US Sanctions on Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to al-Sharaa 

A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
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US Sanctions on Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to al-Sharaa 

A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)

Syrians have lived under the shadow of US sanctions for 46 years, spanning generations who know no other reality. These sanctions have become woven into every aspect of daily life, from banking and international aviation to construction and food supplies. Their burden has fallen hardest on ordinary people, rather than on the symbols of the ousted Assad regime.

While lifting sanctions now would undoubtedly unlock planning and reconstruction efforts, political and security concerns persist, and Syria’s dilapidated infrastructure may impede private-sector investment.

Most importantly, we must ask whether US President Donald Trump’s move to begin lifting sanctions was as improvised as his 2018 announcement to withdraw militarily from Syria, or whether it marks a pivotal shift in US foreign policy toward Syria.

On May 13, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump announced the lifting of US sanctions on Syria. This triggered a period of confusion and internal reviews before his administration outlined an initial mechanism that balanced implementing his announcement with addressing his advisors’ worries over unfettered engagement with the new Syrian leadership.

Before assessing this current phase of easing sanctions, we need a historical overview of them, their context, underlying rationale, implementation methods, and what their potential impact might be for Syria and its people. Sanctions on Syria can be divided into three eras: under Hafez al-Assad, under his son Bashar, and now under interim President Ahmed al‑Sharaa.

Shift toward Iran (1979–2000)

US sanctions on Syria began in 1979, following the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel and the rise of Iran’s revolution. With the end of the strategic alliance between Cairo and Damascus, Hafez al-Assad viewed Iran’s emerging regime as a counterweight to Iraq and Israel.

Washington designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979 due to its role in Lebanon and its support for fighters opposed to Israel. Consequently, the US imposed restrictions on foreign aid, defense exports, and the transfer of dual‑use goods. In November 1986, President Ronald Reagan barred Syrian planes from landing in the US.

The Iraq War (2001–2010)

Sanctions entered a new phase as US policy shifted after the September 11, 2001 attacks and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, coinciding with Bashar al‑Assad’s arrival to power in July 2000. In his 2002 State of the Union, President George W. Bush labeled Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and North Korea the “Axis of Evil”, prompting Iran to form a “Resistance Axis” that included Syria and Hezbollah.

With these strains came stricter measures: the Syria Accountability and Lebanon Sovereignty Act of 2003, enforced by OFAC at the US Treasury in 2004 under Executive Order 13338, targeted Syria’s role in Lebanon and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, as well as its opposition to the US-led occupation of Iraq.

On May 7, 2025, the Trump administration signed a notice extending the national emergency concerning Syria until May 7, 2026, encompassing executive orders from 2003 to 2012.

The Syrian uprising and Caesar Act

Following Syria’s uprising in March 2011, the US imposed a wave of sanctions targeting violence and human rights abuses. President Barack Obama’s April 29, 2011 executive order froze Assad regime assets, followed by an August 2011 ban on oil, asset freezes, and broad trade prohibitions, excluding food and medicine.

However, the defining moment came with the Caesar Civilian Protection Act of 2019, signed by Trump in December 2019 and implemented in June 2020. Targeting infrastructure, military maintenance, energy, and those funding the Assad regime, it also banned foreign investment in Syria’s reconstruction. This legislation aimed to check both Russian and Iranian influence and serve as leverage for negotiations with Moscow, permitting temporary waivers if productive talks occurred.

Though enacted long after the internal conflict began, the Act functioned less as a response to internal dynamics and more as an economic restraint on reconstruction efforts.

Al‑Sharaa after Assad

By late 2024, with Bashar al-Assad’s regime fallen and Trump back in power, Syria had not been a US priority, with internal debate over how to engage the new al‑Sharaa administration. That shifted after Trump spoke with Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on March 16, signaling alignment with Turkish‑Saudi policy against the hardline Israeli stance.

In Saudi Arabia, Trump began rolling back sanctions on Syria, but the fate of the Caesar Act remains uncertain, currently suspended in 180‑day increments, extendable. Although it was briefly lifted for humanitarian relief during the Feb 2023 Türkiye-Syria earthquakes and in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), its full repeal remains on hold.

Mechanisms and challenges

Trump’s administration has implemented three key executive measures: Treasury’s “GL‑25” on May 23, enabling sweeping economic coverage; a 180‑day suspension of Caesar sanctions; and a specific waiver for the Commercial Bank of Syria via the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, allowing re‑establishment of correspondent banking relationships.

GL‑25 has no set expiry and can be revoked anytime, while Caesar waivers renew every six months. An earlier GL‑24 waiver, issued in January, allowed limited official and energy sector transactions and personal transfers, but US banks have remained cautious.

The permit covers four sectors: finance, oil‑gas, maritime shipping, and aviation. US persons remain barred from transactions that may benefit Russia, Iran, or North Korea, meaning rigorous due diligence is necessary. The original executive orders remain in force, although press reports suggest possible cancellations.

Procedurally, Syria remains on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, as removal would require Congress to be notified by the US State Department. The Department of Commerce and State’s defense trade regulators have yet to remove export controls, which means that Syria still falls under International Traffic in Arms Regulations, necessitating export licenses for most goods, excluding basic food and medicine.

Furthermore, Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham is still designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Even after al‑Sharaa met Trump, the Treasury’s waiver excludes HTS leader Abu Mohammed al‑Golani, al-Sharaa's former nom de guerre, who remains sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1267, supported by a likely Russian veto of any attempt to remove HTS from global blacklists. Arms embargoes and surveillance‑tech restrictions will also persist.

The Caesar Act itself was renewed by Congress in January 2025 for five years, lasting until January 2030 unless overturned legislatively and its suspension may be extended in November 2025. But these continue as temporary waivers, not full repeals.

US politics and Congressional dynamics

Legislative repeal would require Act passage in Congress. Ironically, Trump’s allies in this are Democrats, as many Republicans, especially senators, remain wary.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jim Risch remarked that Trump lifted sanctions a bit more than what was expected, but cautioned that the sanctions could come back. US energy firms, together with Syrian‑American groups, have lobbied Trump to ease sanctions, while pro‑Israel lobby AIPAC insists any relief must hinge on demonstrable positive behavior from the new Syrian government.

Impact on economy and society

In 2018, the UN estimated at least $250 billion would be required to rebuild Syria fully, far beyond what domestic resources can furnish.

Serious barriers remain: destroyed roads, hospitals, and power networks hinder basic services. Reviving industry needs massive investment; millions displaced internally or abroad need rehousing; food, fuel, medical gear, and decent jobs are in short supply.

Even a partial lifting marks a seismic shift: essential imports like food, medicine, and technology could flow more freely; reconstruction of schools, hospitals, and roads becomes feasible; frozen international assets might be unfrozen, inviting foreign companies back to construction, energy, and trade.

The most immediate relief will come from reconnecting Syrian banks to global payment systems, especially SWIFT, dismantling the economic collapse born of widespread distrust. Yet Syria remains on the FATF grey list, deterring banks and obstructing liquidity, so regulatory frameworks must be built.

Future prospects

Ambitious domestic and regional projects have surfaced under al‑Sharaa, with some contracts bypassing competitive bids. The UAE has been granted an $800 million concession at the Port of Tartus, via a Dubai Ports World MoU, to develop multi-purpose terminals, industrial zones, dry ports, and logistics hubs.

Meanwhile, a 30‑year deal with French CMA CGM was signed to develop Latakia Port. China’s VDL company secured rights to 300,000 m² in the Adra Free Zone outside Damascus for 20 years to build industrial and commercial facilities with tax breaks, labor flexibility, and repatriable profits.

A Qatari-US-Turkish energy consortium plans a $7 billion, 5,000 MW power project.

All are seen as steps to lure foreign capital and reshape Syria’s foreign policy by leveraging international corporate interests.

Uncertain transition

The sanctions regime hinges on three pillars: Syria’s State Sponsor designation (since 1979), the Syria Accountability Act (2003), and the Caesar Act (2019). Only the first may soon shift, pending a State Department and Congressional review; the others remain entrenched.

While Syria will not likely see a flood of US investment tomorrow, the first visible presence would probably involve Turkish and Gulf investors, as the US must first verify the stability and reliability of the new Syrian leadership before enabling wider investors to return.

Damascus does not fully control its territory or armed factions, and fresh sanctions may target entities linked to coastal violence in recent months.

Thus, Caesar’s intent has transitioned from coercing the Assad regime to ensuring al‑Sharaa’s good behavior. But its six‑month renewals offer limited investor certainty, making regional neighbors the marginal beneficiaries.

Al‑Sharaa’s teams may aim to woo Trump with bold reconstruction plans akin to a Marshall Plan. But Trump isn’t easily swayed. He has yet to appoint an ambassador to Damascus; instead, US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack was named envoy to Syria, indicating Syria remains an extension of Turkish policy.

Trump is unpredictable and could reverse course swiftly, but current signs still point to provisional waivers rather than a full repeal of sanctions.



What to Know about the Latest Effort to End Türkiye's 40-year Kurdish Conflict

FILED - 02 November 2041, Hesse, Frankfurt_Main: A man displays a flag with the image of imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan at the Kurdish Newroz celebration in Frankfurt. Photo: Boris Roessler/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2041, Hesse, Frankfurt_Main: A man displays a flag with the image of imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan at the Kurdish Newroz celebration in Frankfurt. Photo: Boris Roessler/dpa
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What to Know about the Latest Effort to End Türkiye's 40-year Kurdish Conflict

FILED - 02 November 2041, Hesse, Frankfurt_Main: A man displays a flag with the image of imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan at the Kurdish Newroz celebration in Frankfurt. Photo: Boris Roessler/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2041, Hesse, Frankfurt_Main: A man displays a flag with the image of imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan at the Kurdish Newroz celebration in Frankfurt. Photo: Boris Roessler/dpa

A group of 30 Kurdish fighters clad in camouflage fatigues burned their weapons in a large cauldron in northern Iraq on Friday, in a symbolic gesture marking the first concrete step in an effort to end one of the Middle East’s longest-running insurgencies.

The ceremonial laying down of arms by members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK -- including 15 women — comes months after the group’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, called on it to disarm and disband as part of a new peace effort with Türkiye. Ocalan repeated that call in a video message to his fighters this week.

The process in Türkiye was initiated in October by Devlet Bahceli, a firebrand ultranationalist politician who has usually opposed any concessions to Kurdish identity or rights.

While Turkish officials have welcomed the first step toward the PKK’s disarmament, questions remain about the future of Kurdish fighters in Syria.

What is the PKK? The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, has waged an armed insurgency against Türkiye since 1984, initially with the aim of establishing a Kurdish state in the southeast of the country. Over time, the objective evolved into a campaign for autonomy and rights for Kurds within Türkiye.

The conflict between militants and state forces, which has spread beyond Türkiye’s borders into Iraq and Syria, has killed tens of thousands of people. The PKK is considered to be a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States and the European Union.

Who is Ocalan? Abdullah Ocalan, who as a student of political science in Ankara became deeply involved in leftist movements, formed the PKK in 1978 as a Marxist organization. He fled to Syria in 1979, along with other PKK members, where he remained until 1998, when Syria expelled him under intense pressure from Türkiye.

Ocalan was captured in Kenya in 1999 and imprisoned on Imrali island in the Sea of Marmara, where he remains to this day. His death sentence for treason was commuted to a life term in prison after Türkiye abolished the death penalty.

The 76-year-old endures as a symbol for Kurdish independence and rights and continues to wield influence over the Kurdish movement, with past messages relayed through family members or lawyers resonating beyond Türkiye, in Iraq and Syria.

Push for peace

In October, Bahceli, a close ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, suggested Ocalan could be granted parole if he renounces violence and disbands the PKK.

It was a major shift for the hardline politician who had previously strongly supported the state’s military action against the militant group and its affiliates in neighboring Syria and rejected any notion of negotiation.

In a message delivered through senior officials of the pro-Kurdish People's Equality and Democracy Party, or DEM, Ocalan called on the PKK leadership to take the decision to disband and disarm in February.

The PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire in March in response to Ocalan’s call and later announced its decision to disarm.

It was not immediately clear what concessions, if any, the Kurdish groups would get in return. PKK officials have said they expect former fighters to be given a path to integrate into the political system in Türkiye.

There are also concerns that some splinter groups may emerge within the PKK and that attacks may continue.

Soon after Bahceli's announcement, the PKK claimed an attack on Türkiye’s key aerospace company outside of Ankara that killed several people.

Previous attempts

There have been several peace efforts between the Turkish state and the PKK over the years, including secret negotiations held in Oslo, Norway from 2009 until 2011. However, none have yielded results.

The last attempt to reach a peace deal took place between 2013 and 2015 with a series of talks between Turkish officials and Ocalan, who declared a ceasefire and withdrew fighters to bases in northern Iraq.

Turkish officials took steps to improve Kurdish rights, including allowing Kurdish-language broadcasts. The process collapsed in July 2015, after a series of violent attacks, including one by the ISIS group that killed 33 pro-Kurdish activists.

Since then, Türkiye has cracked down on its pro-Kurdish movement and has jailed thousands of people, including the former leader of the main pro-Kurdish political party, Selahattin Demirtas, over alleged links to the PKK.

Reshaping the region

The latest peace effort comes at a time when Türkiye and the Kurds are both seeking security to face the challenges in the Middle East.

The renewed peace initiative unfolds amid fundamental changes reshaping the region, including the reconfiguration of power in Syria after the toppling of President Bashar Assad, the weakening of the Hezbollah militant movement in Lebanon, and the ongoing Israel-Hamas war in Gaza.

Türkiye strongly supports a deal reached between Syria’s new administration and the Kurdish-led and US backed Syrian Democratic Forces under which the SDF forces would merge with the new Syrian national army. The US envoy to Syria told The Associated Press this week that the sides remain at odds over the merger.

Hamish Kinnear, Senior Middle East and North Africa Analyst at risk intelligence company Verisk Maplecroft, said Ocalan’s decision to abandon the armed struggle coincides with a period when the PKK’s leverage is weak due to military setbacks and regional isolation.

“The PKK’s armed struggle was already faltering in the face of advances by Türkiye’s military, while its popularity among its traditional base was in decline,” Kinnear said. ”Ultimately, the peace talks were a useful off ramp in which improvement of Kurdish rights could still be pursued."

However, some believe the main aim of the reconciliation effort is for Erdogan’s government to garner Kurdish support for a new constitution that would allow him to remain in power beyond 2028, when his term ends.

Bahceli has openly called for a new constitution, saying it was essential to keep Erdogan in power for Türkiye’s future. Erdogan and Bahceli are reportedly seeking parliamentary support from the DEM.