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From Buenos Aires to Rome: Key Dates in the Life of Pope Francis

(FILES) Pope Francis waves to the crowd during the weekly general audience on March 20, 2024 at St Peter's square in The Vatican. Pope Francis had a quiet night, the Vatican said on March 12, 2025, amid hopes the 88-year-old might be able to return home soon, after almost four weeks in hospital with pneumonia. (Photo by Filippo MONTEFORTE / AFP)
(FILES) Pope Francis waves to the crowd during the weekly general audience on March 20, 2024 at St Peter's square in The Vatican. Pope Francis had a quiet night, the Vatican said on March 12, 2025, amid hopes the 88-year-old might be able to return home soon, after almost four weeks in hospital with pneumonia. (Photo by Filippo MONTEFORTE / AFP)
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From Buenos Aires to Rome: Key Dates in the Life of Pope Francis

(FILES) Pope Francis waves to the crowd during the weekly general audience on March 20, 2024 at St Peter's square in The Vatican. Pope Francis had a quiet night, the Vatican said on March 12, 2025, amid hopes the 88-year-old might be able to return home soon, after almost four weeks in hospital with pneumonia. (Photo by Filippo MONTEFORTE / AFP)
(FILES) Pope Francis waves to the crowd during the weekly general audience on March 20, 2024 at St Peter's square in The Vatican. Pope Francis had a quiet night, the Vatican said on March 12, 2025, amid hopes the 88-year-old might be able to return home soon, after almost four weeks in hospital with pneumonia. (Photo by Filippo MONTEFORTE / AFP)

Key events in the life of Jorge Mario Bergoglio, who became Pope Francis and died on Monday:
Dec. 17, 1936: Jorge Mario Bergoglio is born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the eldest of five children to Mario Jose Bergoglio, an accountant from Italy, and Regina María Sívori, the daughter of Italian immigrants.
Dec. 13, 1969: Ordained a priest with the Jesuit religious order, which he would lead as Argentina provincial superior during the country’s murderous dictatorship that began in the 1970s.
May 20, 1992: Named auxiliary bishop of Buenos Aires and in 1998 succeeds Cardinal Antonio Quarracino as archbishop of the Argentine capital.
Feb. 21, 2001: Elevated to cardinal by St. John Paul II.
May 2007: Helps draft the final document of the fifth meeting of the Latin American bishops conference in Aparecida, Brazil, synthesizing what would eventually become his concerns as pope for the poor, Indigenous peoples and the environment and the need for a missionary church.
March 13, 2013: Elected 266th pope, the first from the Americas, the first Jesuit and the first to take the name of Francis, after St. Francis of Assisi.
April 13, 2013: Creates a kitchen cabinet of eight cardinals from around the globe to help him govern the church and reorganize its bureaucracy.
May 12, 2013: Canonizes the “Martyrs of Otranto,” 813 Italians slain in 1480. With one ceremony, Francis nearly doubled the 480 saints made by St. John Paul II over his quarter-century pontificate, which at the time was more than all his predecessors combined for 500 years.
July 8, 2013: Makes first trip outside Rome to the Sicilian island of Lampedusa to meet with newly arrived migrants and denounces the “globalization of indifference” shown to would-be refugees.
July 30, 2013: Declares “Who am I to judge?” when asked about a gay priest during a news conference, signaling a more welcoming stance toward LGBTQ+ community.
Nov. 26, 2013: Issues mission statement for his papacy in Evangelii Gaudium, (“The Joy of the Gospel”), denouncing the world financial system that excludes the poor and declaring the Eucharist is “not a prize for the perfect but a powerful medicine and nourishment for the weak.”
May 25, 2014: Makes an unscheduled stop to pray at wall separating Israel from West Bank town of Bethlehem, in a show of support for the Palestinian cause.
June 8, 2014: Hosts Israeli and Palestinian presidents for peace prayers in the Vatican gardens.
March 20, 2015: Accepts the resignation of the “rights and privileges” of Scottish Cardinal Keith O’Brien after adult men accuse him of sexual misconduct.
June 18, 2015: Issues his environmental manifesto “Laudato Si” (“Praised Be”), calling for a cultural revolution to correct the “structurally perverse” global economic system that exploits the poor and has turned Earth into “an immense pile of filth."
July 10, 2015: Apologizes in Bolivia for the sins and crimes of the Catholic Church against Indigenous peoples during the colonial-era conquest of the Americas.
Sept. 8, 2015: Overhauls the annulment process to make it faster, cheaper and simpler so divorced Catholics can remarry in the church.
Sept. 24, 2015: Challenges Congress to rediscover America’s ideals by acting on climate change, immigration and poverty reduction in the first speech by a pope at the U.S. Capitol.
Nov. 29, 2015: Inaugurates the Jubilee of Mercy by opening the Holy Door of the cathedral in Bangui, Central African Republic, rather than at the Vatican.
Feb. 12, 2016: Meets Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill during a stopover in Havana and declares “We are brothers,” in first such meeting between a pope and patriarch in over 1,000 years.
Feb. 18, 2016: Prays for dead migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border, later says then-presidential candidate Donald Trump is “not a Christian” for wanting to build a border wall.
April 8, 2016: Opens the way to letting divorced and civilly remarried Catholics receive Communion in a footnote to the document “Amoris Laetitia” (“The Joy of Love”).
April 16, 2016: Visits a refugee camp in Lesbos, Greece, and brings 12 Syrian Muslims to Rome aboard his papal plane in an appeal for solidarity toward migrants.
Sept. 19, 2016: Is questioned in a letter by four conservative cardinals seeking clarification of his opening to divorced and remarried Catholics.
Dec. 1, 2017: Declares at a meeting in Bangladesh with Myanmar Rohingya refugees that, “The presence of God today is also called Rohingya.”
Jan. 19, 2018: Accuses sex abuse victims of slander during a visit to Chile, further undermining Catholic Church’s credibility. Subsequently orders a Vatican investigation into Chile’s abuse crisis.
April 12, 2018: Admits to “grave errors” in judgment in Chile’s sex abuse scandal. Later summons Chilean bishops to Rome to secure their resignations and invites abuse victims to Vatican to apologize.
Aug. 3, 2018: Declares capital punishment “inadmissible” under all circumstances in a change to official church teaching.
July 28, 2018: Accepts the resignation of Cardinal Theodore McCarrick from the College of Cardinals, orders him to penance and prayer pending an investigation into allegations of sexual misconduct with minors and adults.
Aug. 26, 2018: Retired Vatican ambassador Archbishop Carlo Maria Vigano publishes bombshell accusation claiming U.S. and Vatican officials for two decades covered up McCarrick’s sexual misconduct, demands Francis resign.
Sept. 22, 2018: Vatican and China sign landmark agreement over bishop nominations.
Oct. 14, 2018: Canonizes slain Salvadoran Archbishop Óscar Romero after his saint-making process was held up for decades by conservative cardinals.
Feb. 4, 2019: Signs the “Human Fraternity” document with the imam of Al Azhar, establishing collaborative relations between Catholics and Muslims.
Feb. 16, 2019: Defrocks McCarrick after Vatican investigation finds he sexually abused minors and adults.
Feb. 21, 2019: Opens first Vatican summit on child protection, warns bishops the faithful demand action, not just condemnation of clergy sexual abuse.
May 9, 2019: Issues new church law requiring clergy sex abuse to be reported in-house, although not to police; establishes procedures for investigating accused bishops, cardinals and religious superiors.
Oct. 25, 2019: Apologizes to Amazonian bishops, tribal leaders after conservative activists steal Indigenous statues from Vatican-area church and throw them into Tiber River in show of opposition to the pope.
Nov. 24, 2019: Declares the use and possession of nuclear weapons “immoral” during a visit to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan.
Dec. 17, 2019: Abolishes use of “pontifical secret” in clergy sex abuse cases, allowing bishops to share internal documentation about abusers with law enforcement.
Feb. 12, 2020: Declines to approve ordination of married men as priests after appeals from Amazonian bishops, sidestepping issue in document “Querida Amazonia” (“Beloved Amazon”).
March 27, 2020: Delivers solitary evening prayer to the world facing the coronavirus pandemic from the promenade of St. Peter’s Square.
Oct. 4, 2020: Issues encyclical “Fratelli Tutti” (“Brothers All,”), arguing the pandemic proves theories of market capitalism failed and a new type of politics is needed to promote human fraternity.
Nov. 10, 2020: Vatican report into McCarrick finds Vatican, U.S. bishops, cardinals and popes played down or dismissed reports of sexual misconduct but spares Francis.
March 5-8, 2021: Becomes first pope to visit Iraq, meeting with its top Shiite Muslim cleric.
July 4, 2021: Undergoes intestinal surgery at Rome’s Gemelli hospital, has 33 centimeters (13 inches) of colon removed.
Jan. 5, 2023: Presides at funeral Mass for Pope Benedict XVI.
Jan. 24, 2023: Declares in an Associated Press interview that “Being homosexual is not a crime.”
March 29, 2023: Is admitted to Rome's Gemelli hospital for respiratory infection; is released April 1.
June 7, 2023: Undergoes surgery to remove intestinal scar tissue and repair a hernia in the abdominal wall.
Oct. 4, 2023: Opens a synod on making the church more responsive to ordinary faithful during which women are allowed to vote alongside bishops for the first time.
Nov. 28, 2023: Cancels visit to Dubai to address U.N. climate conference and outline a new ecological manifesto “Laudate Deum” ("Praise God") because of a new case of acute bronchitis.
Dec. 16, 2023: Vatican tribunal convicts Cardinal Angelo Becciu of embezzlement and sentences him to 5½ years in prison in one of several verdicts in a complicated financial trial that aired the city state’s dirty laundry and tested its justice system.
Dec. 19, 2023: Approves blessings for same-sex couples provided they don't resemble marriage, sparking fierce opposition from conservative bishops in Africa, Asia and elsewhere.
July 5, 2024: Vatican excommunicates leading Francis critic Archbishop Carlo Maria Vigano for schism.
Sept. 10, 2024: Some 600,000 people, half of East Timor's population, attend Francis' Mass in Dili in what is believed to be the biggest turnout for a papal event in terms of the proportion of the population.
Dec. 26, 2024: Opens the holy door of Rome's Rebibbia prison, two days after formally inaugurating the 2025 Jubilee.
Jan. 16, 2025: Appears wearing a sling after a fall that bruised his right arm, just weeks after another apparent fall bruised his chin.
Feb. 14, 2025: Is hospitalized after a bout of bronchitis worsens and then develops into a complex lung infection and double pneumonia.
Feb. 28, 2025: His doctors briefly consider suspending treatment after a breathing crisis but decides instead on an aggressive course that risks organ damage.
March 13, 2025: Marks the 12th anniversary of his election as pope while hospitalized.
March 23, 2025: Is released from the hospital after 38 days of treatment but looked weak and frail earlier that day when appearing on a balcony to greet the crowd below.
April 17, 2025: Still recovering from double pneumonia, Francis keeps his Holy Thursday tradition of spending time with the least fortunate, visiting inmates at Rome's Regina Caeli prison. Although he says he couldn’t perform the ritual of washing the feet of 12 people in a gesture of humility, he adds he wanted to be with them and “do what Jesus did on Holy Thursday.”

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ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
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ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)

The issue of ISIS detainees transferred from prisons in northeastern Syria to Iraq has moved to the forefront of Baghdad’s security and political agenda, coinciding with intensified efforts to form a new government and determine the next prime minister.

Long confined to narrow security and technical discussions, the issue has entered broader political debate following Iraqi steps to receive a number of the detainees inside its territory, in coordination with concerned international parties. While the move carries direct security implications, it has also unfolded against a highly sensitive domestic political backdrop.

On Friday, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, in a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron, urged “countries around the world, particularly European Union states,” to repatriate their nationals held as ISIS detainees, following their transfer from Syria to Iraq.

 

An Iraqi border guard at a checkpoint along the Syrian border in Sinjar, January 22, 2026 (AP)

From a Border Liability to a Domestic Challenge

For years, the presence of thousands of ISIS members in detention facilities beyond Iraq’s direct control has been a persistent security concern for Baghdad, given the proximity of those prisons to the Iraqi-Syrian border and the region’s fragile security conditions. The transfer of some detainees into Iraq has shifted the challenge from a cross-border threat to a domestic issue requiring complex security, judicial, and logistical arrangements.

Iraqi authorities say handling the detainees falls within the state’s responsibility toward its citizens and individuals accused of crimes committed on Iraqi soil, while also reducing the risk of a potential security breakdown at detention sites outside the country.

At the same time, political circles have raised questions about the security burden, societal repercussions, and Iraq’s capacity to manage the issue over the long term.

Where Security and Politics Converge

The renewed focus on the detainee issue has coincided with a sensitive phase of negotiations among political forces within the Coordination Framework coalition over government formation and the selection of a prime minister.

Although fundamentally a security matter, the timing has propelled the issue into political debate, particularly as international actors welcomed steps taken by the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, while regional players monitored developments in Baghdad with caution.

On Friday, US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack praised what he described as Baghdad’s “exceptional leadership” and its firm commitment to helping protect the international community from the continuing threat posed by ISIS detainees, speaking on behalf of the US president and secretary of state.

Some political factions view the handling of ISIS detainees as a test of the Iraqi government’s ability to manage complex issues in coordination with the international community. Others see it as a highly sensitive issue that must be handled independently of political pressure or diplomatic signals between capitals with influence over Iraqi affairs.

 

Iraqi border guards are deployed along the Syrian border amid tight security measures (AP)

Complex Domestic Calculations

Within Iraq, debate over the detainees is inseparable from concerns about the possible resurgence of extremist cells, prison attacks, or escape attempts — scenarios Iraq has experienced in the past. As a result, security discussions have focused on intelligence readiness, securing detention facilities, and expediting judicial procedures for suspects.

Politically, most parties are careful to avoid appearing lenient on terrorism, yet they differ on the timing and approach to managing the issue, particularly amid a political transition whose outcome remains unsettled.

The detainee issue also highlights Baghdad’s effort to strike a balance between responding to international security concerns and asserting its sovereignty and national interest. Countries concerned with foreign fighters and ISIS dossier are pushing for lasting solutions, while Iraqi authorities are keen to prevent the country from once again becoming a theater for the fallout of regional and international conflicts.

In this context, the issue of ISIS detainees is no longer merely an isolated security concern; it has become a complex issue intertwining considerations of border control, sovereignty, security readiness, internal political tensions, and sustained international attention to the ISIS group.

Features

Greenland Galvanizes Europe to Confront New US Reality

Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)
Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)
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Greenland Galvanizes Europe to Confront New US Reality

Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)
Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)

Europe may have rallied to see off President Donald Trump over Greenland, but its leaders recognize the confrontation is unlikely to be the last in dealings with his increasingly strident version of the United States.

The stakes could hardly be higher, given the $2 trillion trading relationship between the European Union and the US and the dominant role Washington continues to play in the NATO alliance and in support of Ukraine against Russia.

This week, ​in the space of a few hours at the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Trump first ruled out taking Greenland by force and then removed the threat of new tariffs on eight European states standing in his way - hailing instead a vague deal for the Arctic island with NATO chief Mark Rutte.

European leaders believe Trump backed down in part because - in contrast to their more accommodating stance in last year's tariff negotiations - this time they made it clear he was crossing a red line by asserting that Greenland's status as an autonomous territory of Denmark was non-negotiable.

"All this shows that you cannot let the Americans trample all over the Europeans," said a European Union official, who requested anonymity to speak candidly about US ties.

"We did the right thing to push back, to be firm in what we said, but it is not over. My sense is that we will be tested constantly on issues like this," ‌the official told ‌Reuters.

While Europe may have learned the value of standing up to Trump, the challenge is ensuring it ‌is ⁠less ​exposed next time.

"It's ‌a hard route, and it's going to take time," said Rosa Balfour, director at Carnegie Europe, adding that Europe had "far more leverage than it has dared to use".

EUROPE NOT SEEKING A SPLIT

An emergency summit of Europe's leaders on Thursday called for last year's EU-US trade deal to be put back on track after lawmakers suspended its ratification in protest over Greenland.

"Despite all the frustration and anger of recent months, let us not be too quick to write off the transatlantic partnership," German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said in Davos beforehand.

While seeking to stabilize the partnership, Europe is also taking steps aimed at "de-risking" it given the open antipathy from Trump, whose new national security strategy accuses the continent of freeloading on defense and demands it open its markets to US companies.

Europe is only too aware of how long it can ⁠take to get agreement among 27 nations with different histories, politics and economies, which was highlighted in taunts this week by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.

Two EU officials said the Greenland row has accelerated discussions on ‌how the approach taken on Ukraine - in which countries offer security guarantees on a voluntary basis ‍and no one has a right of veto - can be extended.

"We should ‍do more with coalitions of the willing and leave it open for others to follow if they want," said one, adding that joint efforts to ‍boost Europe's development of artificial intelligence technology could be one example.

Coalitions such as the "E3" group comprising France, Germany and Britain focusing on security matters also allow non-EU states to take part, which speaks to others on the rough end of Trump policies.

"The middle powers must act together, because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu," Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said in a Davos speech to warm applause.

Another route is using the leeway afforded by EU law.

In December, EU states used an emergency provision ​to indefinitely immobilize hundreds of billions of dollars of Russian assets. That removed the risk of a pro-Moscow country like Hungary blocking the roll-over of the measure at some point and forcing the EU to return the money.

NEW EUROPEAN DOCTRINE

Europe also plans to toughen ⁠up on economic policy.

Next month it will kickstart legislation that will include "Made in Europe" requirements on strategic sectors and strengthening conditionality clauses for any foreign direct investment in the EU.

"Some provisions were originally conceived to reduce reliance on China but in reality they will help us to de-risk from other markets," European Commissioner for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy Stephane Sejourne told Reuters.

"This will totally change the European doctrine on those sectors," Sejourne added.

Unlike Canada, there is no plan in Europe to pivot more towards China to compensate for transatlantic strains. But the bloc is actively pursuing others in a diversification drive.

While the impact of higher US tariffs on European goods is not clear - in fact Europe's trade surplus with the US initially rose over the course of 2025 as companies front-loaded exports ahead of the new levies - recent data shows that German companies nearly halved investments there last year.

After the signing of the EU-Mercosur pact this month - the largest in EU history - European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said it is now "on the cusp" of a deal with India.

However, nobody is saying Europe can redress the imbalance with the US overnight, particularly on security.

Despite European commitments to a defense spending surge and even calls for an EU army, analysts say it will be years before its military might is up to ‌tasks which now include bolstering Arctic security.

The question is whether the past few weeks provide a catalyst for Europe to start reducing its US dependencies.

"All this is not surprising," Swedish deputy Prime Minister Ebba Busch said of Trump's showing in Davos.

"The EU needs to toughen up," she told Reuters.

Features

Possible ‘Emergency Exit’ for Iraqi Factions, But Not for Everyone

An Iraqi man carrying the Iranian flag passes in front of security forces outside the Iranian embassy in Baghdad during a demonstration to show solidarity against US threats (DPA). 
An Iraqi man carrying the Iranian flag passes in front of security forces outside the Iranian embassy in Baghdad during a demonstration to show solidarity against US threats (DPA). 
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Possible ‘Emergency Exit’ for Iraqi Factions, But Not for Everyone

An Iraqi man carrying the Iranian flag passes in front of security forces outside the Iranian embassy in Baghdad during a demonstration to show solidarity against US threats (DPA). 
An Iraqi man carrying the Iranian flag passes in front of security forces outside the Iranian embassy in Baghdad during a demonstration to show solidarity against US threats (DPA). 

Since protests erupted in Iran, political elites in Iraq have quietly debated whether the “Islamic Revolution” in Tehran might be nearing a rapid collapse. Yet the more cautious question circulating in Baghdad is different: what if the Iranian system survives, but weakened and stripped of its tools, for years to come?

This question now resonates within the corridors of the Coordination Framework, the coalition most closely tied to regional power dynamics. It appears to be repositioning itself amid shifting centers of influence, but not before paying a price.

Figures from Shiite parties and armed factions, as well as researchers interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat, say anxiety over Iran’s trajectory is palpable in Baghdad, though rarely expressed openly for ideological reasons and because of what they describe as a chronic inability to produce independent national policies.

Pressure on Shiite forces has been building for months. Washington is pushing to dismantle militias and sever their operational and economic ties with Iran. Tehran is weighed down by sanctions and protests whose sparks have reached even the bazaars. Meanwhile, the Coordination Framework is attempting to engineer a governing formula capable of surviving these pressures.

It is widely believed that the heavy presence of armed factions’ representatives in parliament - holding more than about 80 seats - is part of a broader strategy to adapt to US pressure, whether Iran’s system collapses or remains weak for years.

Accordingly, Shiite political actors appear compelled to move from the era of militias toward the state, though only after establishing a strong central power within state institutions, in order to avoid confrontation with Washington and prepare for the possibility of Iran’s declining influence.

Over time, it has become clear that avoiding confrontation with the United States requires not only reducing Iranian influence but also constructing local power under the umbrella of a national political settlement.

A situation resembling Saddam Hussein

Since 2003, Shiite parties have rarely debated Iran’s future publicly. There is a prevailing belief that discussing the fate of a system led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is ideologically taboo for those who profess absolute loyalty to him, according to a senior leader in the Coordination Framework.

Many also dismiss the possibility of Iran’s collapse altogether. But Hisham Dawood, a researcher at the French National Center, argues that the impact of maximum sanctions on Iranian society cannot be ignored. He said sanctions do not overthrow regimes as much as they reshape societies, shifting them from a culture of living to one of survival.

In private gatherings, Iraqi politicians have begun drawing an analogy that alarms Shiite groups. They note that Tehran’s system is approaching a condition similar to that of Saddam Hussein’s regime after the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent economic embargo, a crushed social base and a leadership gradually stripped of its traditional tools.

Aqeel Abbas, a researcher on US affairs, does not believe Iran’s system will collapse but is convinced that its behavior will change. On that basis, Shiite forces may seek to adapt in order to weather the storm.

This trajectory, however, does not appear sufficient in Washington’s eyes. The United States is not searching for treasure but for the key. US presidential envoy Mark Savaya wrote that militias are merely a symptom of a deeper disease in Iraq. For months, he has been shaping among Shiite circles in Baghdad a narrative of sustained pressure within a broader American strategy.

Groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq have shown striking flexibility compared with their past. The faction that once fought the Americans now stands as one of the main pillars of government and parliament and is reportedly planning to dominate both in the next legislative cycle, according to associates of its leader, Qais al-Khazali.

During his election campaign months ago, al-Khazali welcomed US investments. Yet Washington continues to press for the removal of his representative in parliament from the post of deputy speaker, according to information leaked from meetings held by Acting Chargé d’Affaires Joshua Harris with Coordination Framework officials.

A Western diplomat who served in a mission between Baghdad and Damascus during the fight against ISIS explains US behavior toward Shiite factions: after months of “power diplomacy” in exchange for avoiding military targeting, the Americans are not seeking a truce but a decisive blow followed by a deal on their terms. Savaya’s role, he says, is likely to clarify and enforce those conditions.

More than weapons

Spokespersons for armed factions declined to comment on questions about their plans for dealing with US pressure. But a senior figure in an armed faction, speaking anonymously, said they had reached a stage of “confrontation without masks — no intermediaries, no maneuvering.”

Aqeel Abbas believes Shiite forces may attempt to transform existing militias into local forces under new names, limited to protecting the system inside Iraq without regional roles or provoking the United States and Israel.

Theoretically, such a shift could satisfy Washington. But the faction leader warned that the confrontation goes beyond weapons: the Americans, he said, want the core of influence and resistance. “We tried to confine the crisis to weapons, but now they are pressing on our existence, our economy, and our ideological ties. What room for maneuver remains except defending our dignity?”

He added that such questions are being raised in Baghdad faster than they are answered in Tehran.

Iran “that cannot be defeated”

Hisham Dawood divides Shiite reactions in Baghdad into three groups.

The first consists of pro-Iran forces with direct ideological ties to Tehran, which do not view the Iraqi state as the ultimate framework of political belonging but rather as a field of action within a transnational project. These forces, Dawood argues, are prepared to bear high costs - even if they affect the Iraqi state - so long as they serve what they consider a religious obligation toward Tehran.

Indeed, many factions place near-absolute confidence in Iran. A faction leader who was active in Syria before the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime said some battles are managed according to logic that transcends local calculations, and that the final decision is not always in the hands of those who pay the price on the ground. He argued that without Iran, the Islamic Revolution would have no meaning.

The second group comprises forces that have governed Iraq since 2003 and occupy a more complex position. They are not overtly pro-Iran ideologically or organizationally, but they remain deeply influenced by Tehran for historical and sectarian reasons, and out of fear that Iranian influence could reshape internal Shiite alignments.

These forces seek to present themselves as holders of national legitimacy, yet in decisive moments they still defer to Tehran. Many observers believe this dynamic was reflected in what was described as Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s “concession” to Nouri al-Maliki over the premiership - an attempt, according to a senior Shiite leader, to restore Maliki’s centrality through a new-old alliance.

Pro-Iran groups mobilized demonstrations in central and southern cities, carrying images of Khamenei and Iranian flags. But the Coordination Framework issued only one statement urging diplomatic solutions and warning of economic challenges and falling oil prices. This has revealed a leadership caught between traditional power calculations and growing risks.

The third group consists of a popular majority with weak political representation, which views the continuation of the Iranian model in Iraq as a source of political stagnation, economic crisis, social paralysis, and international isolation.

The Sadrist movement may represent part of this majority. Dawood argues that it is politically reduced to an image of Iranian extension, a simplification that imposes a heavy symbolic and political cost.

Most Iraqi Shiite forces - except some ideological actors - appear ready to strike deals with Washington, provided their interests within the Iraqi state are guaranteed, in a manner resembling the model the United States is testing in Syria.

Meanwhile, attempts to create a strong institutional umbrella to fill the vacuum have emerged through the prominent role of the Supreme Judicial Council. On the eve of the legislative elections, Judge Faiq Zaidan urged adherence to constitutional timelines for forming Iraq’s leadership. Weeks later, he began publicly naming factions that must limit weapons. Iraqi elites now speak of an alternative governing umbrella that could fill the vacuum with the force of law.

An emergency exit

A Western diplomat believes this is the first time in years that Shiite groups may be forced to reconsider options that appear unrealistic, not only for Washington but even for Tehran. He pointed to the fate of the Syrian Democratic Forces as a warning for those who bet on open and absolute hostility.

While these developments paint a suffocating picture for Shiite factions, they also open an emergency exit from the old game toward new alliances.

A former government adviser described such an exit as a search for new alliances during a period in which Iran remains an ideological umbrella but without claws. He argued that pressures on armed factions leave no luxury of choice: Shiite forces must first build sustainable local partnerships and then balance relations with emerging centers of power in the region and the Arab world.

Yet this emergency exit may not accommodate all Shiite players within what Dawood describes as a fragmented state. The central question remains open: will the United States seek to preserve pluralism among Shiite political and factional actors, or will it prefer to support a centralized authority with an authoritarian grip, as some actors in Baghdad now advocate?