Iran is confronting one of the most consequential junctures since the founding of the republic in 1979. The pressures bearing down on the system are no longer confined to economic sanctions or familiar forms of external coercion, but now cut to the heart of the governing formula itself: how to ensure the regime’s survival without accelerating the very forces that threaten to undermine it.
At the center of this moment lies a stark existential dilemma. A permissive response to internal unrest risks allowing protests to spread and harden into a protracted campaign of political attrition, while a sweeping security crackdown would heighten external dangers, at a time of mounting international hostility and unprecedented US warnings.
Caught between these two paths, Tehran finds its room for maneuver shrinking to levels it has rarely faced before.
Passing protests or structural shift?
The evolution of the current protests raises a central question about their nature: are they a containable social wave, or a deeper expression of a shift in public mood? The spread of demonstrations to small and medium-sized cities, and the widening of their social base, reflect an advanced level of discontent, even if it has not yet reached the threshold of a comprehensive explosion.
Farzin Nadimi, a senior Iran analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, argues that this wave differs from previous ones.
He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the latest protests, unlike earlier waves led by university students or low-income workers in major cities, are now driven by young people in smaller towns and supported by university students nationwide.
He described them as “more entrenched and widespread,” though not yet as large as some previous protests, noting the absence of government employees and oil workers, alongside a strong female presence once again.
This assessment aligns with the reading of Michael Rubin, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, who pointed to three key differences defining this wave: the nature of the participating forces, the symbolism of its launch from Tehran’s bazaar, and the impact of Israeli strikes that have punctured the aura surrounding Iran.
By contrast, Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, cautions against overestimating the street’s ability to bring about rapid change, noting that the Iranian system is highly organized and does not hesitate to use violence to control society.
‘Political fuel’
Iran’s economic crisis is no longer a technical issue that can be separated from politics. The collapse of the currency, the erosion of purchasing power, and declining trust in institutions have turned the economy into a direct driver of protest.
With each new round of pressure or sanctions, the sense deepens that the system is incapable of delivering real solutions without making political concessions.
Alex Vatanka, a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, argues that what is unfolding goes beyond anger over prices or living conditions.
He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the protests reflect a deeper shift in public opinion, in which opposition is no longer directed at specific policies but at the model of governance itself. This shift, he said, confronts the system with a difficult question: can the economy be saved without rethinking the structure of power?
The security establishment: cohesion or fatigue?
Security institutions, from the Revolutionary Guards and their Basij mobilization arm to the intelligence services, form the backbone of the system’s ability to endure. Historically, these institutions have been the primary guarantor of internal stability, but mounting pressures now raise questions about their moral and ideological cohesion.
Rubin said that cracks are widening, pointing to rumors that Tehran has turned to deploying forces from Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces and Afghanistan’s Fatemiyoun Brigade due to declining confidence in some Revolutionary Guard units’ willingness to carry out orders.
Vatanka, for his part, acknowledged that these institutions remain cohesive for now, but warned that this cohesion is under growing strain from economic and social exhaustion, which over time could erode morale and produce partial fractures, even if open defections remain unlikely in the foreseeable future.
From deterrence to breaking taboos
If internal challenges are pressing on the structure of power, the external environment multiplies the risks. US-Israeli escalation, coupled with the waning weight of regional allies, places Iran before a radically different strategic landscape.
Threats by US President Donald Trump to support Iranian protesters signal a qualitative shift in US rhetoric, in which the focus is no longer confined to the nuclear program, but now includes Iran’s internal dynamics as part of the pressure equation.
Nadimi said that the developments in Venezuela and the arrest of Nicolas Maduro as carrying troubling implications for Tehran, while stressing the differences between the two cases, arguing that Iran is larger and more complex, and that Washington does not believe its system can be easily overthrown without a clear internal alternative.
Vatanka, however, sees a significant psychological impact from that precedent, saying it has weakened the assumption that leaders are immune from personal targeting.
The regional network: asset or burden?
Israeli strikes in June that targeted military leaders and sovereign symbols inside Iran reflect a shift in Israel’s security doctrine, from containment to direct confrontation.
O’Hanlon said that this pattern, following events in Venezuela and attacks on figures linked to Iran’s nuclear program, has become more likely under Trump, reflecting a willingness to break taboos that once held.
At the same time, questions are resurfacing over the effectiveness of Iran’s regional network. According to Vatanka, these arms are no longer a real deterrent, but have become, given their rising costs, a strategic burden.
Rubin agreed, adding that they have drained the state treasury, although he does not rule out the system turning to them if the crisis intensifies on the domestic front.
Amid this complex entanglement between internal and external pressures, the Iranian system’s options are narrowing as never before.
Between those who see this weakness as an opportunity to rebalance the region and those who fear widespread chaos, the core question remains: Is Tehran facing a manageable crisis of governance or an existential crisis that could shape Iran and the region for decades to come?
