Arafat and Tehran: From Revolutionary Embrace to Open Hostility

Yasser Arafat during a visit to Tehran on February 17, 1979. He was the first official figure to visit Iran after the "Islamic Revolution" (Getty).
Yasser Arafat during a visit to Tehran on February 17, 1979. He was the first official figure to visit Iran after the "Islamic Revolution" (Getty).
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Arafat and Tehran: From Revolutionary Embrace to Open Hostility

Yasser Arafat during a visit to Tehran on February 17, 1979. He was the first official figure to visit Iran after the "Islamic Revolution" (Getty).
Yasser Arafat during a visit to Tehran on February 17, 1979. He was the first official figure to visit Iran after the "Islamic Revolution" (Getty).

Yasser Arafat was the first foreign leader to visit Iran after Khomeini’s 1979 Iranian Revolution. At the time, he believed the Palestinian cause was gaining a powerful new ally in revolutionary Iran, which immediately closed the Israeli embassy and handed it over to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). But Arafat soon discovered that Tehran’s public support for Palestine was neither unconditional nor straightforward. What began as a honeymoon quickly unraveled into a lasting rupture.88888

Associates of Arafat, who was known for his wit and political sharpness, recalled his surprise when Khomeini insisted on using a Persian translator during their meeting despite speaking fluent Arabic. Arafat was even more unsettled when Khomeini urged him to declare the Palestinian revolution an Islamic one. Those moments deepened Arafat’s suspicions that Iran’s support came with ideological and political conditions attached.

Arafat’s ties with Iranian revolutionaries had predated the revolution, and he responded cautiously. He told Khomeini that the Palestinian struggle was not an Islamic revolution but a national movement representing all Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike. Later, he would joke about the irony of the leader of the Islamic Revolution pretending not to speak Arabic—the language of the Quran—even though the two men had previously spoken in Arabic before the revolution succeeded.

Arafat–Tehran: Open Hostility

Despite his reservations, Arafat initially maintained cordial relations with Tehran. But the relationship collapsed after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. Iranian leaders demanded that Arafat publicly support them against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Instead, Arafat leaned toward Iraq. From that point on, relations spiraled into open confrontation.

 

Iran increasingly sought to weaken Arafat and the PLO by cultivating rival Palestinian factions. Palestinians still remember that Tehran did little to help Arafat during Israel’s siege of Beirut in 1982, while he was simultaneously confronting Syria, then one of Iran’s closest regional allies. Damascus supported and financed a major split within Fatah led by Said Moussa Muragha, better known as Abu Musa, who later founded the breakaway movement Fatah al-Intifada and settled in Syria. Tehran also encouraged divisions within other factions operating under the PLO umbrella.

Palestinians also remember the role played by Lebanese Shiite militias affiliated with the Amal Movement, which had pledged allegiance to Khomeini and later participated in massacres inside Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

From that point onward, relations between Iran and the PLO, and later the Palestinian Authority, remained deeply strained. Mutual accusations continued even after Arafat’s death, eventually evolving into something close to declared hostility.

Between periods of tension and cautious rapprochement, Iran eventually found an opening with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority through its growing ties with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Tehran initially offered the two groups public political support, then financial and military backing, eventually integrating them into a broader regional axis. That axis remained intact until the Hamas-led October 2023 attack on Israel, which triggered devastating consequences not only for Hamas but for Iran’s entire regional network, ultimately reverberating back to Tehran itself.

Supporting Rival Factions to Undermine Fatah

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad established relations with Iran in the late 1980s, shortly after both movements were founded. Those ties deepened throughout the 1990s and intensified during the Second Intifada, which erupted in late 2000. Iranian support expanded further after Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007.

That takeover gave Iran unprecedented influence inside the Palestinian territories. Tehran intensified military cooperation with Hamas and Islamic Jihad through joint meetings, strategic coordination, and training programs. Fighters from Gaza were sent to Iran and to Hezbollah camps in Lebanon for military training under the supervision of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iran poured money into both groups and trained their operatives to manufacture and launch rockets and other weapons, significantly strengthening their military capabilities. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority and Fatah accused Tehran of fueling Palestinian division through its limitless support for Islamist factions.

Two Hamas sources, one inside Gaza and one abroad, told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hamas’ takeover of Gaza opened the door to an entirely new relationship with Tehran. According to the source outside Gaza, Iran provided extensive financial and military support while helping improve the movement’s combat expertise.

A source inside Gaza said Iran proposed establishing training facilities inside the enclave, but Hamas rejected the idea and instead limited cooperation to sending selected operatives abroad for training. Even so, the relationship substantially enhanced Hamas’ military capabilities.

Islamic Jihad’s relationship with Tehran was even older and stronger. A source from the movement said Iran played a decisive role in arming Palestinian factions during that period, supplying ready-made Grad rockets and Iranian-made Fajr missiles before local production capabilities were later developed using Iranian technical expertise.

Iran’s influence became so visible in Gaza that smaller armed groups also received funding, while some organizations openly embraced Shiite ideology or even called themselves “Palestinian Hezbollah.”

Although Hamas and Islamic Jihad insisted that their political decisions remained independent, Iranian influence became impossible to conceal. Neither movement directly answered questions about whether Tehran had deliberately encouraged Palestinian fragmentation. Instead, sources maintained that Iran’s primary objective was to strengthen the “resistance” against Israel and reinforce Gaza’s front line.

The Turning Point of the Syrian Revolution

The Syrian uprising against President Bashar al-Assad in 2011 exposed the fragility of the Hamas-Iran alliance. Hamas sided against Assad and left Damascus in 2012, enraging Tehran. Iran sharply reduced its financial support to the movement, a fact later acknowledged publicly by Hamas political leader Khaled Meshaal.

Meshaal admitted that Hamas’ dispute with Assad severely damaged ties with Iran and that Tehran was no longer the movement’s primary financial backer. Iran had expected Hamas to support Assad during the uprising, and Hamas’s refusal cost the group both its Syrian base and substantial Iranian funding.

Still, Tehran did not abandon its efforts. Instead, it tried to cultivate influence within Hamas itself. Sources said Iran shifted toward providing limited support directly to Hamas’ armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, in an apparent attempt to create tension with the movement’s political leadership.

At minimum, Iran succeeded in deepening internal debates within Hamas over regional alliances and political loyalties. The period proved difficult for both sides, and repeated attempts at reconciliation angered Hamas’s Sunni support base because of Iran’s growing regional role.

Abu Marzouk Debunks Iran’s Claims

As Hezbollah worked behind the scenes to repair relations, a leaked phone call revealed unprecedented criticism from within Hamas itself. In January 2012, Asharq Al-Awsat obtained and published a recording of Mousa Abu Marzouk, then deputy head of Hamas’s political bureau, sharply attacking Iran and denying Iranian claims that it had significantly supported Palestinian resistance since 2009.

In the recording, Abu Marzouk criticized Tehran’s regional policies, including its role in Yemen, and described Iranian diplomacy as manipulative. He also claimed Iran conditioned its support on Hamas helping improve Tehran’s relations with countries such as Sudan, describing that as part of Iran’s pressure tactics. He accused Iranian officials of exaggerating their support, saying: “Every ship they lose, they claim was heading to Gaza. A ship was seized in Nigeria and they said it was for us. I told them: apparently every intercepted ship in the world belongs to us.”

A Hamas source abroad told Asharq Al-Awsat that the leaked recording infuriated Iran and forced Hamas leaders to provide explanations to Tehran during an already dangerous turning point in the relationship. The crisis was eventually contained, but it exposed the deep mistrust underlying the alliance.

Building the Axis and the “Unity of Fronts”

Within months of that incident, efforts to restore ties resumed. Relations steadily improved as Hamas’ Gaza leadership tightened its grip over the movement’s political bureau elected in 2017, headed by Ismail Haniyeh, with Yahya Sinwar leading in Gaza and the military wing gaining unprecedented influence.

A source said Iran had strong incentives to preserve the relationship with Hamas because it remained “the largest Sunni Islamist movement in Palestine, with broader reach and capabilities than any other faction.” The relationship, he noted, never completely broke down, and once Hamas’s military leadership gained prominence, ties deepened further in ways that served both sides’ interests.

Relations continued to improve as Hezbollah and Iranian officials worked to restore Hamas’ ties even with the Syrian regime, though reconciliation was never fully completed before Bashar al-Assad’s government collapsed.

Hamas regained Iranian backing, and Tehran consolidated a regional axis in which the movement became a central pillar. Iran also promoted the idea of the “unity of fronts,” convincing its allies that all arenas confronting Israel were interconnected. That appears to have helped persuade Sinwar that Tehran would stand firmly behind Hamas after the October 7 attack, something that did not happen.

Iran, which denied prior knowledge of the attack, chose not to intervene directly, raising serious doubts about the cohesion of the so-called “axis,” the credibility of the “unity of fronts,” and the true extent of coordination among its members.

Even Palestinian Islamic Jihad, despite receiving substantial Iranian support alongside Hamas, reportedly had no prior knowledge of the attack. The movement was generally viewed as more closely aligned with Tehran, or at least more willing to accommodate Iranian political priorities.

The October 7 Turning Point

Islamic Jihad was not immune to Iranian demands that went beyond support for “the resistance.” In 2015, the two sides entered a serious but short-lived crisis over Yemen after the Palestinian movement refused to issue a statement backing the Houthis and their seizure of large parts of the country, including the capital, Sanaa.

Iran responded by cutting support to Islamic Jihad, much as it had previously done with Hamas, and redirected funding to the Sabireen Movement, a splinter faction formed by former Islamic Jihad figures with Iranian backing.

A source from Islamic Jihad told Asharq Al-Awsat that the sharp decline in Iranian support marked one of the most difficult periods the movement had ever faced.

Ultimately, Iran could not escape paying a price itself. It found itself pulled into confrontation with the United States and Israel after wars had already engulfed Hamas and Hezbollah. Those cascading conflicts were set in motion by the October 7 attack, which reshaped not only Iran’s regional axis but the broader Middle East.

The War’s Endgame

The war is still ongoing, and it remains unclear whether Iran will eventually abandon Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and the Houthis to protect itself. Tehran continues to assure the Palestinian factions that support will continue, although that support has slowed in recent months because of the war, regional instability, and intensified Israeli and American efforts targeting Iranian financial and logistical networks.

Israel has assassinated several Iranian officials responsible for managing ties with Palestinian factions, while Washington has increasingly demanded that Tehran halt support for its regional proxies.

The Palestinian Authority Cuts the Final Thread

Throughout the war, Hamas and Islamic Jihad publicly sided with Iran, signaling their desire to preserve the relationship, though it remained unclear how much control they truly had over that decision, or what the alliance’s future might look like.

The Palestinian Authority, however, appears to have decisively severed what Arabs often call the “Muawiya thread,” the final strand holding a relationship together.

During the Gaza war, the Authority not only attacked Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, for praising Hamas’s October 7 operation — accusing him of sacrificing Palestinian lives and land to serve Iran’s agenda — but also said Hamas was serving Iranian interests rather than Palestinian national ones.

At the same time, the Palestinian Authority refrained from condemning the joint American-Israeli strikes on Iran while later condemning Iranian attacks on Arab countries.

The war pushed the Authority more firmly into alignment with the so-called “moderate Arab axis” in opposition to the Iranian-led camp, abandoning much of the ambiguity that had long characterized its political posture.

A well-informed source told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Palestinian Authority had not changed its position so much as clarified it. “Its stance is not new,” the source said, “but it is now more explicit. The Authority is strengthening its place within the moderate camp against the Iranian axis.”

The Palestinian Authority believes everything changed after October 7. But it also believes the wars unleashed by the attack will ultimately vindicate its own political strategy while weakening Iran and its regional allies.



Iran Eyes Limited US Deal to Relieve Economic Strain and Buy Time

 A drone view shows vessels at the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from Musandam, Oman, June 1, 2026. (Reuters)
A drone view shows vessels at the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from Musandam, Oman, June 1, 2026. (Reuters)
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Iran Eyes Limited US Deal to Relieve Economic Strain and Buy Time

 A drone view shows vessels at the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from Musandam, Oman, June 1, 2026. (Reuters)
A drone view shows vessels at the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from Musandam, Oman, June 1, 2026. (Reuters)

Iran is pushing for a limited interim agreement with the United States in a bid to ease mounting economic pressure and stabilize the situation at home, while avoiding major concessions on its nuclear program, according to sources and analysts.

The approach reflects a familiar playbook for the Iranian regime: absorb pressure, avoid irreversible compromises and keep negotiations alive without shifting core positions, three Iranian sources close to decision-makers said, according to Reuters.

But the latest push is also driven by more immediate concerns. Officials see a narrow deal as a way to buy time, unlock financial relief and contain rising domestic risks over a deteriorating economy without addressing the most contentious issues.

The diplomatic maneuvering follows weeks of escalation after US-Israeli strikes in late February spiraled into a broader regional conflict. Iranian attacks across the Gulf heightened fears over the security of the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for roughly a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies.

Three months on, and ‌despite a fragile ‌ceasefire in early April, the conflict has hardened into a stalemate. A US blockade on ‌Iranian ⁠ports and Tehran's ⁠grip on the Strait have sustained mutual pressure, driving up economic costs while leaving the risk of renewed fighting unresolved.

Against that backdrop, both sides have lowered expectations of a comprehensive settlement. Instead, they are exploring what officials describe as a temporary memorandum — effectively an interim deal — aimed at preventing a return to open conflict, while deferring core disputes over Iran's nuclear activities.

TEHRAN SEEKS BREATHING SPACE

For Tehran, such an arrangement is primarily a means of converting military and economic pressure into liquidity, breathing space and de-escalation, without curbing sensitive nuclear work.

Iran is seeking an end to hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon, access to billions of dollars in oil revenues, waivers on crude ⁠exports, a lifting of the US port blockade and continued leverage over the strait, ‌while postponing decisions on the most contentious issues.

The framework would center on temporary ‌easing and phased access through the waterway, leaving unresolved questions over enrichment capacity and Tehran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium, including material enriched to ‌60%.

Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, said Tehran's calculation is shaped less by battlefield ‌risks than by economic pressure and uncertainty.

"Iranian leaders understand that time is not necessarily on their side... their calculation appears to be that dialogue, even limited dialogue, is preferable to entering an open-ended period of economic attrition and uncertainty that could gradually weaken its ability to govern at home and project influence abroad."

TEHRAN FEARS PROTEST REVIVAL

Much rests on the success of negotiations. President Donald Trump is under pressure to reopen ‌the Strait of Hormuz and curb US fuel prices, while fending off criticism from Iran hawks in his own Republican party over any concessions to Tehran.

Iran's leadership also ⁠faces domestic pressures. Years of sanctions, ⁠economic mismanagement and conflict have fueled inflation, currency depreciation and a sharp decline in living standards.

Short-term financial inflows are therefore crucial to Tehran's interest in a preliminary deal, the sources said, as they could keep the economy running, ease immediate pressures and stave off a resurgence of unrest.

In January, Iran's clerical establishment and the Revolutionary Guards killed thousands while suppressing nationwide protests sparked by economic grievances.

Hamidreza Azizi, a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, said a memorandum could also address mounting concerns about the long-term resilience of the system.

"By ending the conflict, reducing economic strain, removing US military pressure around Iran, and creating space for reconstruction, an MoU could help prevent a gradual erosion of state capacity and governance," Azizi said.

STRAIT REMAINS IRAN'S LEVERAGE

The Strait of Hormuz remains central to Iran's leverage. Within the clerical establishment, it is increasingly seen less as a bargaining chip than as a durable strategic asset.

Any arrangement that restores shipping while preserving that leverage would leave Tehran's influence over the chokepoint intact, the sources said, allowing flows to resume while stability remains tied to political negotiation.

One source said a limited deal would effectively restore prewar conditions without forcing Iran to yield to Washington’s demands, adding: "With the start of the war, Trump gave Iran the gift of control over the Strait."


In Finland, Radioactive Spent Nuclear Fuel Soon to Be Buried Underground

Picture taken on May 18, 2026 shows the "hot cell" fuel handling chamber at the encapsulation plant of nuclear waste management company Posiva at the site of what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel at the Onkalo nuclear repository in Eurajoki, southwestern Finland. (AFP)
Picture taken on May 18, 2026 shows the "hot cell" fuel handling chamber at the encapsulation plant of nuclear waste management company Posiva at the site of what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel at the Onkalo nuclear repository in Eurajoki, southwestern Finland. (AFP)
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In Finland, Radioactive Spent Nuclear Fuel Soon to Be Buried Underground

Picture taken on May 18, 2026 shows the "hot cell" fuel handling chamber at the encapsulation plant of nuclear waste management company Posiva at the site of what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel at the Onkalo nuclear repository in Eurajoki, southwestern Finland. (AFP)
Picture taken on May 18, 2026 shows the "hot cell" fuel handling chamber at the encapsulation plant of nuclear waste management company Posiva at the site of what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel at the Onkalo nuclear repository in Eurajoki, southwestern Finland. (AFP)

The elevator display reads "433", the number of meters below ground. The doors slide open, revealing the entrance to what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel.

Blasted into 1.9 billion-year-old stable bedrock in Eurajoki, southwest Finland, the geological repository for spent nuclear waste -- dubbed Onkalo which means "cave" in Finnish -- is nearly ready to start operations.

Countries have been wrestling with what to do with dangerous nuclear by-products since the first plants were built in the 1950s. Currently, most of it is in temporary storage.

Final repositories are being built in other countries, including neighboring Sweden and France, but Finland is expected to be first to open an underground storage solution.

The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is due to give approval in its final assessment in June, after which an operating license can be granted.

"We hope we can start the operation either at the end of this year or most probably at the beginning of next year," said Philippe Bordarier, chief executive of nuclear operator Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO).

His voice echoed in the damp tunnel where the spent nuclear fuel will be buried in holes drilled into the bedrock, where it will remain harmfully radioactive for thousands of years.

The waste currently cooled in water pools at an interim storage site, at the nearby Olkiluoto power plant next to the Baltic Sea, will be first to be deposited, Bordarier said.

With space for 6,500 tons of uranium, Onkalo is aimed at providing permanent storage for spent fuel from Finland's five nuclear reactors -- three of them located in Olkiluoto.

Nuclear waste management company Posiva began building the site in 2004, with the cost now estimated at one billion euros ($1.16 billion).

- 'Forever'-

Spent fuel is planned to be deposited in Onkalo's massive network of tunnels for 100 years, but operations may be extended if new nuclear reactors are built.

Subsequently, the vault will be sealed to provide safe storage for at least 100,000 years.

"Basically, it needs to be safe forever," noted Lauri Parviainen, a Posiva chemist who showed reporters around the facilities.

The fuel will be highly radioactive for "tens of thousands of years", he said.

After 100,000 years, they will be "about the same level as the uranium ore of which the fuel is made."

Above ground, the spent nuclear fuel will be encapsulated in highly corrosion-resistant copper canisters.

The canisters will be lowered into holes drilled in the tunnels, before the holes are filled with bentonite clay to seal them, Parviainen explained.

"So if the bentonite stays in place, we are safe," he said.

Once each 300-meter-long disposal tunnel is filled, it will be sealed with a steel-reinforced concrete plug.

- Long-term risks -

Jarkko Kyllonen, an expert on nuclear safety at Finland's nuclear regulator STUK, has assessed risk scenarios for the Onkalo project stretching up to a million years into the future.

Considering the "hazard potential of the waste, the first 10,000 years are very important for keeping the capsules intact," he told AFP.

The main long-term risks are corrosion of the copper canisters or earthquakes during future ice ages, which could potentially damage the capsules and cause radioactive fuel to leak, Kyllonen said.

But the results of various risk assessments conducted over the years have been "positive".

While France's plans for a similar underground nuclear tomb have met with strong opposition, Onkalo has received broader backing in Finland.

There was some opposition locally when the plans were first introduced in the 1970s, but "people have gotten used to it, and they trust the assessments made by STUK", Matti Kojo, social sciences professor at Lut University, told AFP.

"At the moment, support for nuclear power is at a historically high level in Finland," he noted.

The Finnish Association for Nature Conservation remains critical of the project, however, insisting that nuclear waste poses a long-term, serious risk.

"No one can guarantee the safety of Onkalo for thousands of years," director Tapani Veistola told AFP in an e-mail.

- Finland's nuclear push -

Under Finnish law, nuclear waste produced in Finland has to be deposited in the country, Climate and Environment Minister Sari Multala told AFP.

"Before the legal change in 1994, the spent nuclear fuel was exported to, for example, Russia," she said.

Increasing nuclear power in Finland has been a priority for the right-wing government, and the country is considering building so-called small modular reactors (SMRs).

How the spent nuclear fuel from future SMRs would be managed "has not been decided yet," Multala said. An assessment should be completed by March next year, she added.


Iran's Strongest Card in Nuclear Talks: Its Highly Enriched Uranium

Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
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Iran's Strongest Card in Nuclear Talks: Its Highly Enriched Uranium

Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)

Iran and the United States are in discussions to extend ‌their ceasefire so as to start negotiations on issues including Tehran's nuclear program, where Washington insists Iran must not be able to make a nuclear weapon.

While much of Iran's uranium enrichment infrastructure was destroyed or badly damaged when Israel and the US bombed it in June, a large part of the highly enriched uranium it amassed is thought to have survived. That is the biggest US concern ahead of nuclear talks.

On Friday Trump said in a social media post that Iran must agree that the enriched uranium buried underground after earlier US strikes be "unearthed" and destroyed in coordination with Iran and the UN nuclear watchdog.

WHAT IS HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM?

One of two fissile materials, along with plutonium, with which one can make the core of a nuclear bomb. While plutonium is usually extracted from the spent fuel of a nuclear reactor, requiring large and highly visible infrastructure, uranium can be enriched using centrifuges that have a much smaller footprint. Two of Iran's three enrichment sites that are known to have been operating when Israel and the ‌US attacked in ‌June were underground. The above-ground one was clearly destroyed.

Uranium is highly enriched when it ‌has ⁠reached 20% purity, and ⁠weapons-grade as of around 90%.

Modern reactors generally use fuel enriched to up to 5%, but some use fuel enriched to higher levels. The ones that power US nuclear submarines reportedly use fuel enriched beyond 90%.

HOW MUCH DOES IRAN HAVE?

Iran has not informed the UN nuclear watchdog of the fate of its enriched uranium since the June attacks or let its inspectors return to the sites where it was stored.

The International Atomic Energy Agency estimates Iran had these amounts when the first Israeli bombs fell on June 13:

- 440.9 kg enriched to up to 60%

- 184.1 kg enriched to up to 20%

- 6,024.4 kg enriched to ⁠up to 5%

- 2,391.1 kg enriched to up to 2%

According to an IAEA yardstick, ‌the amount at 60% is enough, if enriched further, for 10 nuclear weapons. ‌The 20% stock would be enough for one and the 5% could produce 12. How much has survived is unclear. IAEA chief ‌Rafael Grossi has said his agency believes "a bit more than 200 kg" of the 60% stock is stored at a ‌tunnel complex in Isfahan that appears to have been largely unharmed by the June attacks. Some was also at the Natanz nuclear site, he said.

WHY THE CONCERN? US concern has been focused on the 60% material because that would be easiest and thus quickest to make a bomb with. Washington wants it gone. Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons.

As the enrichment level of uranium increases, it becomes exponentially easier to enrich ‌further. Getting from 60% to 90% is easier than getting from unenriched to 5%.

President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of a nuclear deal between Iran and ⁠major powers that kept Tehran ⁠at a far greater distance from being able to produce an atom bomb than it is at now. The US withdrawal in 2018 caused the deal to unravel, and Iran quickly expanded its atomic program.

Under that 2015 deal, Iran did not enrich beyond 3.67%.

Even at 90%, however, it takes more steps to produce the core of a bomb. When it is enriched, the uranium is in gas form. It must then be turned into metal for use in a weapon.

CAN YOU MOVE IT?

Yes. Iran moved enriched material between sites under IAEA monitoring before the June attacks.

Under the 2015 deal and a precursor to it, Iran's stocks of uranium enriched to up to 20% were diluted or turned into reactor fuel plates and shipped out of the country.

Moving nuclear material like highly enriched uranium internationally is a sensitive but relatively routine procedure.

"It requires some precaution but it can be moved," Grossi told PBS in March when asked about the 60% material.

WILL IRAN GIVE IT UP? Iran's supreme leader has issued a directive that the 60% material should not be sent abroad, two senior Iranian sources said last week.

Iranian sources say Tehran might agree to send half of it to a third country, receiving uranium enriched to 5% in return, and dilute the other half inside Iran.