The Worst Drought in Decades Is Threatening Syria’s Fragile Recovery from Years of Civil War

A drone view shows the dried up Orontes River in Jisr al-Shughour, west of Idlib, Syria, on Aug. 14, 2025. (AP)
A drone view shows the dried up Orontes River in Jisr al-Shughour, west of Idlib, Syria, on Aug. 14, 2025. (AP)
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The Worst Drought in Decades Is Threatening Syria’s Fragile Recovery from Years of Civil War

A drone view shows the dried up Orontes River in Jisr al-Shughour, west of Idlib, Syria, on Aug. 14, 2025. (AP)
A drone view shows the dried up Orontes River in Jisr al-Shughour, west of Idlib, Syria, on Aug. 14, 2025. (AP)

The worst drought in decades is gripping much of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, drying out rivers and lakes, shriveling crops and leading to dayslong tap water cutoffs in major cities.

The situation is particularly dire in Syria, where experts say rainfall has been declining for decades and where the fledgling government is trying to stitch the country back together following a 14-year civil war that left millions impoverished and reliant on foreign aid.

Small-farmer Mansour Mahmoud al-Khatib said that during the war, he couldn't reach his fields in the Damascus suburb of Sayyida Zeinab some days because fighters from the Lebanese Hezbollah party allied with then-President Bashar Assad would block the roads. That problem vanished when Hezbollah withdrew after Assad fell in a December opposition offensive, but the drought has devastated his farm, drying up the wells that irrigate it.

"The land is missing the water," al-Khatib told The Associated Press recently as he watched workers feed the wheat he did manage to harvest into a threshing machine. "This season is weak — you could call it half a season. Some years are better and some years are worse, but this year is harsh."

In a good year, his land could produce as much as 800 to 900 kilograms (1,764 to 1,984 pounds) of wheat per dunam, an area equal to 0.1 hectares and 0.25 acres. This year, it yielded about a quarter that much, he said. He hired only six or seven workers this harvest season instead of last year’s 15.

Syria's withering crops

Because the drought followed a prolonged war, farmers who were already financially stretched have had little ability to cope with its effects, said Jalal Al Hamoud, national food security officer for the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization in Syria.

Before the uprising-turned-civil war that began in 2011, Syrian farmers produced an average of 3.5 million to 4.5 million tons of wheat per year, which was enough to meet the country’s domestic needs, according to Saeed Ibrahim, director of agricultural planning and economics in Syria’s Agriculture Ministry.

That annual yield dropped to 2.2 million to 2.6 million tons during the war, and in recent years, the government has had to import 60% to 70% of its wheat to feed its roughly 23 million people. This year's harvest is expected to yield only 1 million tons, forcing the country to spend even more of its strained resources on imports.

Mudar Dayoub, a spokesperson for Syria's Ministry of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection, said this year’s wheat crop will only last for two or three months and that the government is "currently relying on signing contracts to import wheat from abroad" and on donations, including from neighboring Iraq.

But in a country where the World Food Program estimates that half the population is food-insecure, Ibrahim warned that "total reliance on imports and aid threatens food security" and is "unsustainable."

The drought isn't the only major issue facing Syria, where postwar reconstruction is projected to cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Since Assad fled, the country has been rattled by outbreaks of sectarian violence, and there's growing doubt about whether the new authorities will be able to hold it together. Without jobs or stability, millions of refugees who fled during the war are unlikely to come home.

A drone view shows dramatically low water levels at Lake Qaraoun, one of the Lebanon's largest reservoirs, as the result of a drought following heatwaves and a winter with very scarce precipitation, in Qaraoun village, eastern Lebanon, Aug. 6, 2025. (AP)

Interconnected crises

A dam on the Litani River in neighboring Lebanon's fertile Bekaa Valley forms Lake Qaraoun, a reservoir that spans about 12 square kilometers (4.6 square miles).

Over the years, climate change has led to a gradual decline in the water flowing into the reservoir, said Sami Alawieh, head of the Litani River National Authority.

This summer, after an unusually dry winter left Lebanon without the water reserves its usually banks through snow and rainfall, it has shrunk to the size of a pond, surrounded by a vast expanse of parched land.

Although an average of 350 million cubic meters (12.4 billion cubic feet) of water flows into the lake during the rainy season each year, meeting about one-third of Lebanon's annual demand, this year the incoming water didn't exceed 45 million cubic meters (1.6 billion cubic feet), he said.

Lebanon’s water woes have further exacerbated the drought in Syria, which partially relies on rivers flowing in from its western neighbor.

The largest of those is the Orontes, also known as the Assi. In Syria’s Idlib province, the river is an important source of irrigation water, and fishermen make their living from its banks. This year, dead fish littered the dried-out river bed.

"This is the first time it’s happened that there was no water at all," said Dureid Haj Salah, a farmer in Idlib’s Jisr al-Shugour. Many farmers can't afford to dig wells for irrigation, and the drought destroyed not only summer vegetable crops but decades-old trees in orchards, he said.

"There is no compensation for the loss of crops," Haj Salah said. "And you know the farmers make just enough to get by."

Mostafa Summaq, director of water resources in Idlib province, said the groundwater dropped by more than 10 meters (33 feet) in three months in some monitoring wells, which he attributed to farmers over-pumping due to a lack of rain. Local officials are considering installing metered irrigation systems, but it would be too expensive to do without assistance, he said.

Syrian farmers harvest wheat in the outskirts of Damascus, Syria, July 2, 2025. (AP)

A drier climate

Most experts agree that Syria and the broader region appear headed toward worse climate shocks, which they aren't prepared to absorb.

Climate change makes some regions wetter and others drier, and the Middle East and Mediterranean are among those that are drying out, said Matti Kummu, a professor at Aalto University in Finland who specializes in global food and water issues. Syria, specifically, has shown a trend of reduced rainfall over the past 40 years, while it has been using water at an unsustainable rate.

"There’s not enough water from rainfall or from snowmelt in the mountains to recharge the groundwater," Kummu said. Due to increasing irrigation needs, he said, "the groundwater table is going lower and lower, which means that it’s less accessible and requires more energy (to pump)." At some point, the groundwater might run out.

Even with limited means, the country could take measures to mitigate the impacts, such as increased rainwater harvesting, switching to more drought-tolerant crops and trying to put more effective irrigation systems in place, even simple ones.

But "in the long term, if the situation in terms of the climate change impacts continues" as currently projected, how much of the croplands will be arable in the coming decades is an open question, Kummu said.



Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
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Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights

China has increased purchases of Russian oil and gas since ‌the start of the conflict with Ukraine in 2022, with Moscow and Beijing declaring a "no limits" partnership just days before the war began. The energy relationship between the two countries is expected to be an important topic when presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping meet in Beijing on Wednesday.

Here are some facts about the energy ties between the two countries:

GAS

Russia's energy giant Gazprom supplies natural gas to China through a 3,000-km (1,865 mile) pipeline called Power of Siberia under a 30-year, $400 billion deal launched at the end of 2019.

In 2025, exports jumped by around a quarter to 38.8 billion cubic meters (bcm), exceeding the pipeline's planned annual capacity of 38 bcm.

During Putin's visit to China in September, the countries agreed to increase annual volumes on the route by an additional 6 bcm, to 44 bcm, a year. In February 2022, China also agreed to buy up to 10 bcm of gas annually ‌by 2027 via ‌a pipeline from Sakhalin Island in Russia's Far East. The countries later ‌agreed ⁠to raise the ⁠volumes to 12 bcm.

Russia's gas exports to China are still a small fraction of the record 177 bcm it delivered to Europe in 2018-19 annually.

Russia's share in European Union gas imports has shrunk during the Ukraine war, particularly in pipeline flows. Russia remained the EU's second-largest liquefied natural gas supplier last year with a 16% share but the gap with the EU's main LNG partner, the United States, widened considerably. Russia and China are still in talks about a new Power of Siberia 2 pipeline capable of delivering 50 bcm of gas per year ⁠from Russia to China via Mongolia.

Gazprom began a feasibility study for the ‌pipeline in 2020, but the project has gained urgency as Russia ‌turns to China to replace Europe as its major gas customer. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said in September that the ‌countries signed a "legally binding memorandum" on the pipeline, but a firm contract is still elusive.

Russia's liquefied natural ‌gas exports to China rose last year by 18.2% to 9.79 million metric tons, according to China's customs data, cited by TASS news agency.

Russia was, after Australia and Qatar, the third-largest supplier of LNG to China, which is the world's largest buyer of seaborne gas.

OIL China is Moscow's top client for oil shipments via the sea and pipelines. Exports have been ‌high amid Western sanctions on Russia over the war in Ukraine. China's imports from Russia were at 2.01 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2025 (or 100.72 ⁠million metric tons in ⁠total), a decline of 7.1%, according to China's General Administration of Customs. That represented 20% of China's total imported oil by volume.

Yury Ushakov, Putin's foreign policy aide, said Russian oil exports to China grew by 35% in the first quarter of 2026 to 31 million tons.

China, which is the world's top oil importer, primarily buys Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) crude exported via the Skovorodino-Mohe spur of the 4,070-km (2,540-mile) ESPO pipeline, which connects Russian oil fields to refineries in China and from the Russian Far East port of Kozmino. Russia's oil pipeline operator Transneft has said it was expanding the ESPO pipeline to increase exports via Kozmino, seeking to complete the expansion work in 2029. China also imports oil from the Pacific island of Sakhalin, taking Sakhalin Blend and Sokol oil grades. The availability of ESPO Blend oil has remained high since July 2025, when exports had been expanded to 1 million barrels per day. Transneft has kept exports via Kozmino at around this level.

Russia has also agreed to raise its oil exports to China via Kazakhstan through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline by 2.5 million tons per year to 12.5 million tons.


Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
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Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)

Multiple Hamas sources in the Gaza Strip revealed that the movement’s armed wing, the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, is now led by Mohammed Awda, succeeding Ezzedine al-Haddad, who was killed by Israel last Friday after decades of pursuit.

Three Hamas sources in Gaza told Asharq Al-Awsat that Awda had effectively been selected to command the Qassam.

He was close to al-Haddad and remained in regular contact with him, particularly over plans to “rebuild the organizational structure” after the killings of former Qassam commanders Mohammed Deif and Mohammed Sinwar, they added.

Since the Oct. 7, 2023 attack, Israel has eliminated a series of Qassam commanders and key figures involved in planning and directing Hamas’s attack on Israeli communities near Gaza during nearly two years of war in the enclave.

One source said Awda, who headed military intelligence within the Qassam at the time of the Oct. 7 attack, had been offered leadership of the armed wing after the killing of Mohammed Sinwar in May 2025, but declined, leading the role to pass to al-Haddad.

The two other sources said they could not independently verify that account.

Awda appears to face no serious rival for the position as he remains one of the core members of the movement’s military council. The only other surviving member of the original council is home front commander Imad Aqel, whom Hamas sources said did not play a direct role in planning or supervising the Oct. 7 operation, unlike “other commanders who were not informed of the full details or even the zero hour.”

Military intelligence role

Awda previously oversaw military intelligence operations in Gaza, including gathering information on Israeli military positions around the enclave.

Sources said he also supervised the exploitation of surveillance equipment uncovered after an Israeli undercover unit infiltrated Gaza and remained there for an extended period before being exposed in November 2018. Hamas officials at the time described the information recovered from the devices as an “intelligence treasure.”

The military intelligence branch under Awda concentrated heavily on identifying vulnerabilities in the Israeli army’s Gaza Division.

According to the sources, Awda later assumed responsibility for the northern sector after al-Haddad became commander of the Qassam Brigades. In that role, he coordinated with newly appointed commanders in Gaza City and northern Gaza while continuing to oversee intelligence operations.

Early Hamas ties

Sources said Awda’s relationship with Hamas dates back to the first Palestinian intifada, which erupted in 1987. He also spent time in the “Majd” security apparatus established by slain Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar to pursue Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel.

Believed to be in his late forties or early fifties, Awda ranked among the early members of the Qassam Brigades during the second intifada, which began in late 2000.

He is originally from the Khulafaa al-Rashideen area of Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza.

For years, the area functioned as a military hub for the Qassam Brigades. Mohammed Deif and several senior commanders were based there, and it became an early meeting point between Deif and a generation of future Qassam leaders, including Awda.

Although Awda’s career has been closely associated with intelligence and security operations, he also advanced through field command positions.

He served for several years as commander of the central Jabalia battalion, worked in military manufacturing and later headed the “northern brigade” between 2017 and 2019.

During his tenure as northern brigade commander, Awda hosted Mohammed Sinwar, then responsible for overseeing the Brigades’ military and strategic operations.

Hamas sources credit Awda with playing a major role in transforming the military intelligence branch into one of the most influential divisions in the Qassam.

“Awda has always preferred intelligence work and avoided direct field operations,” one Hamas source said. “He also avoids relying on personal guards or drivers, preferring to move alone because of his strict security precautions.”

Awda has reportedly survived several assassination attempts, both before and during the Gaza war. After the ceasefire of Oct. 10, 2025, his father’s home in Jabalia refugee camp was bombed, killing his eldest son, Amr.


In War‑Scarred Gaza, Brides Turn to Refurbished Wedding Dresses

 Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
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In War‑Scarred Gaza, Brides Turn to Refurbished Wedding Dresses

 Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)

In a small sewing workshop in southern Gaza, Nisreen Al-Rantisi pulls fabric from a pile and reshapes worn wedding dresses, trying to keep a fading tradition alive amid war and soaring costs.

Families said they have been struggling to find new wedding dresses and many search instead for places that refurbish gowns and other kinds of clothes for their children.

Importers cite delays, high shipping costs, and restrictions on materials, such as the crystals encrusted into the elaborate wedding dresses, as key factors behind the shortages ‌and price hikes.

Many workshops ‌have also been damaged during the conflict.

“We try ‌to ⁠reuse the old ⁠gowns that we have, produce them by fixing them a bit, work on them, wash them, arrange them, shape them,” said Rantisi, adding that work initially relied on a bicycle-powered sewing machine due to electricity shortages.

Rantisi said she used to buy the fabric for about 120 to 150 shekels ($41 to $51) before the war, but now pays around 500 shekels ($171).

“This has caused a big rise ⁠in the cost of bridal dresses and children’s gowns. We ‌are living in a vicious circle ‌from the war that affected us,” she added.

COGAT, the Israeli military agency that controls ‌access to Gaza, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Most ‌of Gaza's more than 2 million people have been displaced, many now living in bombed-out homes and makeshift tents pitched on open ground, roadsides, or atop the ruins of destroyed buildings after two years of war with Israel.

HIGH PRICES BEYOND REACH ‌FOR MOST IN GAZA

Despite the hardships, some couples still find ways to celebrate, with mass weddings held in ⁠Gaza offering a ⁠rare moment of joy amid the devastation.

Shop workers say the war has driven prices beyond reach.

“Before the war, prices were reasonable for everyone,” said Rawan Shalouf, an employee at a bridal shop.

“But now, given the circumstances we’re in, the price of a dress is ridiculous.”

Across Gaza, brides and families are struggling to afford even basic wedding needs. Shahed Fayez, 21, is due to marry in about four days but has been searching in vain for a dress.

“I don’t care about its style, what’s important is that it's new,” she added.

“The cheapest dress is $1,000 or more, that's the minimum, and all we have is less than $200. The entire dowry does not cover the price of a dress.”