacking access to clean water, vaccines, or emergency care.

Schools turned into barracks as war devastates education

The war has devastated the country’s education system, forcing millions of children out of school, with thousands of facilities either destroyed, occupied by fighters, or repurposed as shelters — and in some cases, even as makeshift cemeteries.

“This war is a catastrophe that has struck at the very foundation of education in Sudan,” said Sami Al-Baqir, spokesperson for the Teachers’ Committee, an independent union, in comments to Asharq Al-Awsat.

He said there are no comprehensive figures on the total damage, but estimates indicate that up to 20,000 schools have been either partially or completely affected by the conflict. Before the war, Sudan had around 12 million school-aged children. Now, between 6 and 7 million have been out of school for the entire duration of the two-year conflict. Fewer than 4 million have managed to continue their studies, he added.

“Some schools have been turned into military barracks, others bombed, and many transformed into shelters for displaced families. Tragically, some have even been used as mass graves,” Al-Baqir said. “This is destruction beyond Sudan’s capacity to recover from in the near future.”

He also warned of a looming educational and social divide, as schools remain operational only in areas controlled by the army. “I fear the fragmentation of the Sudanese national identity,” he said, referring to the 2024 national exams, which were held only in government-controlled zones.

According to Al-Baqir, only 200,000 out of 570,000 students who were expected to sit for the Sudanese certificate exam were able to do so. “The future of those left behind is already slipping away,” he said.



Sept. 11’s Legacy Endures a Quarter-Century Later

A Palestinian man holds up a poster of ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (L) and wanted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden during a demonstration by some 1,000 people in the West Bank town of Hebron 10 April 2004, in support of the Iraqi resistance against the US-led coalition. (AFP via Getty Images)
A Palestinian man holds up a poster of ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (L) and wanted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden during a demonstration by some 1,000 people in the West Bank town of Hebron 10 April 2004, in support of the Iraqi resistance against the US-led coalition. (AFP via Getty Images)
TT

Sept. 11’s Legacy Endures a Quarter-Century Later

A Palestinian man holds up a poster of ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (L) and wanted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden during a demonstration by some 1,000 people in the West Bank town of Hebron 10 April 2004, in support of the Iraqi resistance against the US-led coalition. (AFP via Getty Images)
A Palestinian man holds up a poster of ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (L) and wanted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden during a demonstration by some 1,000 people in the West Bank town of Hebron 10 April 2004, in support of the Iraqi resistance against the US-led coalition. (AFP via Getty Images)

Rarely does a day deserve to be called “the day that shook the world.” September 11, 2001, claimed that distinction the moment it happened. At first, many could scarcely believe what they were seeing on their screens. The sight of civilian aircraft exploding into symbols of American power and success in New York and Washington was shocking and deadly. A quarter-century later, there is no denying the mark that day left on the US, the Middle East and the world.

The day set in motion by al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden brought down two governments: the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq. Afghanistan may have returned to life under a diluted form of Taliban rule, but the Middle East is still paying the price for the regional imbalances created when the US military uprooted Iraq’s Baathist government.

The fall of both governments was an enormous, unintended gift to Iran, now engaged in a military conflict with the United States.

The world was not accustomed to seeing the US attacked at home. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the US base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Washington declared war on Japan the next day, and the rest is history.

On September 11, bin Laden brought the war onto American soil itself, prompting George W. Bush to launch a war against what he regarded as strongholds of terrorism.

It was no surprise that a wounded America, led by Bush, decided to topple the government of Mullah Mohammed Omar, who insisted on sheltering bin Laden and ignored calls to distance himself from the al-Qaeda leader or hand him over.

But the greater response came in the Middle East. In 2003, the region watched a US armored vehicle pull Saddam Hussein’s statue from its pedestal in Baghdad’s Firdos Square. It would later watch the hangman’s noose tighten around Saddam’s neck, alarming two men: Libya’s Moammar al-Gaddafi and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Bin Laden deliberately chose mostly Saudis for the team that attacked New York and Washington, hoping to provoke a crisis and rupture relations between Washington and Riyadh. He did not get what he wanted, but the attacks posed a test across the Muslim world.

Many voices in the US called for terrorism to be uprooted at its source. The attacks unsettled the US and the West’s relations with many countries. They also strained relations between Western governments and Arab and Muslim communities, particularly as waves of migration increased. Today, the far-right is on the rise in several parts of Europe.

Yasser Arafat was living in Gaza that day. He was troubled by the attention focused on a few Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who handed out sweets to celebrate the attacks and express their anger at American bias toward Israel.

Despite his advanced age, Arafat insisted on donating blood for those wounded in New York and Washington and went to a Gaza hospital. Some say that, in the first hours, he feared Palestinians might have been involved in carrying out the attacks.

Al-Gaddafi was also alarmed, although both he and Saddam initially imagined that the attacks would weaken the US. Al-Gaddafi asked Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham to arrange for Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to tell Bush that Libya was ready to normalize relations and open a new chapter with the US.

Bouteflika conveyed the Libyan position, but the US president told his visitor: “Tell al-Gaddafi that he must immediately surrender his nuclear program’s arsenal, or we will go and destroy it ourselves.”

Shalgham, having gauged the tense mood in America, told a meeting in Tripoli that the United States would occupy Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The Libyan leader did not hesitate to bow to Bush’s demands.

The US used Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction as a pretext for attacking the country. It also claimed that the Iraqi government had ties to al-Qaeda. Many did not believe the claim, particularly given the stark differences between Saddam and bin Laden and the vastly different ideologies that guided them.

The prevailing impression was that the allegation had been fabricated. In fact, no relationship existed. But Saddam made a serious error in the 1990s, while bin Laden was in Sudan, when he sent a member of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood to meet him there. The al-Qaeda leader showed no interest in cooperating with what he called the “infidel Baathist regime.”

The Iraqi government tried again, sending an intelligence official named Farouk Hijazi. A meeting with bin Laden was arranged through Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi. After the meeting, which lasted more than three hours, Hijazi returned to Iraq and advised Saddam to abandon the idea of working with bin Laden, who reportedly demanded permission to establish independent camps on Iraqi soil.

The Iraqi government dropped the idea of cooperating with bin Laden. But US intelligence agencies exploited murky threads of contact between the two sides and used them to justify the invasion of Iraq.

The US toppled the Taliban and Saddam’s government and launched a prolonged hunt for al-Qaeda leaders.

On May 2, 2011, bin Laden, hiding in Abbottabad, Pakistan, was taken by surprise when US troops stormed his compound. America exacted revenge on the architect of the attacks on New York and Washington and disposed of his body at sea.

Osama bin Laden was gone, but al-Qaeda’s imprint exacted an enormous price from the countries of the Middle East.


What Options Does Hezbollah Have in Dealing with Israeli Escalation?

Portraits of current and former Iranian and Hezbollah leaders displayed at a rally, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, September 2, 2026. (Reuters)
Portraits of current and former Iranian and Hezbollah leaders displayed at a rally, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, September 2, 2026. (Reuters)
TT

What Options Does Hezbollah Have in Dealing with Israeli Escalation?

Portraits of current and former Iranian and Hezbollah leaders displayed at a rally, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, September 2, 2026. (Reuters)
Portraits of current and former Iranian and Hezbollah leaders displayed at a rally, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, September 2, 2026. (Reuters)

Hezbollah finds itself facing an increasingly difficult equation as Israeli escalation in South Lebanon has widened in recent days. How will the party respond to mounting Israeli strikes without being drawn into a broader confrontation that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may be seeking either to postpone Israel’s elections or improve his prospects in them.

At the same time, Hezbollah is facing growing pressure from its support base, which is bearing the brunt of the strikes and demanding a response capable of deterring Tel Aviv. Yet the group’s options appear largely constrained by regional developments, particularly the course of US-Iran negotiations, as well as domestic political calculations in Lebanon.

A response could benefit Netanyahu

Sources familiar with Hezbollah’s position said the Iran-backed party has largely avoided signaling whether it intends to retaliate or continue exercising restraint and adhering unilaterally to the ceasefire agreement.

They told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah is currently focusing on holding the Lebanese authorities responsible for addressing the situation, noting that the group had previously called on the government to engage in dialogue over the expanding Israeli offensive and the failure of negotiations.

The sources see no indication so far that Hezbollah may make a military response. They argue that one objective of Israel’s widening offensive is to provoke Hezbollah and Iran into retaliating and trigger a broader war, which could benefit Netanyahu electorally or help him postpone the polls.

Limited ability to confront Israel

Hilal Khashan, a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut, took a different view, saying Hezbollah has no options left because its military power has collapsed, particularly after its decision to hand over Ali al-Taher — “a symbol of its pride” — to Israel rather than surrender it to the Lebanese army.

“Hezbollah lacks the ability not only to fight Israel, but even to provoke it,” Khashan told Asharq Al-Awsat. “It sent two drones, and we saw the results.”

The academic believes the party’s current priority is to retain its weapons domestically after its military role in confronting Israel has effectively ended, although Hezbollah “insists on living in denial.”

He expects Israeli escalation to continue ahead of the heated elections, saying it will not be confined to Lebanon but could extend to the West Bank, Gaza and southern Syria, amid continued threats of strikes against Iran.

“As for America’s ability to pressure Israel, it appears limited,” Khashan noted, saying this means an expansion of Israeli operations into Lebanon's Bekaa Valley cannot be ruled out.

Three options for Hezbollah

Retired Lebanese army Brig. Gen. Mounir Shehadeh offered a different assessment, identifying three options available to Hezbollah.

“The first is a broad, direct military response,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. “This is the option that could give Israel the pretext it is seeking to expand its target list, take the escalation deeper into Lebanon and perhaps strike Lebanese infrastructure. It is therefore a high-cost option.”

The second is to refrain entirely from responding. That also carries a price because Israel could interpret it as evidence that it can impose new realities without paying a cost, particularly following the escalation over Ali al-Taher and the continuing strikes, he explained.

The third option is a calibrated, limited response. “In my view, this is the most logical option if the group decides to respond,” Shehadeh said.

Such action would seek to establish the principle that “aggression carries a cost” without triggering an all-out confrontation, he went on to say. Hezbollah could simultaneously maintain a policy of ambiguity by declining to claim every operation, particularly if it wanted to preserve room for political maneuver.

Shehadeh said Hezbollah may be facing a more complicated calculation: whether to respond to Israel now or wait until the direction of US-Iran negotiations becomes clearer.

Waiting for the outcome of those talks would not necessarily mean surrendering or remaining passive, he noted. Instead, Hezbollah could defer a major response while keeping the option of limited retaliation open, since a broad confrontation at this stage could benefit Israel more than the party and give it an opportunity to widen the war before the regional picture becomes clearer.

Shehadeh expects Hezbollah to avoid, in the near term, initiating a major response that could trigger an all-out war. At the same time, the group cannot indefinitely tolerate continued Israeli escalation without responding.

He stressed that the most realistic scenario is to contain the escalation, monitor developments on the ground, take into account the US-Iran diplomatic track and keep open the option of a limited, carefully calibrated response if Israel crosses certain lines.


Iran's Hormuz Leverage Wanes as US Economic Squeeze Bites

Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, September 5, 2026. (Reuters)
Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, September 5, 2026. (Reuters)
TT

Iran's Hormuz Leverage Wanes as US Economic Squeeze Bites

Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, September 5, 2026. (Reuters)
Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, September 5, 2026. (Reuters)

Six months after a conflict that rattled markets and pushed the region to the brink of a wider war, the tide may be turning against Iran as Washington unleashes an unprecedented economic offensive to achieve what military force could not.

After years of surviving sanctions, Tehran is now confronting one of the harshest squeezes in the regime's history, according to Iranian insiders and regional sources cited by Reuters.

A US naval blockade and tougher sanctions are curbing oil exports, ‌restricting access to foreign currency and exposing growing strains in the economy.

The campaign has led US and regional officials to wager that mounting economic pressure can force Tehran to allow free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries about a fifth of global oil and LNG supplies.

Their bet rests on a simple calculation: Iran is suffering more economic damage than it is inflicting. Efforts to choke off oil exports have cut state revenues, while attempts to disrupt shipping through Hormuz have not triggered the global economic shock Tehran hoped would force Washington to compromise. Energy markets have adjusted and alternative supplies have continued to flow.

Whether the pressure will force concessions remains unclear, the regional sources said. Tehran has failed to impose the costs it hoped would break Washington's resolve but has shown little sign of abandoning demands for sanctions relief, access to frozen assets and recognition of its security role in Hormuz.

Still, a new formula for resolving the standoff is now under discussion between mediators and Iran, the sources said.

Can Tehran outlast the squeeze?

Three senior Iranian sources acknowledged that Washington's campaign is becoming increasingly difficult to withstand. The latest measures have sharply restricted Tehran's ability to access foreign currency, import goods and tap global financing networks that have helped keep the economy afloat.

Iranian leaders fear a worsening economy, marked by surging prices, weaker trade and pressure on household incomes, could reignite nationwide unrest that has repeatedly challenged Tehran.

Shortages of key imports, including fuel and wheat, are becoming an increasing concern, officials said.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the strategy as a “one-two punch” combining the blockade with “the toughest sanctions in history.”

“It is going to work in Iran and we are going to collapse this regime,” he told CNBC.

For some US, Israeli and regional officials, such ‌strains strengthen ⁠hopes that economic pressure could eventually carry political consequences inside Iran by triggering unrest, widening rifts within the leadership and weakening its grip on power.

Others remain skeptical that economic and military coercion will produce a political rupture, pointing to decades of failed efforts to destabilize the regime and Tehran's willingness to suppress dissent. They argue Iran's rulers may again prove more resilient than their adversaries expect.

Resilience test

Dennis Ross, a former US negotiator, said Washington may be interpreting Iran's economic distress as evidence of strategic success when the reality is more complicated. Tehran remains determined to demonstrate it can control Hormuz, but appears to be calibrating its use of force while keeping further escalation in reserve.

The Revolutionary Guards may believe Iran can absorb the economic pain and outlast the pressure rather than compromise, ⁠Ross said.

“The Iranians have consistently surprised us in terms of their resiliency,” he added, saying he doubted economic and military pressure alone would force a retreat. Hardliners, he said, may believe they can endure and ultimately secure what they want.

Resilience may depend as much on public tolerance as Tehran's ability to absorb economic hardship, said Burcu Ozcelik, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.

“Of course, the economic squeeze raises the risk of public unrest, but for now, a wartime mentality appears to have a significant hold ⁠over the population,” said Ozcelik. “Foreign military intervention, civilian casualties and the perception of a wider civilization confrontation with a US-led order are sustaining a degree of 'Iran-first' patriotic support, tolerance or simply patience with the regime.”

The result is a more stubborn impasse than Washington may have anticipated. Economic pressure is deepening the pain, but Tehran's powerful Revolutionary Guards may see endurance, backed by the threat of escalation, as leverage rather than a reason to concede.

The key question is not whether Iran is ⁠hurting, but whether it is hurting enough to compromise before either side slips toward another confrontation, the regional sources said.

Ross said the clearest path to a deal may lie in the dispute over shipping fees through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could abandon any demand for a toll while retaining the right to charge for legitimate navigational, security or environmental services, he said.

Such an arrangement could give both sides a claim to victory, allowing Tehran to step back without appearing to capitulate.

“If you could announce that the Strait were reopened,” Ross said, “I think Trump would do a deal.”