Victory and Defeat Scenarios for Iran’s Proxies in Lebanon and Iraq

An Israeli artillery unit fires towards Lebanon, amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, as the US-Israeli conflict with Iran continues, in northern Israel, March 28, 2026. (Reuters)
An Israeli artillery unit fires towards Lebanon, amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, as the US-Israeli conflict with Iran continues, in northern Israel, March 28, 2026. (Reuters)
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Victory and Defeat Scenarios for Iran’s Proxies in Lebanon and Iraq

An Israeli artillery unit fires towards Lebanon, amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, as the US-Israeli conflict with Iran continues, in northern Israel, March 28, 2026. (Reuters)
An Israeli artillery unit fires towards Lebanon, amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, as the US-Israeli conflict with Iran continues, in northern Israel, March 28, 2026. (Reuters)

The future of Iran’s regional allies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and armed factions in Iraq, is increasingly uncertain as a widening conflict reshapes the Middle East and tests the limits of Tehran’s long-standing proxy strategy.

Lebanese politician Michel Chiha once outlined a vision of Lebanon as a country open to the world through its coastline, protected internally by its mountainous terrain. He advocated a liberal, service-based economy rather than heavy industry, while emphasizing that Israel represented the primary external threat.

His assessment was largely accurate, but incomplete. Chiha did not fully account for the broader geopolitical system that governs Lebanon, one influenced by global and regional powers.

Lebanon has historically been vulnerable to shifts between these two levels. When global and regional dynamics align, the country experiences relative stability. When they clash, Lebanon often pays a heavy price, including political paralysis, internal unrest, and even civil war. If such conflicts persist without resolution, international powers tend to intervene, often delegating regional actors to impose a settlement.

This pattern has repeated itself at key moments in Lebanon’s modern history: the 1958 crisis at the end of President Camille Chamoun’s term; the outbreak of civil war in 1975; Syria’s 1990 intervention that ended General Michel Aoun’s military government; the 2008 Doha Agreement following Hezbollah’s takeover of Beirut; and more recently, political shifts culminating in the election of President Joseph Aoun after the failure of Hezbollah’s “support war” to meaningfully assist Gaza.

Iran in the region

Iran’s confrontation with the US-led global order dates back to the 1979 revolution. However, the strategic environment changed dramatically after the September 11, 2001, attacks and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime reshaped the regional balance of power. For the first time, US forces were positioned directly on Iran’s borders, in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Tehran responded by expanding its influence through a network of allied groups across the region.

This strategy centered on the development of proxies, linked geographically through what became known as the “Axis of Resistance” and the concept of “unity of arenas.” These networks extended across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, allowing Iran to project influence across land, sea and air.

The so-called “Arab Spring” represented both an opportunity and a setback for Iran. On one hand, it enabled Tehran to expand its presence by filling political and security vacuums. On the other, it exposed its intentions, particularly as it mobilized allied groups to support friendly regimes.

Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria marked a turning point. The group became deeply involved in a prolonged and complex conflict, exposing vulnerabilities at multiple levels — security, military and ideological. These weaknesses became evident during subsequent confrontations with Israel, particularly during the Gaza war, when Israel penetrated Hezbollah’s structure and targeted senior leaders.

An Israeli Air Force F-16 fighter aircraft flies over Marjeyoun in southern Lebanon on March 28, 2026. (AFP)

Iraq enters the picture

Iraq occupies a central place in Iran’s geopolitical thinking. Historically, it has been viewed as a major source of threat to Iranian national security, from ancient times through to the modern era under Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War.

After 2001, Iran found itself effectively encircled by US forces. The emergence of the ISIS group in 2014, which seized large areas of Iraqi territory, further underscored Iraq’s strategic importance. For Tehran, maintaining influence in Iraq is essential to ensuring internal stability and national security. Control or strong influence over Iraq provides strategic depth and helps prevent potential threats from emerging on its western border.

Following the 2003 invasion, Iran’s regional strategy became more clearly defined: Iraq as the base, Syria as the corridor, and Lebanon — through Hezbollah — as the strategic endpoint or “crown jewel.”

October 7

The October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas on Israel is widely viewed as a “black swan” event, one that disrupts the foundations of the existing order without immediately creating a new equilibrium.

The attack triggered a chain reaction across the region. It exposed the limitations of Iran’s proxy-based strategy and highlighted what is known in political theory as the “principal-agent problem.” In this dynamic, the patron state - Iran - pursues broader strategic goals, while proxies focus on local or ideological objectives.

This misalignment creates inherent risks. When proxies succeed, both sides benefit. When they fail, the proxies bear the immediate consequences.

In the case of October 7, Iran was drawn into a conflict it neither fully anticipated nor sought to escalate. It encouraged Hezbollah to intervene under the banner of a “support war” for Gaza. The result was a cascading deterioration, with both Hamas and Hezbollah suffering significant losses.

The concept of “unity of arenas” began to unravel as the conflict expanded. By 2025, the situation escalated further when Israel and the United States launched a coordinated military campaign against Iran in June, lasting 12 days.

The campaign included strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities using advanced bunker-busting munitions carried by US B-2 bombers. It also reflected an unprecedented level of coordination between Washington and Tel Aviv, not only in execution but also in planning and target allocation.

Another defining feature of the conflict has been its reliance on remote warfare. Iran has used missiles and drones to strike Israel and regional targets, while Israel, backed by US capabilities, has relied on air power and technological superiority, including the use of artificial intelligence in target selection and strike coordination.

Lebanon and Iraq in the crossfire

The regional conflict has drawn in multiple actors, though with varying levels of involvement. Yemen’s Houthi militants have played a more limited and delayed role, likely reflecting logistical constraints and strategic calculations.

In contrast, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran-aligned factions within Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces have been more actively engaged.

In Lebanon, Iran has sought to rebuild Hezbollah following its setbacks in 2024. Reports suggest the group has been retrained in a decentralized form of warfare known as “mosaic warfare,” which emphasizes dispersion, flexibility and the avoidance of large-scale confrontations. This approach relies on a combination of rockets, anti-tank weapons and drones, effectively returning Hezbollah to tactics used prior to Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.

In Iraq, the situation differs. Armed factions have conducted attacks against US interests but have also targeted Iraqi state institutions, including intelligence facilities and radar systems. This dual targeting reflects internal divisions and raises concerns about the erosion of state authority.

A woman sits in a cemetery before the funeral of Lebanese journalists, Al Manar reporter Ali Shaib, Al Mayadeen reporter Fatima Ftouni and cameraman Mohammed Ftouni, who were killed by a targeted Israeli strike, amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, as the US-Israeli conflict with Iran continues, in Choueifat, Lebanon, March 29, 2026. (Reuters)

Lebanon and Iraq’s challenges

Lebanon and Iraq share similarities as internationally recognized sovereign states, yet both face significant challenges in exercising full control over their territories.

In Iraq, militias within the PMF are formally integrated into the state’s security structure. However, some operate according to independent agendas that do not always align with national interests.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah operates as both a military force confronting Israel and a powerful domestic actor. It has often challenged state authority and pursued policies that diverge from official government positions.

The impact of the conflict has been more severe in Lebanon. The country has experienced displacement, particularly in the south and in parts of Beirut, as well as widespread destruction in Hezbollah strongholds. Israeli forces have also established a presence in southern territories they had not previously occupied.

In contrast, Iraq has not faced large-scale displacement or foreign occupation during this phase of the conflict. However, internal instability remains a concern, particularly as tensions between different political and ethnic groups persist.

Strategically, Iraq continues to serve as a cornerstone of Iran’s regional system. Lebanon, by contrast, has become more isolated, especially following the disruption of supply routes to Hezbollah through Syria.

War outcome

Several scenarios could shape the outcome of the conflict, each with significant implications for Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and Iraq.

Diplomatic solution:

At present, this scenario appears unlikely. The United States is demanding concessions that Iran had previously rejected, while Tehran is putting forward conditions that are seen as difficult to meet. Among these are demands related to control over key maritime routes and broader regional security arrangements.

Iran has also linked any potential ceasefire to developments on the Lebanese front, suggesting an effort to maintain influence there. A diplomatic resolution would raise critical questions about Hezbollah’s future, including the status of its weapons, its fighters and its role within Lebanon’s political system.

Current situation persists:

A prolonged war of attrition is seen as a scenario that could work in Iran’s favor. Time and economic resources, particularly oil revenues, could allow Tehran to sustain the conflict while gradually wearing down its adversaries.

However, this scenario carries significant risks. It could lead to deeper instability across the region, particularly in Gulf states, while exacerbating internal tensions in Iraq. In Lebanon, continued conflict could further weaken state institutions and increase the risk of internal unrest.

War scenario:

A broader military escalation remains a possibility. Reports indicate that the United States has considered expanded operations involving ground, naval and air forces.

Potential targets could include Iran’s strategic oil export facilities, such as Kharg Island, as well as key islands controlling access to the Strait of Hormuz. More complex operations, such as seizing enriched uranium, are considered less likely due to the challenges involved.

For Washington, any such operation would need to achieve a clear outcome. Failure could have significant consequences for the United States and its allies.

If a military campaign were to succeed, Lebanon would face major challenges, including addressing Hezbollah’s future and managing relations with Israel. Iraq, on the other hand, could see an opportunity to strengthen state authority and consolidate internal stability.

If it were to fail, the broader regional situation would likely remain unstable, with limited immediate impact on Iraq but continued uncertainty for Lebanon.



Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
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Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights

China has increased purchases of Russian oil and gas since ‌the start of the conflict with Ukraine in 2022, with Moscow and Beijing declaring a "no limits" partnership just days before the war began. The energy relationship between the two countries is expected to be an important topic when presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping meet in Beijing on Wednesday.

Here are some facts about the energy ties between the two countries:

GAS

Russia's energy giant Gazprom supplies natural gas to China through a 3,000-km (1,865 mile) pipeline called Power of Siberia under a 30-year, $400 billion deal launched at the end of 2019.

In 2025, exports jumped by around a quarter to 38.8 billion cubic meters (bcm), exceeding the pipeline's planned annual capacity of 38 bcm.

During Putin's visit to China in September, the countries agreed to increase annual volumes on the route by an additional 6 bcm, to 44 bcm, a year. In February 2022, China also agreed to buy up to 10 bcm of gas annually ‌by 2027 via ‌a pipeline from Sakhalin Island in Russia's Far East. The countries later ‌agreed ⁠to raise the ⁠volumes to 12 bcm.

Russia's gas exports to China are still a small fraction of the record 177 bcm it delivered to Europe in 2018-19 annually.

Russia's share in European Union gas imports has shrunk during the Ukraine war, particularly in pipeline flows. Russia remained the EU's second-largest liquefied natural gas supplier last year with a 16% share but the gap with the EU's main LNG partner, the United States, widened considerably. Russia and China are still in talks about a new Power of Siberia 2 pipeline capable of delivering 50 bcm of gas per year ⁠from Russia to China via Mongolia.

Gazprom began a feasibility study for the ‌pipeline in 2020, but the project has gained urgency as Russia ‌turns to China to replace Europe as its major gas customer. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said in September that the ‌countries signed a "legally binding memorandum" on the pipeline, but a firm contract is still elusive.

Russia's liquefied natural ‌gas exports to China rose last year by 18.2% to 9.79 million metric tons, according to China's customs data, cited by TASS news agency.

Russia was, after Australia and Qatar, the third-largest supplier of LNG to China, which is the world's largest buyer of seaborne gas.

OIL China is Moscow's top client for oil shipments via the sea and pipelines. Exports have been ‌high amid Western sanctions on Russia over the war in Ukraine. China's imports from Russia were at 2.01 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2025 (or 100.72 ⁠million metric tons in ⁠total), a decline of 7.1%, according to China's General Administration of Customs. That represented 20% of China's total imported oil by volume.

Yury Ushakov, Putin's foreign policy aide, said Russian oil exports to China grew by 35% in the first quarter of 2026 to 31 million tons.

China, which is the world's top oil importer, primarily buys Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) crude exported via the Skovorodino-Mohe spur of the 4,070-km (2,540-mile) ESPO pipeline, which connects Russian oil fields to refineries in China and from the Russian Far East port of Kozmino. Russia's oil pipeline operator Transneft has said it was expanding the ESPO pipeline to increase exports via Kozmino, seeking to complete the expansion work in 2029. China also imports oil from the Pacific island of Sakhalin, taking Sakhalin Blend and Sokol oil grades. The availability of ESPO Blend oil has remained high since July 2025, when exports had been expanded to 1 million barrels per day. Transneft has kept exports via Kozmino at around this level.

Russia has also agreed to raise its oil exports to China via Kazakhstan through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline by 2.5 million tons per year to 12.5 million tons.


Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
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Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)

Multiple Hamas sources in the Gaza Strip revealed that the movement’s armed wing, the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, is now led by Mohammed Awda, succeeding Ezzedine al-Haddad, who was killed by Israel last Friday after decades of pursuit.

Three Hamas sources in Gaza told Asharq Al-Awsat that Awda had effectively been selected to command the Qassam.

He was close to al-Haddad and remained in regular contact with him, particularly over plans to “rebuild the organizational structure” after the killings of former Qassam commanders Mohammed Deif and Mohammed Sinwar, they added.

Since the Oct. 7, 2023 attack, Israel has eliminated a series of Qassam commanders and key figures involved in planning and directing Hamas’s attack on Israeli communities near Gaza during nearly two years of war in the enclave.

One source said Awda, who headed military intelligence within the Qassam at the time of the Oct. 7 attack, had been offered leadership of the armed wing after the killing of Mohammed Sinwar in May 2025, but declined, leading the role to pass to al-Haddad.

The two other sources said they could not independently verify that account.

Awda appears to face no serious rival for the position as he remains one of the core members of the movement’s military council. The only other surviving member of the original council is home front commander Imad Aqel, whom Hamas sources said did not play a direct role in planning or supervising the Oct. 7 operation, unlike “other commanders who were not informed of the full details or even the zero hour.”

Military intelligence role

Awda previously oversaw military intelligence operations in Gaza, including gathering information on Israeli military positions around the enclave.

Sources said he also supervised the exploitation of surveillance equipment uncovered after an Israeli undercover unit infiltrated Gaza and remained there for an extended period before being exposed in November 2018. Hamas officials at the time described the information recovered from the devices as an “intelligence treasure.”

The military intelligence branch under Awda concentrated heavily on identifying vulnerabilities in the Israeli army’s Gaza Division.

According to the sources, Awda later assumed responsibility for the northern sector after al-Haddad became commander of the Qassam Brigades. In that role, he coordinated with newly appointed commanders in Gaza City and northern Gaza while continuing to oversee intelligence operations.

Early Hamas ties

Sources said Awda’s relationship with Hamas dates back to the first Palestinian intifada, which erupted in 1987. He also spent time in the “Majd” security apparatus established by slain Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar to pursue Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel.

Believed to be in his late forties or early fifties, Awda ranked among the early members of the Qassam Brigades during the second intifada, which began in late 2000.

He is originally from the Khulafaa al-Rashideen area of Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza.

For years, the area functioned as a military hub for the Qassam Brigades. Mohammed Deif and several senior commanders were based there, and it became an early meeting point between Deif and a generation of future Qassam leaders, including Awda.

Although Awda’s career has been closely associated with intelligence and security operations, he also advanced through field command positions.

He served for several years as commander of the central Jabalia battalion, worked in military manufacturing and later headed the “northern brigade” between 2017 and 2019.

During his tenure as northern brigade commander, Awda hosted Mohammed Sinwar, then responsible for overseeing the Brigades’ military and strategic operations.

Hamas sources credit Awda with playing a major role in transforming the military intelligence branch into one of the most influential divisions in the Qassam.

“Awda has always preferred intelligence work and avoided direct field operations,” one Hamas source said. “He also avoids relying on personal guards or drivers, preferring to move alone because of his strict security precautions.”

Awda has reportedly survived several assassination attempts, both before and during the Gaza war. After the ceasefire of Oct. 10, 2025, his father’s home in Jabalia refugee camp was bombed, killing his eldest son, Amr.


In War‑Scarred Gaza, Brides Turn to Refurbished Wedding Dresses

 Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
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In War‑Scarred Gaza, Brides Turn to Refurbished Wedding Dresses

 Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)

In a small sewing workshop in southern Gaza, Nisreen Al-Rantisi pulls fabric from a pile and reshapes worn wedding dresses, trying to keep a fading tradition alive amid war and soaring costs.

Families said they have been struggling to find new wedding dresses and many search instead for places that refurbish gowns and other kinds of clothes for their children.

Importers cite delays, high shipping costs, and restrictions on materials, such as the crystals encrusted into the elaborate wedding dresses, as key factors behind the shortages ‌and price hikes.

Many workshops ‌have also been damaged during the conflict.

“We try ‌to ⁠reuse the old ⁠gowns that we have, produce them by fixing them a bit, work on them, wash them, arrange them, shape them,” said Rantisi, adding that work initially relied on a bicycle-powered sewing machine due to electricity shortages.

Rantisi said she used to buy the fabric for about 120 to 150 shekels ($41 to $51) before the war, but now pays around 500 shekels ($171).

“This has caused a big rise ⁠in the cost of bridal dresses and children’s gowns. We ‌are living in a vicious circle ‌from the war that affected us,” she added.

COGAT, the Israeli military agency that controls ‌access to Gaza, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Most ‌of Gaza's more than 2 million people have been displaced, many now living in bombed-out homes and makeshift tents pitched on open ground, roadsides, or atop the ruins of destroyed buildings after two years of war with Israel.

HIGH PRICES BEYOND REACH ‌FOR MOST IN GAZA

Despite the hardships, some couples still find ways to celebrate, with mass weddings held in ⁠Gaza offering a ⁠rare moment of joy amid the devastation.

Shop workers say the war has driven prices beyond reach.

“Before the war, prices were reasonable for everyone,” said Rawan Shalouf, an employee at a bridal shop.

“But now, given the circumstances we’re in, the price of a dress is ridiculous.”

Across Gaza, brides and families are struggling to afford even basic wedding needs. Shahed Fayez, 21, is due to marry in about four days but has been searching in vain for a dress.

“I don’t care about its style, what’s important is that it's new,” she added.

“The cheapest dress is $1,000 or more, that's the minimum, and all we have is less than $200. The entire dowry does not cover the price of a dress.”