With Israel preparing for possible military strikes against Iran, and Washington showing restraint ahead of the US midterm elections, questions are mounting over whether the region is experiencing a temporary pause dictated by electoral calculations or a final opportunity for a political settlement.
While one strategic affairs expert expects a major confrontation by the end of November, two others downplay the influence of election results on decisions by US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, arguing that strategic considerations will ultimately prove decisive.
The question in Washington and Tel Aviv is no longer simply whether war with Iran will resume, but when, on what scale and with what objectives.
Reports that Israel prepared a large-scale bombing campaign against Iranian targets before postponing it following Trump's objections have revived a sensitive question: Is the war awaiting the conclusion of the US and Israeli elections, or does its postponement reflect deeper disagreements over the merits of escalation?
These questions are gaining urgency as elections approach in both countries. Assessments by three American experts reveal differing expectations about military developments and political calculations, but converge on one central point: Election results alone will not determine the outcome of the confrontation.
A War Awaiting Its Moment
The Financial Times reported Wednesday that Netanyahu had instructed the Israeli military to prepare a large-scale bombing campaign against Iran, initially scheduled for October 10, before the operation was canceled after Trump objected to resuming military action ahead of the US elections.
According to the newspaper, the plan included strikes on nuclear facilities, civilian infrastructure and sites associated with the Iranian regime.
Israeli officials also presented US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth with a list of targets based on new intelligence during his unannounced visit to Israel on Monday.
Axios had previously reported that the Pentagon requested the completion of preparations for extensive military operations without setting a date for their execution.
The outlet cited officials as saying that Hegseth and US military commanders in the region were pushing for renewed strikes, while most of Trump's advisers favored continuing sanctions and economic pressure.
These developments suggest that the disagreement concerns the timing and necessity of military force more than the ultimate objectives.
Washington wants to secure Iranian concessions on Tehran's nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz, while Israel fears that continued negotiations could allow Iran to rebuild its military capabilities.
Scenarios for Escalation
Offering a more pessimistic assessment, Farzin Nadimi, an expert on Iranian military and security affairs at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told Asharq Al-Awsat that all indicators point toward a major military confrontation involving the United States, Israel and Iran, and potentially other regional countries, by the end of November.
Nadimi did not rule out the possibility that intensive diplomatic efforts could prevent escalation, but considered the chances of success extremely slim.
He outlined a scenario beginning with a renewed wave of strikes targeting senior leaders and command-and-control centers, followed by attacks on nuclear and missile facilities and air defense systems, eventually escalating into a comprehensive bombing campaign against Iranian military and security installations.
Whether the campaign would expand to infrastructure, oil and gas facilities, and petrochemical plants would depend on the nature of Iran's response, he said.
Nadimi warned that Tehran might make a more determined effort this time to sink US warships and shoot down manned aircraft, while also deploying longer-range, medium-range ballistic missiles.
He raised an even more dangerous possibility: a ground incursion into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia from Iraq, carried out by Shiite factions linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces.
This remains a hypothetical scenario proposed by the researcher, rather than confirmed evidence of an Iranian plan to carry out such an operation.
At the same time, Nadimi ruled out a US ground invasion of Iran, suggesting that the next confrontation would more closely resemble the previous 39-day war.
Washington's Calculations
Brian Katulis, a foreign policy and regional affairs expert at the Middle East Institute, downplayed the significance of election results in determining the course of the war.
He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the US midterm elections were unlikely to substantially affect decisions by the Trump administration or Israel regarding Iran, because the threats posed by Tehran would remain the primary factor shaping their next steps.
Katulis noted that Trump is experiencing his weakest political position across his two presidential terms, amid declining approval ratings and the possibility that Republicans could lose seats in Congress.
In his view, however, that does not mean the election results will constrain the president's ability to take military action, given the executive branch's broad national security powers relative to those of Congress.
Katulis identified two more consequential factors in the administration's calculations.
The first is a shortage of certain types of ammunition and military equipment following the previous phase of the war, which has left US forces more exposed in the region and elsewhere. The second is the economic cost of another confrontation.
These concerns are particularly significant amid continuing tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and global energy markets, as renewed operations against Iranian facilities could cause further disruptions to oil supplies.
As for Israel, Katulis argued that disagreements among political leaders tend to diminish when the perceived Iranian threat is at issue.
Beyond the Ballot Box
Michael Rubin, director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum, went further, dismissing the possibility that the elections would fundamentally change the political dynamics governing decisions about war.
He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Trump would remain the ultimate decision-maker regardless of developments in Congress.
Indeed, Rubin suggested that Trump might feel greater freedom to make military decisions after the elections, given that he would not face another presidential election.
In Israel, Rubin argued that widespread opposition to Netanyahu does not necessarily translate into comparable divisions over Iran.
In his assessment, there is broad agreement among Israeli candidates on both the right and left regarding the nature of the threats posed by Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah.
Rubin also pointed to a striking possibility: Another Israeli prime minister might be able to act more effectively than Netanyahu because some objections from members of Congress, diplomats and foreign ministers are directed more at Netanyahu personally than at Israel itself.
Consequently, Netanyahu's electoral defeat would not necessarily reduce the likelihood of confrontation, just as Republican losses in Congress would not automatically give lawmakers the power to prevent Trump from resuming military operations.
Ultimately, the elections appear more likely to influence the timing of a confrontation than to determine its objectives.
Trump's decision to postpone military action does not mean the military option has been abandoned, just as Israel's preparations do not mean that a final decision to go to war has been made.
Negotiations remain the alternative path, despite continuing disagreements over nuclear concessions and the conditions for ending the war.
The conclusion of the elections could remove one reason for postponement, but it would not eliminate the military, economic and political obstacles.
The central question remains whether Washington will use its military preparations to secure a negotiated settlement or view the failure of diplomacy as justification for resuming the war.
In either case, Trump's decision, rather than election results alone, will be the most influential factor in determining the direction of the crisis.
