‘Hezbollah’ Develops Iranian Drone to Use in Qalamoun Outskirts

A Lebanese ‘Hezbollah’ militant carries his weapon as he stands in Khashaat, in the Qalamoun region on May 15, 2015. (Reuters)
A Lebanese ‘Hezbollah’ militant carries his weapon as he stands in Khashaat, in the Qalamoun region on May 15, 2015. (Reuters)
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‘Hezbollah’ Develops Iranian Drone to Use in Qalamoun Outskirts

A Lebanese ‘Hezbollah’ militant carries his weapon as he stands in Khashaat, in the Qalamoun region on May 15, 2015. (Reuters)
A Lebanese ‘Hezbollah’ militant carries his weapon as he stands in Khashaat, in the Qalamoun region on May 15, 2015. (Reuters)

Photographs released by Lebanon’s “Hezbollah” war media showed a remarkable development in its arsenal with new drones capable of carrying missiles. These drones appear to be a development of Iranian warplanes of the same kind – but bigger – that are being used in Syria.

“Hezbollah” used the drone for the first time in the border region of al-Qalamoun to target ISIS terrorists, but did not disclose further details about them. It only said that they were being employed to strike ISIS positions and fortifications in Qalamoun, near the border with Lebanon.

These photographs reflect a development in the military industries of “Hezbollah”.

The armed group originally announced that it was manufacturing drones back in October 2012 when Israeli warplanes shot down a drone that the party later claimed as its own.

Hisham Jaber, head of the Middle East Center for Studies and Political Research, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the drone revealed on Monday is “small and capable of carrying up to six medium-sized munitions.”

He added that “they are controlled from close range and can fly at an altitude of 200-300 meters for an hour.” Such warplanes are used to strike tactical targets, he continued.

Iran uses such drones in Syria and they were first revealed when they flew beside US military bases in al-Tanf at the Syrian-Jordanian-Iraqi border triangle. The US warplanes shot down one such drone two months ago, making it more probable that the drones are manufactured by Iran.

“But these drones are smaller than the Iranian ones in Tanf. It is easy to deliver small parts of the drone to Syria where they are manufactured and armed by ‘Hezbollah’ technicians,” Jaber stated.



Iran’s Allies Constrained in Confronting Israel

Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
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Iran’s Allies Constrained in Confronting Israel

Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)

As war rages between Tehran and Tel Aviv, Iran may soon need to call upon its network of regional allies - groups it has armed and funded for years. But now, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” looks strained, fragmented, and far from ready.

On June 19, 2025, General Mohammad Reza Naqdi of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard urged Iran’s regional allies to take action to relieve mounting pressure on Tehran. At that point, Iran was entering its second week of heavy Israeli bombardment. Strategically, an Israeli strike on the Iranian capital once seemed unthinkable, but the regional terrain has since shifted. Iran’s supply routes are now disrupted, and its key proxy groups have either been neutralized or weakened.

According to The Times of Israel, Israel launched this war after nearly two years of systematically targeting Iran’s allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen. The 2023 Hamas attack on Israel had triggered a chain of retaliation that left many of Iran’s partners damaged or demoralized. With the Assad regime collapsed in Syria, Hezbollah weakened in Lebanon, and Hamas reduced to guerrilla tactics in Gaza, few proxies appear ready for a new confrontation.

In Gaza, Hamas has been forced into small ambushes and urban warfare, its rocket arsenal depleted and many senior leaders killed. Iranian communication channels with the group have also eroded. Israel’s targeted assassination of Mohammad Saeed Izadi, a key Quds Force commander linked to Palestinian factions, further strained coordination. For now, Hamas can offer little more than rhetorical support.

In Iraq, US forces have fortified their embassy in Baghdad, while withdrawing from bases such as Ain al-Asad. Iraqi factions loyal to Iran are posturing, threatening US interests should America enter the war. But most Iraqi leaders remain reluctant to drag the country into open conflict, knowing the consequences could be disastrous. Iran, too, is cautious about sacrificing Iraq’s political and economic value.

Hezbollah, reeling from the death of its longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah in a 2024 Israeli strike, is in disarray. Its military capacity and leadership have been significantly degraded. Though the party retains some strategic capabilities, domestic and regional pressures have so far restrained it from opening a major front.

In Yemen, the Houthis have emerged as Iran’s last viable card. They now play a key role in smuggling weapons and expanding Iranian influence into Africa. Should the US directly join Israel’s war, Tehran may finally authorize the Houthis to use their stockpile of ballistic missiles, signaling a decisive and potentially catastrophic new phase of the conflict.