Victory and Defeat Scenarios for Iran’s Proxies in Lebanon and Iraq

An Israeli artillery unit fires towards Lebanon, amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, as the US-Israeli conflict with Iran continues, in northern Israel, March 28, 2026. (Reuters)
An Israeli artillery unit fires towards Lebanon, amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, as the US-Israeli conflict with Iran continues, in northern Israel, March 28, 2026. (Reuters)
TT

Victory and Defeat Scenarios for Iran’s Proxies in Lebanon and Iraq

An Israeli artillery unit fires towards Lebanon, amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, as the US-Israeli conflict with Iran continues, in northern Israel, March 28, 2026. (Reuters)
An Israeli artillery unit fires towards Lebanon, amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, as the US-Israeli conflict with Iran continues, in northern Israel, March 28, 2026. (Reuters)

The future of Iran’s regional allies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and armed factions in Iraq, is increasingly uncertain as a widening conflict reshapes the Middle East and tests the limits of Tehran’s long-standing proxy strategy.

Lebanese politician Michel Chiha once outlined a vision of Lebanon as a country open to the world through its coastline, protected internally by its mountainous terrain. He advocated a liberal, service-based economy rather than heavy industry, while emphasizing that Israel represented the primary external threat.

His assessment was largely accurate, but incomplete. Chiha did not fully account for the broader geopolitical system that governs Lebanon, one influenced by global and regional powers.

Lebanon has historically been vulnerable to shifts between these two levels. When global and regional dynamics align, the country experiences relative stability. When they clash, Lebanon often pays a heavy price, including political paralysis, internal unrest, and even civil war. If such conflicts persist without resolution, international powers tend to intervene, often delegating regional actors to impose a settlement.

This pattern has repeated itself at key moments in Lebanon’s modern history: the 1958 crisis at the end of President Camille Chamoun’s term; the outbreak of civil war in 1975; Syria’s 1990 intervention that ended General Michel Aoun’s military government; the 2008 Doha Agreement following Hezbollah’s takeover of Beirut; and more recently, political shifts culminating in the election of President Joseph Aoun after the failure of Hezbollah’s “support war” to meaningfully assist Gaza.

Iran in the region

Iran’s confrontation with the US-led global order dates back to the 1979 revolution. However, the strategic environment changed dramatically after the September 11, 2001, attacks and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime reshaped the regional balance of power. For the first time, US forces were positioned directly on Iran’s borders, in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Tehran responded by expanding its influence through a network of allied groups across the region.

This strategy centered on the development of proxies, linked geographically through what became known as the “Axis of Resistance” and the concept of “unity of arenas.” These networks extended across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, allowing Iran to project influence across land, sea and air.

The so-called “Arab Spring” represented both an opportunity and a setback for Iran. On one hand, it enabled Tehran to expand its presence by filling political and security vacuums. On the other, it exposed its intentions, particularly as it mobilized allied groups to support friendly regimes.

Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria marked a turning point. The group became deeply involved in a prolonged and complex conflict, exposing vulnerabilities at multiple levels — security, military and ideological. These weaknesses became evident during subsequent confrontations with Israel, particularly during the Gaza war, when Israel penetrated Hezbollah’s structure and targeted senior leaders.

An Israeli Air Force F-16 fighter aircraft flies over Marjeyoun in southern Lebanon on March 28, 2026. (AFP)

Iraq enters the picture

Iraq occupies a central place in Iran’s geopolitical thinking. Historically, it has been viewed as a major source of threat to Iranian national security, from ancient times through to the modern era under Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War.

After 2001, Iran found itself effectively encircled by US forces. The emergence of the ISIS group in 2014, which seized large areas of Iraqi territory, further underscored Iraq’s strategic importance. For Tehran, maintaining influence in Iraq is essential to ensuring internal stability and national security. Control or strong influence over Iraq provides strategic depth and helps prevent potential threats from emerging on its western border.

Following the 2003 invasion, Iran’s regional strategy became more clearly defined: Iraq as the base, Syria as the corridor, and Lebanon — through Hezbollah — as the strategic endpoint or “crown jewel.”

October 7

The October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas on Israel is widely viewed as a “black swan” event, one that disrupts the foundations of the existing order without immediately creating a new equilibrium.

The attack triggered a chain reaction across the region. It exposed the limitations of Iran’s proxy-based strategy and highlighted what is known in political theory as the “principal-agent problem.” In this dynamic, the patron state - Iran - pursues broader strategic goals, while proxies focus on local or ideological objectives.

This misalignment creates inherent risks. When proxies succeed, both sides benefit. When they fail, the proxies bear the immediate consequences.

In the case of October 7, Iran was drawn into a conflict it neither fully anticipated nor sought to escalate. It encouraged Hezbollah to intervene under the banner of a “support war” for Gaza. The result was a cascading deterioration, with both Hamas and Hezbollah suffering significant losses.

The concept of “unity of arenas” began to unravel as the conflict expanded. By 2025, the situation escalated further when Israel and the United States launched a coordinated military campaign against Iran in June, lasting 12 days.

The campaign included strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities using advanced bunker-busting munitions carried by US B-2 bombers. It also reflected an unprecedented level of coordination between Washington and Tel Aviv, not only in execution but also in planning and target allocation.

Another defining feature of the conflict has been its reliance on remote warfare. Iran has used missiles and drones to strike Israel and regional targets, while Israel, backed by US capabilities, has relied on air power and technological superiority, including the use of artificial intelligence in target selection and strike coordination.

Lebanon and Iraq in the crossfire

The regional conflict has drawn in multiple actors, though with varying levels of involvement. Yemen’s Houthi militants have played a more limited and delayed role, likely reflecting logistical constraints and strategic calculations.

In contrast, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran-aligned factions within Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces have been more actively engaged.

In Lebanon, Iran has sought to rebuild Hezbollah following its setbacks in 2024. Reports suggest the group has been retrained in a decentralized form of warfare known as “mosaic warfare,” which emphasizes dispersion, flexibility and the avoidance of large-scale confrontations. This approach relies on a combination of rockets, anti-tank weapons and drones, effectively returning Hezbollah to tactics used prior to Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.

In Iraq, the situation differs. Armed factions have conducted attacks against US interests but have also targeted Iraqi state institutions, including intelligence facilities and radar systems. This dual targeting reflects internal divisions and raises concerns about the erosion of state authority.

A woman sits in a cemetery before the funeral of Lebanese journalists, Al Manar reporter Ali Shaib, Al Mayadeen reporter Fatima Ftouni and cameraman Mohammed Ftouni, who were killed by a targeted Israeli strike, amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, as the US-Israeli conflict with Iran continues, in Choueifat, Lebanon, March 29, 2026. (Reuters)

Lebanon and Iraq’s challenges

Lebanon and Iraq share similarities as internationally recognized sovereign states, yet both face significant challenges in exercising full control over their territories.

In Iraq, militias within the PMF are formally integrated into the state’s security structure. However, some operate according to independent agendas that do not always align with national interests.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah operates as both a military force confronting Israel and a powerful domestic actor. It has often challenged state authority and pursued policies that diverge from official government positions.

The impact of the conflict has been more severe in Lebanon. The country has experienced displacement, particularly in the south and in parts of Beirut, as well as widespread destruction in Hezbollah strongholds. Israeli forces have also established a presence in southern territories they had not previously occupied.

In contrast, Iraq has not faced large-scale displacement or foreign occupation during this phase of the conflict. However, internal instability remains a concern, particularly as tensions between different political and ethnic groups persist.

Strategically, Iraq continues to serve as a cornerstone of Iran’s regional system. Lebanon, by contrast, has become more isolated, especially following the disruption of supply routes to Hezbollah through Syria.

War outcome

Several scenarios could shape the outcome of the conflict, each with significant implications for Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and Iraq.

Diplomatic solution:

At present, this scenario appears unlikely. The United States is demanding concessions that Iran had previously rejected, while Tehran is putting forward conditions that are seen as difficult to meet. Among these are demands related to control over key maritime routes and broader regional security arrangements.

Iran has also linked any potential ceasefire to developments on the Lebanese front, suggesting an effort to maintain influence there. A diplomatic resolution would raise critical questions about Hezbollah’s future, including the status of its weapons, its fighters and its role within Lebanon’s political system.

Current situation persists:

A prolonged war of attrition is seen as a scenario that could work in Iran’s favor. Time and economic resources, particularly oil revenues, could allow Tehran to sustain the conflict while gradually wearing down its adversaries.

However, this scenario carries significant risks. It could lead to deeper instability across the region, particularly in Gulf states, while exacerbating internal tensions in Iraq. In Lebanon, continued conflict could further weaken state institutions and increase the risk of internal unrest.

War scenario:

A broader military escalation remains a possibility. Reports indicate that the United States has considered expanded operations involving ground, naval and air forces.

Potential targets could include Iran’s strategic oil export facilities, such as Kharg Island, as well as key islands controlling access to the Strait of Hormuz. More complex operations, such as seizing enriched uranium, are considered less likely due to the challenges involved.

For Washington, any such operation would need to achieve a clear outcome. Failure could have significant consequences for the United States and its allies.

If a military campaign were to succeed, Lebanon would face major challenges, including addressing Hezbollah’s future and managing relations with Israel. Iraq, on the other hand, could see an opportunity to strengthen state authority and consolidate internal stability.

If it were to fail, the broader regional situation would likely remain unstable, with limited immediate impact on Iraq but continued uncertainty for Lebanon.



When Does Peace Become the Rule Rather than the Exception?

The United Nations needs structural reform (Photo by Reuters)
The United Nations needs structural reform (Photo by Reuters)
TT

When Does Peace Become the Rule Rather than the Exception?

The United Nations needs structural reform (Photo by Reuters)
The United Nations needs structural reform (Photo by Reuters)

It has become common among analysts to say that the world has entered a new global order, where the logic of “might makes right” has replaced the “power of right,” and the old rules-based international system has faded. International relations are increasingly managed through power and influence rather than consensus and multilateralism. This emerging order is shaped by empires of varying scale seeking to expand spheres of influence and sources of wealth through force, rather than relying on international agreements that place large and small states on equal footing.

 

It is widely understood that the primary goal of any cooperative global order is the pursuit of sustainable peace. In that regard, the Dutch philosopher of Portuguese origin Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) described peace as “not merely the absence of war but a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice.” Albert Einstein (1879–1955) stressed that “peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding.” Since antiquity, Plato viewed the establishment of peace and friendship as the highest duty of both citizen and lawgiver, while Aristotle held that victory in war is not enough, and that the real objective is to secure peace. Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) asserted that peace does not arise from armed conflict, but from justice upheld even in the face of challenges.

 

Peace as the exception

 

Against these perspectives, historical experience shows that peace has been the exception rather than the rule. Over roughly 3,500 to 5,000 years of recorded human history, the world has seen only about 230 to 268 years entirely free of major wars, less than 10 percent of its history. This indicates that conflict has been the dominant feature of human relations, both at the individual and collective levels.

 

A distinction must be made between the “international system” and the “global order.” The international system describes how the world functions in terms of actors, power, motives, and constraints. The global order, by contrast, is a political, institutional, and cultural structure formed through negotiation, cooperation, or even coercion, as occurred after the First and Second World Wars, each of which ended with victors and defeated parties. The global order is not fixed; it is the result of deliberate choices by active powers to organize and manage the world.

 

It is fair to say that the global order that emerged after the Second World War achieved notable successes. The likelihood of large-scale global wars declined, traditional empires with vast geographic reach came to an end, and levels of welfare and prosperity rose to unprecedented levels. The foundations of national sovereignty were also reinforced for many states, based on the principles associated with the Peace of Westphalia. However, this order no longer meets the demands of the profound transformations underway today. This helps explain the growing sense of crisis, the widespread global unease, and serious concern about the outbreak of a third world war carrying the risks of nuclear catastrophe.

 

Shifts and alternative models

 

In recent decades, influence across the globe has been redistributed, with the rise of new powers challenging Western dominance built on material wealth and scientific and technological advancement. Countries within the BRICS group, for example, are playing an increasingly influential economic and political role. This shift goes beyond the transfer of power; it also involves deep intellectual and cultural changes, as non-Western states seek to assert their identities and present alternative models of governance and development.

 

This phase, sometimes described as “post-Western,” presents major existential challenges for both the West and its competitors. It requires broader international cooperation, especially in addressing cross-border issues such as climate change, cybersecurity, migration, organized crime, and terrorism. Yet these shifts are not without tension. Rising powers are seeking to advance their interests, leading to friction with established powers, particularly in trade relations and sometimes in direct confrontations, complicating efforts to build a stable global balance.

 

The rise of nationalist and populist trends adds another layer of instability. These movements, by their nature, tend to question and undermine international cooperation while prioritizing narrow interests, weakening international institutions and threatening global stability. Regional conflicts and great-power competition, such as tensions between the United States and China, further intensify this fragmentation.

 

Another major challenge lies in balancing universal values with national particularities. International standards cannot be imposed unilaterally without regard for cultural and political diversity. As a result, constructive dialogue and flexible, network-based diplomacy, rather than rigid hierarchical structures, become essential to establishing common ground for building peace.

 

Strait of Hormuz is a theater for major conflict (Photo by Reuters)

 

A test of adaptation and cooperation

 

In sum, the current international system is undergoing a profound transformation shaped by the rise of new powers, the relative decline of Western influence, escalating conflicts, mounting global challenges, and intense competition for economic gains that strengthen position and safeguard sovereignty. The future of this system depends on the ability of international actors to adapt, cooperate, build new partnerships, and embrace multiple perspectives to understand the world’s complexity.

 

In this context, the emergence of alternative narratives should not be viewed as a threat but as an opportunity for a deeper understanding of a multipolar world. The international system now taking shape reflects a significant historical shift in which the West is no longer the sole center of power, but one among several.

 

The path toward a more complex and interconnected global order, where different models of governance coexist, is already taking form. Navigating this new reality requires innovative thinking and openness to change, while preserving the structures and institutions that have proven their value, foremost among them the United Nations, which requires structural reform to prevent decline. Ultimately, building a more just, peaceful, and sustainable world depends on a collective will capable of reconciling difference with cooperation.


The Iran War Has Revealed Trump's Pressure Point: The Economy

President Donald Trump waves to reporters as he walks on the South Lawn upon his arrival to the White House, Friday, April 17, 2026, in Washington. (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana)
President Donald Trump waves to reporters as he walks on the South Lawn upon his arrival to the White House, Friday, April 17, 2026, in Washington. (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana)
TT

The Iran War Has Revealed Trump's Pressure Point: The Economy

President Donald Trump waves to reporters as he walks on the South Lawn upon his arrival to the White House, Friday, April 17, 2026, in Washington. (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana)
President Donald Trump waves to reporters as he walks on the South Lawn upon his arrival to the White House, Friday, April 17, 2026, in Washington. (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana)

Seven weeks of war have failed to topple Iran’s theocratic rulers or force them to meet all of President Donald Trump's demands, but for US adversaries and allies it has cast a spotlight on one of his central vulnerabilities: economic pressure.

Even with Iran’s announcement on Friday that it was reopening the Strait of Hormuz to shipping, the Middle East crisis has revealed the limits of Trump's willingness to tolerate domestic economic pain.

Trump joined Israel in attacking Iran on February 28 based on what he said were imminent security threats, especially over its nuclear program. But now, with US gasoline prices high, inflation rising and his approval ratings down, Trump is racing to secure a diplomatic deal that could stem the fallout at home.

Iran has taken a beating militarily, but demonstrated it can exact economic costs that Trump and his aides underestimated, unleashing the worst-ever global energy shock, analysts say.

RISING ENERGY COSTS, RECESSION RISK

Trump has often publicly shrugged off domestic economic concerns driven by the war. But he can hardly ignore that though the US does not depend on the one-fifth of global oil shipments that were effectively blocked by Iran’s chokehold on the strait, surging energy costs have hit US consumers. The International Monetary Fund’s warning of a risk of global recession adds to the gloom.

Pressure for a way out of the unpopular war has mounted as Trump’s fellow Republicans defend narrow majorities in Congress in the November midterm elections.

None of this has been lost on Iran's leaders, who have used their grip on the strait to push Trump's team to the negotiating table.

Analysts say US rivals China and Russia may draw their own lesson: while Trump has shown an appetite for military force in his second term, he looks for a diplomatic off-ramp as soon as the economic heat becomes uncomfortable at home.

“Trump is feeling the economic pinch, which is his Achilles heel in this war of choice,” said Brett Bruen, a former foreign policy adviser in the Obama administration who heads the Global Situation Room strategic consultancy.

White House spokesman Kush Desai said that while working toward a deal with Iran to resolve "temporary" energy market problems, the administration "has never lost focus on implementing the president’s affordability and growth agenda."

FEELING THE PRESSURE

Trump’s abrupt shift on April 8 from airstrikes to diplomacy followed pressure from financial markets and parts of his base.

Some of the economic pain is borne by US farmers, a key Trump constituency, due to disrupted fertilizer shipments, and is also reflected in higher airfares from increased jet fuel prices.

With the clock ticking on a two-week ceasefire, it remains to be seen whether a president who embraces unpredictability will reach a deal that meets his war goals, extend the truce beyond April 21, or relaunch the bombing campaign.

But global oil prices fell sharply and financial markets, which Trump often sees as a barometer of his success, flourished on Friday after Iran said the strait would be open for the remainder of a separate US-brokered 10-day truce between Israel and Lebanon.

Trump was quick to declare the strait safe as he touted a deal-in-the-making with Iran that he said would be completed soon and mostly on his terms. But Iranian sources told Reuters gaps remained to be resolved. Experts have warned that even if the war ends soon, the economic damage could take months if not years to fix. A key question is whether any deal achieves the objectives Trump has laid out, including closing Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon, which Tehran has long denied it is seeking.

Iran has a stockpile of highly enriched uranium believed buried by US-Israeli strikes in June. Trump told Reuters on Friday the emerging deal calls for the US to work with Iran to recover the material and bring it to the US. Iran denied agreeing to a transfer anywhere outside its territory.

A senior Trump administration official said the US was maintaining "several redlines" in negotiations with Iran. At the same time, Trump’s call at the war’s outset for Iranians to overthrow their government has gone unheeded. Allies from Europe to Asia were initially stunned by Trump’s decision to go to war without consulting them or seeming to take into account the risk to them of Iran closing the strait.

“The alarm bell ringing for allies right now is how the war has highlighted that the administration can act erratically, without much regard for consequences,” said Gregory Poling, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, former Democratic President Joe Biden was cautious about imposing sanctions on Moscow’s energy sector out of concern for reducing oil supplies and inflating US gas prices.

But Trump, who ran for a second term on promises of cheap gas and low inflation, has shown himself sensitive to accusations that his policies raise prices. An example was when he reduced tariffs on China last year after it retaliated.

A motorist fills up his truck for over a $100 at a gas station in Los Angeles on Friday, April 17, 2026. (AP Photo/Damian Dovarganes)

MISCALCULATIONS

Just as Trump misjudged Beijing’s response in a trade war, he seems to have miscalculated how Iran might strike back economically in a shooting war by attacking energy infrastructure in Gulf states and blocking the strategic waterway between them.

Trump mistakenly believed the war would be a limited operation like the January 3 lightning raid in Venezuela and June’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, US officials have said privately. But this time the repercussions are more far-reaching.

The message to Asian allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan may be that Trump, who is looking for warmer ties with China, can be expected to pursue his regional goals with less regard for their geopolitical and economic security.

Analysts believe those governments will adjust for any contingency, such as a Chinese bid to seize Taiwan, out of concern over Trump’s reliability.


In Final Moments Before Truce, Israeli Strike Kills Lebanese Man’s Family

 A woman reacts as emergency personnel search for survivors at the site of an Israeli strike carried out just before a 10-day ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, in Tyre, Lebanon, April 17, 2026. (Reuters)
A woman reacts as emergency personnel search for survivors at the site of an Israeli strike carried out just before a 10-day ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, in Tyre, Lebanon, April 17, 2026. (Reuters)
TT

In Final Moments Before Truce, Israeli Strike Kills Lebanese Man’s Family

 A woman reacts as emergency personnel search for survivors at the site of an Israeli strike carried out just before a 10-day ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, in Tyre, Lebanon, April 17, 2026. (Reuters)
A woman reacts as emergency personnel search for survivors at the site of an Israeli strike carried out just before a 10-day ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, in Tyre, Lebanon, April 17, 2026. (Reuters)

Hassan Abu Khalil's family miraculously survived six weeks of war in southern Lebanon, but tragedy struck in the final minutes before a ceasefire came into force. An Israeli strike late on Thursday killed 13 of his relatives, leaving him the sole survivor.

Abu Khalil, 36, stepped out to see friends just before midnight, when a US-brokered truce between Lebanon and Israel was meant to halt fighting that had raged since March 2 between Israel and armed group Hezbollah.

“I heard a very powerful strike, and when I came ‌back to the neighborhood, ‌I found this had happened," Abu Khalil told Reuters on ‌Friday ⁠as he watched ⁠a bulldozer dig through the mountains of pulverized concrete that was once his home in the southern Lebanese port city of Tyre.

"In this building, more than 13 members of my family are missing under the rubble. What then, Israel? Just before the ceasefire, it was one massacre after another against us," he said.

Later on Friday, Lebanon's state news agency said rescue teams had recovered 13 bodies and pulled 35 wounded survivors from the ruins ⁠of the building that was hit the previous evening. It ‌reported that 15 other people were unaccounted for.

The ‌Israeli military did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the strike.

Lebanon's health ministry ‌says 2,294 people have been killed between March 2 and Thursday, when the ‌ceasefire came into force. The toll includes 177 children and 274 women.

'MY FUTURE IS GONE'

On Friday, thousands of Lebanese streamed through Tyre on the way to their southern villages. They crossed over a dirt berm that Lebanese soldiers had erected over the ruins of a main bridge ‌destroyed by Israel earlier on Thursday. Many were relieved to return to their southern villages, even if they were destroyed.

But ⁠Abu Khalil spent ⁠the first day of the ceasefire in a haze of despair, unable to eat or sleep.

He stood wringing his hands next to a bulldozer working through the ruins, his eyes locked on the gaping hole that rescuers were searching.

"Since the strike, I've been here and haven't gone anywhere. Every time they pull someone out, we run over to see what happened, who it is - my friend I grew up with, my friend's mother, my friend's father," Abu Khalil said.

He said he had been living in the United Kingdom but returned to Lebanon to be with his extended family.

"Who is left? No one is left. I wish I had never gone out for that coffee and had stayed with them," he said.

“My future is gone here. This was my life, this was my family - what now? What more is there after this?"